Cordeiro v. Berryhill et al
Filing
62
Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered.The Commissioner's motion to reconsider (Dkt. No. 58 ) is DENIED.SO ORDERED.(Lara, Miguel)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
______________________________
)
CHERYL ANN CORDEIRO,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
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Civil Action
)
No. 18-10203-PBS
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
)
the Social Security Administration,)
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Defendant.
)
______________________________
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
December 20, 2019
Saris, C.J.
Plaintiff Cheryl Ann Cordeiro suffers from major depressive
and anxiety disorders and seeks SSDI benefits for a period
running from September 1, 2000, to December 31, 2005. In August
2019, the Court vacated the Social Security Administration’s
decision denying Cordeiro benefits and remanded her application
for further proceedings. Now, the Commissioner has moved for
reconsideration of that decision, arguing that the Court
committed two legal errors. First, the Commissioner claims the
Court flipped the burden of proof in determining the ALJ’s
decision that Cordeiro did not satisfy a listed impairment was
not supported by substantial evidence. Second, the Commissioner
claims the Court incorrectly concluded that the ALJ failed to
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properly weigh the medical opinion evidence from Dr. Wold and
Dr. Boshes. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the
Commissioner’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 58).
DISCUSSION
“[M]otions for reconsideration are appropriate only in a
limited number of circumstances: if the moving party presents
newly discovered evidence, if there has been an intervening
change in the law, or if the movant can demonstrate that the
original decision was based on a manifest error of law or was
clearly unjust.” United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st
Cir. 2009). The Commissioner has not presented any new evidence
and there has been no intervening change in the law, so this
motion is based solely on supposed errors in the Court’s prior
opinion. That opinion describes the administrative record
evidence in detail. It also lays out the applicable legal
framework for Cordeiro’s appeal. The Court assumes familiarity
with its prior opinion and does not repeat that background
information here.
I.
Listed Impairment
The Commissioner first argues that the Court committed
legal error by misapplying the burden of proof at step three of
the sequential analysis. He argues that it was Cordeiro’s burden
to show that her disability met the criteria for a listed
impairment under the Social Security regulations. The Court
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agrees that was Cordeiro’s burden before the ALJ –- indeed, it
said as much in its prior opinion. See Dkt. No. 55 at 10 (“The
claimant bears the burden of proof for steps one through
four.”). On appeal, however, the Court reviews the ALJ’s
decision to see whether it was supported by substantial
evidence. See Coskery v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
2018). The Court followed this standard of review when it
concluded “the ALJ did not provide substantial evidence to
conclude that Plaintiff’s condition did not meet [L]isting
12.04.” Dkt. No. 55 at 17. Although the Court appreciates how
the Commissioner might read this language as flipping the burden
of proof, that is not what the Court did. The Court vacated the
ALJ’s decision, in part, because the conclusion that Cordeiro
failed to carry her burden was not supported by substantial
evidence.
The Commissioner also disagrees with the Court’s assessment
that the ALJ’s determination that Cordeiro did not meet listing
12.04 was not supported by substantial evidence. While the
Commissioner identifies several supposed errors in the Court’s
reasoning, these arguments miss the forest for the trees. The
ALJ did not literally ignore the medical evidence in the record,
but she did discount all of it in reaching her opinion. The
record contains opinions from two treating sources and two DES
consultants, all of whom stated that Plaintiff was disabled
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and/or suffered from severe or marked limitations in her ability
to function. In fact, one of the treating sources (Dr. Wold) and
the two DES consultants opined that Plaintiff was severely
disabled as of the fall of 2000, which was during the period for
which Cordeiro seeks SSDI benefits. Yet the ALJ substituted her
own opinion that Cordeiro did not have severe and/or marked
limitations for the opinions of these medical experts. See
Banushi v. Barnhart, No. 06-cv-10042-RWZ, 2007 WL 1858658, at *7
(D. Mass. June 26, 2007).
The ALJ based her opinion primarily on a handful of
statements by Cordeiro that were cherry-picked from the record.
