Logie v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority et al

Filing 42

Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: ORDER entered. " For the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation, I dismiss the other claims as well. The action is DISMISSED. " re 35 Magistrate Judge M. Page Kelley: ORDER entered. REPORT AN D RECOMMENDATIONS re 10 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Scott C. Andrews, Norman W. Michaud Recommendation: "For the above reasons, the court RECOMMENDS that the MBTA defendants' motion to dismiss be G RANTED in part and DENIED in part. All claims against defendants Andrews and Michaud in their official and individual capacities should be dismissed. All claims against the MBTA, except for plaintiff's claim for violation of Title II of the ADA should be dismissed." (Coppola, Katelyn) Modified on 8/3/2018 due to clerical error regarding related docket entry (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/3/2018: # 1 Report and Recommendations) (Coppola, Katelyn).

Case 1:17-cv-10949-PBS Document 42 Filed 08/02/18 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUETTS
______________________________
)
)
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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MASSACHUSETTS BAY
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TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
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BOSTON CARMEN’S UNION,
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LOCAL 589, NORMAN W. MICHAUD, )
SCOTT C. ANDREWS,
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JOHN J. LEE, and LARRY KELLY, )
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Defendants.
)
______________________________)
ROSALIND LOGIE,

Civil No. 17-10949-PBS

ORDER RE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
REGARDING MBTA DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
August 2, 2018
Saris, U.S.D.J.
The MBTA defendants have objected to the Report and
Recommendation, which recommended that the Court deny the motion
to dismiss the claim of employment discrimination under Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132. See Docket No. 35. The MBTA argues that employment
discrimination claims must be brought under Title I. The First
Circuit has not yet ruled on the subject. See Currie v. Group
Ins. Comm’n, 290 F.3d 1, 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). However, most
circuits have held that employment claims against public

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Case 1:17-cv-10949-PBS Document 42 Filed 08/02/18 Page 2 of 3

entities must be brought under Title I. See Taylor v. City of
Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Unlike Title I
of the ADA, Title II does not create a cause of action for
employment discrimination.”); Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty.,
Md., 789 F.3d 407, 421 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Based on the text and
structure of Title II and the ADA, we agree with the majority of
circuits to have considered the question that Title II
unambiguously does not provide a vehicle for public employment
discrimination claims.”); Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d
619, 628 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Title II is clearly inapplicable to
employment discrimination because Title I specifically,
comprehensively, and exclusively addresses disability
discrimination in employment.”); Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State &
Local Ret. Syst., 707 F. 3d 144, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding
that the ADA “unambiguously limits employment discrimination
claims to Title I”); Elwell v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Okla., 693 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2012)
(“[E]ach title does important and independent work -- work that
would be diminished, duplicated, even rendered superfluous were
we to read Title II as covering employment discrimination.”);
Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir.
1999) (“[W]hen viewed as a whole, the text, context and
structure of the ADA show unambiguously that Congress did not
intend for Title II to apply to employment.”); see also
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Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 118-19 (3d
Cir. 1998) (discussing Title III and holding that “it is evident
that Congress sought to regulate disability discrimination in
the area of employment exclusively through Title I”); Parker v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014-15 (6th Cir. 1997)
(discussing Title III and holding that “the statutory framework
of the ADA expressly limits discrimination in employment
practices to Title I of the ADA”). But see Bledsoe v. Palm Beach
Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 822 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“[E]mployment coverage is clear from the language
and structure of Title II.”). I agree with the majority of the
circuits and dismiss the claim of employment discrimination
brought under Title II.
For the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation, I
dismiss the other claims as well. The action is DISMISSED.

/s/ Patti B. Saris
HON. PATTI B. SARIS
Chief, U.S. District Judge

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