Hagenah v. Berkshire County ARC, Inc. , et al

Filing 53

Magistrate Judge Katherine A. Robertson: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER entered. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint - (Dkt. No. 44) is DENIED. On February 28, 2018, Defendants' should either renew their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. No. 23), which the Court found was moot in light of Plaintiff's Motion to file an Amended Complaint, or file a new Motion to Dismiss, or notify the Court that they will not move to dismiss. (Finn, Mary)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
HELENE E. HAGENAH,
Plaintiff
v.

BERKSHIRE COUNTY ARC, INC.,
ET AL.,
Defendants

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) Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-30141-KAR
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Dkt. No. 44)
ROBERTSON, U.S.M.J.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 5, 2016, Plaintiff Helene E. Hagenah ("Plaintiff") filed an amended
complaint against Defendants Berkshire County ARC, Inc. ("BCARC"), and BCARC officers
and employees, Kenneth W. Singer, Maryann T. Hyatt, Bernard C. Melski, Megan B. Anello,
and Angela Buchauer (collectively "Defendants"), arising from Plaintiff's agreement with
BCARC to provide foster care services to two disabled adults and BCARC's termination of
Plaintiff's services (Dkt. No. 6). Plaintiff asserted the following causes of action in her amended
complaint: interference and retaliation in violation of Titles III and V of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"); discrimination and retaliation under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, §§ 4,
4(A), and 5 ("Chapter 151B"); breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; misrepresentation; violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and violations of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act
("MCRA"), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11I (Dkt. No. 6).
1

Presently before the court is Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint (Dkt. No. 44). Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint by adding the following three
claims: "intracorporate conspiracy to deprive rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and in deprivation of Plaintiff's rights under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3);" "intracorporate conspiracy to deprive rights under the Antiretaliation provisions of the . . . ADA and in deprivation of Plaintiff's rights under the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3);" and "BCARCDefendants' vicarious liability for civil conspiracy" (Dkt. No. 44-1). Defendants oppose
Plaintiff's motion on three grounds: (1) the motion to amend was filed late; (2) the conspiracy
amendments are futile; and (3) the amendments are barred by the statute of limitations (Dkt. No.
46). Plaintiff has responded to Defendants' opposition (Dkt. No. 49).
The parties have consented to this court's jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 26). See 28 U.S.C. §
636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. After hearing the parties' arguments on November 15, 2017, the
court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint for the reasons set
forth below.
II.

BACKGROUND 1

Because Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion to amend "on the grounds including
futility, the 'proposed amendment "is gauged by reference to the liberal criteria of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)."'" Perry v. Rose, Civil Action No.10-10769-JGD, 2012 WL

1

The relevant facts are drawn from the proposed second amended complaint, Dkt. No. 44-1, and
Plaintiff's 120 paragraph affidavit, Dkt. No. 44-2, which is incorporated by reference into the
second amended complaint, and appended materials, which are sufficiently referenced in the
second amended complaint. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). Plaintiff
states that the same supporting affidavit was filed with her amended complaint in December
2016 (Dkt. No. 44 at ¶ 12). See Dkt. Nos. 6, 6-1.
2

3903475, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 6, 2012) (quoting Transwitch Corp. v. Galazar Networks, Inc.,
377 F. Supp. 2d 284, 290 (D. Mass. 2005)). Under this standard, "[t]he court must accept as true
all well-pleaded facts set forth in the proposed amended complaint, and give the plaintiff the
benefit of all reasonable inferences." Id. (citing Transwitch Corp., 377 F. Supp. 2d at 294). See
Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1999). Applying this standard to the
instant case, the relevant facts are as follows.
BCARC is a nonprofit agency that provides services to disabled individuals (Dkt. Nos.
44-2 ¶ 39; 44-5; 44-8 at 3, 4). At the time of the events that form the basis of the amended
complaint and the proposed second amended complaint, the individual Defendants held the
following positions with BCARC: Kenneth W. Singer was President, CEO, and Executive
Director; Maryann T. Hyatt was Vice President of Community, Day, and Clinical Services;
Bernard C. Melski was Co-Director of Residential Services; Megan B. Anello was an Adult
Family Care Case Manager and Family Advocate; and Angela Buchauer was a registered nurse
(Dkt. No. 44-1 ¶¶ 21-25).
On May 15, 2014, BCARC approved Plaintiff to be an Adult Family Care ("AFC")
program caregiver for two developmentally and physically disabled adults ("participants"), F.L.
and L.W., who would reside in her home (Dkt. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 5, 39, 42; 44-8 at 3, 4). BCARC
administered the AFC program for MassHealth, the state agency that paid participating
caregivers a per diem rate for services rendered to eligible MassHealth members based on the
level of care they required (Dkt. No. 44-8 at 2). Because Level II participants required more
intensive care than Level I participants, AFC providers received a higher per diem rate for Level
II participants (id.). Both adults who resided with Plaintiff were designated Level I participants
(id. at 3, 4).

