Griffin v. Cohen et al

Filing 5

Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S 2 APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SCREENING OF COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See attached Memorandum and Order for complete details. (Calderon, Melissa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUZANNE GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD COHEN, MAYOR OF THE
TOWN OF AGAWAM, et al,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 14-30147-MGM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF’S
APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (Document No. 2)
AND SCREENING OF COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
December 5, 2014
NEIMAN, U.S.M.J.
This is an action brought by pro se litigant Suzanne Griffin (“Plaintiff”) who, on the
surface, appears to claim that she was discriminated against by the Mayor of Agawam,
among other town officials, because of her disability. Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, which application has been referred to this court for consideration. For
the following reasons, the court will grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis but
nonetheless directs Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if she wishes to proceed,
which complaint shall be subject to further review.
I. DISCUSSION
A.
Upon review of Plaintiff’s financial disclosures, the court concludes that she is
without sufficient income or assets to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, the court will grant
the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Because Plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis, however, her complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2), which authorizes federal courts to dismiss an action if it is malicious,
frivolous, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In conducting its review, the court has liberally construed the complaint because
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Even so, the court has determined that the complaint, to the extent it can be
understood, borders on the frivolous, seeks to bypass a prior complaint pursued by
Plaintiff (which complaint was dismissed because of its own pleading deficiencies) and,
in any event, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B.
Plaintiff brings this action against Richard Cohen, Mayor of the Town of Agawam,
Susan Dawson, who is described as a prior mayor, Doreen Prouty, one-time chair of the
Agawam Zoning Board, and Larry Hoague, Fred Harpin, James Marmo, and Richard
Maggi, each one of whom is or was a member of the Zoning Board. The complaint
ostensibly invokes the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq., as the basis for this court’s jurisdiction but quickly erupts into all sorts of other
claims, the specifics of which are mysterious. For example, Plaintiff describes the
mayors as having “engaged in violating Federal Civil Rights including Bill of Rights,
Amendment IV safeguarding Persons, Houses, Papers and Effects from Despotic
searches and seizures without probable cause.” (Complaint at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff also
mentions having taken her plight “several times” to the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination but fails to mention the dates of those charges, the results of any
investigations, or the receipt of a right to sue letter.
2

It appears from the facts alleged in the complaint, no matter how confused and
disconnected, that, despite her invocation of the ADA, Plaintiff is seeking to reprise
claims she and her husband Alan Griffin, since deceased, previously pursued in this
forum (and elsewhere) centered on a zoning dispute concerning their keeping goats on
their land. See Griffin v. Town of Agawam, Civil Action 13-CV-30142-MAP. As here,
Plaintiff and her husband alleged in that action that they were both disabled, that she
needed raw goats milk because she suffers from colitis, that the Town wanted the goats
removed from the property and that the Land Court had ordered their removal; a parallel
case was also pending at that time in the Hampden County Housing Court.
As this court explained then, Plaintiff and her husband’s complaint offered no
basis for any civil rights action and, further, that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), barred lawsuits where parallel state court
proceedings were already addressing identical issues. Nevertheless, the court gave
Plaintiff and her husband thirty-five days to file an amended complaint addressing the
drafting deficiencies in their complaint. Unfortunately for their cause, their amended
complaint fared no better and the action was ultimately dismissed by District Judge
Michael A. Ponsor. Plaintiff and her husband did not appeal the dismissal.
Plaintiff’s present complaint echoes the situation which was the subject of the
prior complaint. She describes her one acre farm plot, the “RAW milk that was the
medical team ordered medicament,” the need for a special permit, and a claim that “if
the ‘livestock’ need is disablement specific, the farmers AND the goats are untouchable
under normal conditions.” Plaintiff also mentions a “quid pro quo lawyer,”
misstatements as to where the goats were removed, a settlement which had been in the
3

works, the “patriarch at abutting 112 North St.,” and “the uncanny powers to incite
mayoral and department assumed powers to do their dirty hands work.” The complaint
is a tangle of speculation, innuendo, upset and confusion.
C.
Irrespective of any cause of action that Plaintiff attempts to bring, she has failed
to state a claim for relief because she has not complied with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (“Rule 8”). Under Rule 8, a complaint must include “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). At a minimum, the pleading must “give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d
422, 430 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández,
367 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2004)). This means that the statement of the claim must “at
least set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when, where, and why.” Id.
(quoting Educadores, 367 F.3d at 68). Although the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) are
indeed “minimal,” those “requirements are not tantamount to nonexistent requirements.”
Id. (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Thus, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of her claim “requires more
than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A court is not “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Id. (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Further, “only a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief” states a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (emphasis added). “Where the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
4

misconduct,” the complaint does not show that “the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
(quoting Fed. R Civ. P. 8(a)(2) in second quotation).
As described, Plaintiff’s pleading, as a threshold matter, is very difficult to
decipher. This was true of her and her husband’s prior federal complaint, an
inadequacy which was left unremedied. As Judge Ponsor explained with respect to that
complaint and as remains true here, what emerges very clearly from a review of the
pleadings is no colorable claim has been articulated, whether under the ADA or
otherwise.
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently identify the connection between any of
the events she mentions to the alleged misconduct of each individual defendant.
Instead, she has apparently treated the alleged perpetrators of all of the misdeeds
against her as if they have acted in concert. This “lumping” together of all of the
defendants also fails to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. See Bagheri v.
Galligan, 160 Fed. Appx. 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding district court’s dismissal of
action where the original complaint did not “state clearly which defendant or defendants
committed each of the alleged wrongful acts”); Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed.
Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (“By lumping all the defendants together in each claim and
providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct, [plaintiff]’s complaint failed to
satisfy [the] minimum standard” of pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).). Further, even if
Plaintiff is suggesting that all the defendants participated in all incidents of misconduct
because they had conspired together, such conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are
insufficient to meet the Rule 8 pleading requirements. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
5

II. CONCLUSION
In light of the significant deficiencies in the complaint, the court concludes that it
is subject to dismissal under 19 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). However, to avoid possible
dismissal of the action in its entirety, the court directs Plaintiff to file an amended
complaint within thirty-five days, i.e., January 9, 2015, that cures the problems
addressed above. Of course, the amended complaint will be screened as well.
The claims in the amended complaint must be set forth “in numbered
paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(b). In addition, if Plaintiff brings claims against more than one defendant, the
claims must be limited to those “arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A). Failure to do so
may result in dismissal of the action.
IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED: December 5, 2014
/s/ Kenneth P. Neiman
KENNETH P. NEIMAN
U.S. Magistrate Judge

6