Equal Employment Opportunity Commision v. Baystate Medical Center, Inc.

Filing 51

Magistrate Judge Katherine A. Robertson: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered re: Defendant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Provide Further Answers to Interrogatories. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Compel (Dkt. No. 39} is ALLOWED in PART and DENIED in PART as set forth herein. To the extent the Motion is allowed the EEOC is ordered to respond on or before November 13, 2017. Each party to bear its own fees and costs. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(C). (Finn, Mary)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,

)
)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
)
) Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-30086-MGM
)
BAYSTATE MEDICAL CENTER, INC., ET AL., )
)
Defendants
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL
PLAINTIFF TO PROVIDE FURTHER ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES
(Dkt. No. 39)
ROBERTSON, U.S.M.J.
In this employment discrimination action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Plaintiff, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), asserts claims on behalf of Stephanie Clarke. The
complaint alleges that Ms. Clarke's employment at Baystate Medical Center ("BMC") and
Baystate Health Systems ("BHS") (collectively "Defendants") was terminated after she declined
Defendants' free influenza vaccination because of her religious beliefs. The complaint further
alleges that Defendants' influenza policy required Ms. Clarke to wear a mask after she declined
immunization, but the mask prevented her from adequately performing her job in the human
resources department. 1

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Additional background facts are included in the undersigned's Memorandum and Order on the
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendants to Respond to and Produce Documents Responsive to
Plaintiff's First Set of Discovery Requests (Dkt. No. 40).
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Before the court is Defendants' motion to compel answers to interrogatories, which were
served on the EEOC pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). 2 The EEOC has objected to Defendants'
requests on various grounds.
After a hearing and for the following reasons, Defendants' motion to compel is
ALLOWED to the extent set forth herein.
I.

LEGAL STANDARD

"Discovery may be obtained as to any non-privileged material relevant to any party's
claim or defense that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
BPP Retail Props., LLC v. N. Am. Roofing Servs., Inc., 300 F.R.D. 59, 61 (D.P.R. 2014) (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). "The party resisting discovery has the burden of showing 'specifically
how each interrogatory is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or
oppressive.'" Id. (quoting Vázquez–Fernández v. Cambridge Coll., Inc., 269 F.R.D. 150, 155–56
(D.P.R. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). "Where a
response shows that 'the answers as a whole disclose a conscientious endeavor to understand the
questions and to answer fully those questions as are proper, [Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4)] has been
satisfied.'" Vázquez-Fernández, 269 F.R.D. at 155 (quoting Sánchez–Medina v. UNICCO Serv.
Co., 265 F.R.D. 24, 27 (D.P.R. 2009)). If a party withholds otherwise discoverable information
on the basis of privilege, the party must, "'(i) expressly make the claim; and (ii) describe the
nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed — and do

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Each Defendant served interrogatories on the EEOC, but there is some overlap between the sets
served by each Defendant, although the numbers of the overlapping interrogatories differ. For
ease of reference, Baystate Health Systems' interrogatories will be referenced herein as "BSH
Interrogatory No. __" and Baystate Medical Center's interrogatories will be referenced herein as
"BMC Interrogatory No. ___." If the interrogatories propounded by both Defendants seek the
same information, the interrogatories will be referenced as "BSH Interrogatory No. ___/BMC
Interrogatory No. ___."
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so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other
parties to assess the claim.'" BPP Retail Props., LLC, 300 F.R.D. at 61 (citing Rivera v. Kmart
Corp., 190 F.R.D. 298, 300 (D.P.R. 2000)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A). "If the responding
party fails to object or state the reason for the objection timely, he or she may be held to have
waived any objection." BPP Retail Props., LLC, 300 F.R.D. at 61 (citing Rivera, 190 F.R.D. at
300).
II.

