Brown v. City of New York et al
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM & ORDER: All federal claims against the New York defendants are dismissed with prejudice. The Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction as to the state law claims brought against New York defendants, w hich are dismissed without prejudice, save for the collateral estoppel effects of this Order, and with 30 days leave to replead in a state court of appropriate jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in accordan ce with this Order in favor of the New York defendants. After entry of that partial, final judgment, the Clerk of Court is directed to transfer the action against the remaining Massachusetts defendants to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and then to close this docket. So Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 6/13/2013. (fwd'd for jgm) (Lee, Tiffeny)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
FILED
iN CLERK'S OFFICE
-----------------------------------------------------------------x
VINCENT BROWN,
Petitioner,
-against-
U S DISTR!CT COURT E.D NV.
*
JUN 2 6 2013
*
BROOKLYM OFFJCF
.
CITY OF NEW YORK, RICHARD A. BROWN
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF QUEENS COUNTY,:
WILLIAM HOGAN, THE CITY OF
PITTSFIELD, CHIEF OF POLICE MICHAEL
WYNN, DAVID F. CAPELESS DISTRICT
ATTORNEY OF BERKSHIRE COUNTY, and
JOHN DOE.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
10-CV-5229 (ENV) (ALC)
Respondents.
-----------------------------------------------------------------x
VITALIANO, D.J.
In 2010, plaintiff Vincent Brown was arrested by New York City Police
Department ("NYPD") officers on charges relating to a domestic dispute.
After the officers learned of an outstanding Massachusetts warrant seeking an
individual with the identical name, social security number, and FBI number
as Brown, the Queens County District Attorney moved against him as a
fugitive from justice. Plaintiff was then detained for approximately 80 days
awaiting extradition proceedings, but was then released after Massachusetts
officials declined to pursue extradition. Brown now alleges that he was
detained on account of mistaken identity, and sues various public defendants
1
in Massachusetts and New York under§§ 1981and1983; he also asserts
various claims under New York law.
The City of Pittsfield, Pittsfield Police Chief Michael Wynn, and the and
the Berkshire County District Attorney ("the Massachusetts defendants") now
move under Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss all claims against them for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Sgt. William Hogan of the New York Police
Department, the City of New York, and the Queens County District Attorney
("the New York defendants") move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims
against them for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. For
the reasons discussed below, all claims against the Massachusetts defendants
are transferred to the District of Massachusetts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a), and all claims against the New York defendants are dismissed.
Background
The following facts are drawn from the complaint, the sworn
declarations, and the exhibits attached to them. With respect to the
jurisdictional challenge of the Massachusetts defendant, Brown has the
burden to establish jurisdiction, but the record facts are construed in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff. 1 See Emerald Asset Advisors, LLC v. Schaffer,
1
With regard to the New York defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "only the
facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or
incorporated by reference in the [plaintiff's] pleadings and matters of
2
895 F.Supp.2d 418, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing the record on a Rule
12(b)(2) motion); Nasso v. Bio Reference Laboratories, Inc., 892 F.Supp.2d 439,
444 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing the record on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion).
Brown is a man of African-American ancestry who resides in Queens,
New York. (Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 12) ~ 6). He was 43 years old at the time he
filed his complaint. (Id.) In or around 2005, Brown was arrested in Virginia
on an outstanding warrant issued in Massachusetts.
(Id.~
14). This warrant
charged a Vincent Brown of Utica, New York with possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. The warrant was issued on March 6, 1997 by the
Berkshire Superior Court. The Berkshire County District Attorney's Office
("Berkshire DA") entered the warrant in the National Crime Information
Center ("NCIC") system on August 14, 2001. (DePaul Deel. (Dkt. No. 29),
Exh. B at 2-3). The NCIC validation/entry stated that the Berkshire DA would
extradite Brown, if detained there, from Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, or New York. (Id. at 2). Brown alleges that he was
which judicial notice may be taken are considered." Samuels v. Air
Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1993). These facts are deemed
true for the purposes of the motion. However, because the Massachusetts
d~fendants' Rule12(b )(2) motion is" inherently a matter requiring the
resolution of factual issues outside of the pleadings, ... all pertinent
documentation submitted by the parties may be considered in deciding the
motion." Patel v. Patel, 497 F.Supp.2d 419, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). See Standard of Review, infra.
3
"held in Virginia prison for months before Virginia and Massachusetts
concluded he was not the same Vincent Brown from the warrant." (Am.
Compl., 14).
On or about February 21, 2010 came the instant arrest. 2 Brown was
detained on a domestic disturbance complaint. (Id., 15). While Brown was in
custody, Sgt. William Hogan learned, from an NCIC search, of the
outstanding Massachusetts warrant. Sgt. Hogan then obtained a copy of the
warrant via fax from the Pittsfield, Massachusetts Police Department, along
with the NCIC validation/entry for the warrant. (See DePaul Deel., Exh. Bat
2-3). The Massachusetts warrant included a physical description, name, date
of birth, and Social Security number that matched plaintiff's. (See id; see also
id., Exh. F (providing plaintiff's date of birth and Social Security number)).
Sgt. Hogan then proceeded to draft a criminal information in which he swore
that he had matched Brown's FBI and Social Security numbers to those
belonging to the Vincent Brown described in the warrant, and requested that
the plaintiff be detained pending extradition proceedings. (See id., Exh. F).
2
The documentary evidence suggests that the arrest actually occurred on or
shortly before February 20, 2010, the date set forth in the criminal
complaint charging Brown as a fugitive. (See DePaul Deel., Exh. C). The
Court makes this observation merely for the sake of clarity; the precise
date of Brown's arrest is immaterial to the Court's Order.
4
Based on Sgt. Hogan's information, and as authorized by CPLR § 570,
the Queens County District Attorney ("Queens DA") commenced an action
against Brown charging him as a fugitive from justice. (Am. Compl. ~ 14).
