Hootstein et al v. Collins et al
Filing
99
Judge Michael A. Ponsor: AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. As follows: Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 51 & 54) are hereby ALLOWED. Plaintiffs state law claims are dismissed, without prejudice to their refiling in state court. See the attached memo and order for complete details. (Lindsay, Maurice)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
MICHAEL HOOTSTEIN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs
v.
JOSEPH COLLINS, ET AL.,
Defendants
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)
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08-CV-30113-MAP
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Dkt. Nos. 51 & 54)
March 8, 2013
PONSOR, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
In this case, Plaintiffs Michael Hootstein, Kathlyn
Stein, and their minor grandchild, M.R. (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”), filed suit against a number of current and
former employees of the Massachusetts Department of Children
and Families (“DCF”),1 alleging, inter alia, that Defendants
violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, deprived them of civil rights guaranteed by
Massachusetts law, and failed to comply with Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 66A and numerous state regulations.
1
All of these
The DCF was formerly known as the Department of Social
Services. For clarity’s sake, this memorandum will only use
the department’s current name.
allegations relate to abuses that Plaintiffs claim they
suffered during the course of child custody proceedings in
both the Juvenile, and the Family and Probate, state courts
from January 2004 to September 2006.
Plaintiffs originally filed suit against five current
or former DCF employees in their individual capacities,
seeking monetary damages.
After receiving permission from
this court to amend their complaint, on May 5, 2009,
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to add a claim for
“injunctive and equity relief” against former DCF
Commissioner, Lewis “Harry” Spence (“Defendant Spence”), in
his official capacity.
On November 19, 2009, this court
granted Defendant Spence’s Motion to Dismiss, finding that
the claim against him was precluded by the Eleventh
Amendment.
(Dkt. No. 81).
In the motions currently before this court, the
remaining Defendants –- Rome, Collins, Molina, Kipp, and
Greenburg -– all move for summary judgment.
All Defendants
assert that Plaintiffs have not established sufficient facts
to maintain their federal constitutional claims.2
2
Though, in form, Defendants have argued that
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the substance of Defendants’ arguments
really amounts to an assertion that Plaintiffs have failed
to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to any of
their remaining claims.
2
Additionally, Defendant Rome argues that he is entitled to
absolute immunity, and Defendants Collins, Molina, Kipp, and
Greenberg contend they are protected by the doctrine of
qualified immunity.
Finally, Defendants argue that if this
court were to find that they are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiffs’ federal claims, then this court
should exercise its discretion and dismiss Plaintiffs’ state
law claims for lack of jurisdiction.
For the reasons set out below, Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment will be allowed.
II. FACTS3
3
The facts are drawn from Dkt. No. 59, Defs.’ Statement
of Material Facts, and Dkt. No. 77, Pls.’ Statement of
Material Facts. Plaintiffs uniformly failed to cite to
contrary evidence in the record that would cast doubt on the
Defendants’ version of events. Thus, this recitation of the
facts is, by and large, drawn from Defendants’ account.
Where Plaintiffs allege additional material facts that
Defendants omitted, this memorandum has accounted for those
facts. Plaintiffs’ failure to contest the Defendants’
account runs counter to the Supreme Court’s admonition that,
when a party moves for summary judgment, the non-moving
party must cite some evidence of record that casts doubt on
the particular facts asserted by the moving party. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)
(stating that “when a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); see also D. Mass. R. 56.1
(requiring that a non-moving party’s opposition to a motion
for summary judgment include “a concise statement of the
material facts of record as to which it is contended that
there exists a genuine issue to be tried, with page
3
Defendants are sued in their individual capacities as
employees of the Massachusetts DCF: Defendant Rome is an
attorney for DCF; Defendant Collins is the Greenfield
Regional Director; Defendant Greenberg is an Area Program
Manager who has been employed by DCF for approximately
twenty-two years in various capacities; Defendant Kipp is a
supervisor for DCF in the Greenfield Regional Office; and
Defendant Molina is a social worker for DCF, also located in
the Greenfield Regional Office.
Plaintiffs Michael Hootstein and Kathlyn Stein
(“Plaintiff Grandparents”) are the maternal grandparents of
M.R. (the “grandson”), a minor child who first came to DCF’s
attention when, in January of 2004, a mandated reporter
filed a complaint with DCF pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
119, § 51A, alleging that the grandson’s parents were
neglecting him.
After an investigation under Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 119, §51B, on January 21, 2004, DCF determined that
it would support the allegations of parental neglect of the
grandson because he had been present during a domestic
dispute between his parents.
As a result of the decision to
support those neglect allegations, DCF began an assessment
of the grandson’s parents in order to provide social
references to affidavits, depositions and other
documentation.”).
4
services to them.
On January 21, 2004, Defendant Molina was
assigned as Case Manager and Defendant Kipp was assigned as
Supervisor for a case involving the grandson, his mother
(Plaintiff Michael Hootstein’s daughter), and the grandson’s
father.
Plaintiff Grandparents were actively involved in this
process from the beginning, informing DCF that their
daughter suffered from an untreated mental health disability
that affected her ability to take care of their grandson.
On several occasions, Plaintiff Grandparents contacted DCF
or filed formal complaints, alleging that their grandson was
being emotionally abused by his mother and also by the DCF
social worker assigned to the investigation.
Eventually, the grandson began staying with Plaintiff
Grandparents three or four nights a week, and Plaintiff
Grandparents sought and obtained written consent from the
grandson’s parents to seek permanent co-guardianship.
Plaintiffs assert that they informed the DCF staff involved
in their grandson’s case about this living arrangement.
On
or about June 28, 2004, Plaintiff Grandparents formally
petitioned the Franklin County Family and Probate Court for
approval of this “co-guardianship.”
After their daughter’s
mental condition allegedly worsened, Plaintiff Grandparents
also filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Guardianship of
5
a Minor Child with the same Franklin County Family and
Probate Court on or about October 27, 2004.
Two days later, on October 29, 2004, Defendant Molina
filed a Care and Protection petition in Franklin County
Juvenile Court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 24
because of similar concerns about the deteriorating mental
condition of the grandson’s mother.
At the time the Care
and Protection Petition was filed in Greenfield Juvenile
Court, the grandson was officially residing with his mother
in Shutesbury, Massachusetts, and was also in her legal
custody.
As required under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 199, § 24,
DCF notified the grandson’s parents -- who were the
grandson’s legal custodians at the time -- of the Care and
Protection Petition.
Plaintiff Grandparents assert that they should have
been notified of this Juvenile Court proceeding, given that
their grandson was staying with them during part of the week
and because they had a pending Temporary Guardianship
Petition in the Franklin County Probate Court.
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that DCF prevented both the
Grandparents and the court-appointed Guardian Ad Litem who
was representing the grandson in the Grandparents’ Probate
Court guardianship proceeding from participating in the
initial hearing on DCF’s Care and Protection Petition in
6
Juvenile Court, despite their desire to do so.
Following the hearing on the Care and Protection
Hearing, on November 1, 2004, the Franklin County Juvenile
Court gave legal custody of the grandson to DCF.
