Alianza Americas et al v. DeSantis et al

Filing 20

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING Emanuel McCray's Motion to Intervene [ECF No. 11 ]. (McManus, Caetlin)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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RONALD DESANTIS, Governor of Florida, *
and JARED W. PERDUE, Secretary of the
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Florida Department of Transportation, in their *
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official and personal capacities; STATE OF
FLORIDA; THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT *
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OF TRANSPORTATION; and Does #1-5,
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Defendants.
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ALIANZA AMERICAS, YANET DOE,
PABLO DOE, and JESUS DOE on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,

Civil Action No. 22-cv-11550-ADB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING EMANUEL MCCRAY’S
MOTION TO INTERVENE
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Currently before the Court is movant Emanuel McCray’s (“McCray”) motion to
intervene. [ECF No. 11]. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24 allows intervention of right and permissive
intervention. Rule 24(a), “intervention of right,” provides that, upon a “timely application,” the
Court “must permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the . . . transaction
that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties
adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). A party may intervene as a matter
of right under Rule 24(a) if it meets the following four requirements:

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First, the application must be timely. Second, the applicant must claim an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action. Third, the
applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede [its] ability to protect that interest. Fourth, the applicant
must show that [its] interest will not be adequately represented by existing parties.
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629, 637 (1st Cir. 1989).
A “[f]ailure to satisfy any single requirement for intervention . . . is sufficient grounds to
deny [the] request.’” Victim Rights Law Center v. Rosenfelt, 988 F.3d 556, 560–61 (1st Cir.
2021). “[A] party to claim standing [to intervene] must have an interest distinct from that of
every other citizen or taxpayer.” Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election
Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). This reflects a well-founded
reluctance to allow intervention “by individuals whose interest is infinitely diluted, rests solely
on ideological grounds, or could be replicated by an unlimited number of parties or would-be
intervenors.” Daggett, 172 F.3d at 110 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179–
80 (1974)).
Here, McCray argues that intervention is warranted because he and his proposed class
members were “either born or naturalized in the United States and as . . . taxpayer[s], must pay
the costs associated with illegal immigration[.]” [ECF No. 11 at 8]. In his argument for
intervention, however, McCray explicitly states that his interest is not “distinct from that of every
other citizen or taxpayer,” Daggett, 172 F.3d at 110, and there is nothing in the record that
suggests otherwise. Consequently, McCray has failed to satisfy a requirement for intervention
by right.
Alternatively, under Rule 24(b), “permissive intervention,” the Court “may,” on a timely
motion, “permit anyone to intervene who . . . has a claim . . . that shares with the main action a
common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). “Permissive intervention is

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‘wholly discretionary,’ and a court should consider whether intervention will prejudice the
existing parties or delay the action.” In re Bos. Scientific Corp. ERISA Litig., 254 F.R.D. 24, 33
n.82 (D. Mass. 2008) (quoting In re Sonus Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 229 F.R.D. 339, 345 (D.
Mass. 2005)). “[A] district court’s discretion to grant or deny motions for permissive
intervention is very broad.” T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Town of Barnstable, 969 F.3d 33, 42 (1st Cir.
2020) (citations omitted). The Court may consider various factors to determine whether
permissive intervention is warranted. See id. at 41–42 (explaining that “a district court mulling
permissive intervention is free to consider whether ‘the applicants may be helpful in fully
developing the case[,]’” and “that ‘more parties would complicate’ matters unnecessarily”).
Here, the Court does not believe that allowing McCray to intervene will be helpful,
constructive, or protect an otherwise unrepresented interest.
Therefore, the motion to intervene, [ECF No. 11], is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
November 21, 2022

/s/ Allison D. Burroughs
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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