Love et al v. City of Cambridge et al

Filing 71

Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 36 ) is ALLOWED as to Counts I (False Arrest) and XII (Equal Protection).SO ORDERED.(McManus, Caetlin)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
CHRISTOPHER LOVE and
)
ANGELA PETROPOULOS,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
Civil Action
MARK CLAVETTE, NICHOLAS MOCHI,
)
No. 18-11161-PBS
LESTER SULLIVAN, JONATHAN MARTINS, )
BRENDAN PASCO, and THE CITY OF
)
CAMBRIDGE,
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
August 11, 2023
Saris, D.J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Christopher Love alleges that five police officers
with the Cambridge Police Department illegally arrested him and
used excessive force in carrying out the arrest in violation of
the

Constitution

and

state

laws.

Love

and

his

wife,

Angela

Petropoulos, bring this twelve-count complaint against five police
officers (Mark Clavette, Nicholas Mochi, Lester Sullivan, Jonathan
Martins, Brendan Pasco) and the City of Cambridge. At issue here
is a False Arrest claim against Officer Mark Clavette (Count I)
and an Equal Protection claim under the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights against all Defendants (Count XII). Defendants move for
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partial summary judgment on those two counts. For the following
reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 36)
is ALLOWED.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken primarily from Defendants’
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Dkt. 38) and Plaintiffs’
responses to those facts in their opposition brief (Dkt. 41 at 413).

With

non-moving

all

reasonable

party,

notwithstanding

these

alleged

inferences
facts

factual

are

drawn

in

treated

disputes

favor
as

of

the

undisputed,

identified

by

the

parties.
I.

The Parties
Plaintiffs Love and Petropoulos are a married couple living

at

51

Ellery

“biracial

Street

in

Cambridge,

(African-American

and

Massachusetts.
Caucasian)

with

Love
a

is

a

dark

complexion.” Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 15. At the time of this incident, Officers
Mark Clavette, Nicholas Mochi, Lester Sullivan, Jonathan Martins,
and Brendan Pasco were all employed as police officers by the City
of Cambridge.
II.

The Arrest
At approximately 4:30 p.m. on March 27, 2015, Officer Clavette

was conducting routine patrol at Massachusetts Avenue and Dunster
Street in Harvard Square. As Love drove past him, Officer Clavette
noticed that the registration on Love’s car was expired. He ran
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the license number and confirmed that the registration had been
expired for more than four months. Officer Clavette attempted to
stop Love by following Love’s vehicle through traffic and flashing
his blue lights. Observing the flashing lights, Love pulled his
car over to allow the police cruiser to pass. When it did not,
Love then “understood that the Officer intended to pull [him]
over.” Dkt. 41 at 6. Afraid for his safety, Love turned onto Ellery
Street, drove a few houses down the street to his residence, and
parked on his driveway in front of his garage. Officer Clavette
parked his cruiser and sprinted up the driveway to Love.
Officer Clavette informed Love he was under arrest and that
his car was not registered. Love asked, “What’s going on? How can
I help? I live here. Let’s figure this out.” Dkt. 41 at 8. As
ordered by Officer Clavette, Love exited his vehicle. He “was told
to get out or else [he] would be pepper sprayed.” Dkt. 41 at 9.
Officer Clavette then used pepper spray on Love twice. He threw
Love to the ground, and the other Cambridge police officers joined
in when they arrived at the scene. Love says he did not refuse or
resist arrest. Instead, Love states he was protecting himself from
the officers’ assault.
Love was charged with: (1) Operating an Unregistered Vehicle
in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 9; (2) Refusal to Provide
a

License

in

violation

of

Mass.

Gen.

Laws.

ch.

90,

§

25;

(3) Failing to Stop for a Police Officer in violation of Mass.
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Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 25; and (4) Resisting Arrest in violation of
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 32B. On May 31, 2015, a Middlesex jury
found Love guilty of failing to stop for a police officer (in
violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 25) and civilly responsible
for operating an unregistered vehicle. He was found not guilty on
the

remaining

charges

of

refusing

to

provide

a

license

and

resisting arrest. Love was ordered to pay a $250 fine.
III. Procedural History
This suit was removed from Middlesex Superior Court on June 1,
2018. On January 21, 2020, Defendants moved for partial summary
judgment with respect to Counts I (False Arrest), II and IV
(Violations of Massachusetts Civil Rights Act), and XII (Equal
Protection), in addition to part of Count III (Violation of 42
U.S.C.

