Lucien-Calixte v. David et al
Filing
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Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ENDORSED ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER.For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendants Neal David and the Town of Stoughton for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 18 ) is ALLOWED. Count IV is, with respect to the Town of Stoughton, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is permitted to file an amended complaint, if any, on or before Wednesday, August 22, 2018.So ordered. (Franklin, Yvonne)
United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
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Sandra Lucien Calixte,
Plaintiff,
v.
Neal David and Town of
Stoughton,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.
17-11312-NMG
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This case involves claims by Sandra Lucien Calixte
(“plaintiff” or “Calixte”) that defendant Officer Neal David
(“David”) and defendant Town of Stoughton (“Stoughton”)
(together, “defendants”) wrongly caused her arrest and
prosecution.1
Plaintiff asserts violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and M.G.L. c. 12, § 11l, as well as a claim of malicious
prosecution.
Pending before the Court is defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
I.
Background
Plaintiff avers that she lived with her aunt, Marie
Belfort-Bois (“Belfort-Bois”).
Belfort-Bois suffered a stroke
1
Plaintiff mistakenly refers to “Neil” David and the “City” of
Stoughton throughout her complaint.
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on January 22, 2013, and she subsequently entered Good Samaritan
Hospital (“the Hospital”), where she was hospitalized until
March, 2013.
While at the Hospital, Belfort Bois suffered from
severe bed sores and low body temperature.
intravenously.
She was fed
From March, 2013, until June, 2013, Belfort-Bois
was in hospice care, after which she was discharged and returned
to plaintiff’s residence.
The complaint alleges Belfort-Bois required “round the
clock care for her basic needs.”
Calixte, a registered nurse
and trained pulmonary therapist, handled the majority of
Belfort-Bois’s care after June, 2013.
Plaintiff and her family
set up a makeshift hospital room in the unfinished basement of
her home.
The room had a twin bed with a table, a small
television and another table with medication.
On February 16, 2014, plaintiff summoned emergency medical
help for Belfort-Bois.
A first responder found Belfort-Bois to
be dehydrated and to be suffering from low oxygen saturation.
Belfort-Bois was re-admitted to the Hospital, and a nurse there
called the Stoughton Police to report “stuff that was very
troubling.”
The nurse observed that Belfort-Bois had serious
bed sores, low body temperature, a soiled diaper, a dirty
feeding tube and other issues.
Officer David responded to the call, arrested the plaintiff
and filed an undisclosed charge against her.
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Plaintiff
contends she was arrested and that Officer David lied to a Grand
Jury as part of a malicious prosecution.
She states David
claimed to a Grand Jury, that: 1) the basement in which
plaintiff cared for Belfort-Bois was half-finished, 2) BelfortBois’ bed sores had been treated while she was at hospice care
and 3) a doctor told David that Belfort-Bois’s care was
definitely a case of neglect.
In July, 2014, Calixte was charged and arraigned in
Superior Court.
She was tried and acquitted in 2017.
She now
claims that during the prosecution Officer David admitted that
he may have become too emotionally invested in the prosecution
due to a death in his own family.
Calixte alleges she spent approximately $50,000 in legal
fees to defend herself in Superior Court.
She seeks damages for
all of her legal fees as well as lost income as a result of her
damaged reputation as a registered nurse, and emotional
distress.
She seeks punitive damages and equitable relief from
this Court to enjoin Officer David from filing false reports and
ordering him to submit to further police training.
The complaint specifically alleges that (1) defendants
deprived plaintiff of clearly established and well-settled
constitutional rights while acting under color of law in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) the Town of Stoughton
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by maintaining improper policies for
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its law enforcement officers, (3) Officer David violated the
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, M.G.L. c. 12 § 11I and (4) he
maliciously prosecuted plaintiff, which act constituted false
imprisonment.
Pending before the Court is the motion of defendants Neal
David and the Town of Stoughton for judgment on the pleadings.
IV. Motion for judgement on the pleadings
Although a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings considers the factual allegations in both the
complaint and the answer, it is governed by the same standard as
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Perez–Acevedo v. Rivero–
Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008).
To survive such a
motion, the subject pleading must contain sufficient factual
matter to state a claim for relief that is actionable as a
matter of law and “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
For a claim to be facially
plausible, the pleadings must show “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
A
plaintiff cannot merely restate the defendant's potential
liability. Id.