Plaintiff states that he protested repeatedly that he was not the same Vincent
Brown for whom the warrant had been issued and refused to waive
extradition proceedings. (Am. Compl. ~ 16). Plaintiff remained in detention
for 30 days, whereupon the Queens DA applied to hold him for another 60
days pending the commencement of extradition proceedings. The application
sought the relief authorized by the statute establishing procedures for the
processing of out-of-state detainer warrants. See CPLR. 570.36 (permitting a
30-day detention for defendants awaiting extradition, which may be extended
for an additional 60 days). Fifty days later, on May 11, 2010, the Berkshire
DA notified the Queens DA that Massachusetts would not seek to extradite
Brown, that the warrant would be recalled from the NCIC, and that the
prosecution of the matter against Brown would be dropped. (See DePaul
Deel., Exh. D). Brown was released the following day, having spent
approximately 80 days in New York detention. (Am. Compl. at 16-17).
On November 20, 2010, Brown brought this lawsuit to recover damages
on account of his detention. (See Orig. Compl. (Dkt. No. 1)). On May 26, 2011,
he filed an amended complaint naming as defendants the City of New York,
5
Queens DA Richard A. Brown, Sgt. Hogan, the City of Pittsfield, Pittsfield
Chief of Police Michael Wynn, Berkshire County DA David F. Capeless, and
3
John Doe. (See Am. Com pl. at,, 7-13). Brown's first cause of action alleges
violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981and1983 against Sgt. Hogan for having
unconstitutionally arrested and imprisoned him. (Id. , , 19-20). Brown also
sues the Berkshire and Queens DAs under those statutes, asserting
constitutional violations for wrongly detaining him, as well as for "de facto
policies, practices, customs and usages that were a direct and proximate cause
of unconstitutional conduct by Assistant District Attorneys and other staff
members" and for "fail[ure] to properly train, supervise or discipline" these
employees. (Id.,, 21-25).
Next, Brown interposes false arrest and imprisonment claims against
Sgt. Hogan under New York law, (id.,, 27-28), as well as similar claims
against the Queens and Berkshire DAs. (Id.,, 29-31). Brown also advances a
cause of action against all defendants for negligent infliction of emotional
ha·rm, (id. , , 32-34), and a claim for Monell liability against the cities of New
York and Pittsfield. (Id.,, 35-38). Finally, Brown asserts a cause of action
against New York City, Pittsfield, and the Berkshire and Queens DAs for
3
Because all claims against John Doe are also brought against Sgt. Hogan,
all subsequent references to Sgt. Hogan shall, for the purposes of these
motions, implicitly include any and all unnamed defendants.
6
negligent hiring, screening, retention, supervision, and training of various
employees allegedly responsible for constitutional violations. (Id.~~ 39-42). As
relief, Brown seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (See Am. Compl.,
Request for Relief).
The Massachusetts defendants4 now move under Rule 12(b)(2) to
dismiss all claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. The New
York defendants move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims against them
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Brown has
formally opposed these motions.
Standard of Review
A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction-Rule 12(b)(2)
On a motion to dismiss a for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction over the defendants.
"Unlike a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), deciding a Rule
12(b)(2) motion necessarily requires resolution of factual matters outside the
pleadings." Zibiz Corp. v. FCN Tech. Solutions, 777 F.Supp.2d 408, 416
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). Where, as here, the
4
In a joint brief, Chief Wynn and Pittsfield move to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(2) only, while the Berkshire DA moves in a separate brief under Rule
12(b)(2) and, in the alternative, Rule 12(b)(6). Because the Court concludes
that it lacks personal jurisdiction over all of the Massachusetts defendants,
it does not consider the Berkshire DA's 12(b)(6) arguments.
7
jurisdictional question is presented "on the pleadings and without discovery,
the plaintiff need show only a prima facie case." In re Stillwater Capital
Partners Inc. Litigation, 851 F.Supp.2d 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted). Plaintiffs "can make this showing through their own
affidavits and supporting materials containing an averment of facts that, if
credited ... would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant." Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
Thus, on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, while the Court may consider
materials outside the pleadings, it must still credit plaintiffs' averments of
jurisdictional fact (but not their conclusions) as true, and must construe all
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and notwithstanding a
controverting presentation by the moving party. Id. at 566-67. "Nonetheless,
where a defendant rebuts plaintiffs' unsupported allegations with direct,
highly specific, testimonial evidence regarding a fact essential to
jurisdiction-and plaintiffs do not counter that evidence-the allegation may
be deemed refuted." Id. at 567 (internal quotations omitted). In this case, the
Court may therefore consider all the parties' factual assertions, declarations
and attached exhibits for the purposes of determining personal jurisdiction,
but shall construe the facts so established in a light most favorable to Brown.
B. Failure to State a Claim-Rule 12(b)(6)
8
When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the Court must assume the truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory
factual allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). To
survive the motion, the complaint must allege facts sufficient to "state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). A plausible claim is one that "allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To the extent there are disagreements or ambiguities of
fact, the Court must construe all the facts in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Matson v. Bd. of
Educ. o/City School Dist. ofN.Y., 631F.3d57, 72 (2d Cir. 2011).
However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Moreover, "a
pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (internal citations and quotations omitted). On the other hand, "a
complaint need not pin plaintifrs claim for relief to a precise legal theory."
Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011). All that is required is "a
9
plausible 'short and plain' statement of the plaintiff's claim, not an exposition
of his legal argument." Id.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a court may only consider [1] the pleading
itself, [2] documents that are referenced in the complaint, [3] documents that
the plaintiff relied on in bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff'
possession or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, and [4] matters of
which judicial notice may be taken." Arrocha v. City Univ. ofN. Y., 878
F.Supp.2d 364, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.,
282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) and Int'/ Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel.&
Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995)). In his complaint, Brown references a
number of documents that are included in the record as defense exhibits.