The
physical custody of the grandson remained with his mother at
that time.
This decision was affirmed at the so-called
“seventy-two-hour” hearing that took place on November 4,
2004.
Plaintiff Grandparents contend that, prior to the
start of this proceeding, Defendants -- via DCF counsel -threatened them (and the attorney that was representing them
at the time), saying that they would never see their
grandson again if they intervened in the Care and Protection
Petition proceedings.
In light of the ruling on the Care and Protection
Petition filed by DCF, the Franklin County Family and
Probate Court stayed the proceedings on Plaintiff
Grandparents’ Emergency Temporary Guardianship Petition
while the grandson was in DCF’s legal custody.
The Probate
Court indicated that it would mark Plaintiff Grandparents’
emergency petition for hearing once DCF’s legal custody
ended.
On November 17, 2004, after the grandson’s mother was
evicted from Jesse’s House (a shelter where she moved
following the commencement of the Care and Protection
7
Petition proceedings), due to her failure to follow house
rules, DCF assumed both legal and physical custody of the
grandson.
From November 17, 2004 to December 8, 2004, the
grandson was placed in a DCF-approved foster home because of
his mother’s unstable living situation. The grandson was
subsequently placed temporarily with Liz and David
Hootstein, his maternal aunt and uncle, who live in the
eastern part of Massachusetts.
Plaintiff Grandparents
allege that before this new placement with the grandson’s
family members occurred, Defendant Kipp called the
Grandparents and informed them that DCF would not approve
this placement with the aunt and uncle unless the
Grandparents withdrew a Registration of Interest (“ROI”)
that they had filed in mid-November 2004 to become the
grandson’s foster/kinship placement under the procedures
established in 110 Mass. Code Regs. 7.103 and 110 Mass. Code
Regs. 7.108.
According to Plaintiff Grandparents, they
acceded to Defendant Kipp’s demand because they feared that
their grandson was being emotionally and physically abused
in the foster home and preferred that he be placed with
relatives.
Plaintiff Grandparents also allege that DCF initially
refused to grant them any visitation rights with their
grandson after it filed the Care and Protection Petition.
8
Despite their objections to this policy and despite the fact
that they were represented by able counsel, Plaintiff
Grandparents did not appeal DCF’s no-visitation decision in
either the state courts or through DCF’s fair hearing
process outlined in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 23.
In December of 2004, however, DCF decided that
Plaintiff Grandparents could have supervised visitation with
the grandson once a month for two hours at a time.
Subsequently, in March of that same year, the Grandparents
were permitted to have unsupervised contact with their
grandson.
According to Plaintiff Grandparents, following
DCF’s March decision regarding visitation, their grandson
also began staying with them two to three nights a week.
Some time early in April 2005, Plaintiff Grandparents,
through their counsel, filed a motion to intervene in DCF’s
Care and Protection Petition proceeding in the Franklin
County Juvenile Court.
This motion would have allowed
Plaintiff Grandparents to officially take part in any future
proceedings regarding DCF’s Care and Protection Petition.
Plaintiff Grandparents allege that DCF opposed this
intervention.
Later that spring, on May 10, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a
new ROI to become the grandson’s foster/kinship placement.
As foster parent/kinship placements for their grandson,
9
Plaintiffs were required to undergo criminal background
checks pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, § 3B and 110
Mass. Code Regs. 7.100(3)(a) and 110 Mass. Code Regs. 7.104
(3).
DCF received Plaintiff Michael Hootstein’s Criminal
Offender Record Information (“CORI”) report from the
Massachusetts Criminal History System Board on May 20, 2005.
This CORI report disclosed that some unspecified criminal
charges had been filed against Mr. Hootstein over thirty
years earlier but that the charges were either dropped or
Mr. Hootstein was acquitted.
Within a week, on May 24,
2005, Defendant Kipp filed a Background Record Check Waiver
Request for Plaintiff Michael Hootstein.
On June 7, 2005,
Defendant Collins, as the Area Director, granted the Waiver
Request because:
The (criminal) charges are over 30 years old
without new complaints arising. The applicant
(Michael Hootstein) states he no longer uses
illegal substances. The DSS history was reviewed
. . . and the explanation offered by the applicant
is consistent with the record. No abuse/neglect
was supported and probate court granted him full
custody (of his daughter).
After the Waiver Request was signed, on or about June
9, 2005, and after a visit with Plaintiffs, DCF allowed the
grandson to begin living with Plaintiff Grandparents on a
daily basis, pending completion of the foster parent/kinship
placement review.
Plaintiffs’ physical custody of their
grandson was continuous from this point in June until they
10
were finally approved as his guardians.
However, Plaintiffs
allege that on June 24, 2005, unspecified Defendants
conducted a forensic evaluation of their grandson without
their permission while he was with his mother during a
supervised visitation.
According to Plaintiff Grandparents,
when they came to pick up their grandson at the conclusion
of this visit, two Greenfield police officers and some
unspecified Defendants allegedly threatened to remove the
Grandson from the Grandfather’s custody.
Plaintiff
Grandparents assert that unspecified Defendants and the
police officers made this threat in order to coerce their
future compliance with DCF’s requests.
According to
Plaintiffs’ account, however, the grandson was ultimately
released to their custody.
Some time in June of 2005, Defendant Collins decided to
convene a Clinical Review Team (“CRT”) panel to review the
grandson’s foster/kinship placement with Plaintiff
Grandparents.
As the Area Director of the Greenfield DCF
Office, Defendant Collins had the discretion under 110 Mass.
Code Regs. 10.08(2) to convene a CRT with respect to any
foster/kinship placements in order to review goal
determinations.
In the usual course, after a panel meets,
the CRT then makes recommendations to the Area Director
about cases involving any foster/kinship placements.
11
On
June 13, 2005, Defendants Kipp and Molina made a
presentation to a DCF Regional CRT that was considering the
foster parent/kinship placement of the grandson with
Plaintiffs.
Defendant Collins was a member of this panel.
Plaintiff Grandparents complain that they were not informed
of this proceeding, that they were not allowed to
participate in it, and that false information was
disseminated about them during this CRT proceeding.
After considering the presentations, the CRT panel
recommended that the Greenfield Area Office complete a
Family Resource Evaluation (Homestudy); the panel also
requested evaluations of Plaintiff Grandparents, which were
to be conducted by Children’s Charter, Inc., a third party
that contracts with DCF.
The evaluations were requested as
a condition of placement, Defendants assert, because of
Plaintiff’s daughter’s ultimately unfounded accusations that
he abused her as a child.
Plaintiffs were requested to
undergo an evaluation pursuant to 110 Mass. Code Regs.
7.104(2), which states:
A foster/pre-adoptive parent applicant or any
member of her/his household must be free of any
physical, mental or emotional illness or handicap
which, in the judgment of the Department, would
impair his or her ability to assume and carry out
the responsibilities of a foster/pre-adoptive
parent. However, no illness or handicap in and of
itself shall disqualify an individual from
becoming a foster/pre-adoptive parent.
