Navedo v. Colvin

Filing 21

Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. For the reasons stated, the Pltf's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings - 12 is DENIED and the Deft's Motion for Order Affirming Decision of Commissioner - 19 is GRANTED. (Finn, Mary)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
SHEILA MICHELL NAVEDO,
Plaintiff
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security Administration,
Defendant

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Civil Action No. 14-30015-KPN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS and
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AFFIRMING
THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
(Document Nos. 12 and 19)
December 9, 2014
NEIMAN, U.S.M.J.
Sheila Michell Navedo (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g) and 1383(c)(3) requesting judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) regarding her entitlement to
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”)
benefits. Plaintiff has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the
Commissioner, in turn, has moved to affirm.
The parties have consented to this court’s jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c);
FED. R. CIV. P. 73. For the following reasons, the court will deny Plaintiff’s motion and
allow the Commissioner’s motion to affirm.
DISCUSSION
The parties are well aware of the factual and procedural history of this case, the

standard of review, and the applicable five-step sequential analysis. Accordingly, the
court only reviews below the procedural and substantive history of the matter.
On April 25, 2009, Plaintiff applied for SSI and SSDI benefits, alleging an onset
date of April 1, 2008, due to depression, mood disorder and anxiety. After a hearing on
September 8, 2011, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s
application. (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 8-25.) Plaintiff requested review of that
decision, but the Appeals Council denied her request. (A.R. 1-10.)
Plaintiff then filed an appeal in this court seeking to reverse the decision. As
happens on occasion, the Commissioner filed an assented-to motion to remand, which
the court granted. (A.R. 504-507.) Then, pursuant to an order from the Appeals
Council, the matter was returned to the ALJ who was directed, among other things, to
further evaluate the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating mental health provider, Glenroy Bristol,
M.Ed. (“Mr. Bristol”) of Valley Psychiatric Services, and to explain the weight given to
that opinion. (A.R. 508-511.)
In compliance with that order, the ALJ held a second hearing on April 4, 2013.
(A.R. 479-498.) On May 14, 2013, the ALJ affirmed her previous denial. (A.R. 459478.) In her decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments of major depression,
generalized anxiety, post traumatic stress, and attention deficit hyperactivity imposed
more than minimal functional limitations. (A.R. 465.) The ALJ found, however, that
Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled the severity of a listed impairment or specifically, Listings 12.04 or 12.06. (Id.)
Rather, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”), with
certain limitations, to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and
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416.967(b). (A.R. 466.)
Soon thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council to remand her case for
another hearing before a different administrative law judge. (A.R. at 453-456.) The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request, concluding that “the ALJ specifically
addressed and evaluated [the] opinion evidence [and] provided references to the
evidence of record that contradicted these treating source opinions.” (A.R. 449.)
Plaintiff then filed the instant complaint in this court.
In seeking to reverse the decision, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when
assessing her RFC because she failed to “adequately consider the opinions” of her
treating mental health providers, Mr. Bristol and Paul Redstone, M.D. of Valley
Psychiatric Services. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed (1) to identify
what weight, if any, she gave to Mr. Bristol’s opinion, as set forth in an August 8, 2011
mental impairment questionnaire which Dr. Redstone co-signed, or (2) to point to any
evidence in support of her conclusion that Mr. Bristol and Dr. Redstone’s opinion was
both internally and externally inconsistent. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Bristol and Dr.
Redstone’s opinion was consistent with their own treatment notes and the record as a
whole, and, therefore, should have been accorded controlling weight.
Plaintiff’s argument, in the court’s view, misunderstands the nature of the
appropriate inquiry at this stage of the proceedings. However reasonable Plaintiff’s
desired outcome may be, she may only prevail if she persuades the court that the ALJ’s
decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35
(1st Cir. 1999); see also Thayer v. Colvin, 2014 WL 5581272, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 31,
2014). In effect, the court must review the totality of the evidentiary record to see if a
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reasonable mind could find it adequate to support the ALJ’s decision. See Rodriguez v.
Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981).
An administrative law judge may only give controlling weight to a treating
sources’s opinion if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent wtih the other substantial evidence.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) (emphasis added). Conversely, an
administrative law judge must give less weight to a treating sources’s opinion that does
not meet those requirements but, still, must provide “good reasons” for the ultimate
weight determination. Id. See also Guyton v. Apfel, 20 F. Supp. 2d 156, 167 (D. Mass.
1998); McCumber v. Colvin, 2014 WL 4804750, at *8 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2014).
Here, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s decision to accord Mr. Bristol’s
general opinions “moderate weight.” Rather, Plaintiff focuses solely on the lack of
controlling weight assigned to Mr. Bristol’s answers to the August 8, 2011 questionnaire.
In coming to this conclusion, the ALJ found that the answers were “extreme and grossly
inconsistent with the claimant’s actual activities of daily living and with her treatment
(i.e., counseling twice monthly with no i[n]patient treatment).” (A.R. 469.) The ALJ also
found that the global assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score of 58 within the
questionnaire was inconsistent with the “extreme” limitations set forth therein and
determined that it was not only internally inconsistent but was also inconsistent with the
record evidence.1 (A.R. at 469-470.) The court finds the ALJ’s analysis supported by
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A GAF score between 51 and 60 reflects moderate symptoms or moderate
difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning. See Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (American Psych. Assoc., 4th ed., 2000); Social Security
Disability Law and Procedure in Federal Court, § 5:30 (“a GAF score of 51 to 60
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substantial evidence.
With regard to the internal inconsistency, the ALJ found that the answers to the
questionnaire, which otherwise described extreme limitations (including “extreme”
difficulties in maintaining social functioning, concentration, and persistence or pace), did
not align with the GAF score of 58, indicating only moderate limitations. (A.R. 469.) To
be sure, a superficial discrepancy between a GAF score and a treating source’s
assessment is not in and of itself a sufficient basis for according little weight to the
treating source’s opinion. See Thayer, 2014 WL 5581272, at *3; Martinez v. Colvin,
2014 WL 3735889, at *3 (D. Mass. July 11, 2014); Hall v. Colvin, 18 F. Supp. 3d 144,
153 (D.R.I. 2014). Indeed, such superficial discrepancies may in fact be the very
reason why the American Psychiatric Association has moved away from the GAF
system.2 Still, the other incongruities identified by the ALJ do provide sufficient
evidence of inconsistency to support her decision.
For example, the ALJ found Mr. Bristol’s assessment “extreme and grossly
inconsistent” because Plaintiff had been able “to serve as a primary caregiver to her
children and perform household tasks like cleaning and paying bills.” (A.R. 469, 440.)
Similarly, the ALJ pointed out that Mr. Bristol expected Plaintiff to have one or two

