Graves v. Colvin

Filing 26

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS Pltf's Motion for an Order Reversing the Commissioner's Decision - 17 , to the extent it seeks a remand, and DENIES the Commissioner's (Deft's) Motion for an Order Affirming the Commissioner's Decision - 23 . The Clerk shall enter judgment for the Pltf., and this case is remanded for further administrative action. (Finn, Mary)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

DUANE GRAVES,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14-14756-MGM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ORDER REVERSING
THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION AND DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER
(Dkt. Nos. 17 and 23)
January 21, 2016
MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is an action for judicial review of a final decision by Carolyn Colvin, the acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), regarding an individual’s
entitlement to Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (referring to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Duane Graves (“Plaintiff”) asserts the Commissioner’s decision denying him

for order reversing the Commissioner’s decision and the
Commissioner has moved to affirm.

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For the following reasons, the court allows Plaintiff’s motion to the extent it seeks a remand
(Dkt. No. 17) and denies the Commissioner’s motion (Dkt. No. 23).
II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on November 20, 1970. (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 79.) He
reached, but did not complete, a ninth grade education and can read and write in English. (Id. at 51.)
He has five children and he maintains contact with his two youngest children. (Id. at 52.)
Previously, Plaintiff worked as a barber, convenience store cashier, snowmaking machine operator,
and groundskeeper. (Id. at 53–54, 62.)
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI benefits on March 8, 2012, alleging “knee problems”
with an onset date of March 1, 2011. 1 (Id. at 79, 23, 234.) This application was denied initially on
June 15, 2012, (id. at 119–21, 23), and on reconsideration on August 22, 2012. (Id. at 125–27, 23.)
Plaintiff then requested a hearing in front of an administrative law judge, which took place on July 2,
2013. (Id. at 45–74.)
A.

Medical History on Record
Plaintiff claimed his physical symptoms have limited his ability to work. (A.R. at 234.)

Plaintiff made monthly appointments to follow up on his chronic knee pain and renew his
prescriptions. On March 18, 2009, Dr. Stefan Topolski at Trailside Health assessed Plaintiff’s
congenital bilateral knee dislocations. (Id. at 325.) He opined Plaintiff’s knee pain had persisted
despite previously undergoing surgical interventions. (Id.) On May 26, 2009, Dr. Joseph Sklar of
New England Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. performed a bilateral knee arthroscopy and removed his

Plaintiff alleges March 8, 2011 as the onset date relative to his claim. (A.R. at 231.) In his decision, the ALJ limited the
scope of his disability determination to the period beginning March 8, 2012, the date of Plaintiff’s application for SSI.
(Id. at 25.) Plaintiff has not disputed the ALJ’s determined onset date for purposes of this court’s review. (See Def.’s
Mem. in Support Mot. Affirm Comm’r’s Decision at 9, n.9.) The court views the medical evidence of record in its
entirety to place Plaintiff’s symptoms into a larger context, but assumes the relevant period for disability purposes began
at the March 8, 2012 onset date.
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2

