Baggett et al v. Ashe et al

Filing 219

Judge Michael A. Ponsor: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered, as follows: The court finds that Defendants' policy of permitting male guards to videotape strip searches, even if no viewing occurred, in non-emergency situations, violated the class member s' constitutional rights and that no legitimate, penological interest justified it. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 156) is hereby DENIED, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 171) is hereby ALLOWED on the issue of liability. By September 9, 2014, Plaintiff shall submit a proposed schedule to address the questions of potential equitable relief and monetary damages. If Plaintiff's proposal is not assented to, Defendants may submit their counter-proposal by September 23, 2014. It is So Ordered. See the attached memorandum and order for full decision. (Kaplan, Jennifer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

DEBRA BAGGETT, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASHE, JR., ET AL.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
) C.A. No. 11-30223-MAP
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
(Dkt. Nos. 156 & 171)
August 26, 2014
PONSOR, U.S.D.J.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Debra Baggett represents a class of 178
former and current inmates of the Western Regional
Women’s Correctional Center, who have brought suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Michael Ashe,
Jr., Hampden County Sheriff, and Patricia Murphy,
Assistant Superintendent.1

Plaintiff claims that

Defendants’ policy of permitting male officers to
videotape female inmates being strip-searched upon
transfer to the segregation unit violated the Fourth
Amendment.

Though this case is a class action, the court, for
simplicity’s sake, refers to Plaintiff in the singular
throughout this memorandum.
1

Defendants have moved for summary judgment, (Dkt.
No. 156), and Plaintiff has cross-moved for summary
judgment or, in the alternative, for partial summary
judgment on the legal issue of whether any legitimate,
penological interest justified assigning males officers
to videotape the strip searches, (Dkt. No. 171).
Plaintiff presents two theories in support of judgment
in her favor.

First, she contends that the policy of

permitting male guards to be present to videotape the
strip searches –- even if they somehow refrained from
actually viewing the inmates while performing the
videotaping –- violated the Constitution.

The court

agrees that this policy violated the class members’
constitutional rights and that no legitimate,
penological interest justified it.

Moreover,

Defendants are not entitled to the protection of
qualified immunity for this violation.
Given this, it will be unnecessary for the court to
address in detail Plaintiff’s second contention, that
the policy foreseeably resulted in male officers
actually viewing strip searches of female inmates and
that such viewing constituted a violation Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights under clearly established law.
Plaintiff is correct that at the relevant time period,
clear authority established that, if such viewing did

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occur in a manner that was more than incidental or
inadvertent, it violated the Constitution and
Defendants would not be shielded by qualified immunity.
If the court needed to address this second theory of
recovery, however, a trial would be necessary in order
to determine whether actual viewing, as opposed to
videotaping without looking, occurred.

It would also

be necessary to determine whether Defendants were
legally responsible for the actual viewing.
In sum, because Plaintiff will prevail on her
predominant claim, the court will deny Defendants’
motion for summary judgment and allow Plaintiff’s
motion on the issue of liability.

Further proceedings

will be necessary to determine the appropriate
potential equitable relief and monetary damages.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff, Debra Baggett, was a prisoner at the
Western Massachusetts Regional Women’s Correctional
Center (“WCC”) from September 5, 2008, through
September 12, 2008, and again from October 2, 2008,
through January 28, 2010.

She represents a class of

Unless otherwise noted, the facts are drawn from
Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts (Dkt. No. 160),
Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts (Dkt. No. 173),
Plaintiff’s Counter Statement of Material Facts (Dkt.
No. 174), and Defendants’ Counter Statement of Material
Facts (Dkt. No. 195), along with the documents
referenced therein.

2

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approximately 178 former and current inmates of the WCC
who, upon transfer to the segregation unit, were
subjected to a strip search videotaped by male
correctional officers.

As noted, Defendants are

Michael J. Ashe, Jr., the Sheriff of Hampden County,
and Patricia Murphy, Assistant Superintendent in charge
of the WCC.
The WCC is an all-female facility that houses
detainees and sentenced prisoners from the four western
counties of Massachusetts.

If a prisoner presented as

a suicide risk, committed certain disciplinary
infractions, or needed to be in protective custody, she
was transferred to the segregation unit to separate her
from the general population.
The WCC maintained a set of policies that governed
the transfer of prisoners into that unit, specifically
Policy and Procedure (“P&P”) 3.1.7.

A transition team

headed by Defendant Murphy wrote the policies, though
Defendants Ashe and Murphy discussed them while they
were being drafted.

There is no dispute that Ashe and

Murphy were responsible for the policy.

During the

process, the team also relied on an expert consultant,
John Milosovich.

The policy was updated nearly every

year, though its central tenants remained the same.
(Murphy Aff. (Defs.’ Ex. D), Dkt. No 164, Exs. 1-6.)

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The policy adopted by Defendants required, at a
minimum, four officers to move an inmate to
segregation.

