AER Advisors Inc et al v. FMR LLC et al
Filing
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Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. " For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS Fidelitys motion to dismiss (Docket No. 66). " For further details please see the attached order (Coppola, Katelyn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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AER ADVISORS INC., WILLIAM J.
DEUTSCH, and PETER E. DEUTSCH,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC,
Defendant.
______________________________
Civil Action
No. 17-12214-PBS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
August 22, 2018
Saris, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs AER Advisors Inc. (“AER”), William J. Deutsch,
and Peter E. Deutsch bring this action against Fidelity
Brokerage Services LLC (“Fidelity”), alleging that its
unauthorized lending of the Deutsches’ shares in China Medical
Technologies Inc. (“China Medical”), caused a market disruption
in June 2012. To cover up its role in the market disruption,
Fidelity allegedly implicated Plaintiffs in a false Suspicious
Activity Report (“SAR”), filed with the government. As a result
of the SAR, Plaintiffs claim they were subject to investigations
by various state and federal securities-related agencies.
1
On November 8, 2017, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida ordered that the case be
transferred to this Court. See Docket No. 40. One month later,
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Docket
No. 64), asserting 13 causes of action, all of which are
primarily based on the SAR. The claims are for negligent
reporting (Counts I and II), tortious interference with existing
business relationships (Count III), tortious interference with
prospective business relationships (Count IV), breach of
contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Counts
V and VI), promissory estoppel (Count VII), breach of fiduciary
duty (Count VIII), unjust enrichment (Count IX), negligence or
gross negligence (Count X), deceptive and unfair trade practices
(Counts XI and XII), and prima facie tort (Count XIII).
Fidelity moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), arguing first that it enjoys absolute immunity from
liability for any SAR filed. Second, Fidelity maintains that any
claims predicated on its alleged unlawful lending of the
Deutsches’ shares must be dismissed under the doctrine of claim
preclusion. Finally, Fidelity argues that AER’s claim for
tortious interference with existing business relationships is
barred by the statute of limitations.
After a hearing, the Court ALLOWS Fidelity’s motion to
dismiss (Docket No. 66).
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following factual background comes from Plaintiffs’
SAC. Plaintiffs’ factual allegations must be accepted as true at
this stage of the litigation. See Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2014).
I.
The Parties
AER, a registered investment advisor, served clients
nationwide with “discretionary investment management services.”
SAC ¶ 17. AER joined Fidelity’s Wealth Central platform in 2009
and exclusively relied on that platform to provide its
investment services to clients. SAC ¶¶ 18-19. Fidelity promised
to assist AER with business development and growth. SAC ¶ 21. In
reliance on that promise, AER actively solicited business from
clients nationwide. SAC ¶ 21. In 2011, AER introduced the “China
Gold” investment strategy and decided to make the strategy the
focus of its business model. SAC ¶¶ 22, 111. The China Gold
strategy was based on the expectation that the anomalously low
prices at which some Chinese securities were trading would
“trigger a management buy-out or another privately driven exit
transaction (e.g., a strategic acquisition).” SAC ¶ 22. Fidelity
supported China Gold and incorporated the strategy into its own
investing. SAC ¶ 23.
William Deutsch is the Chairman of Deutsch Family Wine &
Spirits, and Peter Deutsch serves as the company’s Chief
3
Executive Officer. SAC ¶¶ 8-9. The Deutsches were clients of
Fidelity’s Family Office Services (“FFOS”), and eventually
participated in AER’s China Gold strategy. SAC ¶¶ 25-26. When
Peter Deutsch decided to join FFOS in November 2011, he accepted
Fidelity’s service proposal, which offered him “seamless and
flawless” strategy execution, institutional-quality brokerage
services, and a “client first,” “conflict-free environment.” SAC
¶¶ 27-28. Peter Deutsch relied on Fidelity’s promises about the
services it would provide. SAC ¶ 28.
II.
The China Medical Investment and Market Disruption
After Peter Deutsch joined FFOS, the Deutsches decided to
accumulate a large number of shares of China Medical, gain
control of the company, and sell it to a buyer or private equity
firm. See SAC ¶¶ 29-30. Peter Deutsch began acquiring China
Medical shares through his FFOS account in December 2011. SAC ¶
33. By February 28, 2012, the Deutsches owned nearly 4.4 million
shares of the company. SAC ¶ 34. They had purchased around 8.6
million additional shares by June 30, 2012. SAC ¶ 34.
Fidelity emailed AER on March 5, 2012, with an offer for
the Deutsches to join its “fully paid lending program” for their
China Medical shares. SAC ¶ 35. In the email, Fidelity
represented that its “securities lending desk in Capital Markets
[was] paying a 5% rate . . . for these hard to borrow shares.”