§ 1983).

Dkt. 36.

Plaintiffs

did

not

oppose

summary

judgment on Counts II and IV. See Dkt. 41 at 4 n.1; Dkt. 47 at 4.
They also did not dispute summary judgment on Count III as to the
false arrest claim. See Dkt. 47 at 11-12. On February 18, 2020,
Judge Douglas P. Woodlock held a summary judgment hearing and
dismissed Counts II and IV, and also dismissed Count III as to the
false arrest claim. Thus, the remaining counts at issue are the
False

Arrest

claim

under

state

law

(Count I)

and

the

Equal

Protection claim under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
(Count XII).

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LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
dispute exists where the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury
could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.”
Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc., 898 F.3d 77, 87 (1st Cir.
2018) (quoting Cherkaoui v. City of Quincy, 877 F.3d 14, 23-24
(1st Cir. 2017)). A material fact is one with the “potential of
changing a case's outcome.” Doe v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 892 F.3d
67, 79 (1st Cir. 2018). “The court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in [its] favor.” Carlson v. Univ. of New Eng., 899 F.3d
36, 43 (1st Cir. 2018).
DISCUSSION
I.

False Arrest Claim (Count I)
The elements of a false arrest claim under state law are

“(1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2) the
plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff did
not consent to the confinement; and (4) the defendant had no
privilege to cause the confinement.” Calero-Colon v. BetancourtLebron, 68 F.3d 1, 3 n.6 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 35, 118 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). A police
officer’s

“authority

to

arrest
5

is

generally

controlled

by

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Massachusetts common law and statutes, which confer the power and
also define the limits of that power.” Lunn v. Commonwealth,
78 N.E.3d 1143, 1154 (Mass. 2017). Here, the applicable statutory
authority is Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 21, which gives police
officers the authority to arrest individuals who violate Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 25, which includes individuals who refuse or
neglect to stop for police officers. 1
As Defendants contend, Officer Clavette arrested Love for
failing to stop for a police officer. It is undisputed that Love
was convicted by a jury for failing to stop for a police officer,
in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 21, which in turn is an
arrestable offense under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 25. Therefore,
Love’s false arrest claim cannot proceed because doing so would
“necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction[.]” Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court
held that when a plaintiff’s claim and prior conviction are in
conflict, the district court “must consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 21, provides that “[a]ny officer
authorized to make arrests may arrest without a warrant . . . any
person who, while operating or in charge of a motor vehicle,
violates the provisions of [Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 25] . . . .”
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 25, is a criminal statute that punishes
any person who “refuse[s] or neglect[s] to stop when signalled to
stop by any police officer who is in uniform or who displays his
badge conspicuously on the outside of his outer coat or
garment . . . .”
1

6

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his conviction[]; if it would, the [claim] must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction [] has already
been invalidated.” Id.; see also Cabot v. Lewis, 241 F. Supp. 3d
239, 257 (D. Mass. 2017) (applying the holding of Heck to state
law claims). If Love were to prevail on his false arrest claim in
this suit, that would imply Officer Clavette did not have the
statutory authority to arrest Love for failing to stop, which would
in turn undermine Love’s state court conviction. Love’s conviction
has not been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,” or
otherwise invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Because Love’s
false arrest claim challenges the legality of his conviction,
dismissal of the claim is appropriate.
Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on two state court cases, Baez and
Lunn, to argue that the false arrest claim should survive because
of the “breach of the peace” requirement for an arrest. Dkt. 41 at
15-16. In Commonwealth v. Baez, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
held that a “sheriff [] cannot arrest without a warrant, even for
those

violations

specifically

enumerated

in

[Mass.

Gen.

