MISTERKA v. Colvin

Filing 27

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. The court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. No. 14) and therefore ALLOWS Defendants Motion to Affirm the Commissioners Decision (Dkt. No. 24).The clerk shall enter judgment for Defendant, and this case may now be closed. (Finn, Mary)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
WALTER M. MISTERKA, JR.,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-cv-10203-MGM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ORDER REVERSING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER AND
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER
(Dkt. Nos. 14 and 24)
September 21, 2016
MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is an action for judicial review of a final decision by Carolyn Colvin, the Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), regarding an individual’s
entitlement to Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Walter M. Misterka,
Jr. (“Plaintiff”) asserts the Commissioner’s decision to deny him such benefits—memorialized in an
August 20, 2013 decision of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”)—was in error. Plaintiff has filed a
motion for order reversing the decision of the Commissioner and the Commissioner has moved to
affirm. For the reasons set forth below, the court allows the Commissioner’s motion (Dkt. No. 24)
and denies Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. No. 14).

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Procedural History

Plaintiff applied for SSDI and SSI on November 10, 2011 and alleged disability since
December 15, 2008. (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 224-32, 238-51.) Plaintiff was notified by the
Social Security Administration that his claims had been initially denied on January 12, 2012 and had
subsequently been denied upon reconsideration on May 31, 2012. (Id. at 106-09, 116-21.) Plaintiff
requested a hearing in front of an administrative law judge, which took place on August 19, 2013.
(Id. at 122-23, 200-04.) In a written decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 817.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision final and
ripe for judicial review. (Id. at 1-4.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant action, the Commissioner
compiled the administrative record, and the parties filed the cross-motions presently at issue.
B.

Medical History on Record

Plaintiff alleges disability due to mental health problems and insomnia. (Id. at 10, 31.)
Plaintiff was 44 years old on the alleged disability onset date of December 15, 2008. (Id. at 34.) He
completed high school and his past relevant work experience has been that of a forklift operator,
insulation installer, machine operator, and pest control worker. (Id. at 50-51.)
Beginning in October 2009, Plaintiff sought treatment at YOU, Inc. Southbridge Family
Center for symptoms of anxiety and feeling overwhelmed by family and financial responsibilities. (Id.
at 347.) At intake, Plaintiff was diagnosed with “adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and
depressed mood” and a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 55.1 (Id. at 354.) In

The GAF is based on a hundred point scale, broken down into ten categories, which measures a clinician’s
subjective judgment of an individual’s overall level of psychological, social, and occupational functioning. See
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 34 (4th
ed. 2005). A GAF score of 51-60 means moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or
school functioning. Id. A GAF score of 41-50 means serious symptoms or serious impairment in social,
occupational, or school functioning. Id.
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November 2010, Plaintiff was diagnosed by a YOU, Inc. clinician with generalized anxiety disorder
and a GAF score of 51. (Id. at 346.)
On June 30, 2011, Plaintiff began therapy with Thomas Porter, LICSW at Harrington
Behavioral Health, where he reported “struggling with panic attacks and being out of work for two
years due to a felony on his [criminal offender record information (“CORI”)].”2 (Id. at 362.) Plaintiff
also requested “help with his current marriage around communication issues” and medications to
help him relax and sleep. (Id.) A mental health examination conducted by Mr. Porter was normal
aside from observed anxious mood and racing thoughts. (Id. at 363.) A functional status assessment
noted Plaintiff required no assistance caring for himself, remembering everyday details, handling
finances, shopping, driving, or getting along with others, but did note that he was unable to seek,
obtain, and maintain employment. (Id.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with panic disorder without
agoraphobia and a GAF score of 45, indicating a serious impairment.3 (Id. at 364.)
At a July 2011 appointment with Mr. Porter, Plaintiff again reported being unable to obtain
employment due to his criminal history. (Id. at 365.) On the mental status examination, Mr. Porter
reported that Plaintiff’s short term memory was impaired, his attention span was decreased, and a
decrease in concentrating ability was observed. (Id.) Mr. Porter again noted Plaintiff exhibited
“racing thoughts.” (Id.) Nonetheless, Mr. Porter noted that Plaintiff “presented as stable and
interactive.” (Id.) At appointments on October 20, 2011 and October 27, 2011, Plaintiff again
reported being unable to obtain work due to his criminal history and expressed feeling depressed
that he was unable to provide for his family. (Id. at 367, 369.) At both visits, Mr. Porter reported
decreased attention span, decreased concentrating ability, and anxious mood. (Id.) Mr. Porter again
noted that Plaintiff “presented as stable and interactive.” (Id.) At the October 27th appointment, Mr.