SAC ¶ 35. The email also acknowledged that there was “a 100%
4
requirement to hold this position” and that a “service agreement
[would] need to be signed by the end client to enter into this
program.” SAC ¶ 35. If the Deutsches had accepted Fidelity’s
offer, they would have been in a good position to accomplish a
short squeeze.1 See SAC ¶ 36. However, AER replied to Fidelity’s
offer with a straightforward rejection: “Client is not
interested in lending stock.” SAC ¶ 37. After receiving AER’s
email, Fidelity never advised the Deutsches that they should
move their shares and trade in a cash account, as required by
Fidelity’s internal policy. SAC ¶ 39.
Despite the fact that Fidelity had not received consent to
lend, between May and early June of 2012, the company lent
nearly 1.8 million of the Deutsches’ China Medical shares to
short sellers or their brokers. SAC ¶ 41. Fidelity made money
from these loans, but the Deutsches were not notified of the
lending, were not paid any compensation for the loans, and did
not receive any collateral. SAC ¶ 42. When AER asked Fidelity
whether it had lent the Deutsches’ stock without their
1
A “short squeeze” is a “situation when prices of a
stock . . . start to move up sharply and many traders with short
positions are forced to buy stocks . . . to cover their
positions and prevent losses. This sudden surge of buying leads
to even higher prices.” Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410
F.3d 1275, 1277 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting John Downes &
Jordan Elliot Goodman, Barron’s Finance & Investment Handbook
807 (6th ed. 2003)), abrogated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 633
(2010).
5
authorization, Fidelity responded that it could not disclose
that information. See SAC ¶ 49. Peter Deutsch was also told by
Amanda Topping at FFOS that the portion of China Medical stocks
that Fidelity could lend out from his account was “very small.”
SAC ¶ 50.
The wine turned to vinegar in June 2012. On June 11, 2012,
after “a routine monthly transfer of [China Medical] shares
between the Deutsches’ margin accounts,” Fidelity’s lending
triggered a recall obligation. SAC ¶¶ 45-46. The company then
issued a recall for about 1.5 million shares on June 13, 2012,
eventually recalling approximately 1.8 million shares over the
next few days. SAC ¶ 46. The Senior Vice President and head of
the Securities Lending Desk of Fidelity Capital Markets, Ugyen
Sass, anticipated a short squeeze due to the company’s loans and
failed recalls on June 15, 2012. SAC ¶ 46. Then, on June 18,
2012, Fidelity issued its final batch of recalls. SAC ¶ 46.
Because the recalls failed, Fidelity bought roughly 1.2 million
shares of China Medical on the open market between June 19 and
June 27, 2012. SAC ¶ 46. The price of the stock increased from
$4.00 per share on June 13, 2012, to $11.80 per share on June
29, 2012. SAC ¶ 46.
6
On June 29, 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) halted the trading of China Medical. See SAC ¶ 46.2
III. The SAR and the January 2013 Letter
Fidelity filed a SAR on July 5, 2012. SAC ¶ 56. A SAR is
the document a “broker or dealer in securities” files with the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), to report “any
suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law
or regulation.” 31 C.F.R. § 1023.320(a)(1), (b)(1). The internal
draft SAR reports that Fidelity observed suspicious activity in
the Deutsches’ and AER’s accounts, “which ha[d] the appearance
of attempting to influence a short squeeze in the stock of China
Medical.” Docket No. 64-2 at 3; SAC ¶ 56. The draft SAR also
states:
On June 18, 2012, 11,945,520 shares of China
Medical (from five separate Deutsch accounts)
were journaled from type 2 (margin), to type 1
(cash). . . . The result of this action caused
previously loaned out shares to be recalled, and
since they were not delivered, stock loan had to
execute buy-in transactions.
Docket No. 64-2 at 4; SAC ¶ 57. Plaintiffs believe that this
draft SAR reflects the contents of the SAR Fidelity actually
filed. SAC ¶ 56.
2
Although the SAC states that trading was halted on July 29,
2012, the record suggests that trading was actually halted on
June 29, 2012. See SAC ¶ 79 (alleging that the SEC lifted the
trading halt on July 16, 2012); see also Docket No. 64-2 at 3
n.1 (noting that the SEC suspended trading from “6/29/2012 . . .
through 07/13/2012”).
