PREDELLA v. Braintree et al

Filing 93

Judge Indira Talwani: For the reasons set forth in the attached ORDER, Defendant Grace's Motion to Dismiss 67 is ALLOWED, and Defendant O'Brien's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Predella's Retaliation Claim 70 is DENIED. (MacDonald, Gail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
ALAN PREDELLA, DANIEL
MCDONNELL, and ALL THOSE
SIMILARLY SITUATED,

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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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TOWN OF BRAINTREE, BRAINTREE
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FIREFIGHTERS IAFF, LOCAL 1920,
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JOSEPH SULLIVAN, JAMES O’BRIEN, *
THOMAS GRACE, and WILLIAM CASH, *
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Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 17-cv-11150-IT

ORDER
September 14, 2018

TALWANI, D.J.
Defendants Thomas Grace and James O’Brien seek to dismiss Plaintiff Alan Predella’s
claims that Grace and O’Brien retaliated against Predella in violation of Massachusetts General
Laws chapter 151B, § 4(4). Because Predella’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim as to
O’Brien but not as to Grace, Grace’s Motion to Dismiss [#67] is ALLOWED and O’Brien’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Predella’s Retaliation Claim [#70] is DENIED.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint [#59] are relevant to

the challenged claims:
Defendant Town of Braintree is a municipality that employs Predella, O’Brien, and
Grace. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 7-8, 10. Predella is the Deputy Chief of the Braintree Fire
Department. Id. ¶¶ 10, 19. O’Brien, the Chief of the Braintree Fire Department, is Predella’s
superior, and Grace, a captain, is Predella’s subordinate. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Defendant Braintree

Firefights, IAFF Local 920 (“Local 920”) is certified and recognized as the exclusive
representative of Braintree Fire Department employees. Id. ¶ 4. Defendant William Cash is the
President of Local 920. Id. ¶ 9.
On June 30, 2016, Predella presented a letter to his human resources director informing
her that he intended to file a MCAD complaint against O’Brien and Grace. Id. ¶ 204. The letter
also recounted allegedly discriminatory acts by O’Brien from early 2016. Id. ¶ 205. On August
16, 2016, Predella filed his MCAD Complaint alleging age discrimination. Id. ¶ 209. O’Brien
and Grace were aware of Predella’s letter and the filing of his MCAD complaint. Id. ¶¶ 206, 209.
On October 20, 2016, O’Brien, Grace, and Cash “orchestrated the ‘rescission’” of
Pradella’s membership in Local 920, which was “made effective at a union meeting.” Id. ¶ 213.
The Town and Local 920, “by their agents, including Defendant O’Brien, Defendant Cash, and
Defendant Grace, also agreed to consider Plaintiff Predella ineligible to work outside paid
details, established under the collection agreement now in effect, because Defendant Local 920
rescinded his union membership.” Id. ¶ 214. They also agreed to consider him ineligible for
overtime. Id.
On or about July 12, 2017, while at work, Predella was transported to the hospital after
suffering difficulty breathing, an abnormally high heart rate, sweating, and trembling. Id. ¶ 219.
After Predella made a timely request for benefits under G.L. c. 41, § 111F, his request was
denied by O’Brien. Id. ¶¶ 220-223. O’Brien and other Chiefs have approved similar requests in
the past for § 111F benefits. Id. ¶ 222.
II.

STANDARD
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is properly

allowed when the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
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(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). For the purposes of this
motion, any well-pleaded, non-conclusory factual allegations are assumed true and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-81 (stating that conclusory
allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 581. The court will
then “determine whether the factual allegations are sufficient to support the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable.” Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting
Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015)).
III.

DISCUSSION
Under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B, § 4(4), no “person, employer, [or]

labor organization” may “discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because
. . . he has filed a complaint” covered by the statute. See also Noviello v. City of Boston, 398
F.3d 76, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2005). To demonstrate retaliation, a plaintiff must establish three prongs:
that (i) he undertook protected conduct, (ii) he suffered some materially adverse action, and (iii)
that the adverse action was casually linked to the protected activity. Dixon v. Int’l Bhd. of Police
Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 81-83 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying retaliation framework to both adverse
employment action as well as union retaliation). For the purposes of this motion, neither Grace
nor O’Brien dispute that Predella engaged in protected activity when he filed his letter with
human resources on June 30, 2016, and his MCAD Complaint on August 16, 2016. See Def.
Grace’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Grace Mem.”) at 3 [#68]; Def. O’Brien’s Mem. Law
Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“O’Brien Mem.”) (addressing only the second prong of the retaliation
framework) [#71]. Thus, this court moves directly to the second prong of the retaliation
framework.