knee hardware

to address Plaintiff’s

persistent knee pain. (Id. at 303, 305–08, 325, 329.) On October 26, 2009, Lisa Miller at Trailside
Health stated Plaintiff’s “[M]ay surgery helped shin pain, but not joint pain. Knees hurt all the
time.” (Id. at 329.)
The record strongly suggests Plaintiff’s physicians were concerned he struggled with
substance abuse. Plaintiff was prescribed Percocet for his pain; he claimed he misplaced his
prescription and his physicians thereafter required random pill counts. (Id. at 325, 327–30.) Dr.
Topolski noted “numerous conflicting reports of substance use or diversion that cannot be
corroborated nor confirmed.” (Id. at 330.) He later prescribed Plaintiff Tramadol which “help[ed]
less but [was] still effective” and did not seem to implicate his substance abuse problems. (Id. at
340.)
On September 22, 2010, Dr. Topolski again indicated Plaintiff’s chronic knee pain and
tenderness continued after his May of 2009 procedure. (Id. at 340.) Dr. Topolski further stated
Plaintiff’s knee “swelled up badly” after he “hit a tree working” the previous week. (Id. at 337, 340.)
On February 9, 2011, Dr. Topolski indicated Plaintiff continued Tramadol during his workday but at
night “the pain roll[ed] back in.” (Id. at 339.) He prescribed Plaintiff Vicodin but discussed with
him the possible risks of addiction. (Id. at 340.)
On May 12, 2011, Dr. Topolski assessed “severe swelling” in Plaintiff’s knees from working,
which lasted five days despite his pain medication and icing daily. (Id. at 342.) On April 6, 2011, he
further opined that, even with continued Tramadol and Vicodin, Plaintiff’s knee pain was “worse
with harder working” and intensified when Plaintiff stopped moving. (Id. at 343.) On August 11,
2011, Dr. Topolski stated Plaintiff had discontinued working due to knee pain and was trying to find
other options. (Id. at 346.) Lisa Miller stated, on September 8, 2011, Plaintiff used more Tramadol
during “hurricane/flood clean up” but was otherwise steady with his medication throughout the day.
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(Id. at 350.) On three occasions between October 26, 2011 and March 8, 2012, Plaintiff’s physicians
indicated Plaintiff claimed he lost access to his medication. (Id. at 353, 356–58, 362.)
On January 16, 2013, Dr. Topolski stated Plaintiff was applying for disability payments and
renewed his prescriptions. (Id. at 406–07.) He further opined there was “no change” with respect to
Plaintiff’s chronic pain and encouraged Plaintiff to engage in activity as he could tolerate it. (Id. at
407.)
impairment: “[B]orn with congenital bilateral dislocated knees and has had [five] surgeries since age
[twenty-six]; cannot replace as [there is] not enough bone and surgeon is afraid that they won’t last.”
(Id. at 398.) Dr. Topolski further indicated Plaintiff had skipped Vicodin the previous month,
“would like it again,” and was “trying to use as little as possible.” (Id.) On April 17, 2013, Dr.
Topolski opined Plaintiff’s chronic knee pain was “controlled somewhat with medications” which
helped him move around. (Id. at 395–96.) Dr. Topolski renewed Plaintiff’s prescriptions for
Tramadol and Vicodin on May 15, 2013 and stated Plaintiff’s knees were worsening. (Id. at 394–95.)
B.

Administrative Hearing
An administrative hearing occurred on July 2, 2013 before Administrative Law Judge

Addison C. S. Masengill. (Id. at 45.) Plaintiff testified his impairment gave him difficulty with
driving, travelling on uneven ground, traversing stairs, sitting, standing for longer than fifteen to
twenty minutes, and cooking for sustained periods. (Id. at 52–53, 63–65.) He estimated his pain
level was a six or seven out of ten with pain medication, and a ten without. (Id. at 57.) Plaintiff
stated he would need knee replacement when he is older. (Id.) He explained he had no diagnosed
mental health issues

. (Id. at 58.)

Following Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ posed to a vocational expert a hypothetical
assuming an individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and limitation to sedentary
work. (Id. at 69–72.) The vocational expert testified such a hypothetical individual could not
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perform his past work as a barber, convenience cashier, or snowmaking machine operator. (Id. at
69–70.) The vocational expert further testified the hypothetical individual would be able to work in
other sedentary and unskilled positions available in the national economy which offer an option for
sitting and standing at will, such as inspection table worker, surveillance system monitor, or jewelry
preparer/polisher. (Id. at 70–71.) When asked to account for the hypothetical individual being offtask for twenty-five percent of the work day due to chronic pain, the vocational expert testified this
would lead to termination in any work. (Id. at 72.)
C.

Decision of the ALJ
Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision on September 27, 2013 denying Plaintiff’s

application for SSI benefits. (A.R. at 20, 23.) Plaintiff then filed an initial request for review with
the Appeals Council on October 9, 2013; the Appeals Council thereafter granted a request for
extension of time on September 18, 2014. (Id. at 18, 7.) Ultimately, the Appeals Council denied
review of Plaintiff’s case on October 28, 2014, thus making the decision of the ALJ final. (Id. at 1.)
Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant action, the Commissioner compiled the administrative record,
and the parties submitted the cross-motions presently at issue.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The role of a district court in reviewing an administrative law judge’s decision is limited to
determining whether the conclusion was supported by substantial evidence and based on the correct
legal standard. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3); Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion. Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as
“more than a mere scintilla.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The court must uphold a Commissioner’s conclusion “if a
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reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to
support his conclusion,” even if multiple other conclusions could be drawn from it. Rodriquez, 647
F.2d at 222. Additionally, it is the Commissioner’s responsibility to weigh conflicting evidence and
decide issues of credibility. Id.
IV.