12
110 Mass. Code Regs. 7.104(2).
On or about June 20, 2005, Defendant Collins informed
Plaintiffs of these requirements for the approval of their
foster parent/kinship placement.
Also on June 20, 2005,
Plaintiffs filed a Family Resource Application to become the
foster parent/kinship placement for their grandson.
Defendant Rome, as an attorney for DCF, drafted an agreement
setting out that Plaintiffs would participate in the
Children’s Charter evaluation and forwarded it to
Plaintiffs’ attorney.
Plaintiffs’ attorney reviewed the
agreement and contacted Defendant Rome, requesting that some
changes be made to the substance of the agreement, including
adding an evaluation of Plaintiff Grandparents’ daughter.
According to Plaintiffs, during the course of this
conversation, Attorney Rome informed their counsel that DCF
would not approve Plaintiffs as foster parents for their
grandson without this evaluation.
One month later, on July 20, 2005, Plaintiffs and their
daughter agreed to participate in a comprehensive family
evaluation to be performed by Children’s Charter.
Defendant
Collins signed the Agreement on behalf of DCF, and Plaintiff
Grandparents also signed it.
Defendant Molina was also
present and witnessed the signature of Plaintiffs' daughter.
According to the agreement, the purpose of this evaluation
13
was to ensure that the placement with the Plaintiff
Grandparents would meet the needs of the grandson, to
support the efforts of the mother toward a permanent plan
that was in the grandson’s best interests, to evaluate the
mother’s current mental health status and the effect of her
mental health status on the grandson, and to ensure that
Plaintiff Grandparents could support the child’s
relationship with the mother.
On or about August 2, 2005, Carolyn Browning, a DCF
social worker, completed a draft Family Resource Assessment.
This report supported the grandson’s placement with
Plaintiff Grandparents.
Upon receipt of the draft Family
Resource Assessment, Defendant Greenberg noted in Section K,
Recommendations that:
This is a draft study. No formal approval has been
given at this time as there are outstanding
evaluations being done on this family by
Children’s Charter. Once those reports are
received, a formal decision will be made [sic] the
homestudy reviewed.
Plaintiff Grandparents allege that Ms. Browning’s favorable
recommendations were deleted and replaced by Defendant
Greenberg’s notation that DCF was awaiting the report from
Children’s Charter.
However, Plaintiff Grandparents can
point to no actual evidence that Defendant Greenberg’s
notation was anything other than an addendum to Ms.
Browning’s report or to evidence that any changes were made
14
to the conclusions contained in the draft Family Resource
Assessment.
Two days after Ms. Browning submitted this Assessment,
on August 2, 2005, Plaintiff Grandparents, through their
counsel at the time, filed a request for guardianship with
the Franklin County Juvenile Court.
On August 11, 2005, the
grandson’s case was transferred from Ms. Molina to Mary
Ramon.
Ms. Ramon, who is not named as a Defendant in this
case, thereafter served as Case Manager.
DCF subsequently
received the Children’s Charter “Independent Evaluations of
the Plaintiffs and the Children’s Charter Independent
Evaluations: Family Study” on October 24, 2005.
Defendant Collins participated as a panel member in a
second CRT that was re-convened under 110 Mass. Code Regs.
10.08 and held at the Western Regional Office of DCF on
November 14, 2005.
Defendants Greenberg and Kipp and
Carolyn Browning were presenters at this CRT.
After
reviewing Children’s Charter’s evaluations of Plaintiff
Grandparents, the second CRT concluded that physical custody
of the grandson should remain with Plaintiffs, and
Plaintiffs' Family Resource Application as a foster
parent/kinship placement for their grandson was approved.
The CRT further decided that DCF would have no objection to
Plaintiff Grandparents seeking a third-party guardianship of
15
their grandson.
On November 18, 2005, Defendant Greenberg
made the following additional notation in Section K,
Recommendations of the Family Resource Assessment:
Regional CRT on 11-14-05 concerning the approval
of the home and continued placement of [grandson].
Children’s Charter Evals were completed and
recommended that [grandson] remain in Kathy and
Michael’s home. Recommendations that Michael to
become re-engaged with Dr. Michael Childs to
understand his stress tolerance and the impact
this may have. Michael Hootstein reports that he
has become re-involved with Dr. Childs. CRT panel
also agreed home to be approved and no objection
[by DCF] to be raised regarding Kathy and
Michael’s petition for 3rd party custody.
On September 25, 2006, the Franklin County Juvenile
Court approved Plaintiff Grandparents’ petition for
guardianship of their grandson.
DCF had no objection to
Plaintiff Grandparents seeking a third-party guardianship of
their grandson, but it did not sponsor the guardianship.
After September 25, 2006, DCF’s regular foster care payments
to the Plaintiffs for the kinship placement pursuant to 110
CMR 7.108 were terminated because of the court’s approval of
the guardianship.
III.
DISCUSSION
The complaint includes thirteen counts, including
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations
of Plaintiff Grandparents’ constitutional rights, as well as
various related state law claims.
16
By and large, the
complaint fails to identify which Defendants are implicated
by each count and generally only sets out that unspecified
“Defendants” are responsible for the constitutional and
state law violations that Plaintiff Grandparents have pled.
Given the lack of specificity in Plaintiffs’ pleadings and
arguments and the rather nebulous nature of the claims made
in each Count, and since all Defendants have moved for
summary judgment on the same grounds, this memorandum will
chart the simplest course through this uneven terrain by
first dealing with Plaintiffs’ federal claims and
Defendants’ claims of qualified (and, in one case, absolute)
immunity.
This memorandum will then turn to whether this
court should exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff
Grandparents’ state law claims if it grants summary judgment
in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ federal claims.
A.
The Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment must be granted if:
[T]he pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Accordingly, the moving party must
establish that there is “an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party's case.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
17
U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
If the party moving for summary
judgment succeeds, the burden shifts to the party opposing
summary judgment to establish the existence of a factual
issue that is both “material,” meaning that it might affect
the outcome of the litigation, and “genuine,” meaning that a
reasonable jury could, on the basis of the proffered proof,
return a verdict for the opponent.
Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
While this court
must resolve any factual controversies in favor of the
non-moving party, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497
U.S. 871, 888-88 (1990), the non-movant cannot rest upon
mere allegations; rather, it must set forth specific,
provable facts demonstrating that there is a triable issue.
Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189, 191 (1st Cir. 1989).
This court must grant the motion for summary judgment if it
determines there are no genuine issues to be resolved at
trial because there is not “sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
In their opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment, Plaintiffs made a glancing argument that summary
judgment was not appropriate in this case at this time
because: (1) while Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiffs’
original complaint, they had not yet filed an answer to
18
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint and a motion for summary
judgment is not a proper responsive pleading to a complaint
and, (2) at the time Defendants filed for summary judgment,
discovery had not yet been completed.
Plaintiffs’ first objection to Defendants’ motion for
summary was disposed of when Defendants, acting at this
court’s direction, filed an answer on December 15, 2009.
