Palumbo v. Testa et al

Filing 14

District Judge Timothy S Hillman: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered granting in part and denying in part 6 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (Castles, Martin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
________________________________________________
)
ROSALBA PALUMBO,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
v.
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DUSTIN TESTA, JEANNE VAN PATTEN-STEIGER,
)
THOMAS J. O’LOUGHLIN, and TOWN OF MILFORD, )
Defendants.
)
________________________________________________)

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 14-40051-TSH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
May 27, 2015

HILLMAN, D.J.
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff, Rosalba Palumbo (“Palumbo”), filed suit against individual Defendants, Dustin
Testa (“Officer Testa”), Jeanne Van Patten-Steiger (“Officer Van Patten-Steiger”) and Thomas J.
O’Loughlin (“Chief O’Loughlin”), and the Town of Milford (“Milford”) as the result of injuries
she alleges she suffered when she was hit with pepper spray during the course of her son’s arrest.
Plaintiff has alleged claims: under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violation of her Fourth Amendment
Rights (Count I—Officers Testa and Van Patten-Steiger); under the Massachusetts Civil Rights
Act, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 12, §§11H and 11I (“MCRA”)(Count II—Officers Testa and Van PattenSteiger); for Negligent Injury and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count III-Milford); Assault and Battery (Count IV—Officers Testa and Van Patten-Steiger); Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count V—Officers Testa and Van Patten-Steiger); Conspiracy

(Count VI—Officers Testa and Van Patten Steiger); and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Milford
and Chief O’Loughlin for violation of her constitutional rights.1
This Order addresses Defendants, Dustin Testa, Jeanne M. Van Patten-Steiger, Chief
Thomas J. O’Loughlin And Town Of Milford’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
(Docket No. 6). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is allowed, in part, and denied, in
part.
Discussion
Standard of Review
Defendants seek to dismiss Counts I, II, VI and VII of the Complaint pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
Court “must assume the truth of all well-plead[ed] facts and give plaintiff the benefit of all
reasonable inferences therefrom.” Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)). To survive a motion to
dismiss, the plaintiff must state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level, ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129
S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Dismissal is appropriate if plaintiff’s
1

The Complaint contains conclusory and unnecessarily hyberbolic factual assertions regarding the arrest
and treatment of Steven Palumbo, the Plaintiff’s son. Additionally, pictures of Steven Palumbo in a cell at the
Milford Police Department are attached to the Complaint. At the hearing, counsel for Palumbo stated that this
information was included in the Complaint because it supports Plaintiff’s municipal and supervisory liability claims.
Although I am allowing these factual allegations and accompanying pictures to stand, given the extremely tenuous
relevance that this information has to Plaintiff’s claims and the fact that the information is included with little or no
context, I am troubled by their inclusion in the Complaint and, more particularly, the decision to present the
information in such an inflammatory manner.

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well-pleaded facts do not “possess enough heft to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Ruiz
Rivera v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and original
alterations omitted). “The relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of
liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint.”
Ocasio-Hernàndez v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011).
Facts
On April 16, 2011, Palumbo, then aged 67 years, got a phone call from her son,
Steven Palumbo (“Steven”). Steven told his mother that members of the Milford Police
Department had just been served him with a restraining order following a conversation he had
with one of his friends, Dustin Morris (“Morris”). Shortly after being served with a restraining
order Steven called Morris’s mother, Beverly Morris (“Mrs. Morris”), to complain about being
served with a restraining order. Palumbo told her son that she would drive over to his house.
Mrs. Morris called the Milford Police Department to complain about the phone call from Steven.
Officers Testa, Van Patten-Steiger, and Angel Arce (“Officer Arce”) were dispatched to
Steven’s Parkhurst Street to arrest him for alleged violation of the restraining order. When
Palumbo arrived at Steven’s house, she found Steven and his girlfriend standing outside. After
speaking with Steven for a short time, she went to her vehicle and noticed two vehicles drive in
front of her son’s property. Palumbo saw Officer Testa in one of the vehicles with another
officer. Palumbo asked officer Testa: “Can I help you? What happened now?” Officer Testa
asked Palumbo if Steven was home. Palumbo saw Steven walking from the garage steps of his
house and she heard him say, among other things, “What did I do now?” Palumbo saw Officer
Testa walk towards Steven. Palumbo next saw Officer Testa grab Steven’s right hand and place