In considering the merits of such a motion, the Court must
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. R.G. Fin.
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Corp. v. Vergara–Nunez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006).
The
Court may also consider documents if 1) the parties do not
dispute their authenticity, 2) they are “central to the
plaintiffs' claim” or 3) they are “sufficiently referred to in
the complaint.” Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir.
2007) (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1993)).
a.
Count I – Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Officer
David
Defendant submits that Officer David is entitled to
absolute immunity and that plaintiff has not stated a claim
against the Town of Stoughton because the allegations arise from
his grand jury testimony.
Grand jury witnesses, including law enforcement officers,
are absolutely immune from § 1983 claims based upon grand jury
testimony. Rehrberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367 (2012).
Plaintiff’s claim is based on the allegation that “David
repeatedly provided false information to the jury.”
Accordingly, Officer David has absolute immunity against
§ 1983 claims arising from his grand jury testimony and his
motion for judgment on the pleadings will, with respect to Count
I, be allowed.
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b.
Count II – Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Town
of Stoughton
The Town submits that plaintiff has not alleged sufficient
facts to support her claim that it had a policy amounting to
deliberate indifference to her rights under § 1983.
A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 for
constitutional violations if the execution of a municipality’s
“official policy [serves] as the moving force of the
constitutional violation.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
The complaint
alleges no facts pertaining to any official policy of the Town
of Stoughton besides the conclusory charges that Stoughton had a
policy or custom of deliberate indifference to misconduct
by police officers [and a] policy or custom of tolerating a
code of silence.
It is unlikely that either allegation sufficiently “serves as
the moving force” of the constitutional violations in this case.
In any event, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555).
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will, with
respect to Count II, be allowed.
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c.
Count III – Violation of the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act
Notwithstanding certain exceptions that do not bear on the
present case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“the
SJC”) interprets MCRA “to provide a remedy under M.G.L. c. 12 §
11I, coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Duarte v. Healy, 405
Mass. 43, 47 (1989).
Because, as explained above, no cause of
action may arise from grand jury testimony, plaintiff fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Cf. Seelig v.
Harvard Co-op. Soc., 355 Mass. 532, 538 (1969) (holding that
pertinent statements made in the course of judicial proceedings
are absolutely privileged in action alleging slander and libel).
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will, with
respect to Count III, be allowed.
d.
Count IV – Malicious Prosecution
The absolute immunity that applies to statements made in
judicial proceedings applies to all theories of tort. Correllas
v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 324 (1991).
Similarly, the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act prohibits municipal liability from
attaching in “any claim arising out an intentional tort,
including . . . malicious prosecution[.]” M.G.L. c. 258 § 10(c);
Barrows v. Wareham Fire Dist., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 626 (2012)
(“The Act expressly exempts intentional torts from its
provisions, and therefore a public employer cannot be sued for
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the intentionally tortious conduct of its employee.”).
Thus,
Calixte fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution upon
which relief can be granted.
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will, with
respect to Count IV, be allowed.
V.
Leave to amend
Plaintiff submits that, should the Court allow the motion
for judgment on the pleadings, she should be provided a
reasonable period in which to file a motion to amend her
complaint, which she will support with additional factual
allegations.
A district court “should freely give leave [to amend] when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Where a movant
evinces futility, bad faith, undue delay, or a dilatory motive,
amendment is not warranted. See Grant v. News Group Boston,
Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995).
Amending a complaint is
futile if the amended complaint “could not withstand a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.” Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth & Their
Families, 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Rose v.
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir.
2000)).
Here, the defendants rely on grand jury immunity and
insufficient factual allegations in the complaint.
Plaintiff
maintains that the added allegations will establish that Officer
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David committed actions prior to his grand jury testimony
sufficient to state the alleged claims.
With the exception of
the malicious prosecution claim against the Town of Stoughton,
which will be dismissed with prejudice, the Court concludes that
amendment of the pleadings would not be futile.
Accordingly,
the Court will allow plaintiff to amend her complaint.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendants Neal
David and the Town of Stoughton for judgment on the pleadings
(Docket No. 18) is ALLOWED.
Count IV is, with respect to the
Town of Stoughton, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff is
permitted to file an amended complaint, if any, on or before
Wednesday, August 22, 2018.
So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton_____
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated August 1, 2018
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