DISABILITY STANDARD AND THE ALJ’S DECISION

An individual is entitled to SSI benefits if he is disabled and demonstrates financial need on
or after the date of the SSI application. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381a. Plaintiff’s financial need is not at
issue here. The Social Security Act (the “Act”) defines disability, in part, as the inability “to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual
is considered disabled under the Act
only if his physical and mental impairment or impairments are of such severity
that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job
vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). See generally Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146–49 (1987).
In determining disability, the Commissioner applies the following five-step analysis, as
outlined by the First Circuit:
1) if the applicant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity, the application
is denied; 2) if the applicant does not have, or has not had within the relevant
time period, a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the
application is denied; 3) if the impairment meets the conditions for one of the
“listed” impairments in the Social Security regulations, then the application is
granted; 4) if the applicant’s “residual functional capacity” is such that he or
she can still perform past relevant work, then the application is denied; 5) if
the applicant, given his or her residual functional capacity, education, work
experience, and age, is unable to do any other work, the application is granted.
Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920).
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In the instant case, the ALJ first found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity during the relevant period between March 8, 2012 and September 27, 2013. (A.R. at 25.)
Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s “knee pain due to congenital arthropathy and adjustment
disorder” to be severe. (Id.) Third, neither of Plaintiff’s severe impairments were found to meet the
severity of those listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (2015). (Id.) Fourth, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, limited to work
involving unskilled tasks. (Id. at 27.) The ALJ further found Plaintiff must avoid workplaces which
would require him to operate challenging “foot and leg controls, heights, ladders, ropes, and
scaffolding,” or “work on uneven ground.” (Id.) The ALJ also found Plaintiff must avoid more
than occasional climbing, “stooping, crouching, crawling, [or] kneeling” and be permitted to “sit and
stand at will.” (Id.) Fifth, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant
work “as a barber, cashier, [or] snow making machine operator.” (Id. at 38.) Nevertheless, the ALJ
found Plaintiff capable of performing alternative work as an inspector table worker, surveillance
in significant numbers in the national economy. (Id. at
39.) Therefore, Plaintiff was determined not to be disabled. (Id.)
V.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff advances three arguments challenging the ALJ’s decision. First, Plaintiff asserts the
ALJ erred in failing to afford controlling weight to the opinions of his treating physician, which left
his RFC determination unsupported by substantial evidence. Second, he argues the ALJ’s credibility
determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Third, Plaintiff claims the ALJ posited an
incomplete hypothetical question to the vocational expert at the administrative hearing, thus leaving
the ALJ’s conclusion reached at step five unsupported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner
counters that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding because the ALJ properly
considered the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician. Further, the Commissioner asserts the ALJ,
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in reaching his conclusion, properly considered the Plaintiff’s credibility and properly relied on the
vocational expert’s testimony.
An administrative law judge must give controlling weight to opinions of a “treating source”
if those opinions are “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and [are] not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the record. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2). When controlling weight is not afforded to the treating source’s opinion, an
administrative law judge must consider the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship,
the opinion’s supportability and consistency with the medical record in its entirety, the treating
See 20
C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2)–(6). Regarding the weight ultimately assigned to the treating source’s
opinion, the administrative law judge must provide “good reasons” supporting his or her decision.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2).
Plaintiff’s treating physician of over nine years
provided two opinions which are presently at issue. (A.R. at 36–37.) On January
16, 2013 and May 22, 2013, he completed two Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaires. (Id. at
386–87, 428–30.) In both his January and May 2013 responses, he stated Plaintiff could walk
roughly one city block without rest or significant pain. (Id. at 386, 428.) He indicated Plaintiff
required a job which permitted him to shift positions at will and to take unscheduled breaks during
an eight-hour workday. (Id. at 386, 428.) Dr. Topolski assessed Plaintiff as having no limitations in
his ability to repetitively engage in reaching, handling, or fingering. (Id. at 387, 429.)
In his January response, Dr. Topolski opined Plaintiff’s congenital arthropathy had shown
no improvement despite five surgeries on each knee, whereas in May he stated Plaintiff’s prognosis
had “continued worsening.” (Id. at 386, 428.) Dr. Topolski assessed how often Plaintiff’s symptoms
would interfere with his attention and concentration required to perform simple work-related tasks.
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In January, Dr. Topolski answered they would “seldom” interfere, but he indicated in May they
would “constantly” interfere. (Id. at 386, 428.) Dr. Topolski did not note any side effects of
Plaintiff’s medication in January, whereas in May he indicated Plaintiff experienced “stomach upset,
risk of addiction, [and] no relief” which may have impacted his capacity for work. (Id. at 386, 428.)
In his January response, Dr. Topolski estimated Plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk fifteen minutes at
one time, for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id.) In May, he increased these
amounts to sitting forty-five minutes at one time for a total of three hours in a hypothetical eighthour workday, and standing and walking thirty minutes at a time for a total of four hours. (Id. at
428.) Dr. Topolski stated in January Plaintiff could frequently lift ten pounds, occasionally lift
twenty pounds, and never lift fifty pounds. (Id. at 387.) In May, he estimated Plaintiff could
frequently carry twenty pounds, never lift twenty pounds, and never lift or carry fifty pounds. (Id. at
429.) In relation to this assessment, he opined Plaintiff “cannot bend easily or get out of a squat.”
(Id.) Ultimately, in January, he concluded Plaintiff was not physically capable of working an eighthour workday on a sustained basis. (Id. at 387.) His May conclusion, however, was that Plaintiff
was physically capable of working an eight-hour workday on a sustained basis and had previously
done so “with sufficient accommodations.” 2 (Id. at 429.)
The ALJ granted “little weight” to the two opinions Dr. Topolski provided. (Id. at 37.) The
ALJ reasoned Dr. Topolski’s opinions were inconsistent with the medical and documentary record
which showed (a) “improvement in knee pain with the use of medications and no evidence of
physical therapy, injections, or surgical intervention since the alleged onset date”; (b) “no evidence
ent due to psychiatric

