Rueli et al v. Baystate Health, Inc. et al

Filing 33

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered re: PltfS' Motion to Remand to State Court. Given the controlling nature of Cavallaro, Pltfs' Motion to Remand - 12 is hereby DENIED. (Finn, Mary)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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CATHERINE RUELI, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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Civil Action No. 14-10319-MGM
BAYSTATE HEALTH INC. and BAYSTATE *
VISITING NURSE ASSOCIATION &
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HOSPICE, INC.,
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT
(Dkt. No. 12)
January 9, 2015
MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Nurses (“Plaintiffs”), working for Baystate Health, Inc. and Baystate Visiting Nurses
Association and Hospice, Inc. (together “Defendants”), filed a complaint in Hampden County
Superior Court to recover unpaid wages for hours of overtime worked. Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’
employment contract is memorialized in a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), which, among
other provisions, sets forth a policy requiring employees request permission from Defendants prior
to working hours that would entitle them to overtime compensation.
In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they regularly must work additional hours in order to
finish their work. Plaintiffs do not, however, allege that they followed the CBA protocol for
requesting overtime. Plaintiffs assert that, since they worked these extra hours and Defendants have
not paid them, Defendants have violated MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148 (“ch. 149”) and MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 151, § 1B (“ch. 151”).

Defendants removed the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446,
alleging Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by federal law. Plaintiffs now move to remand the case back
to state court, arguing their claims are not preempted.
For the reasons stated herein, the court denies Plaintiffs’ motion.

II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

AND PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS
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On December 11, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Hampden County Superior Court
(Dkt. No. 8, State Court Record 1), specifically a “Class Action to recover unpaid wages and
overtime that are owed to employees of Defendants." 2 (Dkt. 1-1, State Court Record 4.) Plaintiffs
claim Defendants have violated ch. 149 3 by failing to pay Plaintiffs unpaid wages, and also that
Defendants have violated ch. 151 4 by failing to compensate Plaintiffs for overtime hours worked.
(Id. at 7.) Plaintiffs have requested a jury trial to resolve all of their claims. 5 (Id.)
Plaintiffs are employed as “visiting nurses.” (Id. at 5). In their complaint, they allege they
have not been paid for all the hours they have worked. (Id.) Specifically, due to the “volume of work
assigned to them, [Plaintiffs] are regularly required to work outside of their regularly scheduled
shifts.” (Id.) Plaintiffs explain that “this unpaid work frequently consists of computer work in
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The complaint identifies Plaintiffs as the following individuals: Catherine Rueli, Christine Clark, Edna Broadway,
Edward Stankiewicz, Melissa Gower, Robin Hackett-Hill, Sharol Menard, Theresa Picard, and “others similarly situated,
namely all other individuals who are, and who have been employed as nurses by Defendants who have no received all
wages and overtime payments due to them.” (Dkt. No. 1-1, State Court Record 4-5).

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Both Defendants are Massachusetts corporations with their principal offices in Springfield, MA. (Id. at 4.) It follows
that, if this court has jurisdiction, it will be solely on the basis of a federal question.

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In relevant part, the statute states: “Every person having employees in his service shall pay weekly or bi-weekly each
such employee the wages earned by him to within six days of the termination of the pay period during which the wages
were earned.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148.

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In relevant part, this statute states: “Any employer or the officer or agent of any corporation who pays or agrees to pay
to any employee less than the overtime rate of compensation required by section one A shall have violated this section
and shall be punished or shall be subject to a civil citation or order as provided in section 27C of chapter 149, and each
week in which such employee is paid less than such overtime rate of compensation and each employee so paid less, shall
constitute a separate offense.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151, § 1B.

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Plaintiffs have specifically requested that “this Court enter the following relief: (1) Certification of the case as a class
action; (2) Restitution for all unpaid wages that are owed to the Plaintiffs; (3) Restitution for all overtime payments that
are owed to the Plaintiffs; (4) Statutory trebling of all damages; (5) Attorneys’ fees and costs; (6) Any other relief to
which the Plaintiffs may be entitled.” (Dkt. No. 1-1, State Court Record 7.)

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preparation for a visit with a [patient], and computer work following up after a visit.” (Id. at 6.)
Since the work has been performed while Plaintiffs have been “logged onto [Defendants’] computer
system,” Plaintiffs contend that “Defendants are . . . aware of the work” which Plaintiffs perform
“outside of their regularly scheduled shifts for which they are not compensated.” 6 (Id.)
On February 13, 2014, the case was removed to this court. (Dkt. No. 1, Notice of Removal.)
As grounds in support thereof, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are preempted by
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“§ 301”) because the resolution of these
claims depend, at least in part, upon the meaning of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ CBA. (Id. at 3.) See
generally 29 U.S.C. § 185. Accordingly, Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs’ state law claims cannot
be resolved without interpreting the CBA to determine issues including: (1) whether additional
wages are owed, (2) whether additional compensation provided by the CBA offsets any deficiency
created by other uncompensated time, (3) how many compensable hours each employee worked, (4)
whether an employee followed proper procedure in requesting payment for hours worked outside
his or her regular shift, (5) whether such payment was “unreasonably withheld,” and (6) the
employee’s regular rate. (Id. at 5.)
On March 17, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case back to state court, asserting
that removal is improper because interpretation of the CBA is not necessary to resolve their claims.
On March 4, 2014, Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Dkt. No. 15.)
On April 21, Plaintiffs filed a reply to that opposition (Dkt. No. 18.) After being rescheduled several
times, a hearing was held on December 12, 2014.

