Littler v. State of Massachuestts

Filing 6

Judge Richard G. Stearns: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered denying without prejudice 5 Motion permission to file electronically; and granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Within 35 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order, Plaintiff shall show cause why the Complaint should not be dismissed or file an Amended Complaint curing pleading deficiencies in accordance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by setting forth a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted. (PSSA, 4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-11277-RGS
LAWRENCE LITTLER
v.
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
August 14, 2017
INTRODUCTION
On July 6, 2017, Plaintiff Lawrence Littler (“Littler”), a self-described
disabled resident of Swampscott, Massachusetts, filed a pro se complaint
accompanied by an Application to Proceed in District Court without
Prepaying Fees or Costs. See Docket Nos. 1-2. Littler subsequently filed a
written request seeking permission to utilize CM/ECF for electronic filing.
See Docket No. 5.
For the reasons set forth below: (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in
District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs is ALLOWED; (2) Plaintiff’s
Motion for Electronic Filing is DENIED without prejudice; and (3) this
action shall be dismissed within 35 days of the date of this Memorandum and

Order unless Plaintiff demonstrates good cause why this action should not
be dismissed, or files an amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
The complaint identifies the defendant as the State of Massachusetts
and asserts federal claims pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”),
29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 791-794, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment1 and state law claims for false imprisonment and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Littler’s claims arise out of a January 12, 2017 proceeding in state court
in which Littler was found in contempt of court for non-payment of alimony
and child support.

Littler complains that “the State of Massachusetts

Judicial branch and its agents servants and/or employees refused to
accommodate Plaintiff’s disabilities, refused to allow Plaintiff to completely
present his case in defense and refused to afford Plaintiff the right to be
represented by an attorney at a proceeding which had become criminal.”

Section 1983 of Title 42 creates a cause of action for persons who are denied a federally
protected right by a person acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137 (1979) (constitutional deprivations); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)
(statutory deprivations). “It is well established that ‘a litigant complaining of a violation
of a constitutional right does not have a direct cause of action under the United States
Constitution but [rather] must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’” Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 81, 92 (D.R.I. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Arpin v. Santa Clara
Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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Littler states that he served a month in prison for “failing to pay money he
did not have.” Littler states that his annual income plummeted in 2012 and
that his assets were depleted by 2014. Littler explains that he receives state
aid and food stamps and has no money to pay child support and alimony.
Littler alleges that he sustained monetary damage in excess of $75,000.00
and he seeks “judgment against the defendant for pain and suffering; loss of
enjoyment of life and for such other further and different relief as to this
court seems just proper and equitable.”
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Based on the information contained in Littler's Application to Proceed
in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs, the court will permit
Littler to proceed in forma pauperis.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a plaintiff is permitted to proceed without prepayment of the
filing fee, a summons is not issued until the Court reviews the complaint and
determines that it satisfies the substantive requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
The court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which
are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2). An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks
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an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted if
it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In addition to the statutory screening requirements under § 1915(e),
this Court has an independent obligation to inquire, sua sponte, into its own
subject matter jurisdiction. McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004).
“Whenever it appears ... that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). As an
additional matter, when subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, there is no
arguable or rational basis in law or fact for a claim, and thus the action may
be dismissed sua sponte under § 1915. Mack v. Massachusetts, 204 F. Supp.
2d 163, 166 (D. Mass. 2002).
In conducting this review, the court reads Littler’s complaint with “an
extra degree of solicitude,” Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 23 (1st Cir.1991),
due to his pro se status, see id.; see also Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 158
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n. l (1st Cir. 1997) (noting obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally)
(citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
Even under a liberal construction, however, there are a number of legal
impediments to this action that warrant dismissal.
DISCUSSION
I.

ADA and RA Claims

To the extent Littler asserts claims against the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts under the ADA and RA, the allegations in the complaint fail
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The ADA2 and the RA3
both proscribe discrimination in the provision of public services. Although
the ADA and RA are not identical, the court will review the claims
simultaneously. See Partelow v. Massachusetts, 442 F.Supp.2d 41, 47 (D.
Mass. 2006) (citing Parker v. Universidad de P.R., 225 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
2000) (“In applying Title II, ... we rely interchangeably on decisional law
applying § 504).

