Metcalf et al v. Bay Ferries Limited

Filing 143

District Judge Timothy S Hillman: ORDER entered denying 128 Motion To Enforce Settlement Agreement and granting 135 Motion to Vacate Settlement Order Of Dismissal. This case shall be restored to trial list with a trial date of September 8, 2015. (Castles, Martin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

____________________________________
)
)
)
)
)
v.
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BAY FERRIES LIMITED,
)
Defendant.
)
)
____________________________________)
KENNETH G. METCALF and NANCY
METCALF,
Plaintiffs

Civil Action No: 12-40075-TSH

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
(Docket No. 128) AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE SETTLEMENT ORDER
OF DISMISSAL [Doc. #123] (Docket No. 135)
June 22, 2015

HILLMAN, D.J.
Background
Kenneth Metcalf (“K. Metcalf”) and Nancy Metcalf (N. Metcalf and, together with K.
Metcalf, “Plaintiffs”) have filed suit against Bay Ferries Limited (“Bay Ferries” or “Defendant”)
alleging claims for negligence and loss of consortium1. More specifically, the Plaintiffs allege
that Bay Ferries was negligent in maintaining its ferry, HSC INCAT 059 (“The CAT”) and that
this negligence led directly to K. Metcalf’s injuries and resulting damages to them. On
December 14, 2014, the Court was advised by the parties that this action had settled and a forty-

The Court has previously granted summary judgment to Bay Ferries on N. Metcalf’s loss of Consortium
claim (Count II).
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five (45) day Settlement Order Of Dismissal was entered. On February 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed
a motion to extent the time period in which to consummate the settlement; that motion was
allowed and the parties were granted an additional forty-five (45) days. The parties were unable
to finalize a settlement within the requisite time.
This Order addresses Defendant’s Motion To Enforce Settlement Agreement (Docket No.
128). For the following reasons, that motion is denied. This Order also addresses Plaintiff’s
Motion To Vacate Settlement Order Of Dismissal [Doc. #123] (Docket No. 135). For the
following reasons, that motion is allowed.2
Discussion
Standard of Review
Plaintiffs’ claims are based on federal general maritime law and therefore, are governed
by federal rather than state law. See Fairest–Knight v. Marine World Distribs., Inc., 652 F.3d 94,
98 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[a]dmiralty jurisdiction brings with it a body of federal jurisprudence, largely
uncodified, known as maritime law.”) Therefore, a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is
determined in accordance with federal law. See Enos v. Union Stone, Inc., 732 F.3d 45, 48 (1st
Cir. 2013); see also Mid–South Towing Co. v. Har–Win, Inc., 733 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir.
1984)(where claims are premised on federal general maritime law, court applies federal law to
decide validity of agreement to settle claims). Under federal law, “[a]s a general rule, a trial
court may not summarily enforce a purported settlement agreement if there is a genuinely
disputed question of material fact regarding the existence or terms of that agreement. In such
circumstances, the cases consentingly hold that the court instead must take evidence to resolve

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Although at the hearing Plaintiffs argued that the settlement should be enforced on their terms, in their
motion, the only relief requested was that the Court vacate its Settlement Order of Dismissal and the action be reopened. To the extent that Plaintiffs’ now assert that their requested relief included enforcement of the settlement on
their terms, their motion is denied.

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the contested issues of fact.” Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir. 1999). “The
load-bearing element of a contract is the mutual assent of the parties to the essential terms of the
agreement, the so-called ‘meeting of the minds.’ Under First Circuit law, as elsewhere, where
there is no meeting of the minds between the parties because of a mistake of fact, no contract is
formed.” Enos, 732 F.3d at 48.
Whether the Parties Entered Into a Binding Settlement Agreement
The parties have each argued to the Court that they had reached a conclusive settlement
agreement on all material terms, including the terms of the release. Each side takes the position
that the operative terms of the release have been agreed to by the other party. The issue is
whether the Plaintiff should release his right to apply for and receive Medicare benefits in the
future. Each party has expended a great deal of energy attempting to shoehorn discrete facts
from convoluted settlement discussions which took place on the eve of trial to support their
theory that a binding settlement had been reached.
It is clear from the parties’ submissions, the evidence introduced at the hearing (including
Attorney Latti’s testimony), and arguments that there was not a meeting of the minds on the
issue. To the contrary, once the monetary terms in the case had been resolved-- it is clear that
this issue was initially both parties’ primary focus-- each staked out a contrary position regarding
the terms of the release. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations, the attorneys’ back and
forth oral and written communications regarding the terms of the release establish beyond any
doubt that there was never an agreement as to the release terms based on Plaintiffs’ December
29, 2014 proposal or otherwise. Furthermore, resolution of this issue was, and is, significant to
both parties. I find that the parties did not reach an agreement as to all of the material terms
necessary to settle the underlying personal injury civil case. Accordingly, I deny Defendant’s

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motion to enforce the settlement and I grant so much of the Plaintiffs’ motion that seeks to
vacate the settlement order of dismissal and re-open the action and deny it all other respects.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons:
1.

Defendant’s Motion To Enforce Settlement Agreement (Docket No. 128) is denied;

2.

Plaintiff’s Motion To Vacate Settlement Order Of Dismissal [Doc. #123] (Docket No.

and

135) is allowed.

This case shall be restored to trial list with a trial date of September 8, 2015.

.

/s/ Timothy S. Hillman
TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN
DISTRICT JUDGE.

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