These include the Massachusetts warrant (DePaul Deel., Exh. Bat 3),
referenced at Am. Compl. , 14; the criminal information filed by Sgt. Hogan
(DePaul Deel., Exh. C), referenced at Am. Compl., 15; and the Notice of
Claim that Brown filed with the Comptroller of New York City on August 3,
2010 (Depaul Deel., Exh. D), referenced at Am. Compl., 5. The Court may
consider these documents as if they were part of the complaint itself when
deciding the New York defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Additionally, the Court may consider documents "integral" to the
complaint, even if they are not referenced in or attached to the pleadings.
10
That is, the Court may consider "documents that the plaintiff[] either
possessed or knew about and upon which [he] relied in bringing the suit."
Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000). Attached as Exhibit F to
the New York defendants' DePaul declaration is a "Designation of Agent for
Access to Sealed Records Pursuant to New York CPLR 160.50[1][d]," signed
by Brown on August 3, 2010-the same day he filed his Notice of Claim with
the New York City Comptroller. This document provides Michael A.
Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, and attorney of
record for the New York defendants, with access to sealed records regarding
Brown's 2010 arrest. It is clear that Brown executed this document as a
prerequisite to bringing suit. 5 As such, he was both aware of it and of
necessity relied on it in his complaint. Cf. Smart v. Goord, 441 F.Supp.2d 631,
637 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("As exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
prerequisite to bringing suit, an inmate plaintiff necessarily refers to and
5
Plaintiffs claiming false arrest are regularly required to provide opposing
counsel with access to sealed records relating to the arrest. See, e.g., Palacio
v. City ofNew York, 489 F.Supp.2d 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (directing§
1983 plaintiff to execute form releasing sealed arrest records to defense
counsel, since such records were "necessary to continue with this
litigation"); Cabble v. Rollieson, No. 04-Civ-9413 (LTS) (FM), 2006 WL
464078, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2006) (directing§ 1983 plaintiff to
execute§ 160.50 releases to city defendants); Order, Quaknine v. City of
New York, No. 09-Civ-2992 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2009) (dismissing
false arrest claim against city on account of plaintiff's failure to execute§
160.50 release).
11
relies on documents exhibiting proof of exhaustion" in his§ 1983 claim);
Chmiel v. Potter, No. 09-CV-555 (RJA), 2010 WL 5904384, at *7 (W.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 2010) (citing Smart and holding similarly). The Court may therefore
consider Exhibit F of the DePaul declaration on the New York defendants'
motion, as it is integral to the pleadings.
Discussion
A. The Massachusetts Defendants' Rule 12(b)(2) Motion
i.
Legal Framework for Personal Jurisdiction
"District courts resolving issues of P.ersonal jurisdiction must engage in
a two-part analysis." Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d
158, 165 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and ellipses omitted). First, the
court "must determine whether, under the laws of the forum state (New York
in this case), there is jurisdiction over the defendant." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). If jurisdiction is found lacking after the first step, the court must
dismiss the action. Otherwise, the court must next "determine whether an
exercise of jurisdiction under these laws is consistent with federal due process
requirements." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
With regard to non-domiciliaries, "New York Law on personal
jurisdiction is codified in CPLR §§ 301 and 302." Universal Marine Med.
Supply, Inc. v. Lovecchio, 8 F.Supp.2d 214, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); see also
12
Opticare Acquisition Corp. v. Castillo, 25 A.D.3d 238, 242, 806 N.Y.S.2d 84, 88
(2d Dep't 2005) (finding that §§ 301 and 302 are the only two bases for
establishing personal jurisdiction over non-resident litigants). Under§ 301the "general jurisdiction" statute-"the authority of the New York courts to
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign [defendant] is based solely upon the fact
that the defendant is engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of
'doing business' here as to warrant a finding of its 'presence' in this
jurisdiction." Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 309-10, 434 N.E.2d 692, 694,
449 N.Y.S.2d 456, 458 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). That is, the
plaintiff must show that "the aggregate of the [defendant's] activities in the
State [is] such that it may be said to be 'present' in the State 'not occasionally
or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity,"' such that
jurisdiction would accord with "'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."' Id. at 310 (quoting Int'/ Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945); other internal quotations omitted).
As empowered by § 302-New York's "long-arm statute"-a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary who
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere
to supply goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of
action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
13
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to
person or property within the state, except as to a cause of
action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he
(i)
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered, in the state, or
(ii)
expects or should reasonably expect the act to have
consequences in the state and derives substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce;
or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state.
"In order to demonstrate that an individual is transacting business within the
meaning of CPLR 302(a)(l), there must have been some purposeful activities
within the State that would justify bringing the nondomiciliary defendant
before the New York courts." SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v Am. Working Collie
Assn., 18 N.Y.3d 400, 404, 963 N.E.2d 1226, 1228, 940 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (2012)
(internal quotations omitted). "Moreover, there must be some articulable
nexus between the business transacted and the cause of action sued upon." Id.
at 404 (internal quotations omitted). "Phrased differently, there must be a
substantial relationship between the purposeful activities and the transaction
out of which the cause of action arose." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
14
ii.