The officers effectuated the move by

cuffing the inmate’s wrists, shackling her ankles,
conducting a pat search, and leading her into the unit.
If an inmate were not compliant, additional officers
would assist.

Any inmate transferred into the unit was

subject to a strip and body cavity search.

This

required the inmate to run her fingers through her
hair, remove dentures if she wore them, raise both
arms, lift her breasts, lift her stomach for visual
inspection if she had a large mid-section, and remove
any tampon or pad if she were menstruating.

She was

then required to turn around, bend over, spread her
buttocks, and cough.
The policy also specified the location of the strip
searches.

They would occur either in the individual

segregation unit itself or in the segregation intake
room.

If the search occurred in the individual cell,

at least two female officers would remain with the
prisoner during the search.

If the supervisor were

female, she would also remain in the cell.

However, if

the supervisor were male, the policy dictated that he
“remain[] in the cell but stand[] in the doorway.”
(Murphy Aff. (Defs.’ Ex. D), Dkt. No 164, Ex. 1.)

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Alternatively, if the search occurred in the intake
room, the entire transfer team would remain in the
room.
One officer was responsible for videotaping the
transfer from the beginning of the move through, and
including, the strip search.

The filming officer was

expected to stand just outside of the cell and point
the camera in the direction of the inmate.

From 2007

to 2010, the policy stated that if a male officer held
the camera, he was to “stand[] outside the cell facing
the Dayroom [away from the cell] with the camera
pointing inside the cell and record[ing] the prisoner
from the neck up.”
No 164, Exs. 1 & 2.)

(Murphy Aff. (Defs.’ Ex. D), Dkt.
From 2010 to 2012, the policy

required “the officer operating the video camera, if
male, [to] stand[] outside the cell with the camera
pointing inside the cell and record[ing] the prisoner.”
(Murphy Aff. (Defs.’ Ex. D), Dkt. No 164, Exs. 3-4.)
Since March 2012, the policy mandated that male
officers operating the camera stand “outside the cell
and position[] the camera on the prisoner from the neck
up . . . then turn[] his head to the side to afford the
prisoner as much privacy as possible.”
(Defs.’ Ex. D), Dkt. No 164, Ex. 5.)

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(Murphy Aff.

In other words, male officers filming the strip
search were required under the policy to conduct the
filming while attempting to avoid looking at the
subject being filmed and, at the same time, taking care
to film the unseen inmate only from the neck up.
According to Plaintiff, when this section of the policy
was being drafted, Mr. Milosovich questioned the need
for the videotaping at all and expressed doubts that
male guards, as a practical matter, could consistently
follow the very awkward procedure as it was prescribed.
(Dkt. No. 175, Ex. 28 at 15 (stating “how can you be
sure that [the camera] will stay from the neck up . . .
Suggest someone check to make sure a strip search can
be video taped at all”).)
Since September 15, 2008, a male guard has held the
camera during 274 strip searches.

For 90% of these

searches, two or more female guards were in the cell,
and during 58%, three or more females were present.
During that period, Defendants employed on the security
staff roughly 31 female officers and 49 to 54 male
officers.

According to Plaintiff, several women

complained to WCC staff about the cross-sex videotaping
policy.
In May 2010, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to
Defendants, informing them that he believed this policy

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was unconstitutional.

Around the same time, Defendants

altered P&P 3.1.7 to restrict the circumstances under
which male officers could operate the camera.

Female

officers were required to do the videotaping unless
“impracticable.” (Murphy Aff. ¶ 110 (Defs.’ Ex. D),
Dkt. No. 164, Ex. 3.)

Between May 2010 and September

2011, male officers held the camera 26% of the time.
Since September 2011, when this suit was filed, males
have held the camera only 2.5% of the time.

From

January 1, 2013 to July 31, 2013, a male held the
camera only one time out of 96 total transfers.
Though it is undisputed that male officers operated
the cameras, the parties vigorously dispute whether
males actually viewed the female inmates during the
searches and, if they did, whether such viewing was
more than incidental or inadvertent.

Plaintiff relies

on the testimony of five members of the class who
discussed their experiences.

They described their

observations of male officers viewing them during strip
searches.

As Plaintiff herself testified, “Sometimes I

could see their eyes and . . . sometimes the camera was
obscuring the face but I almost always could see their
face.”

(Baggett Dep. 279:13-19, Dkt. No. 175, Ex. 13

at 2.)

She further said, “They were looking at me, at

my direction, their faces were pointed and their

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postures and everything were pointed directly at me.”
(Id. 281:17-22.)

Plaintiff also provides testimony

from a former WCC corrections officer who claimed that
male officers would simply “stand off to the side and
just watch the viewfinder.”

