Hugal v. Norfolk Superior Court et al
Filing
20
Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. For the foregoing reasons,1) respondents motion to dismiss (Docket No. 18 ) is ALLOWEDand the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSEDand2) petitioners motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 13 )is DENIED as moot.So ordered.(McDonagh, Christina)
Case 1:18-cv-10427-NMG Document 20 Filed 12/17/18 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
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JOSEPH C. HUGAL,
Petitioner,
v.
EDWARD DOLAN,
Respondent.
Civil Action No.
18-10427-NMG
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
Joseph Hugal (“Hugal” or “petitioner”) filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus against Edward Dolan, the Massachusetts
Commissioner of Probation, (“Dolan” or “respondent”), pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner, who is currently not in state
custody, claims that his sentence of lifetime probation violates
the state statutes of conviction and several of his
constitutional rights.1
Before this Court are petitioner’s
motion for summary judgment and respondent’s motion to dismiss
the habeas petition as time-barred.
1
While neither party raises the issue of whether a person not in state
custody can file a habeas petition pursuant to § 2254, the Court assumes, for
present purposes, that a person released on probation can do so.
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I.
Background
In March, 1999, Hugal pled guilty to a four-count
indictment in Norfolk Superior Court which charged him with
assault with intent to murder, assault and battery by means of a
dangerous weapon, assault by means of a dangerous weapon and
mayhem.
That same day, the Superior Court sentenced him to
seven to nine years in state prison for the charge related to
armed assault with intent to murder and to lifetime probation
with respect to the other three charges.
In June, 2004,
petitioner was released from state custody after receiving
credits for previous jail time and he commenced his term of
lifetime probation.
In 2006, petitioner’s probation was transferred to Florida
at his request.
In July, 2008, petitioner filed a motion to
modify the terms of his probation which was denied.
In
September, 2009, he filed another motion to modify the terms of
his probation and in April, 2010, he filed a motion to leave the
United States.
motions.
The court did not rule on either of those
In June, 2011, petitioner filed motions to terminate
and modify his probation which were denied.
In November, 2014,
he filed another motion to terminate his probation which the
Superior Court denied in March, 2015.
Thereafter, Hugal filed
an appeal to the Massachusetts Appeals Court which affirmed the
order denying the motion to modify or terminate probation in
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February, 2016.
He then filed an application for leave to
obtain further appellate review which was denied by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
In October, 2016, petitioner filed a motion to correct
illegal sentence.
December, 2016.
The Superior Court denied that motion in
Hugal appealed and the Massachusetts Appeals
Court affirmed the denial of that motion in November, 2017.
In
February, 2018, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court again
denied petitioner’s application for leave to obtain further
appellate review.
In March, 2018, Hugal filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
In that
petition, he alleges that his term of lifetime probation is an
illegal sentence because 1) none of the charges for which he was
convicted carry a life sentence and 2) it violates his due
process rights, his right to interstate travel and his right to
be free from double jeopardy.
motion for summary judgment.
In May, 2018, petitioner filed a
A few weeks later, respondent
filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that petitioner’s claim was
time-barred because it was not filed within the one-year statute
of limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
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II.
Motion to Dismiss
A.
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
In considering the merits of
a motion to dismiss, the Court may look only to the facts
alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or
incorporated by reference in the complaint and matters of which
judicial notice can be taken. Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court
of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208 (D. Mass. 2000), aff’d, 248
F.3d 1127 (1st Cir. 2000).
Furthermore, the Court must accept
all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Langadinos v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000).
Although a
court must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in a complaint, that doctrine is not applicable to
legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
B.
Section 2254 Habeas Petition
A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court may file an application for a writ of habeas corpus on the
grounds that “he is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States”. § 2254(a).
