Triumph Foods, LLC et al v. Campbell et al
Filing
125
Judge William G. Young: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Sonnenberg, Elizabeth)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
TRIUMPH FOODS, LLC,
)
CHRISTENSEN FARMS MIDWEST, LLC,
)
THE HANOR COMPANY,
)
OF WISCONSIN, LLC,
)
NEW FASHION PORK, LLP,
)
EICHELBERGER FARMS, INC.,
)
ALLIED PRODUCERS’ COOPERATIVE,
)
individually and on behalf
)
of their members,
)
)
CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiffs,
)
No. 23-11671-WGY
)
v.
)
)
ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL, in her
)
official capacity as Attorney
)
General of Massachusetts,
)
ASHLEY RANDLE, in her official
)
capacity as Massachusetts
)
Commissioner of Agriculture,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
YOUNG, D.J.
February 5, 2024
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Plaintiffs Triumph Foods, LLC, Christensen Farms
Midwest, LLC, The Hanor Company of Wisconsin, LLC, New Fashion
Pork, LLP, Eichelberger Farms, Inc., and Allied Producers’
Cooperative (collectively, the “Pork Producers”) filed their
amended complaint, ECF No. 17, on July 31, 2023.
The complaint
alleged ten causes of action, most under the dormant Commerce
[1]
Clause of the United States Constitution, against the
Defendants, the Massachusetts Attorney General and the
Massachusetts Commissioner of Agriculture (collectively, “The
Commonwealth”), due to the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act
(“the Act”), Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 129 App., § 1-1.
Compl., ECF No. 17.
See Am.
The Pork Producers requested a preliminary
injunction and, after a motion hearing on September 6, 2023, the
Court collapsed that motion with trial on the merits in
accordance with Rule 65(a)(2).
No. 42.
Electronic Clerk’s Notes, ECF
The Commonwealth then filed a motion to dismiss.
Mot.
Dismiss, ECF No. 53; see also Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No.
54.
The Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss with
respect to Counts II - X but denied the motion to dismiss with
respect to Count I, alleging a violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause.
See Electronic Clerk’s Notes, ECF No. 66.
The Pork Producers then brought a motion for partial
summary judgment on Count I.
Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 87; see
also Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 88.
The parties fully
briefed the issues and the Commonwealth requested that summary
judgment be entered against the Pork Producers pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(f)(1).
See Mem. Opp’n Summ. J., ECF No. 94.
On
November 14, 2023, the Court heard oral argument on the motion
for summary judgment.
See Electronic Clerk’s Notes, ECF No. 99.
The Court entered summary judgment sua sponte, per the request
[2]
of the Commonwealth, against all Plaintiffs aside from Triumph
Foods, LLC (“Triumph”), id., on all claims under a Pike theory
of discrimination.
Id.; see Hr’g Tr. 16:1-7,1 ECF No. 103; see
also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
The parties agreed to proceed on a case stated basis as to
Triumph’s claim under Count I with respect to the sales
provision of the Act (the “slaughterhouse exception”).
Id.
The
parties have briefed the slaughterhouse exception issue of Count
I on a case stated basis.
Defs.’ Br. Case Stated, ECF No. 109;
Pl.’s Br. Case Stated, ECF No. 110.
On December 18, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
See Mot. Dismiss, ECF No.
114; see also Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 115.
have briefed that issue fully.
The parties
See Opp’n. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No.
121.
II.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In 2016, Massachusetts enacted the Act through ballot
initiative.
Am. Compl. ¶ 25.
The Act’s purpose is to “prevent
animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm animal
confinement, which also threaten the health and safety of
PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL (Mr. Raupp): With respect to the claims
under Pike vs. Bruce Church, which I don’t think were moved on,
certainly not by us THE COURT: Well theirs was an outright [] opposition, and I
think they’re properly before me, and in any event I reject it
[i.e., the argument based on Pike].
1
[3]
Massachusetts consumers, increase the risk of foodborne illness,
and have negative fiscal impacts on the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.”
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 129 App., § 1-1.
The
Act makes it unlawful “for a farm owner or operator within the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to knowingly cause any covered
animal to be confined in a cruel manner.”
Id. § 1-2.
The Act
defines “confined in a cruel manner” as confining a “breeding
pig in a manner that prevents the animal from lying down,
standing up, fully extending the animal’s limbs or turning
around freely” (“Minimum Size Requirements”).
Id. § 1-5.