(Matlasz Dep. 53:11-15,

Dkt. No. 175, Ex. 5 at 4.)
Moreover, Plaintiff points to the videos
themselves, 68% of which show some or all of the
women’s genitals, buttocks, or breasts, and 82% of
which show some portion of the women below the neck.
Based upon the steadiness of the camera and the footage
of the inmates’ bodies, she believes that a male
officer had to be facing the inmates (or watching
through the viewfinder) to keep the camera as still as
it was and trained on the correct area in the cell.
Defendants, meanwhile, provide testimony from 11
former and current officers who state that they never
witnessed a camera operator actually viewing a search.
More broadly, Defendants believe that Plaintiff’s
evidence is insufficient to establish anything more
than incidental viewing.
On September 15, 2011, Plaintiff filed this onecount complaint against Defendants alleging a violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

This court, on May 23, 2013,

certified a class of “approximately 178 former and

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current WCC inmates who were videotaped by male
correctional officers during strip searches.”

(Dkt.

No. 86.)
On February 21, 2014, Defendants filed their Motion
for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 156), and Plaintiff
cross-filed on March 19, 2014 (Dkt. No. 171).

As

noted, Plaintiff also moved, in the alternative, for
partial summary judgment on the issue of whether any
true emergency or other legitimate, penological
interest justified assigning male officers to videotape
the strip searches.

On April 22, 2014, the court heard

argument on the motions and took the matter under
advisement.
III.

DISCUSSION

On summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable
inferences that might be drawn from them are viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Pac.

Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Eaton Vance Mgmt., 396 F.3d 584, 588
(1st Cir. 2004).

When addressing cross-motions for

summary judgment, “the court must consider each motion
separately, drawing inferences against each movant in
turn.” Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 1997).

Summary judgment is appropriate if no

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genuine dispute of fact exists and a party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

Plaintiff only offers one count in this lawsuit –a violation of § 1983.

To succeed on this claim, “the

challenged conduct must be attributable to a person
acting under color of state law . . . [and] the conduct
must have worked a denial of rights secured by the
Constitution or by federal law.”

Soto v. Flores, 103

F.3d 1056, 1061-62 (1st Cir. 1997).

The law also

“requires the plaintiff to prove not only a deprivation
of federal right, but also that the defendant’s conduct
was a cause in fact of the alleged deprivation.”

Id.

at 1062.
The first element is undisputedly satisfied in this
case.

Defendants were acting in their official

capacities when they created the challenged policy.
Nor is causation in doubt; they were directly
responsible for the policy’s enactment.

Plaintiff’s

claim thus turns on whether Defendants’ policy violated
the Constitution.
Plaintiff, as noted in the introduction, presents
two theories.

First, she contends that the policy of

permitting cross-sex videotaping of strip searches --

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irrespective of whether any viewing of the inmate
actually occurred during the taping –- violated the
Constitution.

Alternatively, Plaintiff says, the

videotaping violated the Fourth Amendment because it in
fact did -- regularly and over extended periods of time
-- result in male guards viewing female inmates during
the strip searches.

Each theory will be addressed

below.
A.

Was the Policy of Permitting Cross-Sex Videotaping,
Regardless of Viewing, Unconstitutional?
Plaintiff’s initial theory is that the searches

required by the policy permitting cross-sex videotaping
violated the class members’ Fourth Amendment rights,
even if the male officer doing the videotaping was able
somehow to avert his eyes while using the camera.

It

must be conceded that the fact scenario posited by this
theory is difficult to conjure up.

Nevertheless, this

(Defendants say) is what occurred, and a fair analysis
of this first, broader theory of recovery must assume,
in the light most favorable to Defendants, that any
videotaping by male guards occurred without the male
actually looking at the female inmate he was filming.
To tackle the argument, two questions must be
addressed: first, did the policy generate
unconstitutional searches of the class members, and

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second, if it did, are Defendants entitled to the
protection of qualified immunity?3
1.

Was there a constitutional violation?

The Fourth Amendment broadly protects “against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”
amend. IV.

U.S. Const.

In the narrow context of searches in prison

facilities, two interwoven strands of cases are
relevant.

The first, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520

(1978), provides guidance for courts tasked with
determining the reasonableness of a custodial search.
The second, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1978),
balances an inmate’s rights against the legitimate
needs of prison facilities.

Though the analyses

overlap to some degree, the cases will be discussed
separately for the sake of clarity.
Defendants believe that Plaintiff’s case is a
“facial” challenge to the constitutionality of the
policy and, thus, Plaintiff can only succeed if she
shows that the policy is unconstitutional in every
conceivable application. See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739 (1987)(noting that a facial challenge must
establish “that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid”). Though difficult to
apply at times, a distinction has emerged between
“facial” challenges –- which broadly attack a law or
policy regardless of the way it is enacted –- and “as
applied” challenges –- those that arise from a specific
dispute about a particular way in which a law is
implemented. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008).
Plaintiff’s challenge here is brought on behalf of a
class of inmates who believe their rights were violated
by the specific manner in which Defendants applied the
policy to them. It thus arises from a concrete dispute
and fits neatly into the “as applied” category.
3

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a.