Laws

ch. 90,] § 21, if there is no concomitant breach of the peace.”
678 N.E.2d 1335, 1338 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). However, the holding
in Baez applies to sheriffs, not police officers. The Baez court
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took

great

pains

to

distinguish

the

“limited

authority

[of

sheriffs] to make arrests,” and that courts had “limited deputy
sheriffs’

power

to

make

warrantless

arrests

to

situations

involving a breach of the peace.” Id. at 1337-38. In this case,
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 21, explicitly grants statutory authority
to “[a]ny officer authorized to make arrests,” which may not
include sheriffs but certainly encompasses police officers such as
Officer Clavette.
Lunn is similarly inapposite. In Lunn v. Commonwealth, the
Supreme Judicial Court held that under Massachusetts common law,
“an officer has authority to arrest without a warrant any person
who commits a misdemeanor, provided the misdemeanor involves an
actual or imminent breach of the peace, is committed in the
officer's presence, and is ongoing at the time of the arrest or
only interrupted by the arrest.” 78 N.E.3d at 1154. Plaintiffs
cite to this case to argue that in order to be lawful, Office
Clavette’s arrest had to occur amidst an “ongoing breach of the
peace.”

Dkt.

41

at

16.

However,

the

Lunn

court

specifically

recognized that, “[a]part from the common law,” there are “numerous
and varied Massachusetts statutes that authorize arrests by police
officers and other officials, both with and without warrants,”
including “G.L.c. 90, § 21 (certain motor vehicle offenses)[.]”
Id. at 1156. The statute by which Officer Clavette exercised his
arrest authority, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 21, is “apart from the
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common law” and therefore does not require a finding of a “breach
of the peace.”
Because there is no genuine dispute that Officer Clavette had
statutory authority to arrest Love for failing to stop for an
officer, the Court ALLOWS summary judgment on Love’s False Arrest
claim (Count I).
II.

Equal Protection Claim (Count XII)
In

Count

XII,

Love

alleges

that

Defendants

violated

Articles I and X of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by
violating his right to equal protection. Specifically, Love claims
that because he is “biracial with a dark complexion,” he “was
subject

to

racially-discriminatory

policing,

including

the

disparate use (and subsequent approval) of force by Defendants in
violation of the guarantees of equal protection of the laws[.]”
Dkt. 1-1 at 19. Defendants contend that this claim must fail
because

a

direct

cause

of

action

under

the

Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights has never been recognized.
Massachusetts state appellate courts have never held that a
right of action to enforce the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
exists. See Pimentel v. City of Methuen, 323 F. Supp. 3d 255, 274
(D. Mass. 2018) (“No Massachusetts appellate court, in the 35 years
since Phillips, has ever held that such a right exists.”); Parson
ex rel. Parsons v. Town of Tewksbury, No. 091595, 2010 WL 1544470,
at *4 (Mass. Super. Jan. 19, 2010) (“No Massachusetts appellate
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court has conclusively addressed the question of whether a party
may bring a cause of action for damages based solely on the
Declaration of Rights in the absence of a statutory vehicle.”)
(citing

Layne

v.

Superintendent,

Mass.

Corr.

Inst.,

Cedar

Junction, 546 N.E.2d 166, 168-69 (Mass. 1989)). Some courts have
suggested that a cause of action may exist or may be available in
certain circumstances. See, e.g., Podgurski v. Dep't of Corr., No.
13-11751,

2014

WL

4772218,

at

*7

(D.

Mass.

Sept.

23,

2014)

(recognizing that “as a general proposition, a cause of action
can, in certain circumstances, be brought directly under the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in the absence of a statutory
vehicle for obtaining relief”); Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program,
Inc.,

459

N.E.2d

453,

457

(Mass.

1983)

(“[A]

person

whose

constitutional rights have been interfered with may be entitled to
judicial relief even in the absence of a statute providing a
procedural vehicle for obtaining relief.”).
In accordance with this Court’s precedent, the Court declines
to recognize a direct cause of action under the Declaration of
Rights because doing so would “develop and expand upon state law,”
and “[i]t is up to the courts of Massachusetts, not this Court, to
make that choice.” Pimentel, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 274. Therefore,
the Court ALLOWS summary judgment on Love’s Equal Protection claim
(Count XII).

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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 36) is ALLOWED as to Counts I (False Arrest)
and XII (Equal Protection).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patti B. Saris_______________
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge

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