(Dkt. No. 83.)
Plaintiffs’ second objection to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is equally unavailing.
Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(f) does provide what the First Circuit has called an
“escape hatch” for a party “who genuinely requires
additional time to marshal ‘facts essential to justify [its]
opposition’ when confronted by a summary judgment motion.”
Paterson-Leitch Co., Inc. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale
Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 988 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting
Herbert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218, 221 (1st Cir.1984).
However, in order to take advantage of that escape hatch,
Plaintiffs were required -- at the very least -- to file a
document with the court that articulates “some plausible
basis for the party's belief that specified ‘discoverable’
material facts likely exist which have not yet come in from
the cold.”
Paterson-Leitch Co., Inc., 840 F.2d at 988.
While strict adherence with the dictates of Rule 56(f)
19
are not required, a party’s failure to file a Rule 56(f)
affidavit or some other authoritative document -- filed
under penalty of perjury or by written representations of
counsel subject to the strictures of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 -is fatal to a party’s request that a court postpone its
decision on a motion for summary judgment until that party
receives any outstanding discovery.
at 221-22.
Id.; Herbert, 744 F.2d
In this case, Plaintiffs failed to provide this
court with any such authoritative document outlining what
further discoverable material facts might exist that would
have an impact on the court’s consideration of Defendants’
motion for summary judgment.
Given this failure to abide by
either the letter or the spirit of Rule 56(f), Plaintiffs’
contention that summary judgment is untimely carries no
weight.
B.
Absolute Immunity
In Defendant Rome’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
No. 51), he claims that, as a DCF attorney who was merely
negotiating an agreement with Plaintiff Grandparents’
attorney, he should be entitled to absolute immunity.
The
Supreme Court has granted absolute immunity from liability
to a select number of government officials, including: the
President of the United States, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731 (1982); judges, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
20
(1978); legislators, Eastland v. United States Serviceman's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1976); prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976); and high executive officers engaged in
adjudicative or quasi-judicial functions, Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478.
However, the Supreme Court has also
emphasized that absolute immunity should be rarely granted,
see Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985), and that
“[f]or executive officers in general, . . . qualified
immunity represents the norm.”
U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
Thus, state officers who seek
absolute exemption from personal liability for
unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing
that public policy requires such an exemption.
Butz, 438
U.S. at 506.
To determine whether absolute immunity should apply, a
court should consider: (1) whether a historical or common
law basis exists for immunity from suit arising out of
performance of the function; (2) whether performance of the
function poses obvious risks of harassing or vexatious
litigation against the official; and (3) whether there exist
alternatives to damage suits against the official as a means
of redressing wrongful conduct.
U.S. 511, 521-523 (1985).
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
Defendant Rome argues that since
absolute immunity has been extended to prosecutors, see
21
Imbler, supra, high executive officers engaged in
adjudicative or quasi-judicial functions, see Butz, supra,
and to government attorneys who initiate civil litigation in
a state or federal court, see Barrett v. United States, 798
F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir.1986), it should also be extended to
attorneys who are negotiating agreements with private
parties on behalf of government agencies.
According to Defendant Rome, he was merely acting
within the scope of his employment as a DCF attorney when he
negotiated the agreement with Plaintiff Grandparents’
attorney, and he should be protected from exposure to
lawsuits given this role.
However, since Defendant Rome’s
argument for absolute immunity begins and ends with this
assertion and with a conclusory statement that the
performance of his duties might be inhibited by the threat
of harassing lawsuits, and since he bears the burden of
establishing that he is entitled to absolute immunity, this
court cannot find that he is entitled to absolute immunity
in this case.
For the reasons set forth below, however,
Defendant Rome, along with the other Defendants, is entitled
to qualified immunity.
C.
Qualified Immunity
As noted above, all Defendants, with the exception of
22
Defendant Rome, moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff
Grandparents’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an
assertion that they are entitled to qualified immunity.4
State actors are protected from damages under § 1983 if
“they have performed discretionary functions falling within
the scope of their authority and have done so in an
objectively reasonable manner, measured by the state of the
law at the time the conduct occurred.”
192 (citations omitted).
Brennan, 888 F.2d at
The qualified immunity doctrine
provides defendant public officials an immunity from suit
and not a mere defense to liability.
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Mitchell v. Forsyth,
Therefore, whether the defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity should be resolved at the
earliest possible stage in litigation.
Hunter v. Bryant,
502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
In order to determine if state actors are entitled to
qualified immunity, a court must decide: (1) whether the
facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation
of a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right
4
Defendant Rome did plead a qualified immunity defense,
See Defs.’ Answer to Amended Complaint with Jury Demand,
Dkt. No. 83, and at oral argument on the motions for summary
judgment, counsel for Defendant Rome indicated that, if this
court did not grant his request for absolute immunity, then
this court should consider whether he was entitled to
qualified immunity.
23
was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant's
alleged violation.
(1st Cir. 2009).
Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269
In conducting this analysis, “[c]ourts
have discretion to decide whether, on the facts of a
particular case, it is worthwhile to address first whether
the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional
right.”
Id. at 270.
If the plaintiffs have established sufficient facts
that would support their allegations that the defendants
violated their constitutional rights, a court must then move
on to the second prong and determine if the right was
clearly established at the time of defendants’ actions.
The
Supreme Court has held that to find a “clearly established”
constitutional right “[t]he contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear [such] that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
While it
is not true that officials’ actions are protected by
qualified immunity unless the specific actions in question
have previously been held unlawful, the illegality of their
actions must have been apparent given the state of preexisting law.
Id.
Finally, officials do not lose their
immunity merely by violating a federal or state law, unless
that law provides the basis for the plaintiffs’ cause of
24
action.
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n. 12 (1984).
If, after canvassing the evidence presented, the
district court finds that there is not some genuine factual
issue about whether the defendants violated the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights, then the court must grant the motion
for summary judgment based on the defendants’ claims to
qualified immunity.
See Lipsett v. University of Puerto
Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 895 (1st Cir. 1988).
In this case,
Plaintiff Grandparents fail to clear the first prong of the
qualified immunity analysis because they have not set forth
sufficient facts in support of any count in their complaint
that are sufficient to maintain their claims that Defendants
violated their constitutional rights.
entitled to qualified immunity.
Thus, Defendants are
This memorandum will now
turn to each count of Plaintiff Grandparents’ Amended
Complaint that contains a federal cause of action under the
United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
delineate why Plaintiff Grandparents have failed to
establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
D.
Count II: Alleged Violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment Rights to Procedural and Substantive Due
Process
Count II of the complaint alleges that Defendants
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying Plaintiff
25
Grandparents’ substantive due process rights, as well as
their procedural due process rights.
This court will first
examine the procedural due process claims and then consider
Plaintiffs’ substantive due process allegations.
1.
Procedural Due Process
The basic protections provided by the constitutional
requirement of due process of law require that, before a
significant deprivation of liberty or property takes place
at the state's hands, the affected individuals must be
forewarned and afforded an opportunity to be heard “at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
Armstrong v.