3

On May 29, 2014, Plaintiff, F.L., L.W., and Defendant Anello executed an Adult Foster
Participant and Caregiver Agreement ("Contract # 1"), which stated the responsibilities of
Plaintiff, BCARC, and the participants (Dkt. No. 44-9 at 2-4). As the caregiver, Plaintiff's
charges included, but were not limited to: maintaining a safe residence that complied with all
eligibility criteria; providing twenty-four hour supervision of the participants; supplying the
participants with a "clean attractive room," fresh linens at least once a week, three nutritionally
balanced meals daily, and snacks; supervising and assisting the participants with activities of
daily living; arranging or providing the participants' transportation; and supervising healthrelated activities, such as reminding the participants to take their medication, refilling their
medication on time, and assisting with their transportation to physicians' offices (id. at 3).
BCARC's responsibilities included: visiting the participants monthly "to monitor health status,
safety, and satisfaction with the placement;" checking on Plaintiff's performance of her
responsibilities, ability to care for the participants, and satisfaction with the placements; annually
assessing Plaintiff's home for "safety and comfort standards;" and developing, implementing, and
updating, when necessary, a plan of care for each participant and including Plaintiff in the
process (id. at 2). Each participant was responsible for, among other things, paying Plaintiff his
or her share of the cost of room and board at the beginning of each month (id. at 3).
Like the amended complaint, the proposed second amended complaint alleges various
federal and state claims of discrimination based on Plaintiff's gender and advocacy for F.L. and
L.W., plus contract-related claims. Mainly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against
her for exercising rights protected by the ADA and Chapter 151B or for assisting the participants
in exercising their rights under the laws, and for refusing to sign a second contract ("Contract #
2") in August 2014 (Dkt. Nos. 44-1 ¶¶ 28, 29; 44-2 ¶¶ 4, 12, 19, 43, 60). Plaintiff claims that her

4

advocacy to BCARC and the Massachusetts Department of Developmental Services ("DDS") on
behalf of F.L. and L.W. included seeking "changes" or "improvements" in F.L.'s and L.W.'s
employment, day rehabilitation, and activity programs and additional services (Dkt. No. 44-2 ¶¶
6, 7, 42, 43, 45, 47). She also sought behavioral counseling and treatment for the participants
and a "Rogers" 2 attorney for medication determination (id. ¶¶ 46, 52, 57, 115). In addition,
Plaintiff recites a litany of ways in which she assisted F.L. and L.W. in protecting and enforcing
their rights including: advocating for "reasonable accommodations to [their] respective
disabilities," "timely delivery" of appropriate services and care and respect for their privacy;
bringing acts of discrimination and abuse to the attention of state and federal agencies, including
DDS, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"), and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"); assisting F.L. and L.W. in appealing
determinations made in their care plans and individual service plans; and affording them an
opportunity to consult with legal counsel (id. ¶¶ 8, 44, 48, 50, 55, 56, 58, 60).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants presented her with Contract # 2 on or about August 5,
2014 in retaliation for her "proper," "effective," and "steadfast" advocacy on behalf of F.L. and
L.W. (Dkt. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 65, 66; 44-11). Plaintiff claims that Contract # 2 -- which significantly
differed from Contract # 1 and which she refused to sign -- eliminated her rights as well as those
of F.L. and L.W. by permitting home visits "with or without notice," releasing BCARC from
liability for specific losses, establishing her status as an independent contractor, permitting
BCARC to terminate the contract "with or without cause, any time, in its sole discretion," and

