In re J Graham Zahoruiko

Filing 12

Judge William G. Young: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER"In arguing his appeal, Zahoruiko makes much of theproposition that the Bankruptcy Code is designed to encourageand accommodate fresh starts for petitioners encumbered bydebt, and he is right to do so. This Court adheres to thepresumption that, much of the time, debtors ought receive thedischarges they seek. But this entitlement is not withoutlimitations, and one of them is that discharge may be denied ifthe debtor has knowingly an d fraudulently made a false oath inconnection with his bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A).The purpose of this section is to make certain that those whoseek the shelter of the bankruptcy code do not play fast andloose with their assets or with the reality of their affairs.In re Tully, 818 F.2d at 110. The Bankruptcy Courts findings and conclusions that Zahoruiko falls within the scope of thisexception were not clearly erroneous, and they were legallysound. For the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS theBankruptcy Courts judgment.SO ORDERED."(Sonnenberg, Elizabeth)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
IN RE:
)
)
J. GRAHAM ZAHORUIKO,
)
)
Debtor.
)
)
)
PREMIER CAPITAL, LLC,
)
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v.
)
)
J. GRAHAM ZAHORUIKO,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-40142-WGY

YOUNG, D.J.

September 25, 2014
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I.

INTRODUCTION
This appeal of a final order of the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts (the
“Bankruptcy Court”) is brought by J. Graham Zahoruiko
(“Zahoruiko”), seeking to overturn a judgment denying the
discharge of his debt under section 727(a)(4)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
A.

Procedural History

On November 9, 2012, Premier Capital, LLC (“Premier”)
initiated an adversary proceeding against Zahoruiko in

1 

Bankruptcy Court, seeking judgment either denying the discharge
of Zahoruiko’s debt under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) or excepting
debts owed to Premier from discharge under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(B). See United States Bankruptcy Court, District of
Massachusetts (Worcester), Adversary Proceeding No. 12-04119
(“Adversary Docket”), Compl. Objecting Dischargeability &
Discharge Debts, ECF No. 1. A trial was held before Judge Melvin
S. Hoffman on May 29, 2013. Adversary Docket, Hearings Held, May
29, 2013; see also Adversary Docket, Tr. Hr’g Re: Trial (“Trial
Tr.”), May 29, 2013, ECF No. 42.1 On October 17, 2013, Judge
Hoffman issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law and
entered judgment for Premier on the first count of its complaint
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). See Adversary Docket,
Findings Fact & Conclusions Law Regarding Objection Discharge &
Dischargeability (“Bankr. Ct. Opinion”), ECF No. 47; Adversary
Docket, Judgment, ECF No. 48.2
Zahoruiko appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment, and the
case was assigned to this Court on December 3, 2013. Elec.
Notice, Dec. 3, 2013, ECF No. 6. Zahoruiko filed his appellant’s
brief on January 29, 2014. See Br. Def.-Appellant, G. Graham

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A copy of the transcript of the trial before Judge Hoffman
has also been docketed in the instant appeal. See Tr. Hr’g Re:
Trial, May 29, 2013, ECF No. 3.
2

A copy of Judge Hoffman’s judgment has also been docketed
in the instant appeal. See Notice Appeal, Ex. 1, Judgment, ECF
No. 1-1.
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Zahoruiko (“Zahoruiko’s Mem.”), ECF No. 8. Premier filed an
appellee’s brief in opposition on February 12, 2014. See
Appellee Premier Capital, LLC’s Br. Opp’n Appellant-Debtor J.
Graham Zahoruiko’s Br. Appeal (“Premier’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 9.
B.

