Cooley v. Gaffney
Filing
27
District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ORDER entered. Petitioner, Edward Cooley's 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (28:2254) is DENIED. (A copy of this Order has been mailed to the Petitioner.) (Montes, Mariliz)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
EDWARD COOLEY,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIN GAFFNEY,
Respondent.
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Civil No. 18-10258-LTS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. NO. 1)
August 21, 2018
SOROKIN, J.
Edward Cooley, a prisoner at the Old Colony Correctional Center in Bridgewater,
Massachusetts, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, in which he raises two challenges to his convictions and sentences. The respondent has
opposed the petition. Because his claims are meritless, Cooley’s petition is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
In September 2011, following a jury trial in Hampden County Superior Court, Cooley
was convicted of first-degree murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and wilful interference
with a criminal investigation, all in violation of Massachusetts law. Commonwealth v. Cooley,
78 N.E.3d 77, 79 (Mass. 2017); Doc. No. 1 at 1-2; 1 S.A. at 1-2, 8. 2 He received a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Doc. No. 1 at 1; S.A. at 8.
Citations to items on the Court’s electronic docket reference the assigned document number and
the page number from the ECF header at the top of each page.
2
The respondent has filed a Supplemental Answer (“S.A.”) attaching the state-court record in
four bound volumes. Doc. No. 17.
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The charges against Cooley arose from a shooting in Springfield. Cooley, 78 N.E.3d at
49. The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows:
At approximately 12:20 A.M. on March 20, 2010, . . . a witness heard two shots
fired. She looked out her window and saw two men speaking in a “panicking way”;
the men then ran in opposite directions. Other witnesses also heard the gunshots,
soon followed by the sound of a motor vehicle crashing. The victim’s motor vehicle
had crashed through a fence, struck another vehicle, and come to a stop in the yard
of one of the witnesses. The victim was slumped over in the driver’s seat and
bleeding heavily.
As the witnesses approached the vehicle, [Cooley], wearing a leather jacket, ran up
yelling, “It’s my god-brother,” and “Don’t call the cops[;] the guy[’]s got weed on
him.” He climbed into the vehicle, pulled the victim slightly toward him while
patting him down, and took the victim’s cellular telephone. He also took a bag
from behind the victim’s seat, where police later found two bags containing
marijuana. After getting out of the motor vehicle, [Cooley] told the witnesses to
telephone the police and left the scene. . . . [T]he victim sustained injuries consistent
with a bullet traveling through his right arm and into his chest. He was pronounced
dead a short time later at a hospital.
Police were directed to [Cooley], who had since returned to the area (without his
leather jacket). [Cooley] was interviewed at the scene and twice more at the police
station. As investigators uncovered further evidence, [Cooley] changed portions of
his statement. For example, after first denying it, he eventually admitted that the
leather jacket, found hidden a short distance away from where the victim and his
vehicle had crashed, was his. The jacket tested positive for gunshot primer residue
on the cuffs, indicating that the jacket may have been within three feet of a gun
when it was fired. The jacket also was stained with blood that matched . . . the
victim. [Cooley] admitted to taking the victim’s cellular telephone from the motor
vehicle after the crash only after police recovered it from a motor vehicle belonging
to [Cooley’s] girlfriend.
Other portions of [Cooley’s] statements to police were proved false at trial. For
example, [Cooley] stated that he had happened to meet the victim at a pharmacy
store hours before the shooting, but surveillance video recordings from inside and
outside the store showed the victim there alone. [Cooley’s] claim that he had been
on the telephone with the victim at the time of the shooting was belied by telephone
records that showed that there were no telephone calls between [Cooley] and the
victim at any point prior to the shooting.
The telephone records also showed that . . . both [Cooley and the victim] were in
touch with a third party, who had a telephone number ending in 7471, in the hours
before the killing. There were numerous calls between the victim’s number and the
7471 number, culminating with a call made minutes before the shooting. In
addition, the records indicated that there were calls during the night prior to the
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shooting between [Cooley’s] number and the 7471 number until 9:42 P.M. Another
call was made from [Cooley’s] number to the 7471 number soon after [Cooley]
finished giving his second statement at the police station.
Id. at 79-80.
The prosecution’s theory of the case was that Cooley “and an unidentified person were
involved in a joint venture to rob the victim, that either one or the other shot the victim during
the course of the robbery, and that [Cooley] completed the robbery after the shooting at the site
of the crash.” Id. at 80. The jury returned a general verdict, convicting Cooley of murder
without specifying whether they had concluded he was the shooter. S.A. at 21.