2

"[I]f a patient is declared incompetent, a court must make the original substituted judgment
treatment decision and should approve a substituted judgment treatment plan." Rogers v.
Comm'r of the Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 318 (Mass. 1983).
5

limiting commencement of any legal action under the contract to either the Central Berkshire
District Court or the Berkshire Superior Court (Dkt. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 12, 13, 61, 67, 71; 44-11 at 45).
Plaintiff alleges that her refusal to sign Contract # 2 spurred Defendants' further acts of
retaliation, threats, intimidation, and coercion (Dkt. No. 44-2 ¶12). Specifically, Defendant
Anello's August 11, 2014 e-mail message indicated that BCARC "was unable to begin issuing . .
. checks" until Plaintiff signed Contract # 2 (Dkt. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 70, 72; 44-12 at 9). Plaintiff
alleges that, in fact, payments were withheld until her attorney contacted Defendants regarding
the "egregious, rights violating terms" of Contract # 2 (Dkt. No. 44-2 ¶ 62). Thereafter,
Defendants purportedly delayed making payments to Plaintiff, withheld F.L.'s and L.W.'s
stipends, which they used to pay Plaintiff for their room and board, "intentionally" incorrectly
classified F.L.'s and L.W.'s disabilities as Level I resulting in Plaintiff being underpaid, and made
false reports to MassHealth and DDS including allegations that Plaintiff provided subpar care to
F.L. and L.W. and that she failed to pay the real estate taxes on her home (id. ¶¶ 11, 12, 25, 32,
33, 63, 72, 74). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants disqualified her home as an AFC
placement for L.W. based on the alleged danger posed by a railing on a balcony and stairway,
which was one-half inch lower than the building code requirements and which MassHealth and
DDS previously had approved (id. ¶¶ 25, 31, 33).
Plaintiff maintains that Defendants' acts of retribution culminated in them terminating
F.L.'s and L.W.'s occupancy of Plaintiff's home thereby stopping payments to Plaintiff and
ending her role as an AFC provider (id. ¶¶ 25, 33, 101-03). Defendants allegedly instigated
F.L.'s departure from Plaintiff's home on September 24, 2014 by telling him that he would not
have to work or attend a day program and could just "'hang out'" and go fishing every day (Dkt.

6

Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 5, 101, 102, 115; 44-21 at 5). Plaintiff claims that these representations
"encouraged and enabled" F.L.'s disruptive and threatening behavior that resulted in F.L. asking
to move out "more than eight times" in one night (id. ¶¶ 99, 101-03). Plaintiff further alleges
that after F.L. moved from her home, Defendants ignored his requests to move back, threatened
to stop caring for him if he contacted Plaintiff or his attorney, and "forced [him] to sign papers"
(id. ¶¶ 5, 97, 104, 111, 112, 115).
On Friday, October 17, 2014, Defendant Hyatt notified Plaintiff of a meeting scheduled
for Monday, October 20, 2014 to discuss Plaintiff's continued role as the AFC provider for L.W.
as well as the "appropriateness" of Plaintiff's home as L.W.'s placement based on MassHealth's
determination that the height of a railing failed to comply with its safety standards (Dkt. Nos. 442 ¶¶ 9, 22, 35; 44-18 at 2-5). Plaintiff states that she did not attend the meeting because she was
denied adequate notice of BCARC's and MassHealth's allegations, the opportunity to be heard,
and representation by legal counsel (Dkt. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 19-24, 35). Plaintiff alleges that the lack
of sufficient notice regarding the meeting further evinced Defendants' deprivation of her rights
and their "continuing policy of retaliatory animus and discrimination" based upon her advocacy
for F.L. and L.W. (id. ¶ 19).
L.W. was removed from Plaintiff's home on October 23, 2014 purportedly against her
will and pursuant to a court order based on Plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with
MassHealth's AFC regulations (Dkt. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 25, 33; 44-19 at 3). BCARC's final payment
to Plaintiff was by check dated October 28, 2014 (Dkt. No. 44-21 at 3).
III.

ANALYSIS

As noted earlier, Defendants raise three grounds in opposition to Plaintiff's second
motion to amend: (1) the failure to file the motion to amend on or before the date set by the

7

court's scheduling order; (2) the futility of the proposed amendments; and (3) the statute of
limitations bar (Dkt. No. 46). Because the court finds that the motion to amend was timely filed,
but the proposed amendments fail to state a viable claim, it addresses only the first two grounds.
A.