Undisputed Facts

On May 1, 2012, Zahoruiko filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. See United States Bankruptcy
Court District of Massachusetts (Worcester), Bankruptcy Petition
No. 12-41662 (“Bankr. Docket”), Ch. 13 Voluntary Pet., ECF No.
1. Naturally, in the course of filing his Chapter 13 petition,
Zahoruiko completed paperwork setting out in detail his
financial circumstances as of May 1, 2012 (the “May 1 filings”),
and much of the controversy in this case focuses on what those
statements left out. See generally Trial Tr., Ex. 1, USBC
Previous Ch. 13 12-41662 (“Bankr. R.”) 12-52, ECF No. 3-1. In
his Schedule B form, listing personal property, Zahoruiko failed
to mention (1) his ownership of stock in two corporations,
Refresh Software, Inc. (“Refresh”) and Celltak Corp.
(“Celltak”), (2) his ownership of Restricted Stock Units
affiliated with his then-employer, Anthelio Healthcare
Solutions, Inc. (“Anthelio”), and (3) his status as trustee of
an asset-owning trust, the J. Graham Zahoruiko Living Trust (the
“Trust”). See id. at 23-25; see also Zahoruiko’s Mem. 4-5;
Bankr. Ct. Opinion 2-3. In his Statement of Financial Affairs
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(“SOFA”), Zahoruiko failed to mention (1) payments he made to
his brother made in the year leading up to the bankruptcy
filing, (2) Zahoruiko’s role and interest in Celltak, and (3)
his unincorporated consulting business. See Bankr. R. 40-45; see
also Zahoruiko’s Mem. 4-5; Bankr. Ct. Opinion 3.
On June 8, 2012, the trustee of Zahoruiko’s Chapter 13
bankruptcy estate convened a meeting of his creditors pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 341(a). Premier’s Opp’n 2. Zahoruiko was
questioned at that meeting and gave responses admitting to his
interests in Refresh and Celltak, the Trust, the payments to his
brother, and his unincorporated consulting business, even as he
testified that he believed his May 1 filings were complete.
Zahoruiko’s Mem. 4-7.
On June 22, 2012, Zahoruiko learned that he was being
terminated from his employment at Anthelio and that he would be
receiving a severance payment in the amount of $58,000. Id. at
17. Four days later, on June 26, Zahoruiko filed an amended
Chapter 13 plan which updated some aspects of his financial
circumstances but which did not mention the loss of his job or
his expected severance payment. See Bankr. Docket, First Am. Ch.
13 Plan, ECF No. 22; Bankr. R. 54-62; see also Bankr. Ct.
Opinion 7. On August 3, 2012, Zahoruiko moved further to amend
his filings, Bankr. Docket, Mot., ECF No. 28; see Bankr. R. 6370, and to convert his case to a bankruptcy filed under Chapter
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7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankr. Docket, Mot., ECF No. 29. See
also Bankr. Ct. Opinion 8. A second section 341 creditor’s
meeting convened on September 10, 2012, and Zahoruiko was
questioned in great detail as to the assets omitted from his
original Chapter 13 filings. See Premier’s Opp’n 2; Zahoruiko’s
Mem. 6-7. No changes were made to these filings, however, until
three minutes before 6 p.m. on May 28, 2013 -- the eve of
Zahoruiko’s trial before the Bankruptcy Court. Bankr. Ct.
Opinion 5.
II.

ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), this Court has jurisdiction
to hear appeals “from final judgments, orders, and decrees” of
the Bankruptcy Court. Id. § 158(a)(1). “On intermediate appeal
to a district court, a final order of the bankruptcy court is
subject to the same familiar standards of review normally
employed in direct appeals to the courts of appeals in civil
cases generally.” In re LaRoche, 969 F.2d 1299, 1301 (1st Cir.
1992). Accordingly, the Court accepts all of the Bankruptcy
Court’s findings of fact “unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses” before it. Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 8013. “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
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entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Conclusions of law, on the other
hand, are reviewed de novo. In re IDC Clambakes, Inc., 727 F.3d
58, 63 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Jeffrey v. Desmond, 70 F.3d 183,
185 (1st Cir. 1995); In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1474
(1st Cir. 1991)). Mixed questions of law and fact “invok[e] a
sliding standard of review, tending more toward de novo review
at the law end.” Braunstein v. McCabe, 571 F.3d 108, 124 (1st
Cir. 2009); see also In re IDC Clambakes, 727 F.3d at 64.
B.