The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the Massachusetts
Defendants Under New York Law
In his opposition brief, Brown makes no reference to § 301, nor does he
argue that any of the Massachusetts defendants "engage in such a continuous
and systematic course of doing business" in New York so as to have a virtual
"presence" in the state, a requisite showing under§ 301. Laufer, 55 N.Y.2d at
309-10. Rather, he argues for personal jurisdiction over the Massachusetts
defendants solely on the basis of§ 302. (See Pl.'s Opp. (Dkt. No. 32) at 8-10
(discussing application of New York's long-arm statute only)). Because Brown
bears the burden of showing personal jurisdiction, the Court construes his
silence on § 301 as a concession that there is no personal jurisdiction over the
Massachusetts defendants on the basis of that statute.6
Brown fares no better with regard to § 302. To start, he makes no claim
relying on the first, second, or fourth standards of§ 302 apply to the
Massachusetts defendants; nor could he--nothing in the record suggests that
these defendants transact any business or contracts to supply goods within
6
Even if Brown had not conceded the issue, the Court would still find
personal jurisdiction lacking under§ 301. As discussed above, Brown's
claim that, "[u]pon information and belief, the Massachusetts Defendants
routinely extradite fugitives from the State of New York" fails to show a
"regular" and "persistent course of conduct" under § 302. For the same
reasons, this assertion-the only fact in the record that might bear on
general jurisdiction-cannot satisfy § 301 's similar (but perhaps even more
rigorous) "continuous and systematic course of doing business" standard.
15
New York, have committed a tort within the state, or own, use, or possess real
property in the state. See CPLR §302(1 ), (2), and (4). Instead, Brown relies
solely on the third standard. As to it, he first contends that, by causing or
contributing to his detention in New York, the Massachusetts defendants
"committed a tort, the effects of which were felt in the State of New York."
(Pl.'s Opp. at 9). He then claims these parties "engage in a persistent course of
conduct within the State of New York" by "routinely extradit[ing] fugitives
from the State of New York." (Id.). Upon these allegations, Brown argues he
has satisfied the requisite elements of §302(3)(i).
Brown's jurisdictional argument misses the mark. Even assuming,
arguendo, he could show as a primafacie matter that the Massachusetts
defendants had committed a tort against him, Brown fails, as a matter of law,
to establish that these parties "regularly do[] or solicit[] business, or engage[]
in any other persistent course of conduct, or derive[] substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed or services rendered" in New York. CPLR §
302(3)(i). For this reason, there is no personal jurisdiction over the
Massachusetts defendants.
Other than alleging that the Massachusetts defendants routinely initiate
requests on behalf of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts calling upon New
16
York authorities to extradite detainees to Massachusetts, 7 Brown makes no
allegations supporting personal jurisdiction over those defendants. Nowhere
else in his complaint, brief, or declaration does plaintiff assert any facts
whatsoever indicating that the Massachusetts defendants partake in or
regularly do or solicit business in New York; nor does he claim that they
derive any revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in
New York.
Brown's assertions regarding Massachusetts's extradition policy simply
do not amount to a showing of a "persistent course of conduct" in New York
on the part of the Massachusetts defendants. Even if these defendants did, in
fact, routinely seek extradition to Massachusetts of fugitives from justice, this
long-distance interaction between sovereigns is not the same as persistent
conduct "in" the state of New York. The necessary communication with New
York justice officials matters not. Brown cites no cases holding that "routine"
7
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that these defendants engage in a "persistent
course of conduct" because, "[u]pon information and belief, the
Massachusetts Defendants routinely extradite fugitives from the State of
New York." (Pl.'s Opp. (Dkt. No. 32) at 10). In support, he points to the
fact that the Berkshire DA stated in the NCIC validation/entry for the
Massachusetts warrant that it would seek extradition of Brown from New
York (see Pl.'s Opp. (Dkt. No. 32) at 10 (citing DePaul Deel., Exh. Bat 2)),
and cites a printout of an internet article stating that Pittsfield police were
seeking extradition of two robbery suspects from New York. (Brown Deel.
(Dkt. No. 31) at PDF p. 10).
17
extradition requests by officials in another state constitutes the kind of
"continuous and systematic course of doing business" contemplated by § 302.
Moreover, the only facts Brown cites in support of his "routine extradition"
claim are that the Berkshire DA's office on one occasion sought to extradite
him from New York, and that the Pittsfield Police Department on one
occasion sought to extradite robbery suspects from New York. There is simply
no showing of persistent conduct by the Massachusetts defendants in New
York.
By contrast, the declarations provided by the Massachusetts defendants
and/or their agents offer detailed reasons why these parties do not engage in a
persistent course of conduct in New York. In his declaration, Chief Wynn
states that he is not a resident or domiciliary of New York, does not conduct
any business in New York, has never applied for a business license or permit
here, owns no real or personal property in the state, maintains no offices,
agents or bank accounts here, has never paid taxes here, has never had a
telephone listing or mailing address in the state, and conducts all of his
personal and professional business in Massachusetts. (See Wynn Deel. (Dkt.
18
No. 24) , , 1-6). Berkshire DA Capeless makes essentially identical assertions
in his declaration. (See Am. Capeless Deel. (Dkt. No. 39) at,, 1-8).8
Furthermore, Linda Tyler, the Pittsfield City Clerk, asserts in her
declaration that Pittsfield conducts no business or manufacturing in New
York, has no agents, real or personal property, bank accounts or mailing
addresses here. (Tyler Deel. (Dkt. No. 25) , , 1-5). Finally, Kathleen Degnan,
the Pittsfield City Solicitor, declares that Pittsfield and Chief Wynn "have no
authority to decide whether or not to initiate extradition proceedings between
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the State of New York," and had no
"involvement in the decision whether or not to initiate extradition
proceedings" with regard to Brown. (Degnan Deel. , , 1-4). Brown fails to
rebut any of these allegations. Accordingly, he has failed to establish that§
personal jurisdiction exists over the Massachusetts Defendants.
8
Although Brown objects that Capeless's original declaration lacks
probative value since it was neither sworn to nor declared under penalty of
perjury, (see Pl.'s Opp. at 6; Orig. Capeless Deel. (Dkt. No. 35)), Capeless's
amended declaration is properly submitted under penalty of perjury, in
compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746. (See Am. Capeless Deel.). In support, he
out that the Berkshire DA stated in the NCIC validation/entry for the
Massachusetts warrant that it would seek extradition of Brown from New
York (see Pl.'s Opp. (Dkt. No. 32) at 10 (citing DePaul Deel., Exh. Bat 2)),
and cites a printout of an internet article stating that Pittsfield police were
seeking extradition of two robbery suspects from New York. (Brown Deel.