Plaintiff established good cause for filing the motion to amend three days beyond
the date set by the scheduling order.

Defendants' first objection to Plaintiff's request for leave to file a second amended
complaint alleges that Plaintiff's motion was filed late (Dkt. No. 46 at 2-3). Because Plaintiff
established good cause for filing the motion to amend three days after the deadline set in the
scheduling order, Defendants' position is a nonstarter.
On June 16, 2017, the court issued a scheduling order establishing August 15, 2017 as the
deadline for seeking leave to amend the pleadings (Dkt. No. 36). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(3)(A). On August 15, 2017, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a second amended complaint
with two exhibits (Dkt. No. 40), and then moved to amend the exhibits to her proposed second
amended complaint (Dkt. No. 41). 3 On August 16, 2017, the court denied, without prejudice,
Plaintiff's two motions due to their failure to certify compliance with LR 7.1(a)(2), which
requires counsel to "certify that they have conferred and have attempted in good faith to resolve
or narrow the issue" (Dkt. Nos. 42, 43). LR 7.1(a)(2). Plaintiff's counsel indicated that the
failure to comply with LR 7.1(a)(2) was "not intentional . . . but was simple, excusable error"
(Dkt. No. 44 at 2). According to Plaintiff's counsel, he and Defendants' counsel briefly conferred
on August 16, 2017 and engaged in a more extensive discussion late in the afternoon of the next

3

Defendants claim that these pleadings were filed at 6:02 P.M. on August 15, 2017, and,
therefore, were filed late (Dkt. No. 46 at 2-3). See LR 5.4(D) ("All electronic transmissions of
documents must be completed prior to 6:00 p.m. to be considered timely filed that day.").
However, the docket reflects filing on August 15, 2017 (Dkt. Nos. 40, 41).
8

day, but were unable to resolve or narrow the issues (Dkt. No. 44 at 2). Plaintiff's motion that
complied with LR 7.1(a)(2) was filed the following day, August 18, 2018 (Dkt. No. 44).
"Rule 16(b) requires that the district court enter a scheduling order setting certain
deadlines, including a deadline for the parties to amend the pleadings." Somascan, Inc. v. Philips
Med. Sys. Nederland, B.V., 714 F.3d 62, 64 (1st Cir. 2013). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A).
"Those deadlines may be modified 'only for good cause and with the judge's consent.'"
Somascan, Inc., 714 F.3d at 64 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)). Although Plaintiff's motion
that was filed on the deadline set by the scheduling order was defective for failing to comply
with LR 7.1(a)(2), the court denied the motion without prejudice (Dkt. Nos. 42, 43). See Direnzo
Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Assoc., Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO.
4:16-10073, 2016 WL 9402847, at *1-2 (D. Mass. May 4, 2016) (denying without prejudice a
motion to dismiss for failure to comply with LR 7.1(a)(2)). Compare Maloney v. Town of
Hinsdale, Civil Action No. 11-11297-MAP, 2012 WL 4103909, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 10, 2012)
("a violation of . . . rule [7.1(a)(2)] does not necessitate summary denial.") (citing Blanchard v.
Swaine, Civil No. 08-40073-FDS, 2010 WL 4922699, at *5 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2010)). The
motion to amend that conformed to the rule was filed three days after the scheduling order
deadline passed (Dkt. No. 44).
The law of this circuit "'clearly establishes that Rule 16(b)'s "good cause" standard, rather
than Rule 15(a)'s "freely give[n]" standard, governs motions to amend filed after scheduling
order deadlines'" have passed. Flores–Silva v. McClintock-Hernández, 710 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
2013) (quoting Trans–Spec Truck Serv. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 327 (1st Cir. 2008)).
Rule 16's "'good cause' standard 'focuses on the diligence (or lack thereof) of the moving party
more than it does on any prejudice to the party-opponent.'" Id. (quoting Steir v. Girl Scouts of

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the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2004)). See O'Connell v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., 357 F.3d 152,
155 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Rule 16(b)'s 'good cause' standard emphasizes the diligence of the party
seeking the amendment."). Because Plaintiff's counsel has demonstrated the requisite diligence
to establish good cause for the three day delay in filing a motion that complied with the local
rule, the technical violation does not present a basis for denying Plaintiff's motion to amend.
B.

Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

Defendants fare better with their argument based on the futility of Plaintiff's proposal to
add two conspiracy claims against BCARC and Defendants Singer, Hyatt, and Melski under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) and one conspiracy claim against all Defendants under Massachusetts law
(Dkt. No. 44-1 ¶¶ 88-107).
"Although Rule 15 proposes that leave to amend be 'freely give[n]' in instances in which
'justice so requires,' Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), this 'does not mean . . . that a trial court must
mindlessly grant every request for leave to amend.'" Mulder v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 865
F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Aponte–Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir.
2006)). "Rather, 'a district court may deny leave to amend when the request is characterized by
"undue delay, bad faith, futility, [or] the absence of due diligence on the movant's part."'" Id.
(quoting Nikitine v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 715 F.3d 388, 390 (1st Cir. 2013)). See also Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In the instant case, the focus is on whether Plaintiff's proposed
amendments would be futile. See Hatch v. Dep't for Children, Youth & Their Families, 274 F.3d
12, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[F]utility is fully sufficient to justify the denial of a motion to amend.");
Correa–Martinez v. Arillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 59 (1st Cir. 1990), overruled on other
grounds by Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2004)
("Where an amendment would be futile or would serve no legitimate purpose, the district court
10

should not needlessly prolong matters."). Where, as here, "leave to amend is sought before
discovery is complete and neither party as moved for summary judgment . . ." the proposed
amendment is measured against the plaintiff-favorable rule 12(b)(6) standard to determine
whether or not "the proposed amended complaint sets forth a general scenario which, if proven,
would entitle the plaintiff to relief against the defendant on some cognizable theory." Hatch, 274
F.3d at 19 (citing Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996)). After
applying this standard to each of Plaintiff's three proposed amendments, the court agrees with
Defendants' contention that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's proposed amendments fail to state a
viable claim for relief (Dkt. No. 46 at 4). See Glassman, 90 F.3d at 623 (leave to amend should
be denied as futile if "the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.").
1.

Proposed Count VII: Alleged intracorporate-conspiracy to deprive
Plaintiff of rights under Title VII.

In proposed Count VII, Plaintiff, a female, alleges that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) entitles her to
relief based on a conspiracy among BCARC and Defendants Singer, Hyatt, and Melski to
deprive her of her rights under Title VII (Dkt. No. 44-1 ¶¶ 88-92). Plaintiff alleges that the
conspiracy occurred at meetings when Defendants determined her rates of pay, which were
purportedly less "than other employees of BCARC, Inc., and particularly . . . the rates of pay [of]
male workers who perform[ed] similar duties and [had] similar responsibilities, though they
[may] not [have] work[ed]" as AFC providers (Dkt. Nos. 44-1 ¶¶ 89, 90; 44-2 ¶ 17). Plaintiff
also points to the "discriminatory effect" of Contract # 2's other terms as further proof of
Defendants' gender-based conspiracy (Dkt. No. 44-1 ¶¶ 90-91).
"To state a claim under § 1985(3) a plaintiff must allege the existence of (1) a conspiracy,
(2) a conspiratorial purpose to deprive a person or class of persons, directly or indirectly, of the
11

equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) either (a) an injury to person or property, or (b) a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right or privilege." Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1996). See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); Williams v. Northfield
Mount Hermon Sch., 504 F. Supp. 1319, 1327 (D. Mass. 1981). "In Griffin, the Supreme Court
placed a gloss on these four elements, effectively adding a fifth requirement." Aulson, 83 F.3d at
3. "It construed the statute's references to 'equal protection' and 'equal privileges and immunities
under the laws' to signify that a plaintiff may recover thereunder only when the conspiratorial
conduct of which [s]he complains is propelled by 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus.'" Id. (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102).
The Supreme Court's holding in Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S.
366 (1979), dooms Plaintiff's proposed Title VII conspiracy claim. In Novotny, the Court "held
that Section 1985(3) cannot be invoked to redress violations of Title VII." Pierce v. Runyon, 857
F. Supp. 129, 132 (D. Mass. 1994).
In making this ruling, the Court reasoned that "Section 1985(3) provides no substantive
rights itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates. The
primary question in the present case, therefore, is whether a person injured by a
conspiracy to violate [Title VII] is deprived of 'the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws' within the meaning of § 1985(3)."
Id. (quoting Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372). The Court answered the question in the negative. See
Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378 ("[D]eprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be a basis for a
cause of action under § 1985(3)."). "The Court also noted that if a violation of Title VII could be
pursued through § 1985(3), a plaintiff could avoid most, if not all, of the elaborate judicial and
administrative process 'which plays such a crucial role in the scheme established by Congress in
Title VII.'" Pierce, 857 F. Supp. at 132 (quoting Novotny, 442 U.S. at 376). See also Rice v.