ANALYSIS

Defendants' interrogatories that are the subject of their motion to compel can be divided
into the following categories: (1) Ms. Clarke's religious beliefs (BSH Interrogatory Nos. 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 15) (BMC Interrogatory Nos. 2, 5, 6); (2) Ms. Clarke's performance of her job while
wearing a mask (BSH Interrogatory Nos. 11, 16) (BMC Interrogatory Nos. 9, 11); (3) the
EEOC's claim that Defendants' influenza immunization policy was implemented with malice or
reckless indifference to Ms. Clarke's rights (BSH Interrogatory No. 13); and (4) BMC's claim
that it was not Ms. Clarke's employer (BMC Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4). Each category will be
discussed in turn.
A.

Discovery Concerning Ms. Clarke's Religious Beliefs

"Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of, among other things, religion." Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 133 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). The statute defines the
term "religion" to include: "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's
or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). "[I]n general terms, Title VII

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requires employers . . . to accommodate, within reasonable limits, the bona fide religious beliefs
and practices of employees." E.E.O.C. v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y
Alcantarillados de P. R., 279 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2002). "The First Circuit applies 'a two-part
framework in analyzing religious discrimination claims under Title VII.'" Robinson v. Children's
Hosp. Bos., Civil Action No. 14-10263-DJC, 2016 WL 1337255, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 2016),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Robinson v. Children's Hosp. of Bos., No. 16-1495 (1st Cir. Feb. 23,
2017) (quoting Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT & T Mobility P. R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2012)). First, the plaintiff must make a "'prima facie case that a bona fide religious practice
conflicts with an employment requirement and was the reason for the adverse employment
action.'" Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 12 (quoting Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 133). "Second, once
the plaintiff has established [a] prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that 'it
offered a reasonable accommodation or that a reasonable accommodation would be an undue
burden.'" Robinson, 2016 WL 1337255, at *5 (quoting Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 12).
"The requirement that the employee have a 'bona fide religious belief' is an essential
element of a religious accommodation claim." Unión Independiente, 279 F.3d at 55-56. "Title
VII does not mandate an employer . . . to accommodate what amounts to a "'purely personal
preference.'" Id. at 56 (quoting Vetter v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 120 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir.
1997)). In order to satisfy the bona fide religious belief element, "the plaintiff must demonstrate
both that the belief or practice is religious and that it is sincerely held." Id. See Redmond v. GAF
Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n.12 (7th Cir. 1978). "Title VII's capacious definition of 'religion'
includes 'all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief . . . .'" Unión
Independiente, 279 F.3d at 56 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1
("[R]eligious practices . . . include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which

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are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views. . . . The fact that no religious
group espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual professes
to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the belief is a religious belief of
the employee or prospective employee.").
"Religious beliefs protected by Title VII need not be 'acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others . . .'" but they must be sincerely held. Unión Independiente, 279 F.3d
at 56 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)). "The
element of sincerity is fundamental, since 'if the religious beliefs that apparently prompted a
request are not sincerely held, there has been no showing of a religious observance or practice
that conflicts with an employment requirement.'" Id. (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Ilona of Hungary,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1575 (7th Cir. 1997)).
While "it is well recognized that courts are poor arbiters of questions regarding what is
religious and what is not," Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale, 311 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196 (D. Mass.),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir.
2004) (citing Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 2001)), it remains the fact
that the EEOC bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on this point. See
Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 133.
1.

BSH Interrogatory No. 3/BMC Interrogatory No. 2

BMC Interrogatory No. 2 and BSH Interrogatory No. 3 seek "the specific denomination,
sect, school, branch, group, party or other affiliation with Christianity of which Ms. Clarke has
considered herself to be a member at any time" from January 1, 2007 to the present "and the
dates of such affiliation" (Dkt. No. 39-3 at 5; Dkt. No. 39-4 at 4-5). Although the EEOC
objected on the grounds of vagueness, ambiguity, and assumption of the truth of facts not proven

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or in evidence, by its supplemental response, it stated that Ms. Clarke "is an adherent of the
Christian faith," and that she occasionally attended services at the Resurrection Life Christian
Center International in Hartford, Connecticut notwithstanding her belief that church attendance
was not necessary to her religious beliefs and practices (id.). In the court's view, the EEOC has
provided an adequate response to these interrogatories. See Unión Independiente, 279 F.3d at
56; Cloutier, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 196 (describing the term "religion" as "elusive[]" and stating that
"the employee's religious beliefs need not be espoused by a formal religion or conventionally
organized church"); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). Accordingly, so much of Defendant's
motion as seeks to compel an additional response to this question is denied.
2.