7
Plaintiffs allege that the transfers between the Deutsches’
accounts did not result in the recall of a single share of China
Medical. SAC ¶ 60. Based on this fact, Plaintiffs allege that
there was no possibility that they had orchestrated the short
squeeze. SAC ¶¶ 58-59. Moreover, they allege that Fidelity knew
that Plaintiffs did not initiate the short squeeze -- even
though the SAR accused them of it -- because Fidelity issued the
recalls for the shares it had loaned. SAC ¶¶ 59-64. The SAC
alleges that the SAR was simply a smokescreen intended to
disguise the fact that Fidelity’s unlawful lending had truly
triggered the short squeeze. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 59.
To cover up the SAR, Fidelity hid documents throughout an
extended Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)
arbitration. SAC ¶¶ 84-85. Only after the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York ordered documents to
be produced on May 6, 2015 did Plaintiffs learn of Fidelity’s
internal draft of the SAR. See SAC ¶ 96.
After the SAR was filed, Fidelity attempted to “poach”
AER’s clients. SAC ¶ 114. “[I]n or around January 2013,”
Fidelity sent letters to AER’s existing clients, which stated
that the two companies no longer had a relationship and that
Fidelity was no longer accepting instruction from AER on any
accounts. SAC ¶ 114. The letter also gave clients options for
managing their Fidelity accounts going forward. SAC ¶ 114.
8
IV.
Investigations and Damages
As a result of the SAR filing, AER was investigated by the
SEC and required to attend a five-hour interview. SAC ¶¶ 99-101.
Ultimately, the SEC decided not to pursue an enforcement action
against AER. SAC ¶ 102. Both the Florida Office of Financial
Regulation, Division of Securities, and New Hampshire’s Bureau
of Securities Regulation also investigated AER’s actions, but
neither pursued enforcement. SAC ¶¶ 103-06. AER spent hundreds
of thousands of dollars on these investigations and “could not,
and did not economically recover.” SAC ¶¶ 106, 115.
The SEC also investigated Peter Deutsch’s trading
activities related to China Medical. SAC ¶¶ 107-08. He was
required to attend an interview with the SEC, which focused on
whether he “intended to artificially manipulate the market
through moving his shares from margin to cash.” SAC ¶ 108. The
SEC did not pursue an enforcement action, but Peter Deutsch
expended hundreds of thousands of dollars on the investigation,
suffered emotional distress, and had his attention diverted from
his business activities. SAC ¶¶ 109-10.
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Standard
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual
allegations in a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
9
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a court “may
not disregard properly pled factual allegations, ‘even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable.’” Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In some circumstances, affirmative defenses may form the
basis of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See
Blackstone Realty LLC v. F.D.I.C., 244 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir.
2001). When a motion to dismiss is “premised on the inevitable
success of an affirmative defense,” the court must still look to
the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, as it does when
considering any Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Nisselson v. Lernout, 469
F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006). Dismissal is only appropriate
when “(i) the facts establishing the defense are definitively
ascertainable from the complaint and the other allowable sources
of information, and (ii) those facts suffice to establish the
affirmative defense with certitude.” Id. (quoting Rodi v. S. New
England Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2004)).
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II.
Fidelity’s Immunity Under 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3)
Congress has granted financial institutions immunity from
liability for filing SARs. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3)(A). The
statute granting immunity reads:
Any financial institution that makes a voluntary
disclosure of any possible violation of law or
regulation to a government agency . . . shall not
be liable to any person under any law or
regulation of the United States, any
constitution, law, or regulation of any State or
political subdivision of any State, or under any
contract or other legally enforceable agreement
(including any arbitration agreement), for such
disclosure . . . .
Id. The scope of this statutory immunity varies from circuit to
circuit, however. Compare Stoutt v. Banco Popular de Puerto
Rico, 320 F.3d 26, 30-32 (1st Cir. 2003) (declining to read good
faith requirement into statute), and Lee v. Bankers Trust Co.,
166 F.3d 540, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1999) (same), with Lopez v. First
Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., 129 F.3d 1186, 1192-93 (11th Cir.
1997) (holding that immunity applies when financial institution
has “good faith suspicion that a law or regulation may have been
violated”).
Plaintiffs urge the Court to apply the Eleventh Circuit’s
good faith limitation to Fidelity’s immunity defense because
this case was transferred from a Florida federal court. See
Docket No. 72 at 10-13; Docket No. 77 at 6-7. When questions of
federal law must be decided, the transferee court will apply the
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law of its own circuit. See Murphy v. F.D.I.C., 208 F.3d 959,
966 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Since the federal courts are all
interpreting the same federal law, uniformity does not require
that transferee courts defer to the law of the transferor
circuit.”); Island View Residential Treatment Ctr., Inc. v.