It is also noted in the written assessment portion of the report that a felony on Plaintiff’s CORI “keep[s]
him from getting work even though he earned a [Commercial Driver’s License]” two years prior. (A.R. 364.)
3 No explanation accompanied this GAF score assigned to Plaintiff.
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Porter reported Plaintiff’s problems included “anxiety and panic attacks due to current stressors of
being unemployed and not having money enough to make life a little easier” and “feel[ing] so
depressed each day about not working that [he] lose[s] [his] motivation to even get up in the
morning.” (Id. at 371.)
On November 8, 2011, Plaintiff was evaluated by Resul Ozbayrak, M.D. of Harrington
Behavioral Health. (Id. at 374-76.) The mental status examination was normal and Plaintiff’s mood
was “appropriate” without anxiety or depression. (Id. at 375.) Dr. Ozbayrak diagnosed anxiety
disorder and episodic mood disorders and assigned a GAF score of 55, indicating moderate
impairment. (Id. at 375-76.) A week later on November 15, 2011, Mr. Porter reported Plaintiff
exhibited a decreased attention span, decreased concentrating ability, and anxious mood. (Id. at 377.)
Then, on November 23, 2011, Dr. Ozbayrak again reported normal findings on the mental status
examination and reported “appropriate, not agitated, not anxious and not depressed” mood. (Id. at
379.) Harrington Physician Services records from December 2, 2011 indicate a diagnosis of bipolar
disorder and chronic pain. (Id. at 403.)
In April 2012, Mr. Porter completed a Psychiatric Disorder assessment form, co-signed by
Dr. Ozbayrak, reporting Plaintiff suffered from episodic mood disorder and anxiety and had a GAF
score of 45, indicating serious impairment. (Id. at 408-10.) The report stated Plaintiff lacked energy
and motivation, had poor focus and memory, could not sustain concentration and attention for
extended periods without distraction by psychologically based symptoms, and could not remember
work-like tasks or instructions.4 (Id. at 408.) The report also stated Plaintiff had poor hygiene, was
irritable with others, and would be unable to cope with an employer’s criticism. (Id. at 409.) The

Although Mr. Porter indicated Plaintiff exhibited decreased attention span and concentration, Dr. Ozbayrak
noted Plaintiff’s orientation, memory, and attention were normal on both of his November 2011 evaluations.