BSH Interrogatory No. 4/BMC Interrogatory No. 5

Defendants ask for a detailed description of the ways in which Ms. Clarke "adheres to her
belief that 'her body is a temple' including any associated practices, rituals, observances, as well
as each and every substance she refrains from taking into her body" (Dkt. No. 39-3 at 5-6; Dkt.
No. 39-4 at 6). The EEOC has answered by indicating that "Ms. Clarke does not permit anything
into her body against her will that might defile her body, such as vaccines, oral contraceptives,
and other medications" (id.). In light of Title VII's requirement of proof of a bona fide religion
and the statute's lack of protection for "what amounts to a 'purely personal preference,'" Unión
Independiente, 279 F.3d at 56 (quoting Vetter, 120 F.3d at 751), the EEOC must supplement its
response to this interrogatory to describe Ms. Clarke's practices, rituals, and observations, if any,
and a list of all substances that she refrains from taking into her body.
3.

BSH Interrogatory No. 5/BMC Interrogatory No. 6

Defendants' request for "a full description of [Ms. Clark's] violat[ions of] her religious
observances, practices, and/or rituals," if any occurred, is overbroad and ambiguous.

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Accordingly, Defendants' request to compel a supplemental response to the EEOC's
supplemental answer to this interrogatory is denied (Dkt. No. 39-3 at 6; Dkt. No. 39-4 at 6-7).
4.

BSH Interrogatory No. 6

BSH seeks the name, address, and telephone number of "each and every individual
known to Ms. Clarke and/or the EEOC who either is known or is believed to have observed Ms.
Clarke's past adherence" to her religious belief and what each person observed or is believed to
have observed (Dkt. No. 39-3 at 7). The court sustains the EEOC's objections on the grounds
that this request is unlimited in scope and time, and overly broad (id.). Accordingly, so much of
Defendants' motion as seeks to compel a supplemental answer to this interrogatory is denied.
5.

BSH Interrogatory No. 7

BSH requests the name, address, and dates of treatment of "each physician, clinic,
hospital, or health care provider including any occupational or employer related practitioner that
saw, examined and/or treated Ms. Clarke in any manner from the date that she first claims to
have formed the religious belief that 'her body is a temple'" (Dkt. No. 39-3 at 7-8). The EEOC
objects on the grounds of irrelevance, lack of limitations on scope and time, and the
psychotherapist-patient privilege or doctor-patient privilege (Dkt. No. 39-3 at 7-8; Dkt. No. 42 at
10).
The requested information is relevant to whether or not Ms. Clarke was observing a
religious belief or indulging a personal preference when she declined the influenza vaccine. See
Unión Independiente, 279 F.3d at 55. Because this information's relevance outweighs any
privilege and because it will be subject to a protective order (see Memorandum and Order
Regarding Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, Dkt. No. 40), the EEOC must answer this interrogatory,
temporally limited to Ms. Clarke's medical treatment from January 1, 2012 to the present.

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6.

BSH Interrogatory No. 15

According to BSH Interrogatory No. 15, if the EEOC is claiming that wearing a mask in
lieu of receiving the influenza vaccine did not "fully eliminate any conflict between Ms. Clarke's
religious practice and her employment requirements," BSH seeks "the manner in which [Ms.
Clarke's] religious freedom was not fully accommodated" (Dkt. No. 39-3 at 12). Although the
EEOC objected on the grounds that the request is "argumentative, and mischaracterizes [its]
claims . . . and Defendants' legal obligations to provide Ms. Clarke with a religious
accommodation," it answered by stating that "the mask Defendants required Ms. Clarke to wear
did not constitute a religious accommodation" (id.). Because the EEOC's answer is ambiguous
and not responsive to Defendants' interrogatories, the EEOC must supplement its answer to
respond to the question of whether or not wearing a mask conflicts with any of Ms. Clarke's
religious beliefs. Accordingly, so much of Defendant's motion as seeks to compel an answer to
this interrogatory is allowed.
B.