Title II of the ADA declares that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132
3 Section 504 of the RA provides, in relevant part: “No otherwise qualified individual
with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
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Pursuant to these statutes, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that he is a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was ... excluded from
participation in ... a public entity's services, programs, or activities or was
otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such exclusion ... or
discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Id. (citing Parker, 225 F.3d
at 5).
The ADA requires reasonable accommodations for persons with
disabilities, to provide them “an even playing field,” but does not require that
disabled persons be treated preferentially or necessarily be given the
accommodation of their choice. Goldblatt v. Geiger, 867 F.Supp.2d 201, 210
(D.N.H. 2012) (quoting Felix v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d
Cir. 2003)). In Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004), the Supreme
Court held that Title II of the ADA with its “requirement of program
accessibility” in the context of the right of access to the courts
“unquestionably is valid ... as it applies to the class of cases implicating the
accessibility of judicial services.” Id. However, Lane cautioned that Title II
requires only “reasonable modifications that would not fundamentally alter
the nature of the service provided,” not “to employ any and all means to make
judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities.” Id. at 531–32.

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Here, Littler has not pled facts to support a claim of unlawful
discrimination under the RA and/or ADA. Plaintiff states that he is a sober
alcoholic and that his disabilities include severe depression and a heart
condition/infection. Compl., ¶¶ 9, 19. The Complaint alleges broadly that
“defendant failed to provide access to certain services to Plaintiff based on
his disability and/or to offer reasonable accommodations or modifications
so that Plaintiff could access those programs and services to resolve a
contempt motion.”

Id. at ¶ 4.

Specifically, Plaintiff complains that

unidentified individuals “refused to accommodate Plaintiff’s disabilities,
refused to allow Plaintiff to completely present his case in defense and
refused to afford Plaintiff the right to be represented by an attorney at a
proceeding which had become criminal.” Id. at ¶ 11.
The factual allegations in the Complaint fail to support a disability
discrimination claim against the defendant. Plaintiff fails to adequately state
how he was denied access to a program, benefit, service, or activity by reason
of his disability. The Complaint fails to allege how the defendant engaged in
unlawful discriminatory conduct or failed to reasonably accommodate him.
Additionally, the claim is conclusory as it simply asserts discrimination
“based on his disability” without alleging any facts to substantiate it. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (to survive dismissal, “[a] pleading that offers ... a
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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the Complaint fails to
state a claim under either ADA Title II or the Rehabilitation Act and these
claims are subject to dismissal. However, Plaintiff will be granted leave to
demonstrate good cause why the ADA and/or RA claims should not be
dismissed or file an amended complaint.
II.

Immunity

Even assuming that Littler has adequately pled a civil rights claim,
there is a fatal jurisdictional impediment to the Complaint.

The

Commonwealth and its departments are immune under the Eleventh
Amendment4 from suit in the federal courts, if the state has not waived
immunity and Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 98–101 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782
(1978); Hudson Sav. Bank v. Austin, 479 F.3d 102, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2007).
Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by
statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 344 (1979)  (Congress did not
override state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting § 1983).

The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI.
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This immunity extends to “arms of the state,” see, e.g., Irizarry–Mora
v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, *12 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining the “arm-of-the
state” doctrine, which courts use to determine whether a particular public
agency shares the state's sovereign immunity); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R.
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Only the state
itself and ‘arms' of the state receive immunity.”), and state officers to the
extent they are sued in an official capacity, and the plaintiff is seeking
damages and other forms of retrospective relief. See Poirier v.
Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 558 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2009).
Here, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Courts of the
Commonwealth, as instrumentalities of the State, are not subject to suit
under § 1983, in light of their sovereign immunity grounded in the Eleventh
Amendment. See Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 2002)
(holding that appellants' claims under § 1983 against the Massachusetts Trial
Court and the Department of Social Services failed “because a state and its
agencies” are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983). Consequently,
Plaintiff may not maintain this action against the defendant.
III.