Thus, at its core,
“procedural due process” is simply “a guarantee of fair
procedure.”
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
Where procedural due process must be afforded because a
liberty or property interest is within the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection, a court must determine “what process
is due” in the particular context.
Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families For Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 847
(1977).
The adequacy of state procedures cannot be determined
by any rigid formula; rather, “due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.”
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481,
26
92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).
Courts must
therefore evaluate procedural due process claims according
to a sliding scale, balancing a number of factors,
including: (1) the nature of the private and public
interests involved; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
accruing under the procedures used by the state; and (3) the
probable benefit of demanding additional procedural
safeguards.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
When a complaint alleges violations of procedural due
process and asserts that those violations are actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the existence of state remedies is
especially relevant.
Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
A
reviewing court must therefore examine “the procedural
safeguards built into the statutory or administrative
procedure . . . [a]ffecting the deprivation, and any
remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute or
tort law.”
Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 755 (1st Cir.
1990) (citations omitted).
Procedural due process requires
that the procedures provided by the state in affecting the
deprivation of liberty or property are adequate in light of
the interest at stake.
Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6
(1st Cir. 1991)
Here, Plaintiff Grandparents have alleged that DCF’s
27
involvement in the custody proceedings regarding their
grandson violated their liberty interests in familial
integrity and in conducting their family life free from
governmental intrusion, see Smith, 431 U.S. at 842, without
providing them with adequate procedural protections.
The
Supreme Court has noted that rights to the custody and care
of children reside first with their parents, Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), and that the scope
of these rights may extend beyond natural parents to
grandparents and other relatives.
Smith, 431 U.S. at 842
n.49.
However, the protection afforded to the parents’ (or
other relatives’ or caretakers’) interests must be balanced
against other valid concerns, especially the best interests
of the child, as well as society’s interest in the
maturation of children as future citizens.
Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 929-30 (1st Cir.1992).
See Frazier v.
Thus, the
state can freely investigate allegations of child abuse,
Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1993), and if it
develops clear and convincing evidence of parental
unfitness, it may move to permanently terminate the
relationship between parent and child.
455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
Santosky v. Kramer,
Additionally, the state may
separate the child from the parent, before any hearing in
28
which it would be required to show cause for such a
separation.
Hatch v. Department for Children, Youth and
Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 20 -21 (1st Cir. 2001).
In this case, Plaintiff Grandparents first assert that
Defendants deprived them of their interests in familial
integrity without providing for adequate procedures, by
filing the Care and Protection Petition in the Franklin
County Juvenile Court in order to “thwart” their separate
guardianship petition in the Franklin County Probate Court,
by failing to notify them of the existence of Care and
Protection Petition, by not listing them as the parents or
guardians of their grandson on the court documents, by not
disclosing Plaintiff Grandparents’ emergency guardianship to
the Franklin County Juvenile Court, and by refusing to allow
them to participate in the initial proceedings.
Despite these claims, the law is clear that DCF was
acting well within established statutory and constitutional
limitations in their actions in regard to this first
proceeding.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 24 provides a
three-part process by which a court may transfer custody of
a child from that child's parent to DCF.
Section 24 states
that on the petition of any person alleging that a child is
without: “(a) necessary and proper physical or educational
care and discipline; or (b) is growing up under conditions
29
or circumstances damaging to the child's sound character
development; or (c) who lacks proper attention of parent,
guardian with care and custody, or custodian; or (d) whose
parents, guardian or custodian are unwilling, incompetent or
unavailable to provide any such care,” the court shall issue
a notice to DCF and summonses to the child's parents and
hold an initial hearing allowing for a presentation of facts
as to the condition of the child.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119,
§ 24.
In this case, DCF filed such a petition with the
Juvenile Court because it had received reports that the
grandson was being abused and/or neglected.
Once the
petition was filed, notice of the emergency hearing was sent
to the grandson’s parents, as required by the statute.
Although Plaintiff Grandparents may have had a private
agreement with their daughter that they would serve as coguardians for their grandson, and though Plaintiff
Grandparents may have already filed their own petition for
guardianship, Defendants had no obligation under state or
federal law to notify Plaintiff Grandparents of the initial
hearing.
Additionally, because of the need for expedition
in this type of proceeding, the emergency hearing, much like
a hearing for a temporary restraining order, may be held in
camera or even ex parte.
Care and Protection of Robert, 556
30
N.E.2d 993, 995 (Mass. 1990).
Thus, there was no statutory
requirement that Plaintiff Grandparents be allowed to
participate in the initial proceedings, and, as outlined
above, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
this kind of emergency procedure in the past.
Plaintiff Grandparents also assert that they were
prevented from participating in the subsequent hearing that
took place after the Franklin County Juvenile Court
initially awarded DCF legal custody of the grandson.
Under
the procedures set out by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 24, if
the court finds that there is reasonable cause to issue an
emergency order transferring custody of a child following
the initial emergency hearing, then, within seventy-two
hours from the initial time of the transfer of custody, the
court must hold a second hearing, the so-called “seventy-two
hour hearing,” to “determine whether such temporary custody
should continue until a hearing on the merits of the
petition for care and protection [a third hearing] is
concluded before [the] court.”
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119,
§ 24; Care and Protection of Robert, 556 N.E.2d at 995-996.
The Franklin County Juvenile Court held a seventy-two
hour hearing on November 4, 2004, and Plaintiff Grandparents
allege that Defendants prevented them from filing a motion
to intervene in these proceedings in order to be heard, as
31
they were entitled to do.
See Care and Protection of
Manuel, 703 N.E.2d 211, 217 (Mass. 1998).
According to
Plaintiffs, because of statements made by unspecified
Defendants, they feared that if they did intervene, they
would not get to see their grandson again.
It may be true -- and for purposes of this motion for
summary judgment, this court must assume that it is true -that some DCF employees made statements that caused
Plaintiff Grandparents to become concerned about a risk to
their relationship with their grandson.
However, this
discomfort does not amount to a violation of Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has ruled that in
cases in which officials make mistakes in judgment -regardless of whether those mistakes are merely negligent or
actually deliberate -- there is no denial of procedural due
process, so long as the state provides an adequate means of
redress.
Herwins v. City of Revere, 163 F.3d 15, 19 (1st
Cir. 1998).
In this case, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs, who
were represented by competent counsel at this point, were
actually prevented from availing themselves of the
protections set out in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 24 during
the course of the Care and Protection Petition proceedings.
In fact, Plaintiffs eventually did file a motion to
32
intervene in this process in April 2005, despite DCF’s
alleged continuing opposition to this intervention.
Thus,
even if this court assumes that DCF made statements to
Plaintiff Grandparents that could somehow be construed as
threatening, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs had no
means of redress and no evidence that these statements
amounted to a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights to procedural
due process.
Plaintiffs also complain that DCF’s decision to file
the Care and Protection Petition in Juvenile Court sabotaged
and blocked their own emergency guardianship petition and
denied them access to the Franklin County Probate Court.