12

New England Coll., 676 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1982) ("Title VII rights cannot form the basis for a §
1985(3) action."); Siupa v. Astra Tech, Inc., Civil Action No. 10-10525-LTS, 2013 WL 212613,
at *3 (D. Mass. Jan. 18, 2013) (same).
Plaintiff "cannot assert a cause of action under § 1985(3) to redress violations of Title
VII." Pierce, 857 F. Supp. at 132. Accordingly, the court denies Plaintiff's motion to amend the
complaint to add proposed Count VII.
2.

Proposed Count VIII: Alleged intracorporate-conspiracy to deprive
Plaintiff of rights under the ADA.

For similar reasons, the court denies Plaintiff's motion for leave to add proposed Count
VIII, which alleges that Defendants Singer, Hyatt, and Melski are liable under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) based on their alleged meeting to draft Contract # 2 (Dkt. No. 44-1 ¶¶ 94-97). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants' actions were taken in retaliation for her engagement in conduct protected
by the ADA (id. ¶ 97).
As is the case with Title VII claims, the First Circuit has held that § 1985(3) does not
provide a remedy for a claim of conspiracy to violate the ADA. See Isaacs v. Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll., Civil No. 17-cv-040-LM, 2017 WL 2982954, at *7 (D.N.H. July 12, 2017) (citing D.B. ex
rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 44 (1st Cir. 2012)). See also M.M.R.-Z. ex rel.
Ramírez-Senda v. Puerto Rico, 528 F.3d 9, 13 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Section 1983 cannot be used
as a vehicle for ADA or other statutory claims that provide their own frameworks for
damages."). Compare Garity v. APWU Nat'l. Labor Org., 655 Fed. App'x 523, 526 (9th Cir.
2016) (unpublished) (parties agreed that § 1985(3) "'may not be invoked to redress violations' of
anti-discrimination statutes like . . . the ADA.") (quoting Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378); Doe v. U.S.
Dep't of Veteran Affairs, No. 08-14958-BC, 2009 WL 2023663, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 7, 2009)
(claims of age and disability discrimination "are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 because
13

a delineated avenue of relief is available under the ADEA and ADA"); Medvey v. Oxford Health
Plans, 313 F. Supp. 2d 94, 100 (D. Conn. 2004) ("Section 1985(3) cannot be used to enforce
statutes [like the ADA] which already provide[s] a mechanism for relief.").
Accordingly, because Count VIII of the proposed complaint fails to state a cognizable
legal theory, Plaintiff's motion to amend is denied as to Count VIII.
3.

Proposed Count IX: Alleged BCARC-Defendants' vicarious liability for
common law civil conspiracy.

