Santamaria v. Greenfield Community College et al

Filing 20

Judge Michael A. Ponsor: ORDER entered. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 7) is DENIED. The case is hereby referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial conference pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. It is so ordered. See attached order for details. (Kaplan, Jennifer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

LUIS R. SANTAMARIA,
Plaintiff ,
v.
GREENFIELD COMMUNITY
COLLEGE,
Defendant.

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) C.A. NO. 17-cv-30121-MAP
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
(Dkt. No. 7)

April 16, 2018

PONSOR, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff Luis Santamaria has brought this one-count
complaint against Defendant Greenfield Community College under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a).

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered retaliation

in the form of termination based on his oral complaints about
ethnic and racial discrimination in the workplace and his filing
of a formal written complaint with the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination (MCAD).
Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Lack

of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) was also
mentioned in the motion, but the argument on this theory was
not developed.
argument.

Initially, the court set the motion for oral

On further reflection and after a careful review of

the papers, the court has concluded that argument is not
necessary.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion will

be denied.
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiff must show that he has alleged sufficient factual
matter to state a plausible claim.
657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011).

Haley v. City of Boston,

The factual allegations cannot

be simply conclusory or overly vague, but they need not be set
forth in minute detail.

Id.

Here, the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 11) sets forth
allegations of specific incidents of disparate treatment and
particular interactions tainted by ethnic bias.

Moreover, the

complaint alleges that Defendant terminated Plaintiff only
three working days after he filed his complaint with the MCAD.
This quantum of facts is sufficient to make dismissal
inappropriate.

2

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s MCAD filing was not
made in “good faith” because Plaintiff was aware that his
termination was imminent for non-discriminatory reasons at the
time he made the filing.
two problems.

The argument suffers from at least

First, it is based on documents not within the

four corners of the complaint.

Moreover, the bad-faith

scenario relied upon by Defendant may be subject to different
interpretations after completion of discovery.

Defendant’s

argument may perhaps be offered again at the summary judgment
stage anchored on a fuller record, but it is insufficient to
justify dismissal at this stage.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No.
7) is DENIED.

The case is hereby referred to the Magistrate

Judge for pretrial conference pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
It is so ordered.

/s/ Michael A. Ponsor
MICHAEL A. PONSOR
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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