However, DCF’s decision to file a Care and Protection did
not end the Probate Court’s consideration of their emergency
petition; rather, that court merely stayed consideration of
Plaintiffs’ petition, pending the outcome of the separate
Care and Protection Petition proceedings in the Juvenile
Court.
Plaintiff Grandparents were still able to file
motions with the Probate Court and with the Juvenile Court,
and actually availed themselves of that opportunity.
Indeed, as they set out in their own version of the facts,
it was the Juvenile Court that ultimately awarded them
guardianship of their grandson.
Finally, Plaintiff Grandparents contend that they were
33
deprived of their liberty interests in familial integrity
without due process because they were initially not
permitted any visitation with their grandson.
However, they
could have appealed DCF’s decision to deny visitation
through the state courts, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, or
through DCF’s fair hearing process.
119, § 23.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
As Plaintiffs readily admit, they declined the
opportunity to avail themselves of these procedures, because
they believed that any proceedings would be unfairly rigged
against them.
While their subjective feelings about the
process may have prevented them from taking advantage of the
procedures open to them, this is not enough to establish
that they were denied their rights to adequate process to
redress their grievances.
In sum, this is not a case in which Plaintiff
Grandparents were excluded from participating in the child
custody proceedings or a case in which the courthouse doors
were closed to them when they wanted to intervene in the
process.
Cf. Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that Plaintiff, who provided foster care for her
half brother and sister, had liberty interest in preserving
familial relationship and that termination of foster care
agreement with state -- without any notice of reasons for
termination or any opportunity to retain counsel or be heard
34
in subsequent proceedings -- violated her rights to
procedural due process).
Thus, Plaintiff Grandparents
cannot point to any facts that would justify a jury in
concluding that their procedural due process rights were
violated.
Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified
immunity as to any claims of violation of procedural due
process, as set forth in Count II.
2.
Substantive Due Process
While procedural due process defines what process the
government must provide if it deprives a citizen of a
protected liberty interest, substantive due process imposes
limits on what a state may do, regardless of what procedural
protection is provided.
(1st Cir. 1991).
Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6
Substantive due process protects
individuals against a narrow swath of impermissible state
actions, including those that are “arbitrary and
capricious,” those that run counter to “the concept of
ordered liberty,” or those that appear “shocking or
violative of universal standards of decency.”
Amsden v.
Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753-754 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted).
Thus, it is only when some basic and fundamental
principle has been transgressed or when some state action
is, in and of itself, egregiously unacceptable, outrageous,
or conscience-shocking that “the constitutional line has
35
been crossed.”
Id. at 754.
The question of whether the challenged conduct shocks
the contemporary conscience is the threshold matter that
must be resolved before a constitutional right to be free
from such behavior can be recognized.
DePoutot v.
Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 118 (1st Cir. 2005).
Mere
violations of state law, even violations resulting from bad
faith, do not necessarily amount to unconstitutional
deprivations of substantive due process, id. at 119, and
fear or emotional injury which results solely from verbal
harassment or idle threats is generally not sufficient to
constitute an invasion of an identified liberty interest.
Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1991).
The complaint and opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, though not always clear, appear to articulate an
allegation that Defendants violated their constitutionally
protected liberty interest in familial integrity, including
the care, custody and supervision of their grandson.
Watterson, 987 F.2d at 7.
See
As stated in the previous
section, however, a party’s interest in familial integrity
is not absolute.
See Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920,
929-30 (1st Cir. 1992).
For example, a state administrative
agency may place a child in temporary custody when it has
evidence giving rise to a reasonable and articulable
36
suspicion that the child has been abused or is in imminent
peril of abuse.
Hatch, 274 F.3d at 21.
The ability to take
this kind of action is related to the government’s
compelling interest in safeguarding children that it
suspects are victims of abuse and in acting quickly on their
behalf.
Id.
Here, given the allegations of neglect and/or abuse
that were reported to DCF, there is little question that
Defendants were acting well within constitutional bounds
when they decided to initiate the Juvenile Court Care and
Protection Petition proceedings under Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
119, § 24, regardless of any pending petitions that
Plaintiff Grandparents may have filed separately in the
Probate Court.
And, as described in detail above, despite
Plaintiffs’ complaints about the manner in which these
proceedings went forward, there are simply no facts of
record submitted to support the allegations in Count II that
so shock the conscience that they would constitute a
violation of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights.
Thus, Plaintiffs have not established a genuine factual
issue that would support their claims that Defendants
violated their substantive due process rights, and
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to this
portion of Count II as well.
37
E.
Count III: Unreasonable Search and Seizure in Violation
of the Fourth Amendment
Count III of the complaint alleges that Defendants
Kipp, Molina, and Collins unlawfully seized the grandson
from Plaintiff Grandparents’ house on October 29, 2004, in
violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment does reach interactions
with police or other law enforcement officials that stop
short of an arrest.
United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108,
110 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987).
However,
not every contact with a police officer or government
official implicates constitutional rights.
Aran, 844 F.2d 898, 904-05 (1st Cir. 1988).
See Lopez v.
If an
individual is detained, the Fourth Amendment is more deeply
implicated, but the constitutional guarantee is violated
only if the detention is unreasonable, as judged by a
balancing test that weighs the need to carry out the seizure
against the invasion involved in the police action.
905.
Id. at
When courts employ this balancing test, they should
consider: “(1) the gravity of the public concerns served by
the seizure; (2) the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest; and (3) the severity of the
interference with individual liberty.”
Brennan v.
Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189, 193 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted).
38
In Count III of the complaint, Plaintiff Grandparents
allege that their grandson was seized from them on October
24, 2005.
However, no physical seizure actually occurred at
this time; rather, this was merely the day on which DCF
filed its Care and Protection Petition in Franklin County
Probate Court.
Even after the initial hearing was held on
this proceeding, the grandson initially remained in the
physical custody of his mother until at least November 17,
2004.
Apparently, Plaintiff Grandparents are asserting that
their grandson was constructively seized from them because
DCF filed the Care and Protection Petition, encouraged their
daughter to move out of the house she was living in at the
time and into a shelter, and discouraged contact between
Plaintiffs and their grandson from the end of October 2004
until December of that year, when DCF began permitting
supervised visitation.
However, Plaintiffs can cite to no
case law that would support this theory that their grandson
was “seized” when DCF initiated the proceedings it was
statutorily permitted to begin.
119, § 24.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
Additionally, Plaintiffs cannot plausibly argue
that DCF unreasonably seized the grandson when they
exercised the authority granted to the agency once the
Franklin County Probate Court awarded them legal custody of
39
the grandson.
In their opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiff Grandparents also seem to contend that
Defendants illegally seized the grandson when Plaintiffs had
some sort of unspecified interaction with two Greenfield
police officers in June 2005.
According to Plaintiffs,
these Greenfield police officers were present when they came
to pick up their grandson following a visitation with his
mother, and the officers were allegedly given orders by some
unspecified Defendants to remove the grandson from Plaintiff
Grandparents’ custody.
