Bryan v. Lark Hotels, LLC

Filing 21

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ENDORSED ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER"For the foregoing reasons, defendants motion to set aside the default (Docket No. 10) is ALLOWED and plaintiffs motion for entry of default judgment (Docket No. 17) is DENIED. So ordered."(Caruso, Stephanie)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
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DAWN BRYAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
LARK HOTELS, LLC,
Defendant.

Civil Action No.
17-10857-NMG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This case arises from a personal injury that plaintiff Dawn
Bryan (“plaintiff” or “Bryan”) allegedly suffered after a fall
in a hotel managed by defendant, Lark Hotels, LLC (“Lark” or
“defendant”).

Plaintiff contends that Lark was negligent in its

operation of the hotel because the bed frame in her hotel room
had unreasonably sharp edges that caused an injury to her right
leg.

Pending before this Court are defendant’s emergency motion

to set aside the default (Docket No. 10) and plaintiff’s motion
for entry of default judgment (Docket No. 17).

For the

following reasons, defendant’s motion will be allowed and
plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
I.

Background
Plaintiff filed her complaint on May 15, 2017 and Lark was

served shortly thereafter.

No responsive pleading was filed
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before it was due on June 21, 2017.

On July 6, 2017, plaintiff

requested and was granted entry of default.

On July 28, 2017,

defendant filed an emergency motion to set aside the default
which plaintiff opposed on August 4, 2017.

On August 23, 2017,

plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default judgment which was
timely opposed by defendant.
II. Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Entry of Default Judgment
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), entry of default can be
set aside for “good cause”.

That standard is a “liberal one”

based upon the policy justification that actions should be
resolved on their merits. Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 76 (1st
Cir. 1989).

The “good cause” standard is not applied

formulaically and instead turns on the unique facts of each
case. McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Rest., 83 F.3d 498, 503 (1st Cir.
1996).

In determining whether entry of default should be set

aside, a district court should consider:
(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether setting it
aside would prejudice the adversary; (3) whether a
meritorious defense is presented; (4) the nature of the
defendant’s explanation for the default; (5) the good faith
of the parties; (6) the amount of money involved; and (7)
the timing of the motion.
Id. (citing Coon, 867 F.2d at 76).
In its motion to set aside the default, Lark suggests that
its conduct did not willfully invite a default and that it has
acted diligently since receiving the subject notice.
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Lark

contends that plaintiff will suffer no prejudice by the removal
of default and that it has meritorious defenses to this action.
Plaintiff rejoins that defendant’s justification is vague and
fails to demonstrate good cause.
Although plaintiff correctly notes that Lark’s rationale
for failing to answer or file a responsive pleading is
equivocal, it does not ring of bad faith or willfulness. Contra
McKinnon, 83 F.3d at 503 (affirming the district court’s
determination that defendants defaulted willfully because they
were aware of the pending legal problem but hoped that it “would
all go away”).

Here, Lark alludes to the failure of an agent of

its insurer, Custard Insurance Adjusters, to forward the summons
and complaint pursuant to her normal practice and procedure.
While that explanation is disconcerting, it does not suggest
that Lark’s employees or agents acted in bad faith.
Furthermore, Lark sought to remove the default soon after it was
entered.
The prejudice factor similarly cuts against Ms. Bryan.

If

entry of default is set aside, plaintiff’s recovery, if she
becomes entitled to one, will have been delayed.

In the context

of Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), however, “delay in and of itself does
not constitute prejudice”. KPS & Assocs. v. Designs by FMC,
Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2003).

Furthermore, Lark has

presented a potentially meritorious defense against plaintiff’s
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claim of negligence.

Lark contends that plaintiff will be

unable to show that Lark breached any duty owed to her because
the bedframe was not dangerously sharp and plaintiff fell on her
own accord.

Establishing a meritorious defense is “not a

particularly arduous task” and a party’s contentions “need only
suggest the existence of facts which, if proven at trial, would
constitute a cognizable defense”.

Indigo Am., Inc. v. Big

Impressions LLC, 597 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Coon, 867
F.2d at 77).

Defendant has met that low bar here.

Taken together, those factors countenance in favor of
allowing defendant the opportunity to defend the case on its
merits.

The Court concludes that there is good cause to allow

defendant’s motion to set aside the default.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to set
aside the default (Docket No. 10) is ALLOWED and plaintiff’s
motion for entry of default judgment (Docket No. 17) is DENIED.

So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton______
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated November 7, 2017

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