The
Act also makes it unlawful for a “business owner or operator to
knowingly engage in the sale within the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts of any . . . [w]hole pork meat that the business
owner or operator knows or should know is the meat of a covered
animal that was confined in a cruel manner, or is the meat of
the immediate offspring of a covered animal that was confined in
a cruel manner.”
Id. § 1-3.
A sale is defined in the Act as “a
commercial sale by a business that sells any item covered by
section 3 [of the Act],” but does not include “any sale
undertaken at an establishment at which inspection is provided
under the Federal Meat Inspection Act.”
Id. § 1-5(M).
The
definition goes on to state that “for purposes of this section,
a ‘sale’ shall be deemed to occur at the location where the
[4]
buyer takes physical possession of an item covered by . . .
section 3 [of the Act].”
Id.
The Attorney General has exclusive authority to enforce the
provisions of the Act.
Id. § 1-6.
Each violation of the Act is
punishable by a civil fine up to $1,000, and in addition, the
Attorney General may seek injunctive relief to prevent any
further violations of the Act.
Id.
The Pork Producers here are a combination of pig farmers
(“the Farmer Plaintiffs”) and one pork processor, Triumph.
Collectively, the Pork Producers are located outside the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska,
Illinois, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, North Carolina,
Missouri, Wyoming, and Indiana.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-19.
The
Farmer Plaintiffs allege that the Act will force them to
“convert their farm operations to meet Minimum Size
Requirements.”
Id. ¶ 56.
Triumph alleges that the adjustments
it will need to make as a pork processor in order to comply with
the Act are “penalties.”
Id. ¶ 58.
a. Triumph’s Business Model and Sales
Triumph, a farmer-owned company headquartered in St.
Joseph, Missouri, is a processor and producer of pork products.
Id. ¶ 12.
Triumph largely receives its supply of pigs from its
member-owners, many of whom were its fellow plaintiffs in this
case (prior to summary judgment entering against them).
[5]
Id.;
see Electronic Clerk’s Notes, ECF No. 99.
Pork produced by
Triumph is sold into Massachusetts as well as throughout the
country.
Am. Compl. ¶ 117.
In 2022, Triumph processed over
eleven million pounds of pork meat sold into Massachusetts.
Joint Mot. Clarification Expedited Status Conf., Attach. A,
Partial Stipulation of Facts ¶ 4, ECF No. 107-1.
Triumph has
made efforts to adjust its business model and structure in order
to comply with the Act.
Am. Compl. ¶ 120.
Triumph receives its orders for pork products through what
it refers to as its “exclusive pork marketer,” Seaboard
Corporation, Seaboard Foods, LLC, and Seaboard Foods of
Missouri, Inc. (“Seaboard” or “SBF”).
Id. ¶ 99.
Triumph and
Seaboard’s relationship is governed by a contract between the
two (“the Marketing Agreement”) which states that “[Triumph]
shall produce pork products at the TF Plant and that [Seaboard]
shall purchase, market and sell such products pursuant to this
Agreement.”2
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Declaration, Ex. A,
Marketing Agreement § 2.01, ECF No. 115-2; Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss 3.
The Marketing Agreement further states that “SBF
shall have the exclusive right to, and shall be obligated to,
market and sell on behalf of TF all TF Plant Products.”
Mem.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Declaration, Ex. A, Marketing Agreement §
“TF Plant” refers to Triumph’s pork processing plant.
“SBF” refers to Seaboard, and “TF” refers to Triumph.
2
[6]
6.01(a).
“SBF shall use its commercially reasonable efforts
(taking into account customer needs and requirements) to
schedule, market, and sell to customers all of the TF Plant
Products.”
Id.
Finally, the Marketing Agreement states that
Triumph agrees to produce “pork products that conform to the
relevant quality standards and specifications made available by
SBF to TF (the “Quality Standards”) . . . , as amended from time
to time.”
Id. § 7.02(a).
“TF shall be solely responsible and
liable for any Losses arising out of the production and sale of
products produced at the TF Plant that do not meet the Quality
Standards.”
Id. § 7.02(b).
“TF Plant Products that do not, in
the Reasonable Good Faith Determination of SBF, meet the
applicable Quality Standards (“Non-Conforming Products”) shall
be marketed and sold to customers by SBF as it deems appropriate
in its sole discretion.”
Id. § 7.02(c).
b. The Act’s FMIA Exception (“Slaughterhouse Exception”)
A processing facility is inspected under the Federal Meat
Inspection Act (“FMIA”) when the United States Department of
Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service examines the
product, facilities, and records of such pork processing plant.