While it is unclear exactly what
happened during the course of this incident, Plaintiffs
admit that the grandson was ultimately released to them
after a brief delay, and Plaintiffs do not allege that they
were ever detained by the police, much less that any
detention that may have occurred was unreasonable.
Given
these facts, the scope of the alleged contact with the
police in this case simply fails to rise to the level at
which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants
violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, there is no genuine factual issue that must be
resolved regarding Plaintiffs’ allegations in Count III
concerning whether Defendants violated their Fourth
Amendment rights, and Defendants are therefore entitled to
40
qualified immunity as to Count III.
F.
Count V: Violations of the First (and Fourteenth)
Amendments
In Count V of the complaint, Plaintiff Grandparents
allege that Defendants violated their rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments by punishing them and retaliating
against them for exercising their rights to free speech and
by denying them access to the courts.
In general, plaintiffs can sustain a claim that would
be actionable under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they can establish that there is a
genuine factual issue as to whether a defendant’s actions
chilled their ability to exercise their right to free
expression or if plaintiffs can prove that they eschewed
protected speech in order to avoid some sort of negative
official consequences.
See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465,
473 (1987).
In this case, however, by Plaintiffs’ own admission,
they exercised their rights to free speech when they felt
they were being wronged during the course of these custody
proceedings.
They filed numerous complaints with DCF
regarding their perceived mistreatment and had numerous
conversations about their allegations with both the DCF
Ombudsman’s office and with supervisors in the DCF chain of
command.
Thus, there is no factual dispute regarding
41
whether Defendants’ actions in this case somehow chilled
Plaintiff Grandparents’ exercise of their free speech
rights.
Plaintiff Grandparents also allege that their access to
the courts was blocked in violation of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has consistently noted that the rights to
assemble peaceably and to petition for a redress of
grievances are among the most precious of the liberties
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.
United Mine Workers of
America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,
222 (1967).
This right to petition extends to all
departments of the government, and the right of access to
the courts is most certainly protected by the First
Amendment.
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).5
The Supreme Court has identified two general categories
of cases in which plaintiffs allege that defendants have
blocked their access to the courts.
536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002).
Christopher v. Harbury,
In the first category of cases
5
While Plaintiffs only allege that Defendants violated
their First Amendment rights by blocking access to the
courts, courts have noted that denying a person access to
the courts could be considered a deprivation “of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law,” in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Germany v. Vance,
868 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1989).
42
are claims that systemic official action frustrates
plaintiffs in their present attempts to prepare and file
lawsuits.
Id.
According to the Supreme Court, “the
justification for recognizing that claim, is to place the
plaintiff in a position to pursue a separate claim for
relief once the frustrating condition has been removed.”
Id.
Since there is no claim that Plaintiffs are presently
being prevented from pursuing any cause of action in any
court, this case does not fit within this first rubric.
The second category of cases, on the other hand, covers
a class of suits that cannot now be tried, no matter what
official action may occur in the future.
Id. at 414.
The
acts by government officials that denied access to the
courts in these cases may cause the loss or inadequate
settlement of a meritorious case, the loss of an opportunity
to sue, or the loss of an opportunity to seek some
particular order of relief.
Id.; see, e.g., Swekel v. River
Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1261 (6th Cir. 1997) (police coverup
extended throughout time to file suit under applicable
statute of limitations, effectively barring plaintiff from
court); Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cir.
1984) (investigating police officers engaged in conspiracy
to conceal facts regarding shooting of plaintiffs’ brother,
negating family’s ability to seek redress in court),
43
overruled on other grounds by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783,
791 (7th Cir. 2005).
In this second category of suits in which plaintiffs
argue that defendants have improperly blocked their access
to the courts in the past, the plaintiffs would receive
relief that would not otherwise be obtainable in any other
future case.
Christopher, 536 U.S. at 414.
Because these
backward-looking actions are brought to receive relief that
could not be awarded in another suit, the remedy sought must
“be identified to hedge against the risk that an access
claim be tried all the way through, only to find that the
court can award no remedy that the plaintiff could not have
been awarded on a presently existing claim.”
Id. at 416.
While Plaintiffs claim that DCF’s decision to file the
Care and Protection Petition “blocked and sabotaged” their
own emergency guardianship petition in the Franklin County
Probate Court, they do not allege any relief that could not
be obtained in a future suit.
In fact, they actually have
already received the relief that they were seeking in that
action before the Franklin County Probate Court -- the
guardianship of their grandson.
Additionally, as discussed
more fully above, there is no actual evidence that
Defendants blocked Plaintiffs’ ability to petition any
court.
Plaintiff Grandparents eventually filed a motion to
44
intervene in DCF’s Care and Protection Petition, filed a
subsequent motion for guardianship, and were eventually
awarded guardianship of their grandson by the Franklin
County Juvenile Court.
In other words, there is no relief
that this court could award under this First Amendment claim
that Defendants blocked Plaintiff Grandparents’ access to
the courts, and even if there were, Plaintiffs have not
established any facts that would support a claim that
Defendants blocked their access to the courts in violation
of the First Amendment.
As this analysis should make plain, Plaintiff
Grandparents’ factual allegations against Defendants do not
establish any genuine factual issue as to whether Defendants
violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and Defendants are therefore entitled to
qualified immunity as to Count V.
G.
Count VI: Violations of Equal Protection
In Count VI of the Complaint, Plaintiff Grandparents
allege that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause by treating them unfairly compared
to others who were similarly situated and by discriminating
against both the grandson because of his “Puerto Rican
heritage” and against Mr. Hootstein because he is male.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, persons who are similarly
45
situated must be provided similar governmental treatment.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985).
In order to sustain an equal protection claim,
Plaintiffs need to establish that there is a factual issue
as to whether, “compared with others similarly situated,
[they were] selectively treated [unfairly] . . . based on
impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent
to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights,
or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.”
Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1995).
Essential to any § 1983 claim that plaintiffs were denied
equal protection based on racial or gender discrimination is
evidence that the defendants engaged in purposeful
discrimination.
See, e.g., Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)
(discussing intent requirement for equal protection claims
in general).
In this case, the complaint does little more than make
conclusory allegations that Defendants discriminated against
Plaintiffs based on the grandson’s race and Mr. Hootstein’s
gender.
As is true with the other counts in their
complaint, Plaintiff Grandparents fail to specify which of
the individual Defendants were responsible for this
46
invidious discrimination and fail to connect their
allegations of constitutional violations with specific facts
that would support their claims.
Plaintiffs contend that
their equal protection claim is supported by their
allegations regarding the commencement of DCF’s Care and
Protection Petition and the court proceedings that followed
and by their assertions that they were forced to undergo
intrusive evaluations of their fitness as guardians for
their grandson that other similarly situated parties would
not have been forced to endure.
As detailed in the sections above, Defendants’ decision
to initiate the Care and Protection Petition and their
conduct in the proceedings that followed was well within the
norms established in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 24.
Although Plaintiff Grandparents may resent not being allowed
to control the terms of the proceedings that unfolded once
DCF became involved in the guardianship process, they have
not come forward with any evidence whatsoever indicating
that Defendants acted in a discriminatory fashion.
