Baggett et al v. Ashe et al

Filing 86

Judge Michael A. Ponsor: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. As follows: For the reasons stated in the attached memo and order, Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. No. 41 ) is hereby ALLOWED. The pretrial phase of the case will continue to unf old, under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman, in accordance with the revised scheduled order entered on January 9, 2013 (Dkt. No. 36), as modified by the parties joint motion (Dkt. No. 72), adopted by the court on April 30, 2013. It is So Ordered. See the attached memo and order for complete details. (Lindsay, Maurice)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

DEBRA BAGGETT, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs
v.
MICHAEL J. ASHE, JR., ET AL.,
Defendants

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C.A. No. 11-cv-30223-MAP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
(Dkt. No. 41)
May 23, 2013
PONSOR, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff Debra Baggett was a prisoner at the Western
Massachusetts Regional Women’s Correctional Center (“WCC”)
from September 5 through 12, 2008, and again from October 2,
2008, through January 28, 2010.

While in custody, Plaintiff

was taken to the Segregation Unit and strip searched during
the transfer, a process which, pursuant to WCC policy, is
videotaped by a corrections officer.

Plaintiff has brought

this putative class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1988 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, contending that Defendants’ policy of
permitting male correctional officers to videotape strip
searches of the female inmates in non-emergency situations
violated her constitutional rights.

Before the court now is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification, seeking to certify a class of approximately
178 former and current WCC inmates who were videotaped by
male correctional officers during strip searches.
The 178 potential class members satisfy the numerosity
requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

Plaintiff’s claims

raise questions of both law and fact common to the class,
specifically (1) whether Defendants maintained a policy or
custom of authorizing males to videotape strip searches of
female prisoners in non-emergency situations and, if this
occurred, (2) whether this policy violated the Fourth
Amendment.

Rule 23(a)(2).

Plaintiff’s claims and defenses,

since she contends that she herself was a subject of the
policy, are obviously typical of the claims and defenses of
the class, as required by Rule 23(a)(3).

Furthermore,

Plaintiff as the representative party, along with her very
well qualified attorneys, will adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Rule 23(a)(4).

Finally, as required by Rule 23(b)(3), a class action
in this case is the superior method for resolving the common
questions of law and fact that exist.

Differences in the

specific circumstances of individual class members may
affect entitlement to damages, but do not affect the
analysis of the propriety of as class action.
2

See Tyler v.

Suffolk County, 253 F.R.D. 8, 11 (D. Mass. 2008) (certifying
a class because the existence of divergent damages among
class members is not an obstacle where a “‘sufficient
constellation’ of common questions predominates”).
Defendants’ opposition raises several arguments that
may be pertinent to the ultimate resolution of the case on
the merits, but are unpersuasive on the issue of class
certification.

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed

to meet her burden under Rule 23(a), as established by the
Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541, 2551 (2011), of affirmatively demonstrating the
existence of the four elements for class certification.
However, the Affidavit of David Milton (Dkt. No. 43) in
support of Plaintiffs’ motion offers sufficient proof of the
fact that the four elements are met to satisfy the standard
as articulated in Wal-Mart.

Also, Defendants refute the

existence of a commonality of issues because Defendants
allege that they had several different policies in place for
the transfer of prisoners into the Segregation Unit during
the class period.

However, the minor variations in the

applicable policies do not make certification improper.
According to Plaintiff, none of the polices limited
videotaping of strip searches by male correctional officers
to emergency situations alone; this is what she challenges.
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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification (Dkt. No. 41) is hereby ALLOWED.

The pretrial

phase of the case will continue to unfold, under the
supervision of Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman, in
accordance with the revised scheduled order entered on
January 9, 2013 (Dkt. No. 36), as modified by the parties’
joint motion (Dkt. No. 72), adopted by the court on April
30, 2013.
It is So Ordered.

/s/ Michael A. Ponsor
MICHAEL A. PONSOR
U. S. District Judge

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