False Oath Under Section 727(a)(4)(A)

In accordance with the “overriding consideration that
equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy
jurisdiction,” Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103
(1966), the statutory entitlement to discharge debt through
bankruptcy ought “ordinarily be construed liberally in favor of
the debtor,” In re Tully, 818 F.2d 106, 110 (1st Cir. 1987). As
such, section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code holds that discharge is
to be denied only under certain circumstances. The exception
relevant to this case is laid out in 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A),
providing that the Court properly may deny discharge if “the
debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the
case[,] . . . made a false oath or account.” Id. “A debtor’s
Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs are the equivalent
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of a verification under oath.” In re Warner, 247 B.R. 24, 26
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).
For the exceptions to apply, “the Court must find that the
debtor (1) knowingly and fraudulently, (2) made a false oath in
or in connection with a case, (3) relating to a material fact.”
Id. at 26. A single false oath meeting these requirements is
sufficient to deny discharge. In re Grondin, 232 B.R. 274, 277
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999). Moreover, the party opposing discharge
bears the initial burden of proving each of these elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4005; see also
In re Sterman, 244 B.R. 499, 504 (D. Mass. 1999) (O’Toole, J.).
Once a prima facie case has been established, however, “the
burden falls upon the bankrupt to come forward with evidence
that he has not committed the offense charged.” In re Tully, 818
F.2d at 110 (quoting In re Mascolo, 505 F.2d 274, 276 (1st Cir.
1974)).
C.

Zahoruiko’s Chapter 13 Schedules and SOFA Omissions

The bulk of Zahoruiko’s challenge to the Bankruptcy Court’s
denial of discharge focuses on the court’s view of the omissions
he made in the schedules and SOFA contained in his May 1
filings. The Bankruptcy Court found that Zahoruiko’s testimony
explaining these omissions lacked credibility, Bankr. Ct.
Opinion 4, and that his incomplete filings constituted a knowing
attempt to conceal certain assets from his bankruptcy trustee
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and creditors, id. at 6. Zahoruiko asks this Court to rule that
these findings were clearly erroneous. See Zahoruiko’s Mem. 8-9.
1.

The Bankruptcy Court’s Finding of Fraudulent
Intent

At trial, Zahoruiko testified that while he had fully
disclosed the assets omitted from his Chapter 13 filings to his
attorney, that attorney advised him to omit mention of his
corporate positions and stock holdings in Refresh, Celltak, and
Anthelio because they were worthless or otherwise meaningless.
Bankr. Ct. Opinion 3-4 (noting, for example, Zahoruiko’s
testimony suggesting that Celltak was abandoned as a meaningful
enterprise within “a few months” of its formation). The
Bankruptcy Court found this testimony lacked credibility -Zahoruiko’s May 1 filings listed at least one asset valued at
zero, indicating that he knew valueless assets still ought be
disclosed, and a 2010 separation agreement between Zahoruiko and
his then-wife contained provisions to divide and distribute his
Celltak assets, indicating that Celltak was more than, as
Zahoruiko represented, “just a concept.” Id. at 4-5. Zahoruiko
also testified at trial that he failed to disclose certain
payments to his brother in the May 1 filings because Zahoruiko
did not know, even at the time of trial, the meaning of the word
“insider.” Id. at 4. The Bankruptcy Court found the notion that
Zahoruiko never asked his attorney about the term to be “at best

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unjustified and at worst premeditated concealment,” given other
evidence in the record that Zahoruiko had consulted his attorney
freely throughout the bankruptcy process. Id. at 5.
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court unfavorably noted that
despite several occasions on which Zahoruiko would have been
alerted to the importance of disclosing these assets to his
creditors, including at least one section 341 meeting and the
filing of Premier’s adversary complaint, Zahoruiko took no
action to correct any of his May 1 omissions until the eve of
his trial. Id. at 5-6. The Bankruptcy Court found that this
behavior “portray[ed] not a debtor who inadvertently or
innocently omitted information but one who foolishly hoped his
day of reckoning would never arrive.” Id. at 6.
2.