Bluecross Blueshield of Mass., Inc., Civ. No. 07-10581-DPW, 2007
WL 4589335, at *9 (D. Mass. Dec. 28, 2007). This general rule
applies with equal force where a transferee court is considering
a federal statutory defense in a diversity case. The Court
therefore will apply the First Circuit’s interpretation of 31
U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) in Stoutt.
The First Circuit has expressly rejected the idea of an
implicit good faith requirement in § 5318(g)(3). See Stoutt, 320
F.3d at 30. And it has done so in sweeping language, indicating
that the statute grants absolute immunity from suit, even when
disclosures are fabricated or made with malice. See id. at 33.
In the opinion, the First Circuit reasoned that Congress did not
intend to include a good faith qualification to immunity because
(1) it easily could have written the requirement into the
statute; (2) it removed a good faith requirement from an earlier
draft of the provision; and (3) any limitation on immunity would
discourage disclosure. See id. at 31-32. Thus, the First Circuit
concluded that § 5318(g)(3) immunizes financial institutions
whose SAR disclosures are “wilfully [sic] false” or “unfounded,
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incomplete, careless and even malicious.” Id. at 32 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs, however, focus on the fact that § 5318(g)(3)
only grants financial institutions immunity when they report
“any possible violation of law or regulation.” See Docket No. 72
at 7-10; Docket No. 77 at 1-3. They claim that while Fidelity
allegedly reported the Deutsches for market manipulation in the
form of an illegal short squeeze, SAC ¶ 56, the Deutsches’
activities could not possibly have caused the short squeeze, see
Docket No. 72 at 8-10; Docket No. 77 at 3. Plaintiffs
specifically point to paragraphs 45 through 47 and 60 through 64
in the SAC to show that Fidelity knew the Deutsches could not
possibly be responsible for the market disruption because
Fidelity itself had caused it. See Docket No. 91 at 41:21-42:5.
Since Fidelity was not reporting an actual “possible violation
of law,” according to Plaintiffs, the conclusion follows that
Fidelity has not met the threshold requirement for immunity. But
in light of Stoutt, the Court is not persuaded by this argument
or by the state court cases Plaintiffs cite in their briefing.
Stoutt deals specifically with the “any possible violation”
language. In that case, Banco Popular reported the plaintiff to
the FBI for check kiting, or “knowingly writing a check against
an account with insufficient funds,” which can be a federal
offense. Stoutt, 320 F.3d at 28. The First Circuit noted that
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the bank’s report “was cast as the disclosure of a possible case
of bank fraud, assuredly a possible violation of law.” Id. at 30
(emphasis added). But the plaintiff said that the bank knew he
was innocent all along because he had informed a bank official
of his transactions and “was encouraged to draw on uncollected
funds.” Id. at 29, 32. In assessing the bank’s motion for
summary judgment, the First Circuit explained:
Conceivably, Stoutt could argue that the report
was not one of a possible violation, even though
so termed and colorably disclosing a possible
crime, if the Bank knew that there was (in
reality) no violation. But this is a non-literal
reading of the statute, which speaks of “any
possible violation,” and we think it more
straightforward to confront any requirement of
good faith or due care as an implied
qualification of immunity rather than an issue of
initial scope. Here, whatever its internal
beliefs, the Bank did by any objective test
identify a “possible violation.”
Id. at 30.
Plaintiffs allege that Fidelity’s SAR accused them of
manipulating stock prices by orchestrating an illegal short
squeeze. SAC ¶ 56. Based on Plaintiffs’ own allegations, the
SAR, on its face, “was cast” as a disclosure of a possible
violation of securities law. Accordingly, Fidelity’s SAR met the
“possible violation” threshold for § 5318(g)(3) immunity.
Finally, Plaintiffs make an additional argument that
fraudulent SARs intended to misdirect suspicion do not insulate
financial institutions from civil liability. See Docket No. 72
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at 3-7; Docket No. 77 at 3-6. This argument does not make it
past Stoutt either. In its analysis, the First Circuit
considered but discounted the fact that plaintiffs like Stoutt
“could be left without any civil redress against malicious or
wholly unfounded accusations.” Id. at 31. Despite that reality,
the court said that government authorities can filter out SARs
reporting “false charges” and decide not to pursue those
investigations. Id. at 32. The First Circuit also concluded that
criminal law -- including 18 U.S.C. § 1517, which prohibits
obstructing an examination of a financial institution -- was a
means of remedying “wilfully [sic] false reports” by those
financial institutions. Id. Stoutt therefore contemplated that a
bank might falsely point blame at others to cover up its own
wrongdoing and decided that civil immunity should still attach
to the filing of that fraudulent SAR.
