Chin v. Garda CL New England, Inc.

Filing 24

Judge Michael A. Ponsor: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. The Motion to Dismiss relying upon 59H is hereby DENIED, without prejudice, in order to permit Pltf. to conduct discovery as contemplated by the statute. The schedule for completion of discovery will be set forth in a separate scheduling order. The Motion to Dismiss, in so far as it relies on Fed.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), is hereby ALLOWED as to any claim pursuant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws Annotated sh. 12, 11H (&qu ot;MCRA"). First Circuit law makes clear that the termination, or threatened termination, of an at-will employee may not be deemed coercive for purposes of the MCRA. Nolan v. CNS, 656 F.3rd 71m\ 77 (1st.Cir, 2011); Drexler v. Tel Nexx, Inc. , _ F. Supp. 3rd _ (D Mass. 2015), 2015 WL 5096466 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2015). In all other respects, the Motion to Dismiss based on Fed. R. Civ.P. 12b(b)(6) is hereby DENIED. The incorprated motions for fees and for costs are hereby DENIED. The motion for hearing is DENIED, as moot. (Finn, Mary)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
MAURICE CHRISTOPHER CHIN,
Plaintiff,
GARDA CL NEW ENGLAND, INC.,
Defendant.

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C.A. No. 15-cv-13110-MAP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
(Dkt. No. 8)
December 14, 2015
PONSOR, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff was formerly employed as an armored car
driver by Defendant Garda CL New England, Inc.

He alleges

that he was charged with theft based upon false information
given to prosecutorial authorities by Defendant.

Defendant

has filed a “Special Motion to Dismiss” under Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 231, § 59H, the so-called “anti-SLAPP” statute, and
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The motion to dismiss relying upon § 59H is hereby
DENIED, without prejudice, in order to permit Plaintiff to
conduct discovery as contemplated by the statute.

The

schedule for completion of discovery will be set forth in a
separate scheduling order.
The motion to dismiss, in so far as it relies on Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), is hereby ALLOWED as to any claim
pursuant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen.

Laws Annotated ch. 12, § 11H (“MCRA”).

First Circuit law

makes clear that the termination, or threatened termination,
of an at-will employee may not be deemed coercive for
purposes of the MCRA.

Nolan v. CNS, 656 F.3d 71, 77 (1st.

Cir. 2011); Drexler v. Tel Nexx, Inc., __ F. Supp. 3rd __
(D. Mass. 2015), 2015 WL 5096466 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2015).
In all other respects, the motion to dismiss based on Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is hereby DENIED.
The incorporated motions for fees and for costs are
hereby DENIED.

The motion for hearing is DENIED, as moot.

It is So Ordered.
/s/ Michael A. Ponsor
MICHAEL A. PONSOR
U. S. District Judge

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