(Dkt. No. 31) at PDF p. 10).
19
The story does not end here. The Court declines to dismiss outright all
claims againt the Massachusetts defendants. But, because the Court does not
address the merits of Brown's claim in its jurisdictional disposition, and
because dismissal may render time-barred Brown's otherwise timely claims,
the Court finds that the interests of justice would be best-served by a transfer
of venue rather than outright dismissal. Accordingly, the motion of the
Massachusetts defendants is granted to the extent that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a), the Court transfers all claims against the Massachusetts defendants
to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. See
Go/dlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1962) (holding that§ 1406(a)
permits a court to transfer claims to another venue even if the transferring
court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants).
B. Failure to State a Claim Against the New York Defendants
i.
42u.s.c.§1981
Brown pleads causes of action against Sgt. Hogan and the Queens DA
for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (See Am. Compl. at,, 18-25). This statute
guarantees "[a]ll persons ... the same right ... to make and enforce contracts
... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). As such, "[t]o state a
claim under § 1981 there must be a contractual relationship." Sutherland v.
N. Y. State Dept. of Law, No. 96-Civ-6935 (JFK), 1999 WL 314186, at* 10
20
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1999); see also Krulik v. Bd. ofEduc. ofN. Y.C., 781 F.2d 15,
23 (2d Cir. 1986) ("On a claim under§ 1981, a plaintiff must show both that
he was subjected to intentional discrimination, and that this discrimination
interfered with a contractual relationship.") (internal citations omitted).
Nowhere in his complaint, brief, or declaration does Brown allege or even hint
he could allege the existence of any contractual relationship that might
implicate § 1981. The Court therefore dismisses all claims brought under that
statute.
ii.
42U.S.C.§1983 Claims Against Sgt. Hogan
Browns asserts § 1983 claims against Sgt. Hogan for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and failure to intervene on his behalf and protect him from
unconstitutional treatment. (See Am. Compl. , , 18-20). "Section 1983
provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting under color
of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States." Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515,
519 (2d Cir. 1993). Although individual state officials may be liable under§
1983 in their personal capacities, they may assert an affirmative defense of
qualified immunity if "(1) their conduct does not violate clearly established
constitutional rights, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for them to believe
their acts did not violate those rights." Southerland v. City ofNew York, 680
21
F.3d 127, 141 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). "A right is 'clearly
established' when ... a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right." Id. (internal quotations omitted). As for the act or
failure to act itself, an officer's actions are "objectively reasonable" if
"officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the legality of the action
at issue in its particular factual context." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
"The elements of false arrest ... under § 1983 are substantially the
same as the elements under New York law." Boyd.v. City ofNew York, 336
F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). In New York, a
plaintiff claiming false arrest or false imprisonment (which are "two names
for the same tort," Holland v. City of Poughkeepsie, 90 A.D.3d 841, 844-45, 935
N.Y.S.2d 583, 589 (2d Dep't 2011)), must show that "(1) the defendant
intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3)
the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was
not otherwise privileged." Petrychenko v. Solovey, 99 A.D.3d 777, 780, 952
N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (2d Dep't 2012) (internal quotations omitted). "A plaintiff
cannot prevail on causes of action based upon false arrest and false
imprisonment . . . if the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that
the plaintiff committed the underlying offense." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). Therefore, "[t]he pivotal issue in the present case is the presence; or
22
absence, of probable cause ... If there was probable cause for the arrest, then
a false arrest claim will fail." Boyd, 336 F.3d at 76.
Probable cause exists when an officer has "knowledge or reasonably
trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution
in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested."
O'Neill v. Town of Babylon, 986 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal
quotations omitted). "When an arrest is made pursuant to a facially valid
warrant, there is a presumption that it was made with probable cause which
can be rebutted only by a showing of fraud, perjury, or the misrepresentation
or falsification of evidence." Garenani v. Cnty. of Clinton, 552 F.Supp.2d 328,
333 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, if officers
arrest an individual based on a mistaken identification, that arrest is still
constitutionally valid if: (1) the police had probable cause to arrest the person
sought; and (2) the arresting officer reasonably believed that the arrestee was
that person. Martinez v. N. Y.C., 340 Fed. App'x 700, 701 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-03 (1971)).
The record makes abundantly clear that Sgt. Hogan had probable cause
to arrest Brown and detain him pursuant to the Massachusetts warrant. This
is so even assuming (as the Court must) that plaintiff is not the same Vincent
Brown as the individual being sought in the warrant. First, in asserting a "you
23
got the wrong guy" claim, plaintiff need not and does not challenge the facial
validity of the Massachusetts warrant. The key question is whether Sgt.
Hogan reasonably believed plaintiff was the same Vincent Brown as the one
named in the warrant. As Sgt. Hogan stated in the criminal information he
drafted, he confirmed that Brown's name, FBI number, and Social Security
number matched those of the suspect described in the warrant posted in the
NCIC database. 9 (DePaul Deel., Exhs. B at 2, C, F). 10 See Vasquez v.
McPherson, 285 F.Supp.2d 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (collecting cases
demonstrating that officers may generally rely on information in the NCIC
database when identifying a suspect). This is an ample basis for an officer to
reasonably identify Brown as the person named in the warrant. See, e.g.,
9
In their brief, the New York, defendants also assert that the officers relied
on Brown's race and date of birth, both of which matched the information
provided in the warrant. (See, e.g., NY Defs.' Mem. at 5). Because these
facts are not directly reflected in the documents on which a court may rely
for the purposes of deciding the 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will not
consider these additional facts. In any event, it is a moot point, since the
Court finds that the officers had a reasonable basis for identifying Brown
as the fugitive suspect on the facts that may be considered.
