Reid v. UBER Inc

Filing 7

Judge Richard G. Stearns: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [Copy of order mailed to plaintiff on 9/26/2018.] (PSSA, 3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-11248-RGS
JOSEPH REID
v.
UBER Inc.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
September 26, 2018
STEARNS, D.J.
Joseph Reid brings this action against UBER Inc. (Uber) in which he
alleges that: (1) he was fired as a driver for Uber without just cause; and
(2) Uber denied him payment for services performed. For the reasons stated
below, the court orders that this action be dismissed without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I.

BACKGROUND
On June 14, 2018, Reid filed a pro se civil complaint (Dkt. #1) against

Uber, claiming that the company had wrongfully fired him, withheld money
due to him, and retaliated against him. In a memorandum and order dated
August 22, 2018 (Dkt. #5), the court granted Reid’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and conducted a preliminary review of the

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court concluded that Reid
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because his
complaint did not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court directed him to file an amended
complaint.
On September 20, 2018, Reid timely filed his amended complaint. Dkt.
#6. While the pleading is not a model of clarity, the court can discern
therefrom some key factual allegations. On or about March 15, 2014, Uber
terminated Reid’s employment without warning or just cause. At that time,
Reid had been earning approximately $150/day or $700/week driving for
Uber. Uber also owed Reid $420.00 for work that he had already performed,
a debt that Uber has never satisfied. Soon after the termination, Reid
contacted Uber in writing and by phone concerning the situation, but he
never received a written response and he was not permitted to speak to a
“boss” at Uber by telephone. Reid also refers vaguely to “retaliation,” but he
does not flesh out the conclusory allegation.
II.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions

arising under federal laws, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“§ 1331”), and over certain
actions in which the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in
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controversy exceeds $75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (“§ 1332”). Where a
district court has original jurisdiction under § 1331 or § 1332, it may have
supplemental jurisdiction over claims that “form part of the same case or
controversy” as the claims on which the court’s original jurisdiction is
predicated. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)-(c). A court has an obligation to inquire sua
sponte into its own subject matter jurisdiction, see McCulloch v. Velez, 364
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004), and “[i]f the court determines at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action,” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Upon review of the amended complaint, the court concludes
that Reid has failed to state a claim over which the court has original subject
matter jurisdiction.
A.

Federal Question Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Reid does not identify, nor can the court discern, a federal law giving
rise to his claims.
Assuming, but not concluding, that Reid was an employee of Uber
(rather than an independent contractor),1 he has not stated a claim under

The employment status of Uber drivers has been the subject of much
litigation. While Uber maintains that the drivers are independent
contractors, Uber drivers have had some success in arguing that they are
employees. See, e.g. Malden Transp., Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 286 F.
Supp. 3d 264, 281 (D. Mass. 2017) (concluding that, for purposes of a
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs had adequately pled that Uber drivers are
employees; citing three other decisions with similar conclusions); cf.
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federal law for wrongful termination of employment. Federal law prohibits
an employer from firing an employee based on the employee’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). In some
circumstances, federal law also prohibits an employer from firing an
employee based on the employee’s age or disability. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a);
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). It is also unlawful under federal law for an employer to
fire an employee because the employee has opposed illegal discrimination by
the employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203.
Although Reid alleges that Uber treated him unfairly, he has not
alleged any facts from which the Court may reasonably infer that the
termination of his employment violated federal law. He does not suggest
that Uber terminated his employment based on his race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, or disability, or because he opposed discriminatory
practices by his employer.

Philadelphia Taxi Ass’n, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332, 337 n.2 (3d
Cir. 2018) (recognizing that “whether [Uber] drivers can be classified as
employees or independent contractors is the subject of ongoing litigation”).
Even if the court considers Reid to be an independent contractor rather
than an employee, he has not stated a claim arising under federal law.
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B.

Diversity Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction exists under § 1332 when the plaintiff and
the defendant are “citizens” of different states and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. “For purposes of diversity, a person is a citizen of the state
in which he is domiciled,” or, in other words, where he has his “true, fixed
home and principal establishment.” Padilla-Mangual v. Pavia Hosp., 516
F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting in part Rodríguez-Díaz v. SierraMartínez, 853 F.2d 1027, 1029 (1st Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). A corporation is a citizen “of any State by which it has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.” 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
Here, it appears that the parties are of diverse citizenship. Reid
provides an address for himself in Randolph, Massachusetts, and the court
presumes that he is a citizen of Massachusetts. Reid represents that Uber
has a place of business in Boston, Massachusetts, but it appears that, for
purposes of § 1332, Uber is a citizen of Delaware and California. See, e.g.,
Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 13-10769-NMG, Dkt.
#1 (D. Mass. Apr. 3, 2013 D. Mass.) (notice of removal filed by Uber,
indicating it was incorporated under the laws of Delaware and that its
principal place of business is in California).
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Notwithstanding the probable existence of diversity of citizenship,
jurisdiction does not exist under § 1332 because the amount in controversy
for any viable state law claim exceeds $75,000.

Although Reid seeks

damages in excess of $75,000 for his wrongful termination, 2 he has not set
forth alleged facts that would support a wrongful termination claim under
Massachusetts law. Similar to federal law, Massachusetts law prohibits an
employer from firing or otherwise discriminating against an employee on the
basis of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or because
the employee has opposed illegal discrimination by the employer.

See

M.G.L. ch. 151B, §4. Yet, as noted above, Reid has failed to alleged facts
suggesting that Uber’s conduct was discriminatory.
Further, in Massachusetts, absent an employment agreement
providing otherwise, employment is presumed to be “at will,” meaning that,
subject to laws prohibiting discrimination, an employee can be discharged at
any time, see, e.g., White v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 442
Mass. 64, 70 (2004) (employer was “well within its rights” to give at-will
employee “any reason, a false reason, or no reason at all for his
The court presumes that, from a pleading perspective, the amount in
controversy for the wrongful termination claim would exceed $75,000. Reid
seeks compensatory damages for two or three years of lost wages because of
the allegedly wrongful termination, and he claims he earned $150/day or
$700/week driving for Uber.
2

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termination”), or quit his employment at any time. Reid has not made any
allegations suggesting that the presumption of “at will” employment is
inapplicable to his former employment with Uber.

Thus, while Reid’s

termination without just cause or a warning violates his sense of fairness, it
does not give rise to a cause of action.
Reid has arguably stated a claim that, under Massachusetts law, Uber
owes him $420.00 for services her performed prior to his termination.
Nonetheless, the court does not have original subject matter jurisdiction over
such claim because the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.
III. CONCLUSION
In the absence of subject matter jurisdiction over this case, this court—
a federal court—must dismiss the action. However, the dismissal does not
preclude Reid from pursuing any state law claims in the appropriate state
court. 3
Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

As a courtesy, the court directs Reid’s attention to an internet site that
might be a helpful guide to bringing a civil case in a Massachusetts trial
court. See https://www.mass.gov/handbook/representing-yourself-in-acivil-case (last visited Sept. 26, 2018). This internet site is not associated
with the Federal Judiciary, and the court’s reference to this webpage is
neither an endorsement of its content nor a suggestion that Reid should
pursue relief in a state court.
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SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
__________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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