Plaintiff's final proposed amendment alleges a state common law claim for civil
conspiracy. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Singer, Hyatt, Melski, Anello, and Buchauer acted
in concert with or "substantially assisted" one another or unidentified third parties in depriving
Plaintiff of enumerated federal and state rights or in committing "tortious acts of interference,
coercion, intimidation and in veiled or direct threats of [retaliation] against [Plaintiff], F.L. and
L.W." (Dkt. No. 44-1 ¶¶ 100, 101). Plaintiff seeks vicarious liability for BCARC and liability
for the other Defendants "to the extent of their illegal participation or assistance" in the alleged
conspiracy and points to Contract # 2 as "express evidence" of the conspiracy (id. ¶¶ 103, 107).
Defendants counter that there is no viable civil conspiracy claim "because . . . Defendants were
all part of the same organization" that cannot conspire with itself (Dkt. No. 46 at 4). The court
agrees with Defendants.
"Massachusetts recognizes two types of civil conspiracy, so-called 'true conspiracy' and
conspiracy based on section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Taylor v. Am. Chemistry
Council, 576 F.3d 16, 34 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1998)). See also Grant v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 183 F. Supp. 2d 344, 362–63 (D.
Mass. 2002). "The 'true conspiracy' is a very limited cause of action that requires an element of
coercion." Blake v. Prof'l Coin Grading Serv., 898 F. Supp. 2d 365, 391 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing
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Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1563 (1st Cir. 1994)). Although
Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint fails to clearly specify the form of conspiracy
alleged, Plaintiff cites cases that address the Restatement type and the proposed count references
"vicarious liability" (Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 44-1 at 26 & ¶ 107). 4
"A civil conspiracy claim, based on § 876 of the Restatement, is a form of vicarious
liability that requires an underlying tort." Blake, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 391-92 (citing Taylor, 576
F.3d at 34-35). See Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 43 F.3d at 1564 ("[T]he concept is invoked to support
liability of one person for a tort committed by another."). "Massachusetts courts have recognized
two theories of liability under section 876: (1) 'concert of action,' and (2) 'substantial assistance'
or 'aiding and abetting.'" Taylor, 576 F.3d at 35. Both theories require the plaintiff to "'show an
underlying tortious act in which two or more persons acted in concert and in furtherance of a
common design or agreement.'" Boyle v. Barnstable Police Dept., Civil Action No 09-11435MBB, 2012 WL 2126868, at *9 (D. Mass. June 11, 2012) (quoting Bartle v. Berry, 953 N.E.2d
243, 253 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011)). See Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 43 F.3d at 1564 ("For liability to
attach [under the Restatement type of conspiracy], there must be, first, a common design or an
agreement, although not necessarily express, between two or more persons to do a wrongful act
and, second, proof of some tortious act in furtherance of the agreement.").

4

The coercive type is "drawn from the common law [and] amounts to 'a very limited cause of
action in Massachusetts' for civil conspiracy based on the defendants' allegedly unique ability to
exert a '"peculiar power of coercion"' when acting in unison." Snyder v. Collura, 812 F.3d 46, 52
(1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Jurgens v. Abraham, 616 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D. Mass. 1985)). "[T]he
'wrong' suffered by the plaintiff is 'in the particular combination of the defendants rather than in
the tortious nature of the underlying conduct.'" Id. (quoting Kurker, 689 N.E.2d at 836). To the
extent Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint can be read to allege that Defendants
conspired to coerce her to sign Contract # 2, she did not sign it (Dkt. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 12, 71).

15

The complaint fails to state an actionable conspiracy claim because Plaintiff alleges that
BCARC and its officers or employees acted as a single legal entity. See Williams, 504 F. Supp.
at 1328-29. "Under this principle – sometimes called the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine – an
agreement between or among agents of the same legal entity, when the agents act in their official
capacities, is not an unlawful conspiracy." Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (citing
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-71 (1984)). The doctrine developed
from the requirement that a conspiracy necessarily involves more than one separate actor. See
id.; Boyle, 2012 WL 2126868, at *9. "When two [or more] agents of the same legal entity make
an agreement in the course of their official duties, . . . as a practical and legal matter their acts are
attributed to their principal." Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1867. Plaintiff does not allege that any of the
five individual Defendants acted other than within the scope of their duties as officers,
employees, or agents of BCARC when they allegedly conspired against her (Dkt. No. 44-1 ¶¶
100-107). See Wentworth Precious Metals, LLC v. City of Everett, No. Civ.A. 11-10909-DPW,
2013 WL 441094, at *14 (D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2013) ("Even joining officers of a corporation . . . in
their individual capacities 'is not enough to make them persons separate from the corporation in
legal contemplation' if they are acting in the course of their employment.") (quoting Williams,
504 F. Supp. at 1328–29). Consequently, as a matter of law, the individual Defendants' acts are
attributed to BCARC, which "cannot conspire with itself." Platten v. HG Bermuda Exempted
Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 131 (1st Cir. 2006). See Williams, 504 F. Supp. at 1328-29. See also Ziglar,
137 S. Ct. at 1867 ("The Court's precedent indicates that there is no unlawful conspiracy when
officers within a single corporate entity consult among themselves and then adopt a policy for