10
Exhibit F of the DePaul Declaration is the "Designation of Agent for Access
to Sealed Records Pursuant to New York CPL 160.50[l][d]," which Brown
executed on August 3, 2010. The last four digits of the Social Security
number Brown provides in this document match those that appear in the
Massachusetts warrant. (See DePaul Deel., Exh. B at 2). Although the rest
of the digits are redacted, Brown does not challenge the New York
defendants' assertions that the two Social Security numbers match in their
entirety.
24
Vasquez, 285 F.Supp.2d at 341 (identical names, descriptions, and dates of
birth supplied probable cause for arrest in the case of mistaken identity based
on information in a warrant); Martinez, 340 Fed. App'x at 701 (matching
names and dates of birth provided probable cause, in spite of differences in
skin tone, height, and weight from plaintiff's physical appearance). In
harmony with these precedents, the Court holds that, as a matter of law, the
officers had probable cause to arrest and detain Brown based on matching
names, Social Security numbers, and FBI numbers.
Plaintiff contends that Sgt. Hogan and other New York defendants
should have further investigated his identity by comparing the Queens arrest
photograph of him to the Massachusetts arrest photograph of the Vincent
Brown named in the warrant. This argument fails to persuade. First, Brown
offers no facts showing that a Massachusetts arrest photograph even exists, or
that the individual named in the warrant was ever arrested in the first place.
Second, once an officer has reasonable basis to make an arrest, he need not
"investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is
based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent."
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).
Hence, in Martinez, 340 Fed. App'x at 701, the Second Circuit held that,
in a case of a detention based on mistaken identity, while "officers arguably
25
could have fingerprinted plaintiff, or otherwise investigated his claim of
mistaken identity, they were not constitutionally required to do so" after they
had established probable cause for the initial arrest. See also Juan Martinez v.
N. Y.C., No. 06-Civ.-5671(WHP),2008 WL 2566565, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 27,
2008) (finding that it was "reasonable for the Officers not to believe" a
suspect's protestations of mistaken identity, although they later proved true);
Sanchez v. Port Auth. ofN. Y. & N.J., 08-CV-1028 RRM CLP, 2012 WL
1068078 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2012) (holding similarly). Simply put, in the
absence of evidence above and beyond the detainee's objections, "[a]rresting
officers ... are not required to investigate a claim of innocence--even a claim
of innocence that is based on mistaken identity." Martinez, 340 Fed. App'x at
701. Sgt. Hogan did not violate Brown's rights by failing to search for a
potentially exculpatory arrest photograph from Massachusetts that may or
may not have existed. Probable cause existed for his arrest and detention, and
Sgt. Hogan is shielded from false arrest or false imprisonment claims under §
1983.
Finally, Brown's§ 1983 claim against Sgt. Hogan for failure to
intervene on his behalf and protect him from unconstitutional treatment fails
to pass muster. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
observed or had reason to know "that (1) that excessive force [was] being
26
used; (2) that a citizen ha[d] been unjustifiably arrested; or (3) that any
constitutional violation ha[d] been committed by a law enforcement official."
Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994). None of these three
scenarios applies to this case. To start, Brown does not allege that excessive
force was applied against him by anyone. Next, as discussed above, his arrest
was supported by probable cause. Third, there is no indication that Sgt.
Hogan knew or had reason to know that any constitutional violations against
Brown had been committed. He lawfully arrested Brown, drafted a criminal
information against him on the basis of the same probable cause that
supported his arrest, and appears to have had nothing further to do with the
matter. Neither Sgt. Hogan nor any other officer had a constitutional
responsibility to continue investigating Brown's identity upon matching his
name, Social Security number, and FBI number to the information contained
in the NCIC database. Accordingly, Brown's§ 1983 claim against Sgt. Hogan
for failure to intervene fails as a matter of law.
iii.
§ 1983 Claims Against the Queens DA
The complaint targets more than Sgt. Hogan and his NYPD colleagues.
Brown also sues the Queens DA under § 1983 for false arrest and false
imprisonment. (See Am. Compl. ~~ 21-25). Although he purportedly brings
suit against this defendant in both his official and personal capacities, official
27
capacity suits seeking damages against District Attorneys in New York are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York,
996 F.2d 522, 529-30, 535-36 (2d Cir. 1993) (official capacity suits against
District Attorneys and Assistant District Attorneys barred under the Eleventh
Amendment); Eisenberg v. Dist. Attorney of Cnty. ofKings, 847 F.Supp. 1029,
1035 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissing official capacity§ 1983 claim against the
Kings County DA on Eleventh Amendment grounds). Accordingly, Brown
may only bring a personal capacity suit against the Queens DA, which
requires a showing of the named defendant's personal involvement in
plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010)
("[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations
is a prerequisite to an award of damages under§ 1983."). To show personal
involvement, Brown must plead facts demonstrating the Queens DA's "(1)
failure to take corrective action after learning of a subordinate's unlawful
conduct, (2) creation of a policy or custom fostering the unlawful conduct, (3)
gross negligence in supervising subordinates who commit unlawful acts, or (4)
deliberate indifference to the rights of others by failing to act on information
regarding the unlawful conduct of subordinates." Hayut v. State Univ. of N. Y.,
352 F.3d 733, 753 (2d Cir. 2003).
28
Brown's complaint (and, indeed, the record as a whole) is entirely
devoid of facts bearing on any of the four possible circumstances described in
Hayut. First, there are no facts suggesting that any of the Queens DA's
subordinates acted unlawfully in his case, despite having allegedly detained
the wrong Vincent Brown with the intention of facilitating his extradition to
Massachusetts. Even if Brown could show that unlawful actions had occurred
(and nothing suggests he can), he pleads no facts showing that the Queens DA
learned about these actions and failed to correct them. Nor are there facts. or
the suggestion that such facts might exist, demonstrating that this defendant
was "deliberately indifferent" to information regarding potentially unlawful
actions by subordinates who were handling Brown's case, or that he was
"grossly negligent" in supervising those subordinates. Finally, nothing in the
record points to "a policy or custom" orchestrated by the Queens DA that
fostered the supposedly unlawful conduct charged in the complaint. See, e.g.,
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360-64 (2011) (holding that deliberate
indifference could not be shown by single unlawful incident by an Assistant
DA); Newton v. N. Y.C., 566 F. Supp. 2d 256, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[A] custom .
or policy cannot be shown by pointing to a single instance of unconstitutional
conduct by a mere employee of the State.") (citing City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 831 (1985)).