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report stated Plaintiff had not resigned from or been fired from jobs because of psychiatric
symptoms. (Id.) The report also indicated psychological testing had not been done. (Id.)
On January 10, 2012, state agency consultant Lisa Fitzpatrick, Psy.D. found that some of
Plaintiff’s limitations related to his anxiety and depression would restrict him to jobs with simple,
routine tasks with limited public contact, but ultimately found him not to be disabled. (Id. at 60.) Dr.
Fitzpatrick found moderate limitations with respect to Plaintiff’s attention, concentration, timeliness,
and ability to complete a normal workday without interruptions from psychological based
symptoms. (Id. at 61-62.) On May 30, 2012, state agency consultant Jan Jacobson, Ph.D. also found
Plaintiff not disabled, but restricted to simple routine tasks with limited public contact. (Id. at 83,
87.)
During medication visits in January, February, March, May, July, August, and October 2012,
Dr. Ozbayrak reported normal findings on Plaintiff’s mental status examinations and observed that
Plaintiff’s mood was appropriate, not agitated, and not anxious. (Id. at 425, 429, 432, 486, 487, 489,
490). In October 2012, Plaintiff returned to therapy with Mr. Porter. (Id. at 491.) Plaintiff reported
that Dr. Ozbayrak said Plaintiff “was no longer disabled and could return to work.” (Id.) Mr. Porter
again noted that Plaintiff’s criminal history “is keeping him from working.” (Id. at 492.) A mental
status examination was normal aside from an anxious mood and racing thoughts. (Id.) Mr. Porter
assessed a GAF score of 50, indicating serious impairment. (Id. at 493.)
On June 19, 2012, clinical neuropsychologist Jill Damon-Minow, Psy.D. conducted a
neuropsychological evaluation, concluding Plaintiff primarily demonstrated impairments in
concentration and cognitive processing speed, and that Plaintiff’s “severe current levels of
depression and anxiety are [very likely] primary contributing factors to the deficits observed.”5 (Id. at

Dr. Damon-Minow also stated: “It is notable that [Plaintiff] reported hearing loss that is currently untreated
in that he does not wear his hearing aids, and as hearing loss can mimic memory difficulties, this may also be
a factor in his daily experience of memory problems.” (A.R. 502.)

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499-504.) Dr. Damon-Minow noted Plaintiff was appropriately groomed and “performed within
normal limits on the first trial of a recognition memory symptom validity test.” (Id. at 500.) Dr.
Damon-Minow concluded that the “test results are not suggestive of a neurodegenerative
condition.” (Id. at 502.)
On January 9, 2013, psychiatrist David Morin, M.D. completed a check-box assessment
form, indicating Plaintiff had a number of marked limitations, including poor concentration and
focus, which affect his ability to perform work-related activities. (Id. at 524-26.) On January 20, 2013,
Dr. Morin reported the mental status examination was normal aside from anxiety and depressed
mood, and found Plaintiff’s short term, remote, and recent registration memory intact. (Id. at 559.)
On February 13, 2013, Dr. Morin observed Plaintiff with an appropriate, not anxious or depressed
mood and again noted a normal mental status examination. (Id. at 560.) On February 14, 2013, Dr.
Morin diagnosed Plaintiff with anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, episodic mood disorder, and panic
disorder without agoraphobia, and a GAF score of 55, indicating moderate impairment. (Id. at 562.)
From March through August 2013, Dr. Morin reported that Plaintiff’s mental status examinations
were normal aside from occasional depressed and/or anxious mood. (Id. at 563-65.)
At the administrative hearing on August 19, 2013, Plaintiff testified that he was unable to
work due to bipolar disorder, OCD, and insomnia. (Id. at 36.) He testified feeling restless and
anxious, and that his bipolar disorder and OCD prevented him from working with others, all of
which contributed to his inability to perform even simple work. (Id. at 38-39.) Plaintiff also
described physical limitations including pain in his legs and knees from prolonged standing and
lower back pain. 6 (Id. at 38.) Plaintiff’s counsel clarified that, although Plaintiff had “some physical

In ascertaining Plaintiff’s limitations, the ALJ presented to Plaintiff the hypothetical of a job folding and
sorting laundry with a sit/stand option. (A.R. 38.) In his testimony, Plaintiff presented various, vague reasons
as to why he was unable to perform such work, but ultimately conceded that the requirements of such a job
and certain modifications would accommodate some of the objections raised. (Id. at 38-40.)