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it behind the back as he walked Steven towards the cruiser. Palumbo saw Officer Testa push
Steven’s head down onto the hood of the police cruiser.
Palumbo could hear Steven gasping for air and not being able to speak clearly. She stood
about 4 feet away from Officer Testa and Steven and next to the front hood of the police cruiser.
At that time Officer Testa had not told Steven he was under arrest, nor did he try to put
handcuffs on him or give him any orders. Palumbo heard Officer Testa tell Steven “we’re here
for Beverly.” Palumbo heard her son respond: “who said I can’t call Beverly [Morris’s mother],
I call her all the time.” Palumbo then saw Officers Arce and Testa force Steven’s head onto the
hood of the cruiser while holding up his arms towards his back as he repeatedly stated: “What
did I do wrong?”
Palumbo, who was unaware the officers were going to place Steven under arrest,
moved to a distance of two feet away from her son and the officers. She then placed a portion of
her body on the hood of the cruiser and about 10 inches away from Steven. Palumbo saw
Officer Van Patten-Steiger to the right of Officer Testa (on the driver side of the cruiser).
Palumbo told Steven “we are going to fix it” and then she heard an officer say: “I’m going to
spray.” Palumbo had no idea what the officer meant by that statement.
Palumbo remembers that both a male officer and a female officers (Officers Testa and
Van Patten-Steiger) were present and said “spray” or “we’re going to spray.” Just before she
was sprayed, she saw the two officers standd a bit back from Steven while holding him. No
officer ordered or told Palumbo to move and no one attempted to move her in an effort to prevent
her from being sprayed.
Palumbo saw an officer extend a hand holding an object toward her face and when

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the object was about 15 inches she saw and felt a jet of spray directly into both of her eyes.
Palumbo then jerked back from the hood of the car screaming “Steven, my eyes, they’re burning,
Steven help.” Steven immediately yelled “how could you this?” “She’s 60 years old!” A few
seconds later, Palumbo could hear Steven yell, “my eyes, my eyes.”
As Palumbo was yelling, “my mouth, my eyes, they’re burning awful,” she heard a
female say “we didn’t spray you.” Palumbo replied “you sprayed me, my eyes are on fire,
they’re burning.” Palumbo also yelled “I can’t breathe.” Palumbo heard the female officer reply
“It’s only a little pepper spray.”
Steven, trying to aide his mother, embraced her and they fell to the ground. Steven,
whose arms were still free, tried to help Palumbo up from the ground and as he did so an officer
yelled: “we’re going to tag you.” Palumbo then heard what sounded to her like two shots and
heard her son moaning on the ground to her right. Palumbo, believing her son had been shot,
panicked. No officer came to her assistance as she lay on the ground, gagging and gasping for
breath.
After a time, while she was still blinded from the effects of the pepper-spray, two officers
lifted her up from the ground and brought her to where Steven’s girlfriend was located. Officers
eventually called an ambulance, which took Mrs. to the emergency department of Milford
Regional Medical Center. Emergency medical technicians of the ambulance service, American
Medical Response, wrote that Palumbo stated that she had been sprayed in both eyes with pepper
spray. She complained of blurred vision and burning pain, and they found redness and swelling
around both eyes. At the Milford Regional Medical Center (“MRMC”) emergency department,
Palumbo was examined and admitted to the hospital, where she remained until her discharge on

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April 19, 2011. Along with her eye complaints she was diagnosed with atypical chest pain
secondary to an acute stress reaction.
Palumbo has been treated by various medical professionals for ongoing light sensitivity
and a burning feeling and pain in her eyes. She continues to receive treatment. At the time she
was sprayed Palumbo was unarmed and non-belligerent and she was never charged with any
crime related to the incident of her son’s arrest.
At the time of and prior to the incident from which this suit arises, Milford and Chief
O’Loughlin had a policy, custom and practice of failing to properly to investigate complaints of
misconduct or to discipline those officers who used excessive force. Milford and Chief
O’Loughlin also had a policy and/or custom and practice of tolerating a code of silence in which
Milford police officers understood that they were not to report incidents of misconduct against
fellow officers. Milford and Chief O’Loughlin also observed a custom and practice of making it
difficult for citizens to file complaints about the conduct of Milford police officers. Where
complaints of unreasonable force were presented, at all pertinent times Milford, Chief
O’Loughlin, and the Milford Police Department failed to properly investigate misconduct claims
and failed to discipline officers who used unreasonable force.
The Milford Police Department, and in particular Chief O’Loughlin, also failed to
monitor officers’ use of force by making sure that officers filed use of force reports whenever
someone taken into custody had visible injuries. Such injured prisoner reports were at all
pertinent times required by state law and by Milford Police Department policies and procedure.
Milford Police officers routinely submitted false or incomplete reports that did not report, or
which underreported, prisoners’ injuries. The Milford Police Department condoned this