III.

ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND

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Though not relevant to the instant motion, Plaintiffs claim that they have exhausted their administrative remedies, as is
evidenced by the fact that they have received a “right-to-sue letter” from the Attorney General’s Office. (Id. at 6.)

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Under the Doctrine of Complete Preemption, “if a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of action, any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of
action necessarily arises under federal law.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)
(quoting Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal.,
463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks and corresponding citation omitted). Therefore,
“any claim purportedly based on . . . pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal
claim.” Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 393. If one or more of a plaintiff’s claims are preempted by
federal law and are therefore removable to federal court, the entire case is removable. See Cavallaro
v. UMass Mem. Healthcare, Inc., 678 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2012).
“Section 301 preempts a state-law claim, whether founded upon the state's positive or
common law, if a court, in passing upon the claim, would be required to interpret the [parties’]
collective bargaining agreement.” 7 Flibotte v. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, 131 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.
1997). “In practice, [the preemption] test boils down to whether the asserted state-law claim
plausibly can be said to depend upon the meaning of one or more provisions within the collective
bargaining agreement.” Id. If it does so depend, then there is federal jurisdiction to resolve the
federal question and a defendant can remove to federal court a case initially filed in state court and
purporting to make claims falling only under state law.
Once such a case has been removed, a party seeking remand has the burden of showing that
it is not even plausible that a resolution of its claim would hinge on an interpretation of the CBA.
See Flibotte, 131 F.3d at 26 (state law claim preempted by LMRA section 301 if it…"plausibly can

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Though not applicable to the instant motion, removal is also proper if an action alleges a breach of a duty that arises
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("[s]uits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties. . . ."); Flibotte v. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., 131
F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1997).

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be said to depend upon the meaning of" or "arguably hinges upon an interpretation of" the CBA);
Cavallaro, 678 F.3d at 8. Plaintiff has not met that burden here.
Though the court is sympathetic to the Plaintiffs’ position, the outcome of this motion is
controlled by the First Circuit’s holding in Cavallaro v. UMass Memorial Health Care, Inc. See id. at
2-9. In Cavallaro, the plaintiffs were nurses covered by a CBA that contained numerous provisions
concerning different rates of pay in different instances, all of which were higher than the mandated
rate under the applicable state statute. See id. The Cavallaro plaintiffs brought claims under ch. 149
and ch. 151, as well as various claims under state common law. See id. at 3. The First Circuit
observed that ch. 149 requires an employer to pay wages owed to an employee within a fixed period,
and that, “to succeed, an employee must, among other things, prove there are wages owed.” Id. at 8.
The court further explained: “determining what (if anything) is owed—an inevitable issue here—
depends at least arguably on interpretations and applications of the CBA at issue.” Id.
Similar to the instant Plaintiffs, the Cavallaro plaintiffs “insist[ed] that they [were] not raising
any interpretive dispute about the CBA or the method of calculating wages, but only a factual
dispute as to whether plaintiffs were paid” for additional, uncompensated time allegedly spent
working. See id. The First Circuit did not accept this argument, and ultimately found that an
interpretation of the CBA would be required because the evaluating court will need to construe and
apply “the various ‘peculiarities of industry-specific wage and benefit structures’ embodied in the
CBA.” Id. (quoting Adames v. Exec. Airlines, Inc., 258 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2001)); see also Hayes v.
Aramark Sports, No. 08-10700, slip. op. at 6 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2009) (holding that, due to the
“complexity of determining what actually is [plaintiffs’] regular rate of compensation,” the evaluating
court will necessarily have to interpret the parties’ CBA).
Plaintiffs in the instant case attempt to distinguish Cavallaro by explaining that, here,
Plaintiffs only assert that they have not been paid for all of the time that they have worked; and by
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contrast, in Cavallaro, “hospital employees brought numerous diffuse, vague, and far-reaching state
law claims . . . alleging that they have been denied compensation for work performed, for example
during meal breaks, during training sessions, and before and after their shifts.” (Dkt. No. 12, Pltf.
Mem. 10 (citing Cavallaro, 678 F.3d at 2-3).) This is, however, a distinction without a dispositive
difference. The instant case is governed by the Cavallaro holding because in both situations,
“determining whether there are wages owed” will, at least arguably, “require construing and
applying” a portion of the CBA. See Cavallaro, 678 F.3d at 8; Flibotte, 131 F.3d at 26.
Plaintiffs also argue that, since they are not seeking to enforce the threshold under the CBA,
it need not be interpreted because Plaintiffs “are seeking only to enforce their state statutory right to
collect overtime pay.” (Dkt. No. 12, Pltf. Mem. 7.) As the First Circuit has explained, however,
“[t]he interrelationship of the state claims and a CBA cannot be avoided merely by refusing to
identify the CBA in the complaint and citing the well pleaded complaint rule.” See id. at 5
(explaining that “[i]f a plaintiff's refusal to identify a CBA controlled, removal under section 301
could always be defeated by artful pleading.”). For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ argument—citing the
well-pleaded complaint rule to support their contention that interpretation of the CBA can be
avoided—is unavailing. (Dkt. No. 12, Pltf. Mem. 10 (citing Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 398-399).)
Contra Cavallaro, 678 F.3d at 5 (rejecting approach used by Plaintiffs here).

IV.

CONCLUSION

Given the controlling nature of Cavallaro, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Dkt. No. 12) is
hereby DENIED.
It is So Ordered.
_/s/ Mark G. Mastroianni________
MARK G. MASTROIANNI
United States District Judge

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