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overlay” that impaired his ability to work, the primary inquiry was with respect to his mental
problems, which prevented him from performing even simple, unskilled work. (Id. at 40, 42.) During
cross-examination by his attorney, Plaintiff testified he was unable to concentrate or finish a task,
allegedly due to his medication. (Id. at 44-45.) He also described his insomnia, testifying he got no
sleep two to three times a week, renerding him lethargic and “basically useless.” (Id. at 45.)
Also at the hearing, vocational expert Erin Bailey testified as to the exertional level of
Plaintiff’s past work experience and the availability of jobs which could accommodate certain
hypothetical limitations. (Id. at 49-52.) Ms. Bailey answered that an individual of Plaintiff’s age,
education, and past work history who is capable of light, unskilled work with simple instructions and
a sit/stand option that is isolated from the public and has only occasional contact with others, would
be able to perform work as an assembler, inspector, or sorter. (Id. at 52.)

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The role of a district court reviewing an administrative law judge’s decision is limited to
determining whether the conclusion was supported by substantial evidence and based on the correct
legal standard. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3); Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as “more than a
mere scintilla.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Even if the administrative record could support multiple conclusions, a
court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings “if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the
record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support his conclusion.” Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 647 F. 2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981)). Additionally, it is the Commissioner’s responsibility
to weigh conflicting evidence and decide issues of credibility. Rodriguez, 647 F.2d at 222.
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IV.

DISABILITY STANDARD AND THE ALJ’S DECISION

An individual is entitled to SSDI benefits if, among other things, he has an insured status
and, prior to its expiration, is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A) and (D). Entitlement to SSI, on
the other hand, requires a showing of both disability and financial need. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381a.
Neither Plaintiff’s insured status nor his financial need is challenged. Therefore, whether Plaintiff
has a disability such that he may qualify for SSDI and SSI is the only issue at hand.
The Social Security Act (the “Act”) defines disability, in part, as the inability “to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and
1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual is considered disabled under the Act:
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area
in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would
be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B). See generally Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-49
(1987).
In determining disability, the Commissioner follows the five-step protocol described by the
First Circuit as follows:
1) if the applicant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity, the application is
denied; 2) if the applicant does not have, or has not had within the relevant time period,
a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the application is denied; 3) if
the impairment meets the conditions for one of the “listed” impairments in the Social
Security regulations, then the application is granted; 4) if the applicant’s “residual
functional capacity” is such that he or she can still perform past relevant work, then
the application is denied; 5) if the applicant, given his or her residual functional
capacity, education, work experience, and age, is unable to do other work, the
application is granted.
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See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) and 416.920(a)(4); Goodermote v. Sec’y of HHS, 690 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir.
1982).
In the instant case, at step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not performed any substantial
gainful activity after his alleged onset date of December 15, 2008. (A.R. 10.) At step two, the ALJ
found Plaintiff had several severe impairments during this period, specifically, insomnia, bipolar
disorder, mood disorder, depression, and anxiety/panic disorder without agoraphobia. (Id.) At step
three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s impairments do not, singly or in combination, meet the severity
of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 14.) The ALJ
found that Plaintiff’s RFC allows him to perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b)
and 416.967(b), with the following accommodations: sit or stand option at will; isolated from the
public with only occasional contact with others; and simple instructions. (Id. at 15.) In light of this
RFC, the ALJ found at the fourth step that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id.
at 16.) At step five, the ALJ, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
found “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that claimant can
perform,” such as assembler, inspector, and sorter. (Id. at 16, 17.) As a result, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff was not disabled and denied his application for SSDI and SSI benefits. (Id. at 17.)
V.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to provide substantial evidence to support his
assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). The court finds
Plaintiff’s arguments unavailing and the ALJ’s decision supported by substantial evidence.
A.