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 76-86.
Triumph is an FMIA-inspected facility.
See Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 12.
There are three pork
processing facilities that are FMIA-inspected within the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
See Pl.’s Br. Case Stated 3.
[7]
Outside Massachusetts, there are 101 other FMIA-inspected
facilities that package and distribute such products for sale.
See id.
As stated above, see p.4, supra, the Act here provides an
exemption from its requirements for pork products when those
products are sold on the premises of an FMIA-inspected facility.
The exemption only occurs for the sale at the inspected
facility.
If, for instance, a Massachusetts FMIA-inspected pork
processer sold non-compliant pork on its premises to a grocery
store, that sale would be exempt; however, the store’s attempts
to then sell that non-compliant pork in-store, off the premises
of the FMIA-inspected facility, would be covered under the Act.
Were that same pork processor to sell directly to the consumer
at its facility, however, whether a family purchasing pork for
dinner or a hospital chain purchasing pork to be served, not
sold, to hundreds of patients, there would be no further sale of
the pork after the sale on the facility’s premises, and the
noncompliant pork sale would therefore be entirely exempt from
the Act.
III. ANALYSIS
A.
The Commonwealth’s Motion to Dismiss
The Commonwealth, in its motion to dismiss, argues that
because Seaboard, not Triumph, markets and sells Triumph pork
product into Massachusetts, Triumph “has not substantiated harm
[8]
to Triumph causally connected” to the Act.
Dismiss 1-2 (emphasis in original).
Mem. Supp. Mot.
This is a distinction
without a difference, however, and the Commonwealth’s motion to
dismiss is denied.
1. Standard of Review
When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), granting such a motion “is
appropriate only when the facts alleged in the complaint, taken
as true, do not justify the exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction.”
Muniz-Rivera v. United States, 326 F.3d 8, 11
(1st Cir. 2003); see also MSP Recovery Claims Series 44, LLC v.
Bunker Hill Ins. Co., No. CV 22-11681-WGY, 2023 WL 4744739, at
*3 (D. Mass. July 25, 2023).
“When a district court considers a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion, it must credit the plaintiff's well-pled
factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor.”
(1st Cir. 2010).
Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54
“In addition, the court may consider whatever
evidence has been submitted, such as the depositions and
exhibits submitted in this case.”
Aversa v. United States, 99
F.3d 1200, 1210 (1st Cir. 1996).
“While the court generally may
not consider materials outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, it may consider such materials on a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion.”
Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 288 (1st Cir.
2002), as corrected (May 8, 2002).
[9]
2. Standing under Article III
“Article III confines the federal judicial power to the
resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ For there to be a
case or controversy under Article III, the plaintiff must have a
‘personal stake’ in the case -- in other words, standing.”
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021).
“[T]o
establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered
an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual
or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the
defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed
by judicial relief.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
The Commonwealth characterizes Triumph’s relationship with
Seaboard to that of a buyer and seller.
As the Commonwealth
describes it, Triumph sells its pork products to Seaboard, and
Seaboard then, as now-owner of these products, markets and sells
them into Massachusetts.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6-7.
Triumph
disputes this characterization, however, instead describing
Seaboard as a contractor Triumph engages to market its products.
See Opp’n. Mot. Dismiss 10.
Drawing every reasonable inference
in favor of Triumph as the plaintiff, the contractual
relationship between Seaboard and Triumph does not prevent
Triumph from suffering injury under the Act.
Triumph’s pork
products can only be sold into Massachusetts when they are
[10]
compliant with the Act; who markets the products and creates
relationships with customers does not change that fact.
In order to produce compliant pork, Triumph must (and in
fact, has begun to) restructure its processing facility and
procedures, segregating pork that meets the requirements of the
Act.
See Am. Compl. ¶ 89.
Without compliant pork, Triumph is
unable to sell its products into Massachusetts at all.
These
are both concrete, particularized injuries to Triumph.
See,
e.g., Gustavsen v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2018) (“[A]ctual economic loss . . . is the prototypical
concrete harm.”).
This injury to Triumph is also imminent and actual economic
harm.
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555.
The Commonwealth argues that
Seaboard is required “to sell all of Triumph’s product.”
Supp. Mot. Dismiss 8 (emphasis in original).
Mem.
With this claim,
however, the Commonwealth misreads the Marketing Agreement.