In the
face of a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs’ mere
allegations regarding these proceedings are not sufficient
to establish that Defendants violated their rights to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In support of their equal protection claims, Plaintiffs
47
also make reference to the fact that Defendant Collins
convened two CRT panels, one to review whether the
grandson’s foster/kinship placement with his grandparents
was in the grandson’s best interests, and one to review both
whether the grandson should continue to reside with his
grandparents and whether DCF should oppose Plaintiff
Grandparents petition to become his permanent guardians.
However, Defendant Collins, as Area Director, had clear
regulatory authority under 110 Code Mass. Regs. 10.08(2) to
convene the CRTs to review any foster/kinship placements,
and Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that DCF chose not
to use these procedures when considering placements for
other similarly situated parties.
Additionally, though
Plaintiff Grandparents complain that they were not allowed
to participate in these panels, there is no evidence that
DCF’s regulations call for such participation or that other
foster parents who were similarly situated were allowed to
have the kind of active role that Plaintiff Grandparents
wished to play in these panels.
Plaintiff Grandparents also argue that DCF’s decision
to require that Plaintiff Grandparents undergo the
psychological and other evaluations conducted by Children’s
Charter, Inc. before they were allowed either to assume or
retain physical custody of their grandson evidences
48
Defendants’ intent to discriminate against the grandson and
against Mr. Hootstein.
As with Plaintiffs’ other
allegations against Defendants, though Plaintiff
Grandparents may have found this process disagreeable, there
is no evidence that DCF’s decision to require these
evaluations was the result of any invidious discrimination.
This evaluation was permissible under 110 Mass. Code Regs.
7.104(2), which provides that:
A foster/pre-adoptive parent applicant or any
member of her/his household must be free of any
physical, mental or emotional illness or handicap
which, in the judgment of the Department, would
impair his or her ability to assume and carry out
the responsibilities of a foster/pre-adoptive
parent.
110 Mass. Code Regs. 7.104(2).
Defendants were therefore
acting well within their regulatory roles when they deemed
that the Children’s Charter home study of Plaintiff
Grandparents was necessary in order to satisfy the
requirement that DCF guarantee that Plaintiffs were fit to
serve as their grandson’s foster/kinship placement.
Plaintiffs have simply provided no cognizable evidence that
DCF has declined to order such evaluations of other parties
who are similarly situated.6
While Plaintiff Grandparents
6
Plaintiff Grandparents’ Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts does repeat an allegation that DCF”s
Ombudsman, Kevin Barboaza, told Mr. Hootstein in a telephone
conversation that unspecified “Defendants” were
49
may have found this process objectionable and unnecessarily
intrusive, this does not constitute proof that the
evaluations violated their constitutional rights.
Thus,
Plaintiffs have failed to offer any evidence that Defendants
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Defendants are therefore entitled to
qualified immunity as to the equal protection claim in Count
VI.
H.
Count IV: Allegations of a Conspiracy in Violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
Count IV of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges that
unspecified Defendants participated in a conspiracy to
violate Plaintiff Grandparents’ civil rights in
contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
The First Circuit has
held that, in order to establish a claim under § 1985(3),
plaintiffs must satisfy four elements: (1) first, plaintiffs
must allege a conspiracy; (2) second, they must allege a
conspiratorial purpose to deprive the plaintiff of the equal
protection of the laws; (3) third, they must identify an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) finally,
they must show either injury to person or property, or a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.
Aulson
discriminating against Mr. Hootstein based on his gender,
but no evidence is offered as to who these other parties
were or how the discrimination impacted Plaintiffs.
50
v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).
Courts have
repeatedly emphasized that any claim under § 1985(3)
requires “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators'
action.”
See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102
(1971).
As set out above, Plaintiff Grandparents have failed to
come forward with any cognizable evidence of any classbased, invidious discrimination against them.
Thus, they
could not possibly succeed in proving that Defendants
engaged in a conspiracy to deprive them of their
constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),
and Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity
as to the conspiracy claim in Count IV.
I.
Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims
The complaint also contains various state law claims,
including: (1) that Defendants participated in a criminal
conspiracy in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 25 (a
criminal statute that likely does not provide a basis for
any civil claim) (Count I); (2) that Defendants violated
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119 and various sections of 110 Mass.
Code Regs. (Count II); (3) that Defendants’ actions violated
their rights under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
(Count VI); (4) that Defendants violated the Massachusetts
51
Civil Rights Act (Count VII); (5) that Defendants engaged in
an abuse of the judicial
process (Count VIII); (6) that
Defendants intentionally subjected them to emotional
distress (Count IX); (7) that Defendants invaded their
privacy in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B (Count
X); (8) that Defendants Molina, Kipp, and Collins defamed
them in various court proceedings and DCF meetings (Count
XI); and (9) that Defendants violated numerous DCF
regulations under 110 Code Mass. Regs. and fair information
practices under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 66A (Count XII).
Defendants argue that, if this court grants the motions for
summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ federal claims, then it
should exercise its discretion to decline supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff Grandparents’ remaining state
law claims.
In a federal question case, a federal court may decide
closely related state law claims pursuant to the limits of
its supplemental jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
The
termination of the federal claims in these cases does not,
however, necessarily divest the district court of its power
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Roche v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256-257 (1st Cir.
1996).
Rather, dismissal of the federal questions merely
sets the stage for the court to use its informed discretion
52
regarding whether it should retain the remaining state law
claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (authorizing a district
court to decline adjudication of lingering state-law claims
after it has dismissed “all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction”).
In deciding whether or not to
retain jurisdiction, the trial court must “take into account
concerns of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and the like.”
Roche, 81 F.3d at 257 (citations omitted).
Each case must be decided based on its own particular facts,
and the “preferred approach is pragmatic.”
Id.
In this case, important considerations of state
expertise and judicial comity weigh against this court
retaining the remaining state law claims.
After all, it is
well-established that state courts have almost exclusive
jurisdiction over matters of family law.
This expertise is
especially significant given the Supreme Court’s admonition
that “needless decisions of state law should be avoided both
as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the
parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of
applicable law.”
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
This court will therefore
exercise its discretion and decline jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ causes of action that are based on state law.
Thus, Plaintiff Grandparents’ remaining state law claims
53
must be dismissed, without prejudice to their refiling those
claims in state court.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ sincere sense of grievance comes through
powerfully, both in their counsel’s oral and written
arguments and in their own pro se submissions.
Moreover,
the court deeply respects the generous love reflected in
their determination to nurture and protect their grandson.
Nevertheless, it would be false charity to Plaintiffs to
pretend that this federal lawsuit rests on an adequate legal
foundation.
Any outcome favorable to them would quickly be
reversed on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 51 & 54) are hereby ALLOWED.
noted above, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are dismissed,
without prejudice to their refiling in state court.
case may now be closed.
It is So Ordered.
/s/ Michael A. Ponsor
MICHAEL A. PONSOR
U. S. District Judge
54
This
As
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