Cooley filed a timely direct appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for a
judgment of acquittal on the murder, armed robbery, and firearms charges. S.A. at 9; Doc. No. 1
at 2. Shortly thereafter, Cooley’s trial counsel learned from the prosecutor that, during an
interview conducted by police months before Cooley’s trial regarding an unrelated murder, a
witness said he had heard another man (not Cooley) confess to having shot the victim in
Cooley’s case. Cooley, 78 N.E.3d at 82. In light of this disclosure, Cooley filed a motion for a
new trial alleging a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). S.A. at 9; Cooley, 78
N.E.3d at 79. The trial court denied Cooley’s motion after a hearing, S.A. at 14-32, and the SJC
consolidated his appeal of that ruling with his direct appeal, Cooley, 78 N.E.3d at 79. The SJC
affirmed Cooley’s convictions and sentence in a July 13, 2017 decision. Id.
In his timely federal habeas petition, Cooley advances the same two challenges
considered and rejected by the SJC: 1) that the prosecution violated its Brady obligations when
it failed to disclose the witness statement concerning another man’s admission “to having done
the murder,” Doc. No. 1 at 5; and 2) that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of
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murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm, id. at 7. 3 Cooley’s petition is fully briefed
and ripe for resolution. 4
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
State court decisions merit substantial deference. Federal district courts may not grant a
writ of habeas corpus unless they find that the state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claims
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[,] or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As the Supreme
Court repeatedly has emphasized, these standards are “difficult to meet,” with the petitioner
carrying a heavy burden of proof. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011); accord Cullen
v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011); see Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19-20 (2013)
(emphasizing “formidable barrier” faced by federal habeas petitioner where claims already were
adjudicated in state court, and limiting relief to cases of “extreme malfunctions” by state criminal
justice systems).
A state court ruling is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if the
state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”
or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision
Cooley articulates this claim as a challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion for a
judgment of acquittal on these charges, but for federal habeas purposes it amounts to a
constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of evidence proving the relevant offenses.
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In his brief, Cooley accuses his trial counsel of “foolishly neglect[ing] to have” various
seemingly valuable items recovered by police from the victim’s car “admitted into evidence,”
suggesting such evidence would have challenged the theory that the shooting occurred in the
course of a robbery. Doc. No. 4 at 2. He clarifies, however, that he is not advancing a counsel
ineffectiveness claim here, id., nor could he, as he did not exhaust such a claim in state court.
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of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000); see Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2014)
(emphasizing that “circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established Federal law’” for
these purposes). The state court is not required to cite, or even have an awareness of, governing
Supreme Court precedents, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of [its] decision
contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).
A state court decision constitutes an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court
precedent if it identifies the correct governing legal rule, but “unreasonably applies it to the facts
of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. When making the
“unreasonable application” inquiry, federal habeas courts must determine “whether the state
court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.
An unreasonable application of the correct rule can include the unreasonable extension of that
rule to a new context where it should not apply, as well as an unreasonable failure to extend the
rule to a new context where it should apply. Id. at 407. “The more general the rule, the more
leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).
A showing of clear error is not sufficient for a habeas petitioner to establish entitlement
to relief. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); accord McCambridge v. Hall, 303
F.3d 24, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc). If a state court’s decision “was reasonable, it cannot be
disturbed” on habeas review. Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 72 (2011) (per curiam); see Renico v.
Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010) (admonishing federal habeas courts not to “second-guess the
reasonable decisions of state courts”). Relief is available only where a state court’s
“determination was unreasonable – a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550
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U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining habeas relief
is appropriate only if a state court ruling is “so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of
record support, or so arbitrary, as to indicate that it is outside the universe of plausible, credible
options” (quotation marks omitted)).
Federal courts ordinarily must presume that the state court’s factual findings are correct,
unless the petitioner has rebutted that presumption with clear and convincing evidence.
§ 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340-41 (2003); see Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d
61, 68 (1st Cir. 2007) (discussing the “separate and exacting standard applicable to review of a
state court’s factual findings”).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Cooley first asserts that his constitutional rights were violated when prosecutors
“withheld evidence that someone else admitted shooting [the victim] until well after the trial was
over.” Doc. No. 4 at 4. This information, he argues, was exculpatory and was specifically
requested by his trial counsel. Id. at 4-7. Cooley claims the withheld witness statement likely
would have altered the outcome of his trial, based on his view that the jury “[o]bviously”
concluded Cooley was the shooter, and “evidence that another person with no discernable ties to
Cooley admitted to [the] killing” would have undercut that conclusion. 5 Id. at 7.