The AEDPA
provides that such a petition must be brought within one year
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from the date on which the state court judgment becomes final
either “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of
the time for seeking such review”. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Under Massachusetts law, the entry of a guilty plea is a
final judgment of conviction that begins the running of the
limitations period. See Turner v. Massachusetts, Civil Action
No. 12-12192-FDS, 2013 WL 3716861, at *2 (D. Mass. July 11,
2013); Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 874 N.E.2d 654, 659 (Mass. 2007)
(“A guilty plea, once accepted, leads to a final judgment of
conviction; like a verdict of guilty, it is conclusive.”); see
also Bermudez v. Roden, Civil Action No. 14-10257-IT, 2016 WL
4007553, at *2 (D. Mass. July 26, 2016) (explaining that “[i]n
Massachusetts, a Rule 30(b) motion [for a new trial] is the
proper way to challenge a guilty plea . . . [and] [i]n this
District, a majority of courts have . . . treated the motions as
seeking collateral, rather than direct, review” (collecting
cases)).
While a properly filed application for state postconviction or collateral review tolls the limitations period,
those motions for post-conviction relief “cannot revive a time
period that has already expired”. Cordle v. Guarino, 428 F.3d
46, 48 n.4 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Dunker v. Bissonnette, 154
F. Supp. 2d 95, 103 (D. Mass. 2001)); see also § 2244(d)(2).
The one-year limitations period, however, may also be tolled on
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equitable grounds. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010).
The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is
entitled to equitable tolling. Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7,
14 (1st Cir. 2001).
The petitioner must establish that 1) “he
has been pursuing his rights diligently” and 2) “some
extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented
timely filing”. Holland, 560 U.S. at 650 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Holmes v. Spencer, 822 F.3d 609, 611
(1st Cir. 2016).
Application of the equitable tolling doctrine
is justified only in rare occasions. See Riva v. Ficco, 615 F.3d
35, 39 (1st Cir. 2010).
C.
Application
Even assuming that a petitioner can challenge his sentence
of probation after he has been released from state custody,
Hugal did not timely file his habeas petition.
plea of guilty in March, 1999.
He entered a
Respondent submits that there is
a split among the courts in this District with respect to
whether the judgment of conviction becomes final immediately
upon entry of the guilty plea or 30 days thereafter pursuant to
Mass. App. R. 4(b).
Even if the Court were to conclude that the
limitations period begins to run after the 30-day period for a
notice of appeal, however, Hugal’s habeas petition would still
be untimely.
At the latest, the one-year limitation period
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expired in April, 2000.
Hugal did not file his habeas petition
until nearly 18 years later.
Furthermore, the filing of motions by petitioner to modify
and/or terminate his probation in 2008 and thereafter does not
extend the one-year limitations period.
Even if those motions
qualified as properly filed applications for state postconviction relief or other collateral review pursuant to
§ 2244(d)(2), they were not filed within the one-year
limitations period and thus do not toll the period for the
filing of a habeas petition nor do they reset the limitations
period.
Finally, petitioner has provided no factual basis for
concluding that he is entitled to equitable tolling.
Hugal did
not pursue his rights diligently, as evidenced by the fact that
his first filing related to his probation was made over nine
years after his date of conviction.
Hugal also does not
identify any extraordinary circumstances that would have
prevented him from filing his habeas petition timely.
He
suggests in his petition that he “was heavily medicated on
strong psychiatric drugs and was incapacitated” but that claim
is too vague to satisfy petitioner’s heavy burden of proving
extraordinary circumstances. See Riva, 615 F.3d at 40 (“Mental
illness does not per se toll the AEDPA limitations period . . .
[but rather] [t]here must be some causal link between a
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petitioner’s mental illness and his ability seasonably to file
for habeas relief.”). Moreover, petitioner’s claim of
incapacitation is contradicted by the statements in his July,
2008, motion to modify his probation in which he asserted that
[h]is mental health is stable and has been improving since
his arrest and introduction to medication over twelve years
ago . . . [and thus he should be permitted] to travel and
possibly work in Europe.
Petitioner also contends that he was “indigent and had to learn
the law”.
Ignorance of the law, even for incarcerated pro se
prisoners, is not an excuse for untimely filing. Lattimore v.
Dubois, 311 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Hugal’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus is time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) and therefore that petition will be denied.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons,
1) respondent’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 18) is ALLOWED
and the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED
and
2) petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 13)
is DENIED as moot.
So ordered.
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_/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton_____
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated December 17, 2018
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