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widespread violation of the Massachusetts Injured Prisoner Statute as well as the Milford Police
Department’s own internal policies and procedures.
The policies and customs of Milford led MPD officers, including Officers Van PattenSteiger and Testa, to believe that they could use as much force as they wanted, to believe that
they could violate the constitutional rights of its citizens’ by using unreasonable force, making
arrests without probable cause, filing false reports, and even testifying falsely in court without
any level of police sanction.
Whether Plaintiff Has Stated A Claim Under Count I
In Count I of her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the actions of Officers Testa and Van
Patten-Steiger deprived her of right to be from the use of unreasonable force under the Fourth
Amendment. Officers Testa and Van Patten-Steiger assert that because Palumbo was never
“seized,” her claim does not arise under the Fourth Amendment,2 rather, her claim arises under
the Fourteenth Amendment-- because Palumbo has not pled the elements of a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, Count I must be dismissed. In the alternative, Officers Testa and Van PattenSteiger argue Count I must be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff argues that she has properly pled a Fourth Amendment claim. She also argues
that the Court should interpret Count I as including a Fourteenth Amendment claim because in
Paragraph 2 of her Complaint, she alleges that the Court has jurisdiction over this action because
she is alleging claims for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff’s latter
argument is a non-starter. In Count I, Palumbo expressly alleges that the officers’ actions
violated the Fourth Amendment and at the hearing, counsel failed to identify any language in

At the time of the incident, police officers were responding to a complaint that Palumbo’s son had
violated a recently issued restraining order. Palumbo was pepper sprayed when standing in close proximity to her
son as the police officers were attempting to arrest him. Palumbo was never arrested and never charged with any
crime.
2

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Count I which could be interpreted to support a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Therefore, the
Court will focus on whether Plaintiff has stated a Fourth Amendment claim.
Whether Plaintiff Has Stated A Claim For Violation Of her Fourth Amendment Rights
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides individuals the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. “[A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur
whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual’s freedom of
movement…, nor even whenever there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired
termination of in individual’s freedom of movement…, but only when there is a governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County ov
Inyo, 489 U.S. 596-97, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (1989). Whether Palumbo was seized for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment is a question of fact. First, there is the question of whether Palumbo’s
freedom of movement was terminated after she was pepper sprayed. Second, is the issue of
whether the pepper spray was intentionally applied—to her (there is no question that the pepper
spray was directly applied to her son.) See Hamilton v. City of Olympia, 687 F.Supp.2d 1231
(W.D.Wash. 2009).
This is a close case. If the officers knew that because of Plaintiff’s close proximity to her
son she would be effected, that is, if they also intended to expose her to the pepper spray which
they targeted at her son, then she was seized by the officers for Fourth Amendment purposes.
However, if Palumbo was not an intended target of the officers, then the fact that she suffered
secondary exposure to the pepper spray would not constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Logan v. City of Pullman, 392 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1260 (E.D. Wash. 2005), see also
Landol-Rivera v. Cosme, 906 F.2d 791,795 (1st Cir. 1990)(In determining whether there has been
Fourth Amendment seizure, law distinguishes between police action which is directed towards

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producing particular result and action which simply causes particular result—thus, police
shooting of innocent hostage is not Fourth Amendment seizure of hostage where police bullet
was intended to hit robber for purpose of stopping robber’s flight). While the facts alleged by the
Plaintiff suggest that she was inadvertently hit with pepper spray as the result of having
positioned herself in close proximity to her son during the course of his arrest, she asserts that the
police intended to pepper spray her. At this stage of the proceeding, considering all factual
inferences in her favor, I find that Plaintiff has at least stated a plausible Fourth Amendment
claim.
Whether The Individual Defendants Are Entitled To Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public employees “from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982).
‘Qualified immunity is a judge-made doctrine designed to “balance two
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise
power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably ” ’ The doctrine thus protects
from liability for civil damages all public officials other than those who, ‘from an
objective standpoint, should have known that their conduct was unlawful.’
The qualified immunity inquiry has two parts. A court must decide whether
the plaintiff has made out a violation of a constitutional right and, if so, whether the
right was clearly established at the time of the violation. This second part, in turn, has
two aspects. The first focuses on the clarity of the law at the time of the violation.
The other aspect focuses more concretely on the facts of the particular case and
whether a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights. The “salient question” is whether the state of the law
at the time of the violation gave the defendant fair warning that his particular conduct
was unconstitutional.
Drumgold v. Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 42 (1st Cir. 2013)(internal citations and citation to quoted case
omitted).