Seaboard is only required to sell all of Triumph’s product that
meets the Quality Standards set forth by Seaboard.
Product that
fails to meet these Quality Standards is only sold at Seaboard’s
discretion, and Triumph is responsible for any loss suffered due
to the sale or failure to sell such products.
Seaboard designs
its Quality Standards based on the needs of its consumers;
consumers in Massachusetts likely have more stringent
[11]
requirements due to the Act.
Triumph, therefore, must produce
pork compliant with the Act in order to make its sales.
Triumph has standing to challenge the Act.
The
Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss is denied.
B.
The Pork Producers’ Claims under Pike
Triumph and its co-plaintiffs have attempted to reserve
argument of their claims under Pike.
See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
Under this argument, the Pork Producers argue that “the burdens
on interstate commerce outweigh the putative local benefits of
the statute.”
See Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. v.
The Court
entered summary judgment against this claim at oral argument;
the Pork Producers, however, continue to raise it.
The claim is
foreclosed by the recent Supreme Court decision in National Pork
Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356, 371 (2023), and the
Court therefore entered summary judgment against the Pork
Producers on this argument.
In Ross, two organizations of pork
producers filed suit on behalf of their members to challenge
Proposition 12, a California state statute that is nearly
identical to the Act.
Id. at 367.
The Supreme Court ruled that
“harm to some producers’ favored methods of operation” did not
rise to a “substantial harm to interstate commerce,” and that
“increased production expenses” cannot be compared by a court to
“noneconomic” state benefits.
marks omitted); id. at 380-81.
Id. at 385-87 (internal quotation
Further, the Court explained,
[12]
“judges often are ‘not institutionally suited to draw reliable
conclusions of the kind that would be necessary . . . to satisfy
[the] Pike’ test as petitioners conceive it.”
Id. at 380
(quoting Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S.
328, 353 (2008)).
Triumph apparently wants the Court to attempt
to apply the Pike balancing test to the facts of its case.
As
the Supreme Court notes, however, “[t]he competing goods are
incommensurable. . . . In a functioning democracy, policy
choices like these usually belong to the people and their
elected representatives.”
Id. at 382.
“[C]ourts should not be in a position to choose between
different substantive moral positions based on an inchoate
balancing test.
Instead, the question should be whether the
state has a genuine and well-founded conscience concern
underlying its law.”
Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause and
Moral Complicity in a National Marketplace, 137 Harv. L. Rev.
980, 1001 (2024) (“The Dormant Commerce Clause and Moral
Complicity”).
As the Act here is the result of Massachusetts
citizens petition process, see Sec’y of the Commonwealth of
Mass., Information for Voters, Massachusetts 2016 Ballot, 8–11
(2016),3 these “social norms . . . have won out in the political
process of [Massachusetts].”
The Dormant Commerce Clause and
https://www.sec.state.ma.us/divisions/elections/download/
information-for-voters/IFV_2016-English.pdf.
3
[13]
Moral Complicity, supra, at 1000-01.
Accordingly, this Court
declines to engage in Pike balancing and rejects the Pork
Producers’ argument.
The Pork Producers complain that summary judgment should
not have entered against them on this point as the Court gave
inadequate warning of that result.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)
(“After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the
court may (1) grant summary judgment for a nonmovant . . . .”).
The point is of no practical moment (as the Court sought to
explain during a busy motion session).
The legal issue had been
fully briefed and the Court’s resolution obviated the need for
evidence.
C.
Constitutionality of the “Slaughterhouse Exception”
Finally, Triumph and the Commonwealth proceeded on a case
stated basis regarding Triumph’s last claim, the so-called
slaughterhouse exception.
1. Standard of Review
“In a case stated, the parties waive trial and present the
case to the court on the undisputed facts in the pre-trial
record.”
Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673
F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted).
“‘Case-stated’ resolution is appropriate ‘when the basic dispute
between the parties concerns only the factual inferences that
one might draw from the more basic facts to which the parties
[14]
have agreed, and where neither party has sought to introduce
additional factual evidence or asked to present witnesses.’”
Id. at 11 (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union, Local 14 v.
International Paper Co., 64 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1995)).
In a
case stated procedure, “the Court approaches the issues as a
neutral adjudicator and is entitled to ‘engage in a certain
amount of factfinding, including the drawing of inferences.’”
A
& W Maint., Inc. v. First Mercury Ins. Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 113,
118 (D. Mass. 2015) (citation omitted).