Zahoruiko’s Admissions to the Creditors

On appeal, Zahoruiko seeks to relitigate the factual issue
of his intent by describing in detail the disclosures he made
during his second section 341 creditor’s meeting, related to his
conversion to bankruptcy under Chapter 7. See Zahoruiko’s Mem.
6-8. By his account, he openly admitted to all of the property
interests he omitted from the May 1 filings as soon as he was
questioned about them. This is evidence, Zahoruiko suggests, of
his lack of awareness that the interests ought have been
disclosed, and of the culpability of others, primarily his
attorney, for failing to advise him to amend his filings. See,
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e.g., id. at 11-12 (“Debtor’s counsel never once . . . amended
the Statements and Schedules to reflect the very testimony he
had heard right in front of him, from his client, at both 341
meetings.”).
While Zahoruiko’s frank admissions could be construed as
circumstantial evidence of his lack of fraudulent intent, the
Bankruptcy Court concluded they were outweighed by other
evidence. This finding was not clearly erroneous, and the Court
will not disturb it.
The Bankruptcy Court’s finding of fraudulent intent remains
unaffected by Zahoruiko’s attempts to blame his attorney for
failing to advise him to update his Chapter 13 filings after the
second section 341 creditor’s meeting. Any advice Zahoruiko did
or did not receive after that meeting has no bearing on the fact
of his intent to make a false oath on May 1, 2012, the date of
his original incomplete filings. Moreover, even if Zahoruiko’s
attorney’s failure to give advice at that point were relevant,
it would not aid Zahoruiko’s appeal. The Court observes that
it is well settled that reliance upon advice of
counsel is . . . no defense where it should have been
evident to the debtor that the [omitted] assets ought
to be listed in the schedules. A debtor cannot, merely
by playing ostrich and burying his head deeply enough
in the sand, disclaim all responsibility for
statements which he has made under oath.
In re Tully, 818 F.2d at 111 (internal citations omitted).
Zahoruiko appears to be incredulous that a competent attorney
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could have witnessed the sharp questioning Zahoruiko received at
the second section 341 meeting without seeing fit to amend the
May 1 filings. See Zahoruiko’s Mem. 11-12. He overlooks,
however, that it is nearly as dubious that a good-faith debtor
could answer such questions without feeling compelled to at
least inquire as to their significance. Zahoruiko’s version of
events suggests that even the commencement of this adversary
proceeding did not timely prompt him to ask his attorney about
the omissions that were the subject of Premier’s complaint, or
swiftly to amend the filings himself. His continued efforts to
shift blame to his attorney are misguided.
3.

The Effect of Zahoruiko’s Omissions on His
Creditors

On a different tack, Zahoruiko contends that because he
made it convenient for creditors to discover his omitted
interests and assets by freely admitting to them upon
questioning, and because those interests were valueless, his
creditors were not impaired by his initial false statements.3 See