29
Since he cannot sue the Queens DA in his official capacity, and fails to
plausibly plead facts in his amended complaint necessary to state a claim
against the Queens DA in his personal capacity, Brown's§ 1983 claim against
the Queens DA is dismissed.
iv.
Monell Liability
Beyond the individual New York defendants, Brown brings a claim for
§ 1983 Monell liability against New York City. (See Am. Compl. , , 35-38). A§
1983 cause of action against a municipality cannot be premised on respondeat
superior. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Oki. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
403 (1997). Instead, a plaintiff suing a city under § 1983 must show: "(1)
actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or
statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of
the municipality caused the constitutional injury." Roe v. City of Waterbury,
542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 690-91 (1978)). See also Roe, 542 F.3d at 36 ("[M]unicipal liability under
§ 1983 attaches where--and only where--a deliberate choice to follow a
course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or
officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject
matter in question.").
30
Under Monell, an actionable municipal policy or custom exists in the
following
circ~mstances:
(1) the existence of a formal policy which is officially endorsed by
the municipality; (2) actions taken or decisions made by
municipal officials with final decision making authority, which
caused the alleged violation of plaintiff's civil rights; (3) a practice
so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a custom of which
constructive knowledge can be implied on the part of the
policymaking officials; or (4) a failure by policymakers to
properly train or supervise their subordinates, amounting to
'deliberate indifference' to the rights of those who come in contact
with the municipal employees.
Bliven v. Hunt, 478 F.Supp.2d 332, 336-37 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Moray v.
City of Yonkers, 924 F.Supp. 8, 12 (S.D.N.Y.1996)). If a plaintiff seeks to show
a city policy by referring to only a single act, that act must have been
committed by a city official "responsible for establishing final policy with
respect to the subject matter in question," and must represent a deliberate
and considered choice among competing alternatives. Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986). If the plaintiff challenges what he
claims is an unofficial custom or practice of the city, he must show that the
practice is "so widespread as to have the force of law." Id. (quoting Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 404). The custom "need not [have] receive[d]
formal approval by the appropriate decision-maker ... [but] plaintiff must
prove ... that [it] is permanent." Davis v. N. Y.C., 228 F.Supp.2d 327, 337
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
31
Plaintiff has made nowhere near the kind of factual pleading needed to
avoid dismissal of his Monell claim against New York City. There are no facts
in the record, much less the complaint, revealing or even hinting at a
pattern-either through official policy or unofficial custom or practice--of
unconstitutional activity by NYPD, the Queens DA, or any other agent or
employee of New York City. Brown's sole allegation concerns a single act: his
allegedly wrongful detention based on a mistaken identity, incorporated into
the criminal information filed by Sgt. Hogan. He has pleaded no facts showing
that this decision resulted from the considered deliberations of officials with
final policymaking responsibility, conscious of the unconstitutional
implications of their actions. Nor has he offered facts in or beyond his
pleadings indicating that his detention resulted from such grossly negligent
supervision as to manifest "deliberate indifference" to his rights. There is
simply no plausible claim for Monell liability based on the pleadings or in the
record before the Court. The Monell claim against New York City is
dismissed.
v.
Remaining Federal Claims
Although he does not adequately plead them in his Amended
Complaint, Brown appears in his opposition brief to assert claims under §
1983 for unlawfully prolonged detention and malicious prosecution. (See, e.g.,
32
Pl.'s Opp. at 1 ("Plaintiff submits that even assuming arguendo that probable
cause initially existed for Plaintiff's arrest-the continued detention of the
Plaintiff was unlawful and actionable under federal and state law.") and 4-5
(outlining malicious prosecution claim against Sgt. Hogan and the Queens
DA)). Because these claims were not clearly included in the complaint, they
cannot now be considered by the Court and are dismissed for that reason. See
DePasquale v. DePasquale, No.12-CV-2564 (RRM) (MDG), 2013 WL 789209,
at *10 n.6 (E.D.N.Y., Mar. 1, 2013) ("Plaintiff cannot use their opposition to
the motion to dismiss to raise new claims or arguments, and thus the Court
does not address the new argument made in the plaintiff's memorandum.")
(internal quotations omitted); O'Brien v. Nat'[ Prop. Analysts Partners, 719
F.Supp. 222, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the Complaint cannot
be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.").
In any event, and though not required, if the Court were to read
Brown's Amended Complaint liberally and construe it to include these claims
under the rubric of§ 1983, they would still fail. Clearly, there are no facts in
pleadings to s upport a claim for unlawfully prolonged detention, nor does the
record suggest such facts exist. On the contrary, the record points to the
futility of such a claim. To be sure, the "mere detention pursuant to a valid
warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of
33
a certain amount of time deprive the accused of 'liberty ... without due
process of law."' Baker, 443 U.S. at 145. Still, a plaintiff cannot succeed on
such a claim unless he shows "(1) that he has a right to be free from continued
detention stemming from law enforcement officials' mishandling or
suppression of exculpatory evidence, (2) that the actions of the officers
violated that right, and (3) that the officers' conduct 'shocks the conscience."'
Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 211 (2d Cir. 2007). Not only does
Brown fail to demonstrate that any defendant mishandled or suppressed
exculpatory evidence, there is not even a whisper of evidence suggesting the
kind of "malicious and sadistic abuses of power by government officials,
intended to oppress or to cause injury" that would "shock the conscience."
Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged School Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001).
This claim fails on its face, and given Brown's account of his plight in his
pleadings and motion papers, the failure is irremediable.
Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim fares no better, for it too lacks
factual support in the pleadings and the broader record, which together show
that amendment would be futile . To sue under this cause of action, a plaintiff
in the Second Circuit must "demonstrate conduct by the defendant that is
tortious under state law and that results in a constitutionally cognizable
deprivation of liberty." Kinzer v. Jackson, 316 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2003).
34
Under New York law, a plaintiff asserting a malicious prosecution claim must
show: (1) that the defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceeding
against him; (2) that the proceeding was terminated in the plaintiffs favor; (3)
that there was no probable cause for the proceeding; and (4) that the
proceeding was instituted with malice. See Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82
F.3d 563, 571 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Colon v. City ofNew York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82,
N.E.2d 1248, 1250, 468 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (1983)).
As discussed earlier, the New York defendants had probable cause to
arrest and detain Brown under the Massachusetts warrant. While a plaintiff
may show that probable cause dissipated after existing at the time of the
initial arrest, he must demonstrate that defendants became aware of new
exculpatory evidence, see Callan v. State, 73 N.Y.2d 731, 732, 532 N.E.2d 96,
535 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1988), or that they failed to make further inquiries into his
potential innocence when a reasonable person would have done so. See Colon,
60 N.Y.2d at 82. Neither situation applies here. Nothing in the record, which
details the facts and circumstances of Brown's 80-day detention, indicates that
Brown can allege, and he certainly has not already pleaded, that any New
Yirk defendant knew that Brown was not the person named in the
Massachusetts warrant. Given the strong confirmatory evidence defendants
had gathered-identical names, Social Security numbers, and FBI numbers35
a reasonable person would not have deemed it necessary to seek more
confirmation still. The only fact in the pleadings and record pointing in the
other direction is Brown's naked assertion that, notwithstanding the
information stated on the face of the warrant, the New York defendants had
arrested the wrong Vincent Brown.
Other potential streams of relief are equally dry. Brown points to no
facts suggesting that any of the individual New York defendants acted with
"actual malice" in prosecuting the fugitive case against him, as he must to
state such a claim. Nardelli v. Stamberg, 44 N.Y.2d 500, 502, 377 N.E.2d 975,
406 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1978). "Actual malice means that a defendant must have
commenced the prior criminal proceeding due to wrong or improper motive,
something other than a desire to see the ends of justice served." Id. There is
nothing whatsoever in the facts before the court indicating that these
defendants prosecuted and detained Brown out of anything other than a goodfaith belief that Brown was the person named in the Massachusetts warrant.
Although Brown makes much of the fact that the Queens DA sought to detain
him beyond the initial 30-day period for a defendant awaiting extradition, this
fact does not establish-or even suggest-malice. Indeed, as Brown himself
admits, under CPL § 570, "if the accused is not arrested under a warrant of
the [out-of-state] governor after 30 days- he may be recommended for a
36
further period of up [to] sixty days." (Pl.'s Opp. at 3). The Queens DA was
acting fully within the statutorily prescribed guidelines by renewing his
request that Brown remain in custody pending extradition; plaintiff has
revealed no facts to support a finding of malice. Significantly, given what
Brown has claimed in his pleadings and motion papers, it is clear that any
amendment to plead otherwise would be futile as well.
For these reasons, Brown fails to state a cause of action for malicious
prosecution under§ 1983. This claim, like all of Brown's federal claims
against the New York Defendants, is dismissed. 11
vi.
State Law Claims Against the New York Defendants
In addition to his federal causes of action, Brown advances state law
claims against various permutations of defendants for false arrest, false
imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring,
screening, retention, supervision and training. (See Am. Compl.
11
at~~
26-34,
Furthermore, it is likely that the Queens DA would be shielded from suit
under the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Nearly every court
that has addressed the issue has held that a prosecutor's decision to initiate
extradition proceedings falls within the scope of duties for which a
prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity. See Uribe v. Cohen, No. 04-cv-1723
(CFD), 2006 WL 2349567, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2006) (collecting cases).
However, since the Second Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue,
and because Brown's claims would fail on the merits in any event, the
Court declines to rest its principal holding on the ground of prosecutorial
immunity. Nonetheless, the Court notes that it does conclude that
prosecutorial immunity is applicable in this case, and that the claims
against the Queens DA are dismissed for that reason, too.
37
39-41). "Supplemental jurisdiction is traditionally 'a doctrine of discretion,
not of plaintiff's right."' TPTCC NY, Inc. v. Radiation Therapy Serv., Inc., 453
F.App'x 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). "Thus, a district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if it 'has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction."' TPTCC NY, Inc., 453 F.App'x at 105 (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)). The Court having dismissed all of Brown's federal claims, it
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims,
and dismisses them as well. See Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299,
306 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that it may be an abuse of discretion to retain
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have
been dismissed). These claims are dismissed without prejudice, except as to
the effect that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may have upon them, and
with leave to replead them in good faith in a state court of appropriate
jurisdiction within 30 days of the entry of this Order on the docket
Conclusion
All federal claims against the New York defendants are dismissed with
prejudice. The Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction as to
the state law claims brought against New York defendants, which are
dismissed without prejudice, save for the collateral estoppel effects of this
38
Order, and with 30 days leave to replead in a state court of appropriate
jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance
with this Order in favor of the New York defendants.
After entry of that partial, final judgment, the Clerk of Court is
directed to transfer the action against the remaining Massachusetts
defendants to the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts and then to close this docket.
So Ordered.
s/Eric N. Vitaliano
ERIC N. VITALIANO
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
June 13, 2013
39
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