indicates only ‘moderate difficulty in functioning’”); see also, e.g., Griffith v. Callahan,
138 F.3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 1998) (GAF score of 55 indicates moderate symptoms or
moderate difficulty in functioning).
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The newest version of the DSM published on May 18, 2013, no longer employs
the GAF score, although the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has indicated that it
will continue to receive into evidence and consider GAF scores. See SSA
Administrative Memorandum 13066 (July 22, 2013); see also Hall, 18 F. Supp. 3d at
153 (D.R.I. 2014) (noting that “GAF scores have been deemed unreliable” and
discussing the Memorandum).
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episodes of decompensation and miss more than four work days a month, both of which
ran contrary to his assessment that Plaintiff had only “moderate” restrictions on activities
of daily living. (A.R. 469.) The ALJ further cited Plaintiff’s own statements that she was
able to cook, clean, pay bills, and use public transportation, as well as attend school
functions and independently go to her own medical appointments. (A.R. 470.)
In addition, the ALJ pointed to Dr. Redstone’s August 10, 2011 note that Plaintiff denied
being overwhelmingly sad, although she was concerned with irritability, and that she
was organized and able to speak clearly and articulately, all of which was inconsistent
with Mr. Bristol’s assessment. (Id.)
Further, the ALJ cited Plaintiff’s December 29, 2011 appointment with Kimberly
Gage (“Gagne”), APRN, at Valley Psychiatric Services, during which she reported that
her medication, Remeron, was helpful for her depressive symptoms. (Id.) Gagne had
also noted that Plaintiff’s thoughts were clear, logical, organized, and reality-based and
that she continued to reduce the frequency, intensity, and duration of her depressive
episodes and anxiety symptoms. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ highlighted two of Plaintiff’s
other medical appointments: on July 13, 2012, after discontinuing antidepressants due
to pregnancy, Plaintiff’s mood and affect were noted as within normal limits, as was her
speech and thought processes. (Id.) And seven months later on February 5, 2013,
during a routine physical exam, it was noted that Plaintiff exhibited normal mood, affect,
appearance, speech and thought processes. (Id.)
Given all this evidence, which the ALJ discussed in her decision, a reasonable
mind could have reached the same conclusion with respect to inconsistencies in Mr.
Bristol and Dr. Redstone’s answers to the questionnaire. See Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec’y of
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Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (an administrative law
judge’s findings of fact “will stand were a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence on
the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support the Commissioner’s
conclusion.”); see also Rodriguez Pagan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 819 F.2d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987) (“We must affirm the [Commissioner’s] resolution, even if the record
arguably could justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by substantial
evidence.”); Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.
1981) (“In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, we are to keep in mind that
issues of credibility and the drawing of permissible inference from evidentiary facts are
the prime responsibility of the [Commissioner].”). Therefore, the ALJ need not have
accorded more weight to Mr. Bristol and Dr. Redstone’s opinions, as set forth in their
answers to the August 8, 2011 questionnaire, and was instead free to “downplay” their
assessment as she did. See Rodriguez v. Astrue, 694 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42 (D. Mass.
2010); Arruda v. Barnhart, 314 F. Supp. 2d 52, 72 (D. Mass. 2004).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is
DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion to affirm is ALLOWED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
December 9, 2014

/s/ Kenneth P. Neiman
KENNETH P. NEIMAN
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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