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A. Retaliation Claim as to Thomas Grace
Predella alleges that after he filed his letter with human resources and his complaint with
MCAD, Grace: “orchestrat[ed]” with other Defendants “the expulsion of Plaintiff Predella from
Local 920,” see Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 213, 342, and “agree[d] to consider Plaintiff
Predella ineligible to work outside paid details, established under the collective bargaining
agreement now in effect, because Defendant Local 920 rescinded his union membership,” id.
¶¶ 214, 343.
Grace argues that these two allegations are conclusory and that Predella has not pled
sufficient facts to support his allegations. Although Predella charges that Grace “orchestrat[e]d”
his loss of union membership, Predella does not provide any allegations of what Grace
purportedly did. Grace Mem. at 4 [#68]. Similarly, although Predella alleges that Grace was
allegedly involved in his loss of paid detail and overtime, Predella does not allege facts to
support a finding that Grace, as Predella’s subordinate, had any involvement in their employer’s
actions. Id.
In response, Predella cites to passages in his Second Amended Complaint [#59] regarding
Grace’s alleged animus. Pl.’s Opp. at 13 [#76]. These allegations however, provide no facts as to
the allegedly retaliatory acts themselves. Predella does not offer any further, supporting
allegations in his complaint that would suggest that Grace in some way “orchestrat[ed]” the
union dismissing Predella or “agree[d]” to consider him ineligible for paid detail work. Thus,
Predella’s two allegations are simply conclusory statements and Predella has failed to allege
facts sufficient to support his retaliation claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).

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B. Retaliation Claim as to James O’Brien
Predella alleges that after he filed his letter with human resources and his complaint with
MCAD, O’Brien retaliated by: (1) declaring Predella ineligible for overtime and paid details; and
(2) denying his claim for M.G.L. c. 41, § 111F benefits. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 222-223.
O’Brien argues that he cannot be held responsible for Predella’s ineligibility for overtime
payments and paid details because the collective bargaining agreement, not O’Brien, controlled
whether Predella was eligible, and Predella does not plead that O’Brien had any role in drafting
the collective bargaining agreement. O’Brien Mem. at 9 [#71]. O’Brien argues further that
Predella has not pled sufficient facts to demonstrate that he was entitled to § 111F benefits;
therefore, he cannot argue that the denial of the benefits was an adverse employment action. Id.
Both arguments fail. O’Brien, as the Chief of the Braintree Fire Department, is Predella’s
superior officer, and had authority over with paid details and overtime. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7,
214. While Predella does not dispute that the collective bargaining agreement controls, he alleges
that O’Brien considered him ineligible despite the collective bargaining agreement. See id.
¶¶ 214-15. Moreover, he alleges that O’Brien had no legitimate basis to exclude Predella from
outside paid details, because, as a matter of law, Predella continued to be covered by the
collective bargaining agreement despite being expelled from Local 920. Id. ¶ 215.
O’Brien’s arguments regarding the § 111F benefits also miss the mark. O’Brien argues
that Predella has not stated sufficient allegations that the cause of his disability was work-related.
O’Brien Mem. at 10 [#71]. But Predella’s claim against O’Brien is not a claim for § 111F
benefits, but a retaliation claim asserting that when Predella sought § 111F benefits, O’Brien
denied the request despite approving similar requests previously. Id. ¶¶ 222. Predella alleges
further that this denial occurred after O’Brien was aware of his protected activity. Id. ¶¶ 206,
209. While Predella’s claim may ultimately fail if O’Brien denied similar claims, or if Predella’s
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claim is not similar to the claims that O’Brien approved, at this stage he has sufficiently plead a
retaliation claim under M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4).
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the above reasons, Defendant Grace’s Motion to Dismiss [#67] is

ALLOWED and Defendant O’Brien’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Predella’s Retaliation Claim
[#70] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: September 14, 2018

/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge

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