Bell v. Wolfish

In Bell, the Supreme Court considered the
reasonableness of strip searches conducted on pre-trial
detainees in state custody.

Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.

The Court upheld the policy over a Fourth Amendment
challenge and, in doing so, identified a number of
factors to consider when assessing the reasonableness
of these searches.

The elements were: (1) the scope of

the search; (2) the manner in which it was conducted;
(3) the justification for it; and (4) the place where
Id. at 559.

it was conducted.

To evaluate the policy

here, the court must weigh the Bell factors.
The first consideration -- the actual scope of the
search -- is not the subject of any substantial dispute
in the circumstances of this case.

The parties agree

that a strip search during a transfer to a segregation
unit is permissible.
(1st Cir. 1983).

See Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886

Moreover, the actual strip searches

were completed within a reasonable period of time and
were no more intrusive than other, constitutionally
permissible searches.

Id.

The crux of the challenge is the manner in which
the searches were conducted -- that is, with male
officers present during the strip searches to videotape
the female inmates.

In Cookish v. Powell, the First

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Circuit considered whether a strip search of a male
inmate “conducted within the visual vantage point of
female correctional officers” violated the Fourth
Amendment.

945 F.2d 441, 442 n.1 (1st Cir. 1991).

The

search in that case occurred in the immediate aftermath
of a prison riot.

Id. at 444-45.

Though the court

ultimately found that the defendants in Cookish were
protected by qualified immunity, it described the state
of the law as follows:
(1) inadvertent, occasional, casual, and/or
restricted observations of an inmate's naked
body by a guard of the opposite sex did not
violate the Fourth Amendment and (2) if the
observation was other than inadvertent,
occasional, casual, and/or restricted, such
observation would (in all likelihood) violate
the Fourth Amendment, except in an emergency
condition.
Id. at 447.
Cookish recognized that, despite their confinement,
inmates have some limited expectation of privacy.

That

right “is violated when guards of the opposite sex
regularly observe him/her engaged in personal
activities, such as undressing, showering, and using
the toilet.”

Id. at 446; see also Burns v. Loranger,

907 F.2d 233 (1st Cir. 1990); Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d
164 (1st Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by
Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1988).

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Since Cookish, the First Circuit has addressed a
number of challenges to custodial strip searches.

The

Court of Appeals, when considering the reasonableness
of such searches, has consistently recognized the risk
of a constitutional violation posed by the presence of
custodial staff of the opposite sex.

For example, in

Roberts v. State of Rhode Island, the First Circuit
upheld a strip search policy, in part because “the
policy requires the search to be conducted by officers
of the same sex as the inmate.”
Cir. 2001).

239 F.3d 107, 112 (1st

Two years later, the First Circuit again

upheld a similar policy because “[i]t was done in a
private area, by a single officer of the same gender,
and without physical contact.”

Wood v. Hanock Cnty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 354 F.3d 57, 69 (1st Cir. 2003).
In 2004, the court expanded its analysis by not
merely referencing the gender of the individual
conducting the search, but broadening the focus to
include the environment of the search itself.

In

approving the constitutional legitimacy of the search
in United States v. Cofield, the court noted that “the
officers did not require [the plaintiff] to assume
humiliating poses, [or to] expose himself in an
unnecessarily public place or to members of the
opposite sex.”

391 F.3d 334, 337 (1st Cir. 2004).

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Defendants’ central contention is that these cases
only proscribe actual viewing by a guard of the
opposite sex.

The Constitution, in Defendants’ view,

does not restrict the mere nearby presence of a male
officer during a strip search of a female inmate, even
if he is operating a video camera, so long as his eyes
are averted.
Defendants read the First Circuit case law too
narrowly.

Underpinning these authorities is the

understandable implication that even the nearby
presence of an individual of the opposite sex during a
strip search can be, in itself, a deeply humiliating
experience.

No inmate placed in such a vulnerable and

exposed position should have to rely, or comfortably
would rely, on the scrupulousness of an officer of the
opposite sex turning his or her head as a safeguard to
the inmate’s privacy and basic dignity.
Any other conclusion would defy human nature.

Even

if an officer, standing a few feet away and pointing a
video camera at an inmate of the opposite sex, did in
fact avert his or her eyes from the scene entirely (as
perhaps many, or -– as Defendants contend -- all do),
the humiliating sense of exposure arising in this
situation would be virtually as extreme, from the
viewpoint of the inmate, as it would be if the inmate

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knew the officer were actually looking.

It is possible

some inmates might not care, but for the vast majority
of inmates the scene would reasonably be experienced as
painfully degrading.

To suggest otherwise is to ignore

the inborn sense of privacy most human beings harbor
from childhood through the end of life.
Moreover, in this case -- as Defendant Ashe himself
noted -- utilizing a female officer rather than a male
unquestionably would add “to the dignity and worth and
privacy” of the individual inmate.