The court notes the seeming internal inconsistencies within these two opinions. (See id. at 386–87, 428–30.) However,
the ALJ did not cite any internal inconsistency as a basis for reaching his decision regarding Dr. Topolski’s opinions.
(See id. at 37.) See Chiasson v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-248-JD, 2010 WL 5173307, at *7 (D.N.H. Dec. 14, 2010). Therefore, the
court need not inquire into the effect of such inconsistencies, if any, on the ALJ’s disability determination.

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symptoms”; and (c) “an ability to partake in many activities of daily living despite allegedly disabling
symptoms.” (Id.) The court concludes this explanation for discounting Dr. Topolski’s opinion is
inadequate and, thus, it is unclear whether the ALJ properly evaluated this treating source opinion.
First, the court fails to see the inconsistency between Dr. Topolski’s opinions and the
medical and documentary record regarding medication or lack of additional treatment. With regard
to improvements to Plaintiff’s condition with medication, the ALJ failed to account for the evidence
indicating Plaintiff likely had an opioid addiction, which made it difficult for him to rely on more
effective forms of pain medication. (Id. at 261, 340, 397–98.) Dr. Topolski’s opinions are consistent
with this evidence and point to the “risk of addiction [and lack of] relief” as side effects of Plaintiff’s
current pain medication regimen. (Id. at 428.) With regard to the absence of alternative treatment
such as physical therapy, injections, or surgery, the court finds neither the medical records nor Dr.
Topolski’s opinions indicate alternative treatments were possibilities for Plaintiff. For instance,
Plaintiff was specifically recommended against further surgical intervention until he turns fifty due to
lack of bone and cartilage in his knees. (Id. at 325, 329–30, 398.) The ALJ was not free to speculate
whether these hypothetical alternative treatments would have improved Plaintiff’s condition
theref

when the medical records do not

indicate they would. See Doucette v. Astrue, 972 F. Supp. 2d 154, 169 (D. Mass. 2013) (“Importantly,
an ‘ALJ is not free to substitute his own judgment for uncontroverted medical opinion.’”) (quoting
Rose v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1994)).
Second, as to the absence of psychiatric treatment, Plaintiff did not claim a disabling
psychiatric condition, nor did he seek SSI benefits relating to such a condition.3 (See id. at 234.) The