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Based on the allegations contained in the Complaint, which I must accept as true for
purposes of Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has alleged facts which could support a
finding that: (1) the individual officers used excessive force against Palumbo by intentionally
spraying her with pepper spray without justification thus violating a clearly established
constitutional right; and (2) that they acted unreasonably in doing so. See Bettencourt v. Arruda,
Civ.Act.No. 10-11487-JGD, 2012 WL 5398475 (D.Mass. Nov. 1, 2012) Therefore, I cannot find
as a matter of law that the individual police officers are entitled to qualified immunity. As to all
of Plaintiff’s claims, this issue is more appropriately addressed at summary judgment on a more
expansive factual record.
Whether Plaintiff Has Stated A Claim Under Count II
Count Two alleges a claim against Officers Testa and Van Patten-Steiger under the
MCRA. In order to state a claim under the MCRA, Palumbo must assert facts that would support
a finding that her exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of either the
United States or Massachusetts has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, by
threats, intimidation or coercion. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12, § 11I. The MCRA is the state
“counterpart” to Section 1983 and, in general, is coextensive therewith. The primary difference
is that to succeed on an MCRA claim, a plaintiff must also show that the violation of rights
occurred “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 532
N.E.2d 49, 52 (1989). “A ‘threat’ means the ‘intentional exertion of pressure to make another
fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm.’ ” Goddard v. Kelley, 629 F.Supp.2d 115, 128
(D.Mass. 2009)(citation to quoted case omitted). “Intimidation” means putting a person in fear
for the purpose of compelling or deterring his or her conduct. Id. “Coercion” means application
of physical or moral force to another to constrain him to do against his will something he would

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not otherwise do. Id. The direct violation of a constitutional right does not establish a MCRA
violation because “it is not an attempt to force someone to do something the person is not
lawfully required to do.” Columbus v. Biggio, 76 F.Supp.2d 43, 54 (D.Mass. 1999). Defendants
assert that Palumbo’s conclusory allegations that the officers violated her rights under the
MCRA “by threats, intimidation, and coercion” are insufficient to state a claim under the
MCRA. For the reasons set forth below, I agree.
Palumbo alleges that immediately before the officers sprayed, she had placed herself on
the hood of the police cruiser within ten inches of her son. She also alleges that the officers said
something to the effect that they are going to spray. Palumbo does not allege that any officer
told her to move away from her son or she would be sprayed, nor does she allege that she was
sprayed in an attempt to force her away from immediate scene of Steven’s arrest. Therefore,
while Palumbo has asserted facts which could plausibly support a claim for a direct violation of
her constitutional rights, she has not alleged any facts which would support a finding, nor has she
adequately pled, that the officers’ actions were intended to coerce her into refraining from the
exercise of a right or privilege secured by law. 3 For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count II of the Complaint is allowed. Accord Bettencourt, 2012 WL 5398475, at *13
(what is absent from allegations is any pleading that violation was intended to coerce plaintiff
into refraining from exercise of right or privilege secured by law).
Whether Plaintiff Has Stated A Claim Under Count VI
The wording of Count VI of the Complaint is muddled, however, it appears that Palumbo
is alleging that that Officers Testa and Van Patten-Steiger conspired to violate her constitutional
rights by filing false police reports and that their actions deprived and hindered her right of due
3

Under the circumstances, it is not necessary for the Court to address whether Palumbo was exercising a
right or privilege secured by law when she placed herself on the hood of the cruiser while the police were attempting
to arrest her son.