(Ashe Dep. 110:20-

111:4, Dkt. No. 175 at 44-45, Ex. 6.)
Admittedly, the explicit holding of Cookish is that
it is a violation of the Constitution, except in very
limited circumstances, when an officer of the opposite
sex actually views a strip search.

The case does not

suggest, however, that the nearby presence of an
officer of the opposite sex pointing a video camera at
an inmate during a strip search, and the forced
reliance of that inmate on the officer’s strict
compliance with a procedure requiring him or her to
look away during the filming, would satisfy the
Constitution.

Cofield’s use of the word “exposure”

reveals the core value being protected, which is the
inmate’s privacy and basic dignity, experienced from
the inmate’s point of view.

The constitutionality of

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the search does not hinge solely on what the officer of
the opposite sex happens to see but, instead, on the
degradingly vulnerable position the inmate is forcibly
placed in.
Here, the male official is present during the
entire transition to segregation and the subsequent
strip search.

It is undisputed that the female inmate

is fully aware that a male guard is videotaping her.
Indeed, if she looks, she can see him holding the
camera in her direct line of sight from a few feet
away.

The applicable procedure then requires the

female inmate to strip naked and manipulate her body
while in the direct presence of the male guard
videotaping her.

The inmate will be ordered to lift

her breasts, spread her legs, bend over, and spread her
buttocks.

For the female inmate, the knowledge that

the nearby male is obliged to look away (if, indeed,
she is aware of this restriction) cannot, to any
significant degree, minimize the extreme level of
exposure she experiences.

The fact that the male

officer, while operating the video camera, may be
turned to one side or have his back turned will do
little, for most female inmates, to diminish the sense
of embarrassment, humiliation, and vulnerability that
she must inevitably feel.

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Ultimately then, the constitutional violation here
arises from the male video operator’s close presence
while the female inmate is required “not only to strip
naked in front of a stranger, but also to expose the
most private areas of her body.”
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997).

Swain v. Spinney, 117

For the reasons stated, the

conduct of these searches breached the constitutional
boundary to such a degree that, even if the remaining
two Bell factors did not favor Plaintiff’s position,
the policy would still be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.4

A review of these factors, however, reveals

that, for the most part, they favor Plaintiff.
The next factor identified by the Supreme Court is
Defendants’ justification for the policy.

In their

initial memorandum (Dkt. No. 159), Defendants noted
that 103 C.M.R. § 924.06(3)(f) authorized strip
searches upon an inmate’s transfer into segregation.
Based on this, they argued, the policy was justified.
The problem with this initial argument is that the
identified regulation only supports the policy insofar
as it calls for the strip searches.

No one, not even

It is well established that an emergency situation
may justify a search that would otherwise be
unconstitutional. As Cookish makes clear, extenuating
circumstances may require a male to videotape the
search. 945 F.2d at 447. Here however, with only one
exception, Defendants do not contend that an emergency
ever justified the male presence.
4

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Plaintiff, disputes the propriety of strip searches
during transfers to segregation, per se.

As invasive

as they necessarily are, these searches do not violate
the Constitution and, indeed, constitute an appropriate
safeguard in the custodial environment.

The

regulation, however, is silent as to the practice of
videotaping these searches and, more importantly, as to
the permissibility of an individual of the opposite sex
holding the camera.
In their reply memorandum, (Dkt. No. 193),
Defendants offer a number of practical justifications
for the videotaping policy.

Again, however, while

videotaping strip searches may, to some extent, be
controversial, Plaintiff does not take the position
that videotaping itself violates the Constitution.
procedure undoubtedly has advantages.

The

It provides an

objective record of the transition into segregation,
enhances professionalism, and deters both misconduct
and false accusations of misconduct.

None of these

purported justifications, however, covers the use of
male staff to videotape female inmates.
Only one asserted justification bears directly on
the issue of the officer’s gender.

The ability to

utilize a male officer to videotape females during
strip searches, Defendants contend, provides

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flexibility during potentially urgent situations.

A

transfer to segregation can be fraught with risk;
serious problems can arise quickly and unpredictably.
The possible use of a male guard to handle videotaping
-- a male instructed to look away while conducting the
taping -- helps to ensure the safety and security of
staff and inmates.
To buttress this point, Defendants point to one
event in 2013 where an immediate need arose to transfer
an inmate to segregation, but no female officer was
available to handle the videotaping.

The flexibility

of the policy permitted a male officer to hold the
camera and complete the transfer promptly.

This

prevented a potentially dangerous situation from
spinning out of control.5
The shortcoming in this legal argument is that
Plaintiff does not dispute the constitutional
legitimacy of cross-sex videotaping in a true
emergency.

All the case law recognizes this

regrettable but necessary contingency.