The record shows Plaintiff suffers from, but is not disabled by, depression and anxiety. (A.R. at 58.) Plaintiff has not
been medically diagnosed with these conditions but has nonetheless sought mental health counseling and also receives
medication to manage them. (Id. at 58, 238, 364–69, 399.) These conditions, however, are not a basis for Plaintiff’s
application for SSI benefits.
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basis for Plaintiff’s application for SSI benefits was his “knee problems” which limited his ability to
work. (Id.) In any event, there does not appear to be an inconsistency between the medical record
and Dr. Topolski’s opinions as to the impact of Plaintiff’s physical impairments on his ability to
concentrate on work-related activities. Dr. Topolski’s RFC Questionnaires addressed Plaintiff’s
knee condition and its impact on Plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related tasks; they shed no light
on Plaintiff’s mental health. (See id. at 386, 428.) Dr. Topolski’s other assessments which did
address Plaintiff’s mental health do not indicate he suffered a disabling psychiatric condition. For
example, in a statement provided to Disability Determination Services on June 8, 2012, Dr. Topolski
stated Plaintiff had “full normal mental [and] psychiatric health.” (Id. at 379.) Therefore, the
absence of records relating to a psychiatric condition does not support the ALJ’s decision to
discredit the opinions of Dr. Topolski.
Third, the ALJ provided no explanation for his conclusory finding that Plaintiff’s ability to
participate in activities of daily living (“ADLs”) is inconsistent with Dr. Topolski’s opinions, and
thus it is not clear to the court there is an inconsistency. The opinions Dr. Topolski expressed in his
RFC Questionnaire relate specifically to Plaintiff’s ability to engage in gainful activity, such as lifting
particular amounts of weight, concentrating on instructions, and standing and walking during a
typical workday. (Id. at 386–87, 428–29.) Dr. Topolski made no reference to Plaintiff’s ability to
cook, drive, or shop for groceries, Plaintiff’s daily activities on which the ALJ relied in evaluating
Plaintiff’s credibility. (Id. at 29.) In addition, the court sees a notable difference between the ability
to perform ADLs and the sort of work-specific activities referred to in Dr. Topolski’s opinions, and
the ALJ provided no explanation as to their apparent contradiction. See Ormon v. Astrue, No. 11–
2107, 2012 WL 3871560, at *6 (1st Cir. Sept. 7, 2012) (“[T]here is a ‘difference between a person’s
being able to engage in sporadic physical activities and her being able to work eight hours a day five
consecutive days of the week.’”) (quoting Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2004)); see
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also Waters v. Bowen, 709 F. Supp. 278, 284 (D. Mass. 1989) (“[S]uch [sporadic and transitory] tasks
can be performed intermittently, when the individual is not experiencing severe pain or before the
pain caused by such activity becomes overwhelming. Thus, such tasks do not require the sustained
effort necessary for any substantial, sustained, and regular gainful employment.”). Absent such an
explanation, the court is left to speculate as to why this asserted contradiction should support the
ALJ’s conclusion to discredit Dr. Topolski’s medical opinions.
Moreover, without more adequate explanation, the court cannot determine whether the ALJ
properly evaluated these treating source opinions. The court is thus unable to determine whether a
proper evaluation of Dr. Topolski’s opinions would have led the ALJ to give these opinions more
weight and changed his ultimate disability conclusion. Accordingly, it is necessary to remand the
matter for further administrative proceedings. See Seavey, 276 F. 3d at 12 (“When an agency has not
considered all relevant factors in taking action, or has provided insufficient explanation for its action,
the reviewing court ordinarily should remand the case to the agency.”). In light of this
determination, the court need not address Plaintiff’s or the Commissioner’s additional arguments. 4
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court ALLOWS Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Reversing the
Commissioner’s Decision (Dkt. No. 17), to the extent it seeks a remand, and DENIES the

In particular, the court has not considered the Commissioner’s postfor supporting the ALJ’s
decision to discredit Dr. Topolski’s medical opinions. For instance, the Commissioner asserted the ALJ properly
considered Dr. Topolski’s opinions since they were in the form of checklists and “wholly inconsistent” between January
and May. (Def.’s Mem. in Support Mot. Affirm Comm’r’s Decision at 12–13.) As Plaintiff argues, in assessing an
administrative action, the court generally must limit its review to the reasons stated in the ALJ’s decision. See Chiasson,
2010 WL 5173307, at *7 (“[I]n the context of reviewing a social security decision, the court is limited [to] evaluating the
decision ‘based solely on the reasons stated in the decision,’ which precludes consideration of other grounds as a means
to salvage an otherwise deficient decision.”) (quoting Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004)); see also
Lyons ex rel. X.M.K.L. v. Astrue, No. 12-30013-KPN, 2012 WL 5899326, at *6–7 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 2012).
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Commissioner’s Motion to Affirm the Commissioner’s Decision (Dkt. No. 23). The clerk shall
enter judgment for the Plaintiff, and this case is remanded for further administrative action.
It is So Ordered.
__/s/_Mark G. Mastroianni_________
MARK G. MASTROIANNI
United States District Judge

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