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process to seek redress for her injuries. Palumbo asserts her claim under Section 1983. “While
conspiracies may be actionable under section 1983, it is necessary that there have been, besides
the agreement [among conspirators], an actual deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws. Thus, an allegation of conspiracy to deprive someone of, say, his constitutional right to
due process states a claim under § 1983.” Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir.
2006)(internal citations and citation to quoted case omitted)(alteration in original). Defendants
argue that Palumbo’s factual allegations fail to establish either a coercive or concerted activity
conspiracy and therefore, this claim must be dismissed.
‘A civil rights conspiracy as commonly defined is “a combination of two or more
persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by
unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the
parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, and an overt act that
results in damages.”’ Thus, ‘[t]o present an adequate conspiracy claim, there must
be allegations of (1) an agreement between two or more state actors ... (2) to act in
concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in
furtherance of that goal causing damages.’ Additionally, allegations of a
conspiracy under Section 1983 ‘must ... be supported by material facts, not merely
conclusory statements.’
Williams v. City of Boston, 771 F.Supp.2d 190, 204 (D. Mass. 2011). The courts have
recognized that it often difficult for a plaintiff to allege direct proof of a conspiracy. While it is a
close case, at this stage of the proceedings I find that the minimal allegations that Palumbo
makes against these officers, i.e., that the both filed false reports, is sufficient to create an
inference that acted in concert pursuant to an agreement. See Id., at 205.4
Whether Plaintiff Has Stated A Claim As To Count VII
Palumbo alleges a claim against Milford under Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social
Services, 486 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. (1978) alleging that the town had a longstanding custom and or
4
Palumbo’s Complaint is totally devoid of any facts which would support her conclusory contention that
the officers’ actions hindered or deprived her of her right of due process. However, Defendants do not seek to
dismiss Count VI on this ground and the Court will not do so sua sponte. Nonetheless, Plaintiff is on notice that she
is pulling an extremely heavy oar with respect to this claim.

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policy of not investigating “critical incidents” and failing to discipline police officers who
injured citizens, thus condoning police misconduct. She further alleges that this custom or policy
led Milford police officers to believe that they would not be held accountable for their actions.
She makes similar allegations against Chief O’Loughlin to support her supervisory liability claim
against him.
Generally, a municipality ‘may be liable under [section 1983] if the
governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’
a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.’ However, municipalities are not
vicariously liable under section 1983 for the actions of their non-policymaking
employees. They are responsible only for their own unconstitutional acts. Thus, a
plaintiff who brings a section 1983 action against a municipality bears the burden
of showing that, ‘through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving
force’ behind the injury alleged.’ Such a plaintiff must ‘identify a municipal
‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiffs injury.’
Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 51 (1st Cir. 2011). As to Palumbo’s claims against Chief
O’Loughlin, “the standard for supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is clear: ‘[A]
supervisory official may be held liable for the behavior of his subordinates only if (1) the
behavior of his subordinates results in a constitutional violation, and (2) the supervisor’s action
or inaction was affirmatively linked to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as
supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to
deliberate indifference.’” Phillips v. City of Methuen, 818 F.Supp.2d 325, 334 (D. Mass.
2011)(citation to quoted case omitted).
I agree with Defendants that Plaintiff’s Complaint is rife with conclusory legal
statements. At the same time, she alleges that Milford officials, in general, and Chief
O’Loughlin, in particular, have failed to properly oversee and discipline members of the police
department resulting in a police force comprised of rogue and undisciplined officers. Putting
aside the bombastic and inflammatory nature of many of Plaintiff’s assertions, the underlying
factual inferences, if true, suggest a disturbing pattern of behavior by Milford officials and Chief
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O’Loughlin. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court is required to accept her allegations as
true and draw inferences in her favor.5 Therefore, as to her claims against these Defendants with
regard to her allegations relating to policies, customs and/or deliberate indifference by failing to
appropriately investigate or discipline officers (which would include her allegations of failure to
monitor or dismiss officers) who engaged in misconduct, she has stated plausible claims.
However, to the extent that she is alleging claims against these Defendants for failure to
appropriately hire or train police officers, there are no allegations which would support a Monell
claim against Milford or a supervisory claim against Chief O’Loughlin and therefore, such
claims are dismissed.
Conclusion
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
Defendants, Dustin Testa, Jeanne M. Van Patten-Steiger, Chief Thomas J. O’Loughlin
And Town Of Milford’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Docket No. 6) is allowed, in
part, and denied, in part, as provided in this Memorandum and Order.

/s/ Timothy S. Hillman_________
TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN
DISTRICT JUDGE

I want to emphasize that the Court is by no means suggesting that Plaintiff’s allegations are true—the
Court is simply ruling that assuming she can prove her allegations, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim.
5

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