To the extent Counts I through XIII are founded on the
alleged SAR, they are dismissed.
III. Claim Preclusion Based on FINRA Arbitration Award
Fidelity argues that Counts VI, VIII, IX, XI, XII, and XIII
must be dismissed under the claim preclusion doctrine because
they are based in part on the alleged unlawful lending of the
Deutsches’ China Medical stock. See Docket No. 67 at 12-15.
According to Fidelity, the FINRA arbitration award resolved all
15
of the Deutsches’ unlawful lending claims and precludes their
re-litigation here. See Docket No. 67 at 13-14.
The Court need not decide whether applying the claim
preclusion doctrine would be appropriate in this case. On two
occasions, Plaintiffs have expressly disavowed that any of their
claims in the SAC are premised on unlawful lending and have
reiterated that all claims are based on the SAR. See Docket No.
72 at 16 (“While claims in the Arbitration were predicated on
the unlawful lending of the Deutsches’ [China Medical] shares,
the Second Amended Complaint asserts claims predicated on
Fidelity’s fraudulent cover-up scheme and SAR Referral.”);
Docket No. 77 at 10 n.10 (“The six counts Fidelity identified as
[relating to unlawful lending] are expressly predicated on
Fidelity’s ‘fraudulent scheme’ including the filing of a bogus
SAR . . . .”). According to Plaintiffs, the facts about unlawful
lending are included only to provide “background or context to a
different set of claims (those arising from Fidelity’s bogus SAR
and fraudulent cover-up scheme).” Docket No. 72 at 17 (emphasis
in original).
Because Plaintiffs have disclaimed unlawful lending and
reaffirmed the SAR as their foundation for all asserted claims,
the Court does not decide the claim preclusion issue. The Court
dismisses Counts VI, VIII, IX, XI, XII, and XIII in their
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entirety, on the ground that Fidelity enjoys absolute immunity
for its SAR filing.
IV.
AER’s Tortious Interference with Existing Business
Relationships Claim (Count III)
The only count that remains to be discussed is Count III,
AER’s claim for tortious interference with existing business
relationships. To succeed on this tort claim, a plaintiff must
prove that (1) “a business relationship . . . of economic
benefit” existed; (2) the defendant knew of that relationship;
(3) the defendant intentionally and maliciously interfered with
that relationship; and (4) the plaintiff suffered a “loss of
advantage” as a direct result of the defendant’s conduct. Comey
v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 816 (Mass. 1982).3
The tortious interference claim is based in part on letters
Fidelity sent to AER’s existing clients in or around January
2013, which explained that Fidelity had terminated its
relationship with AER and included options for clients to
consider going forward. See Docket No. 64 ¶¶ 114, 132-39.
Plaintiffs allege that these letters were attempts to “poach”
AER’s clients. Docket No. 64 ¶ 114. Fidelity has moved to
dismiss Count III on multiple grounds, including that the
3
Under Florida law, the elements of the tort are very
similar. See Int’l Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Austral Insulated
Prods., Inc., 262 F.3d 1152, 1154 (11th Cir. 2001).
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tortious interference claim is time-barred. See Docket No. 67 at
15-17.
Plaintiffs’ position is that the letters are “intertwined
with the SAR” and are “actually part and parcel of the entire
fraudulent scheme by Fidelity which related to the SAR
referral.” Docket No. 91 at 46:5-18. They maintain that the
discovery of the existence of the SAR in 2015 should count as
the date of accrual because malicious intent was not clear until
that time. Maybe so, but allowing AER to use the SAR to show bad
intent as a basis for Fidelity’s liability would violate 31
U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3). Again, to the extent Count III is based on
the SAR or the discovery of its existence, Fidelity is immune
from liability, even if the claim is timely.
If the Court were to focus solely on the January 2013
letters themselves, the tortious interference claim would be
time-barred under the three-year Massachusetts statute of
limitations, as AER’s attorneys concede. See Docket No. 91 at
46:19-47:4; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A; Pagliuca v.
City of Boston, 626 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
Moreover, even if the Court were to apply Florida’s four-year
statute of limitations, see Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o); Primerica
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Mitchell, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1368 (S.D.
Fla. 1999), Plaintiffs’ complaint would still be time-barred, as
it was originally filed on July 7, 2017 -- approximately four
18
and a half years after the letters were sent. Accordingly, the
Court need not engage in a choice-of-law analysis to determine
which state’s law actually applies. Count III is dismissed.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS Fidelity’s
motion to dismiss (Docket No. 66).
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS
____
Patti B. Saris
Chief United States District Judge
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