Discovery Concerning Ms. Clarke's Job Performance While Wearing a Mask
1.

BSH Interrogatory No. 11/BMC Interrogatory No. 9

Defendants seek information about every person who spoke to Ms. Clarke either in
person or over the telephone while she was wearing a mask at her job and complained that they
could not understand her, including the person to whom she spoke, whether the person to whom
she spoke was a job applicant, a reference, a manager, "or someone else," the date of each such
conversation, the complete substance of each such conversation, and whether the conversation
occurred over the telephone or in person (Dkt. No. 39-3 at 9-10; Dkt. No. 39-4 at 8-9). The
EEOC has responded that "at least one applicant" complained about not being able to understand
Ms. Clarke while she wore the mask and named three colleagues who indicated that she was

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unintelligible (id.). Whether requiring Ms. Clarke to wear a mask was a reasonable
accommodation is at issue in this case. See Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 12 ("'[C]ases
involving reasonable accommodation turn heavily upon their facts and an appraisal of the
reasonableness of the parties' behavior.'") (quoting Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 120
(1st Cir. 2003)). Accordingly, to the extent the EEOC has not fully responded to this
interrogatory, it must supplement its response.
2.

BSH Interrogatory No. 16/BMC Interrogatory No. 11

Defendants ask the EEOC to identify all of Ms. Clarke's supervisors who told her that
they were concerned that wearing the mask would interfere with her ability to perform the
essential functions of her job and/or that she was not adequately performing her job because she
was wearing the mask (Dkt. No. 39-3 at 12; Dkt. No. 39-4 at 10) (emphasis added). Defendants
also seek the dates of these occurrences and the substance of the conversations (id.). The EEOC
objected and named individuals in supervisory positions who Ms. Clarke informed that wearing a
mask impacted her ability to perform her job (id.). This answer is not responsive to Defendants'
interrogatories, which the EEOC must answer. See Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 12.
C.

Discovery Concerning Defendants' Intent in Implementing the Influenza
Immunization Policy (BHS Interrogatory No. 13)

BSH seeks "all facts and information that is used to formulate the basis of . . . EEOC's
claim" that Defendants' vaccination policy was not implemented "with a bona fide objective, but
instead was done with malice or with reckless indifference to [Ms.] Clarke's protected rights"
(Dkt. No. 39-3 at 10-11). The employer's motive and intent are central to employment
discrimination claims. See Vázquez-Fernández, 269 F.R.D. at 155 (quoting Hollander v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, the EEOC's objection that BSH's
request is argumentative and misstates its claims is not well taken (Dkt. No. 39-3 at 10-11), and
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so much of Defendants' motion to compel as seeks a response to Substitute Interrogatory No. 13
is allowed.
D.

Discovery Concerning BMC's Status as Ms. Clarke's Employer (BMC
Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4).

BHS has admitted that it was Ms. Clarke's employer. BMC's Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4
seek discovery of the information upon which the EEOC relies for its claim that Ms. Clarke was
also employed by BMC and that BMC, separate and distinct from BSH, discriminated against
Ms. Clarke because of her religion (Dkt. No. 39 at 13-15; Dkt. No. 39-4 at 5-6). For the reasons
the EEOC explained at the hearing, the EEOC is entitled to discovery on the identity of Ms.
Clarke's employer before it answers these interrogatories. The court defers any ruling on these
interrogatories pending production of additional discovery on the identification of Ms. Clarke's
employer, which is largely in Defendants' custody and control.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to compel (Dkt. No. 39) is allowed in part
and denied in part as set forth herein. To the extent the motion is allowed, the EEOC is ordered
to respond on or before November 13, 2017.
Each party to bear its own fees and costs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C).
It is so ordered.
Dated: October 30, 2017

/s/ Katherine A. Robertson
KATHERINE A. ROBERTSON
United States Magistrate Judge

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