The SJC deferred to the trial court’s finding that the evidence in question was exculpatory
(it would have required proof of Cooley’s “role as a coventurer only, and not as the principal,”
even if it did not rule out his participation in the charged crimes), and noted the
The trial court described the individual who allegedly confessed to the shooting as a cousin to
Cooley’s girlfriend, S.A. at 19-21, providing reason to believe he did, in fact, have “discernable
ties” to Cooley. The Court’s resolution of Cooley’s petition, however, does not turn on this fact.
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Commonwealth’s concession that the evidence was within the scope of a specific discovery
request made by Cooley’s counsel in advance of his trial. Cooley, 78 N.E.3d at 82-83 & n.4.
Nevertheless, the SJC upheld the trial court’s finding that failure to disclose the evidence had not
resulted in prejudice warranting a new trial, concluding “proof that [Cooley] was not the shooter
was immaterial given the strength of the evidence that he was present at the time of the shooting
and participated in the armed robbery.” Id. at 83. According to the SJC, “the evidence of
[another man’s] claimed admission of having shot the victim was more likely to fill in the gaps
of the joint venture (by identifying the second participant) than to demonstrate [Cooley’s]
innocence.” Id. at 84.
The state courts’ rulings were neither contrary to, nor unreasonable applications of, Brady
or any other clearly established federal law. Brady requires prosecutors to produce “evidence
favorable to an accused upon request . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment.” 373 U.S. at 87. For evidence to fall within the scope of that disclosure
requirement, it must be “favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it
is impeaching, . . . and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82
(1999). “[T]here is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that
there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different
verdict.” 6 Id. at 281; accord Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1995).
As the respondent observes, the circumstances presented here bear many similarities to
those the Supreme Court considered in Brady itself. In each case, the defendant faced murder
Although the SJC analyzed this claim citing only its own prior decisions, the standard it applied
included a prejudice inquiry “more favorable” to a defendant than Brady. Healy v. Spencer, 453
F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). Explicit reference to the stricter federal standard is not required.
Zuluaga v. Spencer, 585 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2009).
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charges arising from a killing committed in the course of an armed robbery. 373 U.S. at 84. In
each case, the defendant allegedly acted with a coventurer. Id. In each case, defense counsel
learned only after trial that police had withheld evidence that the coventurer at some point had
admitted to doing the actual killing. Id. And, in each case, the state courts concluded that,
although the prosecution’s failure to disclose the evidence was improper, no new trial was
warranted because the evidence would not have altered the jury’s finding of guilt. 7 Id. at 88.
These parallels suggest the SJC’s analysis comported with Brady.
Moreover, this Court’s review of the record confirms the reasonableness of the SJC’s
assessment that strong evidence established Cooley’s guilt of all charges as a coventurer. The
Commonwealth presented ample evidence of his presence at the scene of the shooting moments
after it occurred, his removal of items from the victim’s car, his apparent coordination with an
unidentified third party who also was in touch with the victim at key times leading up to the
shooting, and his conduct and statements which reasonably demonstrated consciousness of guilt,
including his efforts to hide a bloody jacket (which later yielded evidence suggesting he was
very close to a gun when it was fired) and his numerous demonstrably false statements to police.
In these circumstances, this Court will not second-guess the state courts’ sensible conclusion that
the withheld evidence might have identified Cooley’s coventurer, but very likely would not have
caused jurors to reach a different verdict.
Accordingly, Cooley’s challenge to the SJC’s rejection of his Brady claim is meritless.
In Brady, new penalty-phase proceedings were ordered based on the withheld statement, 373
U.S. at 85, as evidence that Brady had not personally committed the killing might reasonably
have mitigated against a death sentence. In Massachusetts, a life sentence is mandated for firstdegree murder irrespective of whether a defendant is guilty as a principal or a coventurer, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 2(a), so the materiality inquiry here is limited to the question of guilt.
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B.
Sufficiency
Next, Cooley attacks the sufficiency of evidence demonstrating he committed murder,
armed robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Doc. No. 4 at 7-8. He argues that the
Commonwealth’s case “relied for proof mostly upon consciousness of guilt evidence, and an
insubstantial connection with an unknown hypothetical accomplice.” Id. at 8. He posits an
alternate way of viewing the evidence against him, that is, that he was a drug user looking to
purchase marijuana, only to discover that his dealer had been shot, and that he reacted out of
fear, taking what he could from the car and later lying to witnesses and police. Id. at 9-12.