Federal Courts Lack Jurisdiction
To Directly Review State Court Decisions

The status of the state court proceedings is not clear from the face of
the complaint. To the extent Littler seeks review and rejection of the state9

court enforcement proceedings as well as relief from the alimony and child
support obligations imposed upon him, the court is barred from exercising
jurisdiction over such claims by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.

The

Rooker–Feldman doctrine is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which grants the
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the decisions of the highest state courts
for compliance with the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; D.C. Ct. App. v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 467 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 416 (1923). Under the doctrine, “lower federal courts do not have
jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court; only the
United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court
judgments.” Thus, even if the challenge is that the state court's action was
unconstitutional, this court may not review the challenge. Feldman, 460 U.S.
at 485–86.
For the doctrine to apply, the “federal claim [must be] inextricably
intertwined with the state-court judgment [such that] the federal claim
succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues
before it.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Hill v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 1999). Littler’s
recourse is to seek relief in the state court that issued the order or to file an
appeal from that order, not to file an action in this court.
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IV.

Younger Abstention

To the extent that Littler has appealed or may continue to appeal in
state court, the state court is where he must seek his remedy. This court has
no jurisdiction to overturn a state court judgment or to intervene in any state
appellate process. If litigation remains pending in state court, then this
federal court must abstain until all appeals have been exhausted. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); see also generally
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).
V.

Heck v. Humphrey Exception

To the extent that Littler seeks to challenge a prior criminal conviction
for contempt of court, he fails to state any claim that would be cognizable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87
(1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 civil rights action
seeking money damages on the basis of an allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or sentence will not lie unless the plaintiff has already succeeded
in having the conviction or sentence invalidated. When a successful § 1983
damages action would necessarily imply that a prior sentence or conviction
was invalid, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal,
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expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determinations or called into question by the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. Id. See also Robinson v. State of Michigan, No 09-cv-564,
2009 WL 2567171 at *8 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding that Heck bars both
review of prior conviction for failure to pay child support and underlying
challenge to continue to pay such support filed pursuant to § 1983). At the
very least, Plaintiff may not use the instant lawsuit to challenge a prior
conviction for nonpayment of alimony or child support.
VI.

Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

Littler contends that the defendant is liable for the common law torts
of false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim for the reasons stated
above, supra., ¶¶ I - VI, the remaining potential state law claims are subject
to dismissal.
VII. Order to Show Cause or Amend Complaint
Littler’s Complaint is subject to dismissal. Rather than dismiss the
action, he will be provided an opportunity to show cause why the Complaint
is not subject to dismissal or he may file an Amended Complaint that
complies with both the directives of this Memorandum and Order and the
basic pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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If Littler choses to file an Amended Complaint, the Amended
Complaint must include, among other things, “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). This statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," Rivera v. Rhode
Island, 402 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)), such that the defendant is afforded a "meaningful opportunity
to mount a defense." Díaz-Rivera v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 377 F.3d 119, 123
(1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Rodríguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168,
1172 (1st Cir. 1995)). Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has
stated, under Rule 8, a plaintiff must plead more than a mere allegation that
the defendants have harmed him. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (detailed factual
allegations are not required under Rule 8, but a complaint “demands more
than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
Because an amended complaint completely supersedes the original
complaint, if Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he should repeat any
allegations in the original complaint that he wishes to be part of the operative
complaint. See Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2008);
Steele v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 2d 231, 235 (D.
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Mass. 2010).

Plaintiff may not, for example, incorporate by reference

allegations from the prior complaint into the Amended Complaint.
ORDER
ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED
that:
(1)

Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket

No. 2) is allowed;
(2)

Within 35 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order,

Plaintiff shall show cause why the Complaint should not be dismissed or file
an Amended Complaint curing pleading deficiencies in accordance with Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by setting forth a plausible claim
upon which relief may be granted;
(3)

Plaintiff’s motion (Docket No. 5) for permission to file

electronically is denied without prejudice; and
(4)

Failure to comply with the directives of this Memorandum and

Order will result in dismissal of this action.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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