3

Although sufficient legal grounds warrant dismissing this
argument, it is worth mentioning that there is little reason
even to accept the premise that Zahoruiko caused no real
detriment to his creditors. Regardless of how forthcoming
Zahoruiko was later on in the bankruptcy process, his initial
omissions forced his creditors to bear the burden of discovering
assets through their own investigation. Zahoruiko ought receive
little credit for waiting until he was asked sufficiently
specific and directed questions before mentioning items he ought
have disclosed in the first place. See In re Tully, 818 F.2d at
111 (“A petitioner cannot omit items from his schedules, force
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Zahoruiko’s Mem. 13-16. He also suggests that it was improper
for Premier to allege in its complaint false oaths related to
assets and transactions it had long been aware of, and that it
was clear error for the Bankruptcy Court to find fraudulent
intent and materiality as to these omissions. Id. at 16. These
are not, however, grounds to overturn the denial of a discharge
under section 717(a)(4)(A).
First, it is absurd to suggest that Premier ought have
omitted from its complaint any allegations or claims related to
assets it knew about at the time of the complaint’s filing.
Adversary proceedings like this one have no raison d’être if the
creditor does not suspect or know about assets that the debtor
failed to disclose. In other words, that Zahoruiko’s creditors
eventually learned the full extent of his holdings, in spite of
his schedules and SOFA, is what gave rise to Premier’s complaint
in the first place, and it does nothing to cure the false oaths
for which Zahoruiko is responsible.
Second, the ease with which Zahoruiko ultimately may have
led creditors to discover his assets has no bearing on his
intent at the time he filed his initial incomplete disclosures

the trustee and the creditors, at their peril, to guess that he
has done so -- and hold them to a mythical requirement that they
search through a paperwork jungle in the hope of finding an
overlooked needle in a documentary haystack.”); see also In re
Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Creditors are
entitled to judge for themselves what will benefit, and what
will prejudice, them.”).
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on May 1, 2012. When courts have found a lack of fraudulent
intent based on evidence that the omitted asset had no value, or
that the debtor promptly admitted to the asset upon questioning,
they have made such findings in the context of other evidence
that the debtor’s omission was a genuine mistake. See, e.g., In
re Oliveira, Bankruptcy No. 05-11026-RS, 2007 WL 2908624, at *2
(Bankr. D. Mass. Sept. 28, 2007). Similar evidence is not
present in this case, and Zahoruiko’s contentions do little to
demonstrate clear error in the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that
he possessed the requisite intent.
Third, to the extent Zahoruiko seeks to use this evidence
to show that his omissions were not material, he cannot prevail.
“Matters are material if pertinent to the discovery of assets,
including the history of a bankrupt’s financial transactions.”
In re Mascolo, 505 F.2d at 277 (citing Metheany v. United
States, 365 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1966)). The requirement does not
turn on whether creditors were actually harmed by an omission.
See id. at 278 (“[T]he materiality of the false oath will not
depend upon whether in fact the falsehood has been detrimental
to the creditors.” (quoting In re Slocum, 22 F.2d 282, 285 (2d
Cir. 1927))); In re Stevens, 343 B.R. 11, 17 (D. Mass. 2006)
(Gorton, J.) (“There is no exception for a false statement that
did not mislead anyone.”). Neither does the value of omitted
assets determine whether a falsehood was material -- even the
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omission of a closed bank account may warrant the denial of a
discharge. See In re Mascolo, 505 F.2d at 278; see also In re
Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The recalcitrant
debtor may not escape a section 727(a)(4)(A) denial of discharge
by asserting that the admittedly omitted or falsely stated
information concerned a worthless business relationship or
holding; such a defense is specious.”).
D.

