Cain v. Medeiros

Filing 22

Judge Richard G. Stearns: ORDER entered granting 20 Motion to Dismiss. (Zierk, Marsha)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-10782-RGS
WESTLEY CAIN
v.
SEAN MEDEIROS
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON
RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
August 17, 2018
STEARNS, D.J.
On January 20, 2015, after Westley Cain had been convicted of two
counts of rape, the Massachusetts Superior Court sentenced him to
concurrent state prison terms of twenty years to life. 1 Cain’s subsequent
appeals to the Massachusetts Appeals Court and the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court (SJC) were rejected. On April 23, 2018, Cain – now an inmate
at MCI-Norfolk – filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus against MCINorfolk Superintendent Sean Medeiros. Before the court is Medeiros’s
motion to dismiss.

The sentence was enhanced because of Cain’s status as a habitual
offender.
1

BACKGROUND
In September of 2013, “a Suffolk County grand jury returned
indictments charging [Cain] with: Three counts of aggravated rape . . . with
subsequent offense and habitual offender . . . sentence enhancements;
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon . . . and assault with a
dangerous weapon.” Resp’t’s Mot., Dkt. #21 at 1. On December 22, 2014, a
jury in Suffolk Superior Court convicted Cain “of two counts of the lesser
included offense of rape.” Id. Cain was subsequently “convicted of the two
charged sentence enhancements” by the same jury and sentenced to
“concurrent state prison terms totaling twenty years to life.” Id. at 2.
Cain appealed his convictions to the Massachusetts Appeals Court on
four grounds:
(1) The Superior Court erred in not dismissing the indictments,
in view of testimony before the grand jury that the petitioner was
a “known rapist” who had done “time;” (2) the Superior Court
erred in instructing the petit jury on the lesser included offense
of rape, on the jury’s request, after it had begun to deliberate; (3)
the prosecutor made improper arguments in closing; and (4) a
witness at the sentence enhancement trial made an in-court
identification of the petitioner that should have been excluded
pursuant to state law.
Id.

In affirming Cain’s convictions, the Appeals Court considered and

rejected each of the four claims. Id.

2

Cain then sought relief from the SJC. Id. His application for leave to
obtain further appellate review (ALOFAR) focused on whether the grand jury
testimony “so impair[ed] the integrity of the proceeding that it demanded
dismissal of the resulting indictments.” Id. His brief cited no federal cases
or constitutional provisions. In his “Conclusion” section of the ALOFAR,
Cain asked, without elaboration, that
[i]f further appellate review is granted, [the petitioner] also
requests that this Court [the SJC] review the additional issues
that he raised on appeal: 1) Whether the trial judge violated [the
petitioner’s] constitutional right to present a defense when he
instructed the jury on the lesser included offense after the jury
began its deliberations and in response to its question?; 2)
Whether, by arguing that the complainant was credible because
she went through the ordeal of participating in the investigation
and testifying at trial, the prosecutor improperly vouched for her
credibility?; 3) Whether during the trial on the sentencing
enhancement charges, the booking officer’s in-court
identification of the [petitioner] should have been excluded
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Crayton?
Id. at 2-3. The SJC denied the ALOFAR on July 27, 2017. Id. at 3. On April
23, 2018, Cain filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking review of
“federalized” iterations “of his appellate claims concerning the grand jury
testimony, the petit jury instructions, and the prosecutor’s closing
argument.” Id.

3

DISCUSSION
Superintendent Medeiros contends that Cain’s habeas petition should
be dismissed because of his failure to present his federal claims to either the
Appeals Court or the SJC for review. Persons “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” may challenge their
detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus.

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

However, the writ “shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”
Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 2 “A habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden to show that
he fairly and recognizably presented to the state courts the factual and legal
bases of this federal claim.” Adelson v. DiPaola, 131 F.3d 259, 262 (1st Cir.
1997).
A Massachusetts petitioner must “fairly present[] the federal claim to
the SJC within ‘the four corners’” of an “application for further judicial
review” in order to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. (quoting Mele
v. Fitchburg Dist. Ct., 850 F.2d 817, 820 (1st Cir. 1988)). As a general matter,
“a state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim” to the SJC if the court “must

Exceptions to the state exhaustion requirement exist where “there is
an absence of available State corrective process; or . . . circumstances exist
that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.”
Id. § 2254(b)(1)(B). Neither exception applies here.
2

4

read beyond the [application] that does not alert it to the presence of a
federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the
case, that does so.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). Moreover, the
court’s “calculation of the probability that a reasonable jurist would have
discerned the federal question” must be informed by “specific constitutional
language, constitutional citation, appropriate federal precedent, substantive
constitutional analogy, argument with no masking state-law character, and
the like.” Adelson, 131 F.3d at 262 (internal citation omitted). Needless to
say, a claim that was never presented at all could hardly be said to have been
“fairly and recognizably presented.” Id.
Cain’s first claim, of improper testimony before the grand jury in
contravention of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, was addressed in
purely state-law terms in his ALOFAR. At no point did Cain cite any federal
precedent or federal constitutional right.
Cain’s second and third claims, now invoking the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, are equally lacking.

Offered as an afterthought in the

Conclusion to his ALOFAR, Cain’s barebones questions would have required
the SJC to “read beyond” the application to determine whether a federal
question lurked in the interstices of the plea. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32. A

5

“passing reference” to an unidentified constitutional issue does not “preserve
it for habeas review.” Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2001).
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Medeiros’s motion to dismiss is ALLOWED.
The Clerk will enter judgment and close the case. Petitioner Cain is advised
that any request for the issuance of a Certificate of Appealability pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2253 of this Order dismissing the petitioner for writ of habeas
corpus is DENIED, the court seeing no meritorious or substantial basis
supporting an appeal.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns____________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6