16

the entity.") (citing Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 769-71); 5 Bell v. Rinchem Co., CIVIL
ACTION NO. 4:14-40177-TSH, 2014 WL 11290899, at *17 (D. Mass. Mar. 10, 2016)
(dismissing civil conspiracy claim alleging vicarious liability for employees acting within the
scope of their employment); Wentworth Precious Metals, LLC, 2013 WL 441094, at *14 ("The
conspiracy claim fails under both federal and state law for the independent reason that the City
cannot conspire with itself. Plaintiff alleges that Field, Nuzzo, and Mayor DeMaria acted to
enforce City ordinances, albeit unlawfully. When these employees acted in the course of their
employment, they acted on behalf of the City of Everett, and a conspiracy of one fails to state a
claim."); Limone v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 2d 18, 50 (D. Mass. 2004) ("Under the
intercorporate [sic] conspiracy doctrine, a corporate officer cannot be held to conspire with his
own corporation. The idea is that a corporation cannot conspire with its own employees insofar
as they are acting for the corporation."); Williams, 504 F. Supp. at 1328 (actions of defendants
undertaken in their official capacities "are properly attributed to the single entity Northfield
Mount Hermon School, which clearly cannot conspire with itself.").
The two cases upon which Plaintiff relies to refute Defendants' argument that her claims
are barred by the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine are distinguishable (Dkt. No. 49 at 8-10). In
Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984), the court upheld a jury's verdict finding that
government officials were liable under § 1985(3) for conspiring to discriminate against the

5

In Ziglar, the Court also noted that it "has not given its approval to [the intracorporateconspiracy] doctrine in the specific context of § 1985(3)," that "[t]here is a division in the courts
of appeals . . . respecting the validity or correctness of the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine
with reference to § 1985 conspiracies," and "[n]othing in this opinion should be interpreted as
either approving or disapproving the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine's application in the
context of an alleged § 1985(3) violation." Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1868. Here, the court's decision
applies the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine to a state law conspiracy claim, not to the §
1985(3) claims, which are not viable for the other reasons previously discussed.
17

plaintiffs based on their gender. Id. at 20-21. The court found that the intracorporate-conspiracy
doctrine did not shield the defendants from liability because the officials' conduct "went beyond
'a single act' of discrimination." Id. at 21 (quoting Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196
(7th Cir. 1972)). Similarly, Webb v. Cty. of El Dorado, No. 2:15-cv-01189-KJM-EFB, 2016 WL
4001922 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2016), addressed the viability of a § 1985(3) claim for gender
discrimination against a governmental body where "the individual defendants met over several
months and made various plans, taking action in some instances that did not require ratification
by the County Board." Id. at *8. The court granted plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to
provide additional allegations to support her claim of gender-based discrimination. Id. While
courts of this circuit have applied an exception to the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine to
permit § 1985(3) liability for rights violations committed by officials in the public sector, see,
e.g., Stathos, 728 F.2d at 20-21, here, on the other hand, Plaintiff alleges that agents of a private
entity conspired against her in violation of Massachusetts common law. The intracorporateconspiracy doctrine has been applied to bar claims in similar circumstances. See Platten, 437
F.3d at 131; Bell, 2014 WL 11290899, at *17; Williams, 504 F. Supp. at 1328-29.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's proposed Count IX fails as a matter of law and her motion to
amend the complaint to add Count IX is denied. 6
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint (Dkt. No. 44) is DENIED. On or before February 28, 2018, Defendants should either

6

Based on the court's finding that the proposed amendments would be futile, it is not required to
address Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's motion to amend should be denied on the ground
that the three year statute of limitations for conspiracy claims bars the proposed amendments
(Dkt. No. 46 at 3-4). See Nieves v. McSweeney, 73 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 & n.4 (Mass. 1999).
18

renew their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Dkt. No. 23), which the court found
was moot in light of Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint, or file a new motion to
dismiss, or notify the court that they will not move to dismiss.
It is so ordered.
Dated: February 15, 2018

/s/ Katherine A. Robertson
KATHERINE A. ROBERTSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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