Harnish v. Crook

Filing 15

Magistrate Judge Judith G. Dein: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER on 6 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Dambrosio, Jolyne)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
ROBERT HARNISH,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK E. CROOK,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-11744-JGD

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
April 17, 2018
DEIN, U.S.M.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Robert Harnish, is a resident of Massachusetts. He has brought this action
against Mark E. Crook, a resident of Rhode Island, claiming that he sustained severe personal
injuries as a result of a boating accident that occurred on September 20, 2014. Harnish
contends that he was operating his kayak off of the coast of Rhode Island when he was struck
by a Boston Whaler being operated by Crook. Harnish has brought this action pursuant to the
court’s admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, alleging that Crook was negligent, among other
related claims.
This matter is presently before the court on “Defendant Mark E. Crook’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.” (Docket No. 6). Therein, Crook seeks to dismiss the complaint
against him pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the reasons
detailed herein, the motion is ALLOWED.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Scope of the Record
“On a motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff ultimately bears
the burden of persuading the court that jurisdiction exists.” Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden
Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009), and cases cited. “When a district court rules on a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, as in this
case, the ‘prima facie’ standard governs its determination.” United States v. Swiss Am. Bank,
Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001). Under this standard, a plaintiff must “demonstrate the
existence of every fact required to satisfy both the forum’s long-arm statute and the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, to meet his burden in this
case, Harnish must “proffer evidence which, taken at face value, suffices to show all facts
essential to personal jurisdiction.” Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825
F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2016). The court will “take the facts from the pleadings and whatever
supplemental filings (such as affidavits) are contained in the record, giving credence to the
plaintiff’s version of genuinely contested facts.” Id. It will “then add to the mix facts put
forward by the defendants, to the extent that they are uncontradicted.” N. Laminate Sales, Inc.
v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Mass. Sch. of Law v. ABA, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st
Cir. 1998)).
In the instant case the record consists of the complaint and a copy of the registration for
the Boston Whaler, which is attached to the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 6-2).
The plaintiff has not submitted any additional facts relating to the issue of personal jurisdiction,

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and in his opposition to the motion to dismiss he “takes no position” on whether this court has
jurisdiction over the Rhode Island defendant. (See Docket No. 12).
Facts
The plaintiff, Harnish, is a resident of Gloucester, Massachusetts. (Complaint (Docket
No. 1) (“Compl.”) ¶ 1). He owns and operates a 16 foot kayak. (Id.). The defendant, Crook, is a
resident of Narragansett, Rhode Island. (Id. ¶ 2). Crook owns and operates a 26 foot Boston
Whaler that is registered in Rhode Island. (Id.; Docket No. 6-2). The two boats collided on the
morning of September 20, 2014 in “international navigable water” off the coast of Rhode
Island. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4). The plaintiff sustained serious personal injuries. (Id. ¶ 4). There is no
evidence that the defendant has any contacts with Massachusetts.
III. ANALYSIS
Since this is an admiralty case, “the personal jurisdiction analysis includes a twist not
present in diversity cases, although ultimately there is no practical difference in the way in
which the Court proceeds towards its determination.” Zeus Projects Ltd. v. Perez y Cia. de P.R.,
Inc., 187 F.R.D. 23, 28 (D.P.R. 1999). Thus, “where a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction
is based on admiralty or a federal question,” as in the instant case, “the court’s jurisdiction over
parties is national in scope” and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and not the
Fourteenth Amendment, controls. Id.; see also Pike v. Clinton Fishpacking, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d
162, 166 (D. Mass. 2001). “Under the Fifth Amendment, a court may exercise general or
specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only if that defendant has ‘certain minimum
contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend tradetional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Copia Commc’ns, LLC v. AMResorts, L.P., 812
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F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154,
158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)) (alteration in original; additional punctuation and citation omitted).
Moreover, under both general and specific jurisdiction, “the defendant’s contacts with the
state must be purposeful.” Harlow v. Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005). Here,
the plaintiff has not established that the defendant had any contacts with Massachusetts.1
“For general jurisdiction, in which the cause of action may be unrelated to the
defendant’s contacts, the defendant must have continuous and systematic contacts with the
state.” Id. As noted above, there is no evidence that the defendant had any contacts with
Massachusetts, much less “continuous and systematic” contacts. Consequently, there is no
general jurisdiction over Crook.
For purposes of the specific jurisdiction analysis, the First Circuit has “broken the
minimum contacts analysis into three categories—relatedness, purposeful availment, and
reasonableness[.]” Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2007). Thus, as the Court has
explained:
First, the claim underlying the litigation must directly arise out of, or
relate to, the defendant’s forum-state activities. Second, the defendant’s
in-state contacts must represent a purposeful availment of the privilege
of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits
and protections of that state’s laws and making the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s courts foreseeable. Third, the exercise
of jurisdiction must, in light of the Gestalt factors, be reasonable.

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Given the absence of any minimum contacts, and, hence, the inevitable conclusion that this court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, an extended discussion is not warranted, and the court will
eschew a detailed analysis of the finer points of the often complex law of personal jurisdiction.

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Id. (citations omitted). “An affirmative finding on each of the three elements of the test is
required to support a finding of specific jurisdiction.” Phillips Exeter Acad. V. Howard Phillips
Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st Cir. 1999). Here, however, Harnish has not satisfied any of
these elements.
Without belaboring the point, the accident took place in international waters off the
coast of Rhode Island, Crook is a Rhode Island resident and his boat was registered in Rhode
Island. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim does not “arise out of, or relate to” activities in Massachusetts. Similarly, there are no facts to suggest that Crook “purposefully availed” himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in Massachusetts — according to the record before the court
he did not engage in any such activities in Massachusetts at all. Finally, the “Gestalt factors,”
which “bear upon the fairness of subjecting nonresidents to the authority of a foreign tribunal”
and “serve[] the purpose of assisting courts to achieve substantial justice” compel the
conclusion that this court should not exercise jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant who
has no minimum contacts with Massachusetts. See Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1394 (1st
Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons detailed herein, “Defendant Mark E. Crook’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint” (Docket No. 6) is ALLOWED.

/ s / Judith Gail Dein
Judith Gail Dein
United States Magistrate Judge

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