Moreover, as a

factual matter, the record provides no support for the
suggestion that, at least prior to 2013, videotaping of
strip searches by male officers was limited to urgent
Defendants offer additional justifications under the
Supreme Court’s Turner decision, which are addressed
below.
5

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situations.

In fact, the record confirms that female

officers were not only available but actually present
during the vast majority of strip searches.

The

evidence also demonstrates that Defendants employed
female officers at a roughly similar rate as male
officers.

Critically, no evidence in this record

suggests that the lack of a female officer would have
required postponement of a transfer, or generated any
risk, in any but the rarest of circumstances.
Moreover, if male guards were potentially needed in
emergency situations to effectuate swift moves –- a
situation Plaintiff concedes might require cross-sex
videotaping –- this contingency still would not justify
the challenged policy.6

The 2013 event described by

Defendants, one that occurred well after Defendants
altered their policy, illustrated the feasibility of a
narrowly crafted exception covering a truly urgent
situation.

It does not, however, provide support for a

carte blanche license to use male guards regularly to
videotape strip searches of female inmates.

Defendants take issue with Plaintiff’s narrow
definition of an emergency. The court need not address
this disagreement since it is undisputed that no
emergency, however defined, precipitated the searches
at issue in this case.
6

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In sum, Defendants’ attempt to offer justifications
for their policy is flatly inadequate to provide a
bandage for its constitutional deficiencies.
The final Bell factor is the location of the
searches.

The policy, as noted, provides two different

locations where the searches can occur, the segregation
unit itself and the intake area.

Plaintiff contends

that both areas are too public; Defendants disagree.
The importance of this issue may be secondary compared
to the gender issue and, in any event, the parties’
disagreement raises an issue of fact.

Notably, even

assuming Defendants are correct, it would still not
save the policy given the unreasonableness of the
manner of the searches, and thus the disagreement does
not implicate any material fact precluding entry of
summary judgment.
To summarize, examination of the Bell factors
establishes that the strip searches of class members in
this case, to the extent they occurred with male
officers in the immediate vicinity conducting
videotaping, were unreasonable regardless of whether
the officers actually viewed the inmates.

Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the mere
presence of a male officer nearby conducting the
videotaping during her strip search.

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Since Plaintiff’s

rights were violated, the analysis shifts to the Turner
case.
b.

Turner v. Safley

Although the policy violates Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights, that finding must still survive the
Turner analysis.

At issue in that case was, inter

alia, the permissibility of restricting an inmate’s
right to marry.

The Court’s holding, broad in nature,

is relevant here.
In determining the permissibility of a prison
regulation, the Court said, “[W]hen a prison regulation
impinges on an inmates’ constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.”

Turner, 42 U.S. at 89.

Turner

provided four factors to be weighed in making that
determination: (1) whether there exists a valid,
rational connection between the regulation and the
governmental interest; (2) whether “there are
alternative means of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates”; (3) the impact the demanded
accommodation would have on the facility, staff, and
inmates; and (4) the availability or absence of ready
alternatives to the complained of policy.

Id.

Defendants believe that each factor illuminates a
reasonable relationship between their policy and a

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valid, penological interest.

Plaintiff, meanwhile,

contends that Defendants have the weaker argument on
each factor and that she is, at a minimum, entitled to
partial summary judgment on the question of whether any
emergency or legitimate interest justified the
searches.
As to the first factor -- the connection between
the policy and the goal -- Defendants reiterate their
argument that videotaping the searches is justified and
that male guards are a critical component to carrying
out that policy.

Moreover, they assert that the use of

males permits flexibility in staffing and ensures that
the WCC can provide equal employment opportunities.
These arguments are unpersuasive.

Though

videotaping itself may be appropriate, nothing supports
the conclusion that male guards need to be utilized to
conduct the videotaping outside of emergency
situations.

Indeed, since this litigation began,

Defendants have essentially adopted a policy requiring
only female guards to videotape the searches and have
not encountered any problems.
Defendants’ employment-related arguments rely
solely on speculation.

The record offers no examples

of employees complaining about their assignments; no
data evidences staffing problems.

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Nothing in the

record suggests that permitting males routinely to
videotape strip searches enhanced employment
opportunities for anyone.

Therefore, Defendants have

failed to establish a valid connection between the
policy and their purported goals.
The second Turner factor, the existence of an
alternative to exercise the identified constitutional
right -- in this case, the right to be free from an
unreasonable search -- favors Plaintiff.

Defendants

have conceded that their policy left no room for an
alternative method to exercise this right.

Bull v. San

Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 973 n.9 (9th Cir.
2010)(stating that the right to be free from an
unreasonable search “is not a right susceptible to
exercise by alternative means”).
With respect to the third Turner factor –- the
impact the demanded accommodation would have on the
facility, staff, and inmates –- Defendants repeat their
argument that, in order to avoid compromising the
operation of their facility, their only feasible option
was to restrict male guards from viewing female inmates
during strip searches, not from videotaping them.

