Lazarre v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Filing 8

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ORDER DISMISSING PETITION (DOC. NO. 1)AND RESOLVING PENDING MOTIONS (DOC. NOS. 2, 5). In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Lazarres petition, as it presently stands, substantially fails to comply with the rules governing federal habeas proceedings, and likewise fails to advance any colorable basis from which the Court could find that Lazarre may be entitled to relief. As such, the habeas petition (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice. Because of the same deficiencies, the counsel motion is DENIED as moot. re 5 Motion to Appoint Counsel. ; 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Simeone, Maria)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

EPIPHANE LAZARRE,
Petitioner,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS,
Respondent.

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Civil No. 18-10106-LTS

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION (DOC. NO. 1)
AND RESOLVING PENDING MOTIONS (DOC. NOS. 2, 5)
February 2, 2018
SOROKIN, J.
Epiphane Lazarre1 is presently incarcerated at Old Colony Correctional Center in
Bridgewater, Massachusetts, having been convicted in 2014 of two counts of aggravated rape of
a child and related charges. Doc. No. 1 at 1; Commonwealth v. Lazarre, 79 N.E.3d 1111 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2017) (unpublished). On January 19, 2018, the Court received and docketed the
following submissions: 1) a partially completed Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of
Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, Doc. No. 1 (“the habeas petition”); 2) an
Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees, an accompanying Financial Affidavit, and
an Inmate Transaction Report, Doc. No. 2 (“the IFP motion”); and 3) a Motion for Appointment
of Counsel, Doc. No. 5 (“the counsel motion”).

1

Although this is how the petitioner’s name appears on the docket in this action, in the state
court decisions on direct review, and in some of his submissions, in other submissions he
reverses the order of his names and writes “Lazarre Epiphane.” The Court will refer to him
throughout as Lazarre.

The Court has reviewed the IFP motion and the supporting documents. That motion
(Doc. No. 2) is ALLOWED.
The Court also has reviewed the habeas petition, as it is required to do pursuant to the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. See Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.
foll. § 2254 (requiring prompt examination of habeas petitions and dismissal “[i]f it plainly
appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief”). Those Rules require
petitions to contain certain information—information which is specifically identified and
requested by the standard form which Lazarre used in this case. See Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll.
§ 2254. In particular, a federal habeas petition must: “(1) specify all the grounds for relief
available to the petitioner; (2) state the facts supporting each ground; [and] (3) state the relief
requested.” Id.
Lazarre’s petition does none of these things. The entire section of the form in which
petitioners are asked to “state every ground on which you claim that you are being held in
violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” along with the supporting
facts, which provides designated space for four separate “grounds,” and which warns petitioners
that failure “to set forth all the grounds in this petition” may result in claims being barred from
future presentation, is left blank in Lazarre’s petition. Doc. No. 1 at 5-11. Nor has Lazarre
provided any insight into the substance of his claims or the facts underlying them in the
preceding sections which ask petitioners to list the grounds raised in previous appeals and
proceedings before state courts. Id. at 2-4 (answering “I don’t know” when asked to list grounds
raised on direct appeal, and leaving many questions blank). Besides referring to “the false
accusation” of “rape of a child [and] aggravated rape” in his identification of the crimes for
which he was convicted and sentenced, id. at 1, Lazarre provides no substantive information

2

about the underlying proceedings, let alone the errors he wishes to have reviewed by this Court.
Lazarre also failed to answer the question at the end of the form which asks petitioners to specify
the relief they seek. Id. at 15.
At the conclusion of the counsel motion—a separate filing—Lazarre offers the following
explanation for the near-total lack of information presented in his petition, writing: “I did not
completed [sic] the application, because I speak Haitian Creole. Please, I request a Haitian
Creole Interpreter. Thanks.” Doc. No. 5 at 2. The Court notes, however, that despite the
asserted language barrier, Lazarre did manage to complete the IFP motion form, providing all
requested information, including a narrative response regarding his last employment and contact
information for individuals who provide him support. Doc. No. 2.
The Court has reviewed the available state-court rulings related to Lazarre’s direct
appeal. On February 16, 2017, the Massachusetts Appeals Court (“MAC”) affirmed Lazarre’s
conviction and sentence in an unpublished decision. Lazarre, 79 N.E.3d 1111. The decision
reflects that Lazarre raised three claims to the MAC, each of which challenged the trial judge’s
exercise of discretion in admitting specific testimony during Lazarre’s trial. Id. The MAC
rejected each challenge on purely state-law grounds, without reference to any federal law or
federal constitutional principles. See id. (finding no error in admission of first-complaint
evidence, testimony by sexual assault nurse examiner, and expert testimony about delayed
disclosure of rape and absence of physical injury). The Supreme Judicial Court denied review on
April 27, 2017.2 Commonwealth v. Lazarre, 86 N.E.3d 243 (Mass. 2017) (table).

2

It appears Lazarre did not seek certioriari on direct review before the Supreme Court, nor did he
pursue any collateral challenges to his conviction in state court. If that is correct, the one-year
limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition began ninety days after the SJC’s denial of
review, i.e., on July 26, 2017, and will expire on July 26, 2018, absent statutory or equitable
tolling. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
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In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Lazarre’s petition, as it presently
stands, substantially fails to comply with the rules governing federal habeas proceedings, and
likewise fails to advance any colorable basis from which the Court could find that Lazarre may
be entitled to relief. As such, the habeas petition (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice
to Lazarre refiling it in a manner which complies with the above-cited rules (i.e., in a manner
which specifies violations of federal law he believes entitle him to relief, describes facts
supporting his federal claims, and identifies the relief he seeks).3
Because of the same deficiencies, the counsel motion is DENIED as moot and because
the interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel (or an interpreter) in these
circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2), (e).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Leo T. Sorokin
Leo T. Sorokin
United States District Judge

3

Unless tolling applies or there is a basis for using an alternate start date to the one-year
limitation period, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), it appears Lazarre would have to file any future
petition on or before July 26, 2018. It bears noting that the claims Lazarre presented to the MAC
are unlikely to merit federal habeas relief, as they were resolved on the merits by the state court
based on state evidentiary rules (not federal law). See Coningford v. Rhode Island, 640 F.3d
478, 484 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing severely limited scope of federal habeas relief where
challenge is to state court’s evidentiary ruling). However, Lazarre is free to return to state court
to litigate a motion for a new trial, pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, if
he believes he has additional claims he wishes to exhaust in state court (then, if necessary, pursue
in this Court). Filing such a petition would toll his federal limitation period. § 2244(d)(2).
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