Assessment of the Plaintiff’s credibility

“The credibility determination by the ALJ, who observed the claimant, evaluated his
demeanor, and considered how that testimony fit with the rest of the evidence, is entitled to
deference, especially when supported by specific findings.” Frustaglia v. Sec’y of Health & Human
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Servs., 829 F.2d 192, 195 (1st Cir. 1987). Plaintiff asserts the ALJ’s credibility determination was
flawed because the ALJ (1) improperly considered Plaintiff’s criminal record and (2) did not consider
all the relevant factors enumerated at 20 C.F.R. § 404.159(c)(1) and in Avery v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 797 F.2d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2001). The ALJ gave three reasons for not crediting
Plaintiff’s assertions of disability. First, the ALJ noted that in the months before and after he applied
for disability benefits, treatment notes state Plaintiff reported he was not working because his
criminal record prevented him from getting a job, not because a disability prevented him from
working. (A.R. 13, 362-367, 369 411, 492.) Second, the combination of Plaintiff’s criminal history,
which involves crimes of dishonesty, and inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and other
evidence in the record caused the ALJ to view Plaintiff’s testimony with caution. (A.R. 13.) Finally,
the ALJ found Plaintiff’s disability claims not credible because the record contained significant
evidence indicating that marital and financial problems, rather than mental impairments, were the
“primary cause of [Plaintiff’s] emotional state.” (A.R. 13.)
While two of the three reasons the ALJ gave for not crediting Plaintiff’s testimony
referenced Plaintiff’s criminal history, Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ relied “almost entirely on the
fact that [Plaintiff] has a criminal history to support his finding that [Plaintiff] is not credible,” is
misplaced. (Dkt. No. 15, Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (“Pl. Mem.”) 1.) The
inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s reports to his clinician contemporaneous with his application and
his testimony at the hearing, not his criminal record, were the main cause for ALJ’s decision not to
credit Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his disability. Inconsistencies between an applicant’s reports to
a practitioner and testimony before the ALJ, especially if not explained, may be considered by an
ALJ making a credibility determination. See Teixeira v. Astrue, 755 F.Supp.2d 340, 347-48 (D. Mass.
2010).

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Plaintiff also asserts the ALJ’s credibility determination was flawed because the ALJ did not
consider all the relevant factors enumerated at 20 C.F.R. § 404.159(c)(1) and in Avery v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 797 F.2d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 1986).
At the hearing, Plaintiff asserted that he was disabled because his mental health issues and
insomnia prevented him from obtaining or maintaining a job.7 (A.R. at 31.) The ALJ did not credit
Plaintiff’s reports regarding “the intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of Plaintiff’s symptoms.
Plaintiff asserts this decision was erroneous because the ALJ failed “to make specific findings as to
the relevant evidence he considered in determining to disbelieve [Plaintiff]” and by failing to
consider the “Avery factors” in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility. (Pl. Mem. 6 (quoting Da Rosa v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1986)).) See Avery, 797 F.2d at 29. The court finds
the ALJ’s credibility determination complied with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1) and Avery and was
based on substantial evidence such that it is entitled to deference by this court.
In Avery, the First Circuit held that a hearing officer must consider certain factors when
assessing a claimant’s subjective complaints of symptoms, including the nature, location, duration,
and frequency of any symptom; precipitating and aggravating factors; dosage, effectiveness, and
adverse side-effects of any medication; treatment for relief of symptoms; and the claimant’s daily
activities. Avery, 797 F.2d at 29. The factors are also set forth at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and
416.929(c)(3). The relevance of the factors will vary depending on a claimant’s symptoms and the
ALJ “need not expressly discuss every enumerated factor.” Balaguer v. Astrue, 880 F. Supp. 2d 258,
268 (D. Mass. 2012) An administrative law judge complies with Avery when he performs an adequate
inquiry into the Avery factors at the hearing and considers each Avery factor in reaching his

At the start of the hearing Plaintiff affirmed that the only reasons for his disability claim were his mental health
problems and insomnia. (A.R at 31.) Later during his testimony he asserted that various physical ailments prevented him
from doing certain jobs proposed by the ALJ and Vocational Expert. (A.R. at 37-39.) Still later in the hearing, under
questioning from his attorney, Plaintiff agreed that his disability stemmed from his mental problems, rather than from
physical problems. (A.R. at 40.)