This

rule, they point out, was already in place at the time
this lawsuit was filed and was sufficient.

Any other

accommodation, such as excluding males entirely from

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videotaping strip searches (except in an emergency or
otherwise urgent situation), would, Defendants argue,
have reduced Defendants’ flexibility and undermined
security.
The flaw in this argument, as this memorandum has
already noted, is that the record offers no support for
Defendants’ contention that utilizing female guards for
videotaping strip searches decreased Defendants’
ability to effectuate transfers to segregation in nonurgent situations.

On the contrary, Defendants’

current policy of strictly limiting the presence of
males during strip searches has shown that the
overwhelming majority of transfers to segregation can
be managed easily within constitutional boundaries.
Plaintiff’s proffered alternative to the policy as it
existed at the time this lawsuit was filed was clearly
a feasible accommodation that minimally burdened the
facility, staff, and inmates.
On the final Turner factor -- the availability and
benefits of ready alternatives –- Defendants argue that
no available alternative would have provided the same
benefits as the challenged policy.

Defendants itemize

a number of options they consider inferior to
videotaping: an audio recording, not utilizing a
camera, using a tripod, or using a ceiling camera.

-28-

They believe that each alternative would present
serious problems.

An inmate could say something false

on an audio recording; an emergency might arise that
would need to be documented on camera; the tripod could
be used as a weapon; a ceiling camera would actually be
more invasive.

In sum, a video camera held by a

person, Defendants say, was the only option that, as a
practical matter, accomplished Defendants’ goals.
Defendants’ contentions may all very well be true,
but they miss the point.

At the risk of repetition,

this dispute is not about the propriety of videotaping
the searches per se.
the camera.

It is about who should be holding

Since the only real alternative is to

require female guards to hold the camera except in
cases of emergencies, and Defendants have failed to
show why this would not be feasible –- indeed, such a
policy appears to have effectively been adopted at this
point –- the court must conclude that the final Turner
factor manifestly favors Plaintiff.
As a final plea, Defendants suggest that deference
under Turner is particularly appropriate here for a
number of reasons.

First, Defendants utilized an

expert when drafting the regulations to ensure that
they were legally permissible.

Second the WCC has

applied for and received accreditation from the

-29-

American Correctional Association, which did a complete
review of every policy and procedure, including the
policy governing videotaping.

Finally, the

Massachusetts Department of Corrections audited the WCC
twice a year, and no issues respecting the policy were
ever flagged.
None of these reasons justifies deference to the
particular policy at issue.

First, use of an expert,

though prudent, cannot innoculate an unconstitutional
policy.

Here, in any event, a particular irony adheres

to this argument since Defendants’ expert explicitly
warned that the policy presented both practical and
legal problems.

(Dkt. No. 175, Ex. 28 at 15.)

Defendants’ other arguments essentially assert that
since no one who reviewed the policy found a problem
with it, no problem existed.

Again, while the use of

review by outside entities reflected prudence and
professionalism on the part of Defendants, the fact
that these entities did not condemn the videotaping
policy obviously cannot, ipso facto, render it
constitutional.
In sum, no legitimate penological interest
justified the regular practice of using male officers
to videotape female inmates while they were being strip
searched, even assuming the officers respected the

-30-

policy requirement to avert their eyes while operating
the camera.

Moreover, nothing in the record indicates

that any emergency situation ever required the use of
male officers to handle videotaping.

Since the policy

violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the class
members, and since Turner does not save Defendants, the
policy as applied to class members was
unconstitutional.
2.

Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects officials performing
discretionary functions when their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable officer should have known.
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).

Qualified

immunity is not appropriate where (1) an official
violated a constitutional or statutory right, and (2)
the right was “clearly established” at the time the
impermissible conduct occurred.

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011), citing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Defendants contend that qualified immunity is
appropriate here for two reasons.

First, the legal

question at the heart of this case is obscure, and no

-31-

clearly established law existed at the time of the
violation.

If anything, Defendants say, the law

supported their approach since courts have consistently
upheld the use of video cameras to record searches.
See, e.g., Powell v. Cusimano, 326 F. Supp. 2d 322, 335
(D. Conn. 2004).

Second, Defendants say, they strived

to ensure that the policy complied with the
Constitution –- for example, they hired an expert and
had the procedures audited –- and therefore acted
reasonably in concluding that it was permissible.
Though Defendants’ argument has some traction, it
is ultimately unpersuasive.

They essentially concede

that, at the relevant time period, the Constitution
clearly prohibited males from conducting strip searches
of female inmates, or from viewing the strip searches,
except where such viewing was inadvertent or in
emergency situations.

These cases, they argue, were

insufficient to put them on notice that the practice of
having a male officer videotape a strip search of a
female inmate without looking at the inmate violated
the inmate’s rights.

-32-

On the question of when a constitutional right is
clearly established, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that “a case directly on point” is not required.
Ashcroft, 131 S.Ct. at 2083.