2. Analysis
The Act defines “sale” as: “a commercial sale by a business
that sells any item covered by section 3 [of the Act]; provided,
however, that ‘sale’ shall not include any sale undertaken at an
establishment at which inspection is provided under the Federal
Meat Inspection Act.”
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 129 App., § 1-5.
The Act provides further that “for purposes of this section, a
‘sale’ shall be deemed to occur at the location where the buyer
takes physical possession of an item covered by said section 3.”
Id.
Sales covered under the Act must occur within the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Id. § 1-3.
The Act therefore
exempts sales “undertaken” at federally inspected establishments
within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, so long as the “buyer
[15]
takes physical possession” of the covered items while on the
premises of the inspected establishment.
Triumph alleges that as an out-of-state pork processor, it
cannot take advantage of this exemption, even though it operates
entirely federally inspected facilities, because it ships its
product into the Commonwealth from out-of-state and, therefore,
its buyers do not “take physical possession” of its product
while at its facilities.
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 232-37.
Meanwhile,
the federally inspected pork processors in Massachusetts could
operate within this exception.
Id.
For instance, “a large end-
user of pork in Massachusetts -- a hospital system, the state
prison system, a large school district, etc. -- who has for
decades been buying and taking shipment of millions of dollars
of pork each year,” could now purchase and take possession of
cheaper, noncompliant pork on the premises of an in-state
facility.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 12, ECF No. 88.
In
contrast, Triumph would have no way to provide that same
customer with its noncompliant pork, because it does not have an
in-state, federally inspected facility.
The Commonwealth does not dispute Triumph’s analysis of the
regulation’s exemption.
See Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 10.
Instead, it argues that this “limited exception . . . does not
evince an unconstitutional aim to advantage in-state
businesses,” id., and that “the law operates to give in-state
[16]
and out-of-state slaughterhouses the same access to
Massachusetts consumers.”
Defs.’ Br. Case Stated 8.
It is true
that the Commonwealth may not have had a discriminatory purpose
or intent in legislating this exception.
The dormant Commerce Clause, however, also asks the Court
to decide whether the Act results in a discriminatory effect.
“A state law is discriminatory in effect when, in practice, it
affects similarly situated entities in a market by imposing
disproportionate burdens on out-of-state interests and
conferring advantages upon in-state interests.”
Family
Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2010)
(citing Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Env’t Quality
of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
“If the effect of a
state regulation is to cause local goods to constitute a larger
share, and goods with an out-of-state source to constitute a
smaller share, of the total sales in the market . . . [,] the
regulation may have a discriminatory effect on interstate
commerce.”
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117,
126 n.16 (1978) (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349, 352 (1951)).
Triumph alleges that, under the Act, in-state processors
could “create a monopoly for pork processing because they can
accept all meat-- regardless of whether the meat complies with
[17]
the Act and the Regulations-- while out-of-state processors
cannot.”
Am. Compl. ¶ 237.
The Commonwealth counters only that
this is “pure speculation,” and that in-state slaughterhouses
could not “accommodate that sudden skyrocketing demand.”
Mem.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss 10; Defs.’ Br. Case Stated 10.
The slaughterhouse exception has a discriminatory effect.
The only way Triumph would be able to take advantage of the
slaughterhouse exception would be to open its own federally
inspected facility within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
which the Supreme Court has held violates the Commerce Clause.
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 475 (2005).
Instead,
Triumph and other out-of-state pork processors must face higher
costs to sell pork into Massachusetts than those of their
counterparts in Massachusetts, similar to the issue in Hunt.
See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351 (“North Carolina apple producers,
unlike their Washington competitors, were not forced to alter
their marketing practices in order to comply with the statute. .
. . Obviously, the increased costs imposed by the statute would
tend to shield the local apple industry from the competition of
Washington apple growers . . . .”).
As the slaughterhouse exception is discriminatory, it “is
virtually per se invalid . . . and will survive only if it
advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”
[18]
Jenkins,
592 F.3d at 5 (citing Davis, 553 U.S. at 338).
The Commonwealth
fails to demonstrate that the provision advances a legitimate
local purpose.
The Court takes no position on whether the Act
itself serves a legitimate local purpose, see Ross, 598 U.S. at
382,4 but the slaughterhouse exception itself does not appear to
meet the Act’s purported local purpose, as it does not prevent
noncompliant pork meat from sale in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.