Zahoruiko’s False Oaths at Trial

In addition to his filing omissions, the Bankruptcy Court
found that Zahoruiko’s testimony at trial constituted false
oaths. Bankr. Ct. Opinion 7. Zahoruiko seeks a ruling that these
findings were also clear error. Zahoruiko’s Mem. 16.
At trial, considerable evidence was adduced on the subject
of Zahoruiko’s amended Chapter 13 plan, in which he failed to
mention that four days before filing, on June 22, 2012,
Zahoruiko had learned of his termination from employment and of
his former employer’s plans to convey to him a $58,000 severance
payment. See Bankr. Ct. Opinion 7. The Bankruptcy Court noted
that during his trial testimony related to these omissions,
Zahoruiko made at least two statements under oath that he was
compelled to recant upon the presentation of evidence to the
contrary. First, he disavowed knowledge of any amended plan
until he was presented with a copy of the plan bearing his
signature. Id. Then, Zahoruiko claimed that he did not know he
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would be receiving a $58,000 severance payment until June 28,
two days after the June 26 filing date of the amended plan. Id.
at 7-8. Upon further examination, he admitted that he had
actually learned of the news on June 22. Id. at 7. The
Bankruptcy Court found that Zahoruiko knew his initial
statements were false when he made them, “and that his motive in
falsely testifying was to mislead the court.” Id.
Zahoruiko contends that this finding was clear error, but
his arguments are little more than conclusory assertions. He
suggests that until his recollection was refreshed by hard
evidence, he merely forgot about the existence of the amended
plan. Zahoruiko’s Mem. 20. He also argues that it is unrealistic
to assume that he would be so brazen as to admit to learning of
his severance payment on June 22 at a deposition and then tell a
lie at trial one month later. Id. at 18. The Court notes,
however, that on appeal, Zahoruiko is bold enough to assert that
there is “not a significant difference” between learning of his
severance payment before filing his amended plan and learning of
the payment after filing. See id. at 17-18. He claims there was
“nothing to be gained” by telling the lie he told at trial. Id.
at 18. These representations are little more than makeweights.
The Bankruptcy Court found Zahoruiko’s representations at trial
not to be credible, and this Court has no reason to conclude the
finding was clear error.
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E.

Zahoruiko’s Additional Arguments

In addition to his factual challenges, Zahoruiko asks this
Court to vacate the Bankruptcy Court’s finding of a false oath
in connection with his omission of the severance payment from
his amended plan. Id. at 20-21. Allegations related to this
omission, Zahoruiko says, were not contained in Premier’s
complaint against him and are thus not proper grounds to deny
discharge under section 727(a)(4)(A). Id. at 21. Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(b), however, pleadings may be constructively amended
during trial “by the parties’ express or implied consent.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015 (providing
that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 applies to adversary proceedings in
bankruptcy). “Consent to the trial of an issue may be implied
if, during the trial, a party acquiesces in the introduction of
evidence which is relevant only to that issue.” DCPB, Inc. v.
City of Lebanon, 957 F.2d 913, 917 (1st Cir. 1992), abrogated on
other grounds by statutory amendment, Fed. R. App. P. 3, as
recognized in Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 243
n.25 (1st Cir. 2010). The trial transcript shows that Zahoruiko
made no objection to the introduction of evidence as to the
omission of his severance payment. Moreover, Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(b) provides that even had Zahoruiko objected to evidence, he
would have had to show that the evidence would prejudice his

16 

defense, and he makes no argument that he would have been so
harmed.
Lastly, Zahoruiko raises in passing the applicability of 11
U.S.C. § 348, regarding conversion, and he challenges the
Bankruptcy Court’s use of reasoning by analogy in citing to
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365 (2007).
Zahoruiko’s Mem. 21. These arguments have no bearing on the
Bankruptcy Court’s findings and conclusions, nor this Court’s
ruling that the Bankruptcy Court’s findings and conclusions
ought be affirmed.
III. CONCLUSION
In arguing his appeal, Zahoruiko makes much of the
proposition that the Bankruptcy Code is designed to encourage
and accommodate “fresh starts” for petitioners encumbered by
debt, and he is right to do so. This Court adheres to the
presumption that, much of the time, debtors ought receive the
discharges they seek. But this entitlement is not without
limitations, and one of them is that discharge may be denied if
the debtor has knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath in
connection with his bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A).
The purpose of this section “is to make certain that those who
seek the shelter of the bankruptcy code do not play fast and
loose with their assets or with the reality of their affairs.”
In re Tully, 818 F.2d at 110. The Bankruptcy Court’s findings
17 

and conclusions that Zahoruiko falls within the scope of this
exception were not clearly erroneous, and they were legally
sound. For the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the
Bankruptcy Court’s judgment.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ William G. Young_
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE

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