Richardson v. USA

Filing 9

Judge Michael A Ponsor: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. As follows: Petitioners 1 motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is hereby DENIED. The clerk will enter judgment for Respondent; this case may now be closed. It is So Ordered. See the attached order for complete details. (Lindsay, Maurice)

Richardson v. USA

Doc. 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS MELVIN RICHARDSON Petitioner v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent ) ) ) ) ) ) )

09-cv-30079-MAP 03-cr-30047-MAP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. Nos. 1 & 119) July 12, 2010 PONSOR, D.J. On August 1, 2005, a federal grand jury returned a fourcount superceding indictment again Petitioner Melvin

Richardson for various drug and firearm offences.

Following

a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted on all counts on March 31, 2006. He eventually received a sentence of 216 months

imprisonment, with four years of supervised release to follow. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal on March 11, 2008. 2008). In the motion now before the court, Petitioner offers two bases for relief: first, the assistance of his counsel at trial was so ineffective as to violate his constitutional rights; second, the court erroneously permitted admission of evidence against Petitioner in violation of Arizona v. Gant, United States v. Richardson, 515 F.3d 74 (1st Cir.

Dockets.Justia.com

129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009).

As the government's memorandum in

opposition to the motion points out, neither of these bases for relief can sustain scrutiny. As to the effective assistance claim, it is well

established that Petitioner must demonstrate that his lawyer's performance failed to meet an objective standard of

reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the trial would have been different. 688-689 (1984). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, the Supreme Court pointed out in

As

Strickland, a strong presumption exists that counsel's conduct was reasonable. Id. at 697. Indeed, in order to satisfy the

first prong of Strickland, Petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance was so poor that he was in essence "not functioning Amendment." as the `counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth

Id. at 687.

The performance of Petitioner's extremely experienced trial counsel came nowhere near to descending below the required mark. prior His decision to stipulate as to Petitioner's was entirely that reasonable he failed under to the

convictions The

circumstances.

argument

prepare

Petitioner adequately to testify, with the result that he was disastrously impeached during the government's cross-

examination, simply reflects the recklessness of Petitioner's
2

decision counsel.

to

testify, The

not

any that

inadequacy counsel

on

the to

part

of

argument

failed

advise

Petitioner to accept a ten-year plea offer similarly does not reflect ineffective assistance of counsel. The decision with

regard to accepting a plea offer is always difficult, and Petitioner's own affidavit indicates that the offer was

conveyed to him for his consideration. 1 The Strickland test does not require that Petitioner's counsel's performance be perfect. It merely requires that it

satisfy certain objective criteria and not descend to the point where Petitioner effectively had no counsel during trial. This standard has not been even approached on the

facts of this case. Petitioner's Gant argument can be disposed of quickly. Gant involved a search incident to an arrest; the search in this case was made pursuant to an inventory. this case are particularly egregious. over 80-miles-an-hour on an The facts of

Petitioner was driving with no driver's

interstate

license in a vehicle that reeked of marijuana, and in which he was carrying a significant amount of crack cocaine hidden under a floor mat. The police officers who stopped him were

not only entitled, but obliged, to have his vehicle towed.

Significantly, the government denies ever having made such an offer at any point.
3

1

The inventory search was done prior to the towing following normal procedures and revealed the contraband. No argument

for its suppression will sustain weight. See United States v. Sanchez, No. 09-1906 (1st Cir., July 9, 2010) For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is hereby DENIED. The clerk will enter

judgment for Respondent; this case may now be closed. It is So Ordered.

/s/ Michael A. Ponsor MICHAEL A. PONSOR U. S. District Judge

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