The Court, therefore, rules that the
slaughterhouse exception violates the dormant Commerce Clause
because it discriminates against out-of-state commerce.
D.
Severability
Although the slaughterhouse exception violates the dormant
Commerce Clause, it does not render the entire Act
unconstitutional; instead, the provision may be severed from the
rest of the Act.
Severability is governed by state law.
See
Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 813 F.3d 429, 440 (1st
Cir. 2016).
In Massachusetts, there is a “a well-established
judicial preference in favor of severability and a recognition
that ‘the Legislature has announced its own preference in favor
of severability’ as well.”
Id. (quoting Peterson v. Comm'r of
Revenue, 444 Mass. 128, 138 (2005)); see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4,
The Commonwealth argues that the local purpose of the Act
is to “promot[e] animal welfare and remov[e] inhumane products
and their negative effects from its markets.” Defs.’ Br. Case
Stated 10.
4
[19]
§ 6, Eleventh (setting forth statutory rule of construction that
“the provisions of any statute shall be deemed severable, and if
any part of any statute shall be adjudged unconstitutional or
invalid, such judgment shall not affect other valid parts
thereof[]”).
The question of severability turns on legislative intent.5
As the Act was passed by popular vote, the Court therefore must
decide whether Massachusetts voters “would have enacted the
particular bill without the [invalid] provision, or whether, in
the absence of the [invalid] provision, the [voters] would have
preferred that the bill have no effect at all.”
Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 4, § 6 (quoting Peterson, 444 Mass. at 138).
“Severability
entails a two-step examination in which [the court]
determine[s], first, whether the invalid portion of the statute
is ‘capable of separation’ and, second, whether ‘upholding the
statute as severed would frustrate the legislative purpose.’”
Notably, the Act here contains a severability clause,
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 129 App., § 1-9, indicating the voters’
intent to save any portion of the Act that could be upheld in
the case of a constitutional challenge. See Opinion of the
Justices, 330 Mass. 713, 726 (1953) (“Where the statute contains
a severability clause . . . , this is a declaration by the
Legislature that it intends to have the principle of
severability invoked wherever possible.”).
5
[20]
K.J. v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 488 Mass.
362, 373 (2021) (citation omitted).
The slaughterhouse exception is “capable of separation”
from the rest of the statute.
A statute is “capable of
separation” when the “severed [portion] is not so connected with
and dependent upon other clauses of the act as to constitute an
essential factor of the whole.”
quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 374-75 (internal
The provision here is a discrete
clause and, were it severed, the Act can still function as
intended.
Second, the statute as severed would not frustrate the
legislative purpose of the Act.
In fact, were the
slaughterhouse exception severed, the Act would only become
enforceable in more locations.
If anything, therefore, severing
the slaughterhouse exception from the Act only serves to bolster
its purpose.
E.
Preemption under the Federal Meat Inspection Act
Triumph argues that the slaughterhouse exception cannot be
severed from the Act since “absent the exception, the Act is
unquestionably preempted by the FMIA.”
13.
Pl.’s Br. Case Stated
This Court, however, has a number of questions before
reaching that conclusion.
Indeed, having declared the
slaughterhouse exemption unconstitutional, it necessarily must
revisit its dismissal of the Pork Producers’ claim that the Act,
[21]
as originally drafted, was preempted by the FMIA.
Count III, ¶ 200.
Am. Compl.,
The Court thus vacates that dismissal and
grants the Pork Producers 30 days from the date hereof to move
for summary judgment on the ground that the Act –- with the
slaughterhouse exemption severed –- is now preempted by the
FMIA.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 114, is
DENIED.
The Court concludes that the slaughterhouse exemption
violates the dormant Commerce Clause, and orders that provision
SEVERED from the rest of the Act.
The Court entered summary judgment against all Plaintiffs
on all counts and claims save for a dormant Commerce Clause
claim regarding the slaughterhouse exemption of the Act.
See
Electronic Clerk’s Notes, ECF No. 99.
That order must now be VACATED in part to allow the Court
to consider whether the Act –- with the slaughterhouse exemption
severed –- is now preempted by the FMIA.
SO ORDERED.
[22]
_/s/ William G. Young_
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
JUDGE
of the
UNITED STATES6
This is how my predecessor, Peleg Sprague (D. Mass. 18411865), would sign official documents. Now that I’m a Senior
District Judge I adopt this format in honor of all the judicial
colleagues, state and federal, with whom I have had the
privilege to serve over the past 45 years.
6
[23]
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