Several of the statements are drawn from Cordeiro’s treatment
notes from the fall of 2000 when she reported to Dr. Wold that
she was feeling somewhat better and that a Zoloft prescription
had improved her condition. As the Court observed in its prior
opinion, these statements are of minimal evidentiary value since
they do not describe a significant enough improvement to support
the ALJ’s conclusions regarding Cordeiro’s limitations.
See Hagan v. Colvin, 52 F. Supp. 3d 167, 174-76 (D. Mass. 2014).
After all, Dr. Wold diagnosed Cordeiro with major depressive
disorder based on his observations in the fall of 2000 and the
same notes assign her a GAF score of 41. Further, the fact that
Cordeiro’s condition improved with medication suggests at most a
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temporary improvement given that her insurance ran out in 2000
and she subsequently ceased receiving treatment.
The ALJ also relied on a selective reading of Cordeiro’s
2015 Function Report. The Commissioner now argues the ALJ
acknowledged in her opinion the conflicting statements from the
same report and the hearing, but this does not address the
Court’s critique. The Court discerns no principled reason why
the ALJ relied on certain statements and ignored others. For
example, the ALJ claimed that Cordeiro is able to shop and go
out alone, but what Cordeiro actually wrote in the 2015 Function
Report was that she goes outside “[a]s little as I can only when
I have to go out” and “I rarely shop takes [sic] at least one to
two hours. Difficult to concentrate.” R. 184. The problem is
compounded by the fact the ALJ’s reliance on the 2015 Function
Report is inconsistent with her explanation for why she
discounted the opinion of Dr. Boshes. The ALJ assigned little
weight to Dr. Boshes opinion that Cordeiro had “extreme”
impairments in numerous areas because he only began treating her
after the date last insured, but then gave great weight to
certain portions of Cordeiro’s self-description of her presently
existing limitations.1
The Commissioner points out that Cordeiro stated at the
hearing before the ALJ that her condition is presently worse
than it was as of her date last insured. This may be true but,
given that Dr. Boshes opined that Cordeiro currently suffers
1
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Finally, the ALJ bolstered her opinion with the fact that
Cordeiro did not continue seeking treatment for her depression
between December 2000 and her date last insured on December 31,
2005. But the record is reasonably clear that Cordeiro ceased
treatment because she lacked medical insurance. This undercuts
any argument the lack of treatment is evidence of her improving
condition. See Sincavage v. Barnhart, 171 F. App’x 924, 927 (3d
Cir. 2006); Perry v. Colvin, 91 F. Supp. 3d 139, 149-51 (D.
Mass. 2015). Likewise, the fact that Cordeiro did not have any
emergency hospitalizations during the relevant period is not
inconsistent with a finding of marked or severe limitations.
II.
Residual Functional Capacity
The Commissioner also argues that the Court erred by
finding the ALJ did not properly weigh the opinions of Dr. Wold
and Dr. Boshes. To be clear, the Court only found that the ALJ’s
decision not to give Dr. Wold’s opinion controlling weight was
not supported by substantial evidence.2 First, the Commissioner
argues that Dr. Wold’s opinion is not a “medical opinion” within
the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The Court disagrees.
According to the regulations, “[m]edical opinions are statements
from “extreme” impairments, it is not evidence that she did not
have marked or severe limitations as of December 31, 2005.
2
With respect to Dr. Boshes’s opinion, the Court allowed
that the reason for the discounting the opinion provided by the
ALJ was permissible but observed it was inconsistent with the
rest of her analysis.
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. . . that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of
your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and
prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your
physical or mental restrictions.” Id. § 404.1527(a)(1) (emphasis
added). Dr. Wold’s notes describe Cordeiro’s symptoms and
diagnose her with “Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Severe
With Psychotic Features.” See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.
2000) code 296.34 (DSM-IVTR). Second, the Commissioner argues
that the ALJ was entitled to give Dr. Wold’s opinion little
weight because Cordeiro reported to him and John McMullen, a
social worker, that her conditions improved with medication. For
the same reasons discussed above, these vague statements do not
provide substantial evidence to discount Dr. Wold’s opinion.
ORDER
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s motion to reconsider (Dkt.
No. 58) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS________
Hon. Patti B. Saris
Chief U.S. District Judge
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