The SJC considered and rejected Cooley’s sufficiency claim on its merits, finding
adequate proof of Cooley’s intent to participate in a robbery, his knowledge that his accomplice
possessed a gun, and his actual taking of the victim’s property. 78 N.E.3d at 81. The SJC
recounted the evidence in some detail, 8 emphasizing Cooley’s awareness that the victim sold
marijuana, his admission to having taken a phone and a bag from the car, the phone records
suggesting coordination with a coventurer to plan the encounter with the victim, the
reasonableness of an inference that any plot to rob a drug dealer might include a gun, the gunshot
residue found on Cooley’s jacket cuffs, and Cooley’s post-crime conduct including hiding
evidence and lying to witnesses and police. Id. at 81-82. Although the SJC noted Cooley
“offered alternative explanations for his actions,” its sufficiency review did not permit it to
“weigh supporting evidence against conflicting evidence.” Id. at 82.
The SJC’s analysis was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law. Because consideration of Cooley’s claim here is subject to the limited
Cooley has not challenged the SJC’s recitation of the evidence, nor has this Court’s review
identified any clear errors or unreasonable factual determinations.
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scope of habeas review, this Court “do[es] not ask, as [it] might on direct review of a conviction
in federal court, whether the evidence was constitutionally sufficient. [It] ask[s], instead,
whether the state courts’ ruling that the evidence is constitutionally sufficient was itself
‘unreasonable.’” Winfield v. O’Brien, 775 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1)). The relevant “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States,” § 2254(d)(1), for purposes of a sufficiency challenge is Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Under Jackson, a petitioner prevails on a sufficiency-of-evidence
claim only if he demonstrates that, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, [no] rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 319. Jackson requires “a federal habeas court faced
with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences [to] presume – even if it does
not affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor
of the prosecution, and [to] defer to that resolution.” Winfield, 775 F.3d at 9.
After summarizing the trial record in some detail, the SJC concluded that the
Commonwealth’s evidence, though “circumstantial,” was sufficient to support a finding that
Cooley was guilty as a coventurer of robbing and killing the victim, and of possessing a firearm. 9
78 N.E.3d at 82. This Court’s own review of the record confirms that the SJC’s decision was a
reasonable one, and was fully consistent with the sufficiency principles articulated in Jackson.
Even assuming the only available theory of guilt as to Cooley was that he aided and abetted the
Contrary to Cooley’s suggestion, Massachusetts law, including before the time of his trial,
permits a defendant to be convicted of a possessory offense as a joint venturer, even absent proof
of actual or constructive possession. Commonwealth v. Humphries, 991 N.E.2d 652, 658 (Mass.
2013); Commonwealth v. Brown, 737 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
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shooter as part of a joint venture, the evidence was plainly sufficient to permit a rational trier of
fact to convict Cooley of the relevant charges.
In particular, the record contains evidence, referenced above, showing: both Cooley and
the victim exchanged series of phone calls with someone at the same telephone number leading
up to the shooting; witnesses saw two men fleeing the area immediately after the shooting;
Cooley was at the scene of the shooting moments after witnesses heard gunshots and a car crash;
Cooley asked witnesses not to call police while he entered the car and removed items belonging
to the victim; Cooley then fled, only to return to the scene having hidden his jacket and the items
he took; Cooley told authorities he knew the victim was a drug dealer; Cooley lied to police
about the nature of his relationship with the victim, whether he saw or spoke with the victim
before the shooting, whether he had a jacket, and whether he had taken the victim’s phone; and
Cooley’s jacket had both the victim’s blood and gunshot residue on it. From some combination
of these facts, the jury inferred Cooley was guilty and rejected the alternate view offered here by
Cooley (and argued by defense counsel on his behalf at trial). In doing so, jurors resolved any
conflicts in the evidence in the Commonwealth’s favor. This Court is obligated to “defer to that
resolution,” Winfield, 775 F.3d at 9, so Cooley is not entitled to relief on his sufficiency claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Cooley’s habeas petition (Doc. No. 1) is DENIED. 10
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Leo T. Sorokin
United States District Judge
As “reasonable jurists” could not “debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), no certificate of appealability
shall issue. As explained fully above, the state courts identified the correct legal standards and
applied them reasonably in rejecting both of Cooley’s federal claims.
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