Instead, the inquiry is

whether the law “placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.”
At the time of this constitutional violation,
clearly established law prohibited a male officer from
viewing a female inmate during a strip search.
Cookish, 945 F.2d at 447.

It was also plainly

unconstitutional to require a female inmate to expose
herself, particularly to the extreme degree required
during a strip search, in the presence of a male
officer.

Cofield, 391 F.3d at 337.

Given these cases,

any reasonable official would have recognized the
unreasonableness of requiring a female inmate to strip
in the presence of a male officer holding a video
camera and pointing it at her.

The unconstitutionality

of such a policy was, quite simply, “a foregone
conclusion.”

Bonitz, 804 F.2d at 173 n.10.

Given the

clarity of the law at the time the policy was put in
place, a reasonable official would have been properly

-33-

on notice that the policy would inevitably result in an
unconstitutional search.
Moreover, even if the state of the law were
ambiguous –- which it was not –- this policy was so
clearly “antithetical to human dignity” that qualified
immunity would still be inappropriate.
536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).

Hope v. Pelzer,

Any reasonable official

viewing the policy would have concluded that it had the
potential to humiliate and demean the female inmates.
However sincere Defendants’ attempts to comply with the
law may have been, it was unreasonable for them to
neglect the obvious ramifications of their policy.
Ultimately, a reasonable individual in Defendants’
position could not have concluded that permitting male
officers to videotape female inmates during strip
searches –- even if the officers looked away –- was
constitutional.

Therefore, Defendants are not entitled

to the protections of qualified immunity, and Plaintiff
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
B.

Was the Policy Unconstitutional Because It
Foreseeably Led to Cross-Sex Viewing of Strip
Searches?

-34-

The court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s first theory
makes extended discussion of her second theory
unnecessary.

Plaintiff asserts that the videotaping

policy was also unconstitutional because it in fact
inevitably led to male officers actually viewing, in a
manner that was not merely incidental or inadvertent,
strip searches of female inmates in non-emergency
situations.
As a legal matter, if Plaintiff’s assertions were
shown to be true –- i.e., male officers regularly
viewed female inmates during strip searches –- she
would be entitled to judgment in her favor.

Cookish

and its progeny, as discussed, undisputedly hold that
in non-emergency situations cross-sex viewing that is
more than incidental or inadvertent violates the
Constitution.

Cookish, 945 F.2d at 447.

Qualified

immunity would certainly not protect Defendants given
this case law.
Summary judgment, however, would not be available
on this alternate theory on the current record of this
case, based on two disputed issues of fact: did the
policy result in actual viewing that was more than

-35-

incidental or inadvertent, and, if so, were these
specific Defendants legally responsible for the
viewing?

Plaintiff relies on the testimony of five

class members, the videos themselves, and testimony by
a former WCC officer to support her position.
Defendants, in turn, provide testimony from eleven
officers to the effect that male guards handling
videotaping did not routinely view female inmates
during searches.

Moreover, Defendants argue, any

viewing that did occur was incidental and therefore
insufficient to create a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct for which these Defendants
would be liable.
On Plaintiff’s second theory, if this case went to
trial, Defendants might have their work cut out for
them.

The notion that a male officer could

successfully perform the job of videotaping a female
inmate’s strip search (and keep the camera focused on
the neck up as the policy required) without actually
observing the search seems, to put it mildly, dubious.
The practical demands of the task, keeping the camera
steady and trained on the correct location in the cell,

-36-

would make this argument a hard sell to a jury.

Of

course, as the court has already noted, the degrading
exposure of the female inmate placed in this position
should have made the constitutional violation inherent
in this practice manifest to Defendants.

Nevertheless,

to the extent that Plaintiff offers actual viewing as a
basis for her claim of a violation of § 1983, the
record contains sufficiently documented disputed issues
of fact to render summary judgment inappropriate on
this alternate theory.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Managing a correctional facility is a uniquely
difficult task, and Defendant Sheriff Michael J. Ashe
Jr., has a well deserved reputation not only for highly
competent administration but for sensitivity to the
rights and the welfare of the inmates he is responsible
for.

The hallmark of his long tenure as Sheriff has

been scrupulous attention to the dignity of every
inmate, consistent with the operational requirements of
the particular facility.
Unfortunately, in this case a misjudgment occurred
resulting in a policy that clearly transgressed the

-37-

Constitution and injured the plaintiff class.

For this

reason, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
No. 156) is hereby DENIED, and

Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 171) is hereby ALLOWED on
the issue of liability.
By September 9, 2014, Plaintiff shall submit a
proposed schedule to address the questions of potential
equitable relief and monetary damages.

If Plaintiff’s

proposal is not assented to, Defendants may submit
their counter-proposal by September 23, 2014.
It is So Ordered.
/s/ Michael A. Ponsor
MICHAEL A. PONSOR
U. S. District Judge

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