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determination, even if he does not provide “an explicit written analysis of each factor.” See Vega v.
Astrue, 2012 WL 5989712, at *8 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2012).
At the hearing, the Plaintiff testified about his insomnia, bipolar disorder, OCD, anxiety, and
depression. He described the frequency and duration of his insomnia and depression. (A.R. at 42,
45.) Plaintiff listed his medications and identified an inability to concentrate as a side effect of his
medications. (A.R. at 45.) Plaintiff also described a typical OCD episode, as well as his typical daily
activities (Id. at 46.) The court finds an “adequate inquiry into the Avery factors” was made at the
hearing and infers the ALJ considered that testimony when reviewing the record in its entirety. As
articulated by the court in Vega:
While a contrary decision might well have been reached in this case, and such a
decision would certainly be reasonable, it is not for this Court to re-weigh the evidence.
See Lill, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (“[I]t is not the function of this Court to second-guess
credibility assessments of the hearing officer that are supported by sufficient
evidence.”) (citation omitted). Thus, the hearing officer's credibility determination is
entitled to deference by this Court.
Id. at *10. Certainly, the ALJ could have engaged in a more thorough analysis of the Avery factors to
determine the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms, but even without such an analysis, the ALJ’s finding
that Plaintiff was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence. See Frustaglia, 829 F.2d at 195
(affirming ALJ decision where “more express findings” would have been “preferable,” but entire
record includes substantial evidence to support ALJ determination).

B.

Assessment of the Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ failed to provide a sufficient explanation as to how the evidence
on record supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (Pl. Mem. 7-8.) In making this argument, Plaintiff
relies on Titles II and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, a Social Security
Ruling, which states:

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The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence
supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and
nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations). . . . The adjudicator must also
explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case
record were considered and resolved.
SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996); (Pl. Mem. 8.) In the decision, the ALJ stated he
considered the entire record, including all symptoms, and opinion evidence in his RFC assessment.8
(A.R. 15.) The ALJ described the weight he gave to the various providers and reviewers. For
example, he credited the narrative notes from Dr. Morin, but discredited a form completed by Dr.
Morin because the form included no explanation for the answers recorded and those answers were
not consistent with Dr. Morin’s later notes. (A.R. 12, 524-26, 559-70.) The ALJ’s RFC assessment
reflects the findings of practitioners that Plaintiff’s symptoms included anxiety and attention
difficulties and Plaintiff’s own testimony, to the extent credited by the ALJ. The provider and
reviewer opinions together with Plaintiff’s own testimony at the hearing, provide substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform light work with a sit-stand option
at will, that allowed him to remain isolated from the general public, required no more than
occasional contact with others, and required him to remember and carry out only simple
instructions. Reyes v. Colvin, 2015 WL 727935, at *5 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2015). (See A.R. 15.) This
court must uphold the RFC determination so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. See
Blackette v. Colvin, 52 F. Supp. 3d 101, 113 (D. Mass. 2014) (citing McDougal v. Astrue, 2010 WL
1379901, at *10 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2010)). Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

As part of the record, the ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s testimony to the extent that he found it to be
credible. Having already determined that the ALJ’s credibility determination was proper, the ALJ’s reliance on
his credibility determination in his RFC assessment is also not in error. Compare Rohrberg v. Apfel, 26 F. Supp.
2d 303, 312 (D. Mass. 1998) (an RFC determination that hinges on an inadequate credibility determination is
improper).

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VI.

CONCLUSION

The court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. No. 14) and
therefore ALLOWS Defendant’s Motion to Affirm the Commissioner’s Decision (Dkt. No. 24).
The clerk shall enter judgment for Defendant, and this case may now be closed.
It is So Ordered.

_/s/ Mark G. Mastroianni________
MARK G. MASTROIANNI
United States District

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