Largesse v. H&M International Transportation, Inc. et al

Filing 22

District Judge Timothy S Hillman: ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION entered granting 4 Motion to Dismiss and granting 16 Motion to Amend the complaint. (Castles, Martin)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
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vs.
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H&M INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION, INC., )
CHARLES CONNORS and GEORGE WILLMOTT,
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Defendants.
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_______________________________________________ )
DEAN JAY LARGESSE, SR., on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated,
Plaintiff

CIVIL ACTION
No. 14-40121-TSH

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
January 6, 2015
HILLMAN, D.J.
Background
Plaintiff, Dean Jay Largesse, Sr. (“Largesse”), filed suit in Massachusetts State Superior
Court against H&M International Transportation, Inc. (“H&M”), Charles Connors (“Connors”)
and George Willmott (“Willmott”) alleging claims pursuant to Mass.Gen.L. ch. 149, §§148 and
150 (failure to pay wages). Specifically, Largesse alleges that the Defendants failed to pay him
his earned vacation pay pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between H&M
and Teamsters Local Union 170. Connors and Willmott are being sued in their individual
capacities.
Defendants removed the action to this Court on the grounds that Largesse’s claims are
preempted by federal law, specifically, Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Largesse’s claims are preempted by
the LMRA because such claims can only be resolved by reference to the CBA and because they
failed to exhaust administrative remedies through the CBA’s grievance and arbitration
procedures.1 For the reasons set forth in Defendants’ memorandum in support of their motion,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is allowed.
After Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Largess filed Plaintiff’s Motion For Leave
To Amend Complaint (Docket No. 16). For the reasons set forth below, that motion is allowed.
Discussion
Standard Of Review
Under this Court’s rules of procedure, more specifically, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), consent to
file an amended pleading is to be “freely given when justice so requires.” Id. “This liberal
amendment policy applies unless the plaintiff exhibited bad faith, undue delay, the amendment
would work undue prejudice on the opposing party, or be futile.” Weinberg v. Grand Circle
Travel, LCC, 891 F. Supp. 2d 228, 236 (D.Mass. 2012). Largess has not unduly delayed his
motion to amend (it was filed approximately 2 1/2 months after Defendants filed their motion to
dismiss) 2, and there are no allegations of bad faith or undue prejudice. Thus, the only issue to be

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Although Largesse filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, his counsel did not argue against
dismissal of the Complaint at the hearing. Presumably, Largesse recognized that such claims cannot be resolved
without resorting to interpretation of the CBA and, therefore, are clearly preempted by the LMRA. See Haggins v.
Verizon New England, Inc., 648 F.3d 50,54- 55 (1st Cir. 2011)(§ 301 preempts a state-law claim when asserted statelaw claim plausibly can be said to depend upon meaning of one or more provisions within collective bargaining
agreement).
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Defendants argue that Largesse unduly delayed filing his motion to amend his Complaint to add a new
theory of liability by waiting until after they had filed their motion to dismiss the Complaint. I disagree. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 2009 to provide that a plaintiff may amend his complaint once, as of
right, within twenty-one days of the filing of a motion to dismiss. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B). The reason for the
amendment was to force plaintiffs to consider the issues raised in the motion to dismiss and, if warranted, promptly
amend their pleadings to address the arguments raised therein. See Id., at ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES, 2009
Amendments. Had Largess filed his motion to amend his Complaint earlier, leave of Court would not have been
required. That he did not file his motion to amend until approximately 2 ½ months after the filing of the motion to

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addressed by the Court is whether allowance of the motion to amend the complaint would be
futile.
Whether The Motion To Amend Should Be Allowed
Largess seeks to file an Amended Complaint on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated and Teamsters Local Union 170 (who is being added as a Plaintiff in this case) asserting
claims for violation of the LMRA and breach of the CBA. Defendants argue that allowing the
amendment would be futile because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
under the CBA, which is a prerequisite to this Court exercising jurisdiction over their claims.
However, in the proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that H&M repudiated the
grievance process, which is an exception to the exhaustion requirement. See Hayes v. New
England Millwork Distributors, Inc., 602 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1979). This allegation suffices to
allow this Court to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the LMRA. At the same time, H&M has
made a compelling case that Plaintiffs cannot establish that it repudiated the grievance process
and therefore, their claims must ultimately be dismissed. In support of their respective positions
on this issue, the parties have cited to and relied on facts which are not properly before the Court
in deciding the instant motion. Therefore, I find that the issue is one which is more properly
addressed by way of summary judgment after limited discovery. Accordingly, Largess’s motion
to amend is allowed.
The Parties Shall File Motion(s) For Summary Judgment On The Exhaustion Issue
On or before January 20, 2015, the Plaintiffs and H&M shall jointly submit a Scheduling
Order to the Court setting forth the limited discovery they would seek to conduct relevant to the
dismiss has required the Defendants and the Court to expend resources they would not have otherwise had to expend
and has briefly delayed pretrial proceedings. While the better practice would have been to recognize the
Complaint’s deficiencies within the twenty-one day window, the time and effort expended to deal with the motion to
amend were minimal. Under the circumstances, I do not find that the motion to amend the Complaint should be
denied for undue delay.

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issue of whether Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust and their proposed
timetable for: conducting such discovery, filing of motion(s) for summary judgment and/or
oppositions to such motion(s). Thereafter, the Court will hold a Scheduling Conference to
address their joint proposal.
Conclusion
It is hereby ordered that:
(1) Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (Docket No. 4) is allowed; and
(2) Plaintiff’s Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint (Docket No. 16) is allowed, as
provided herein. Plaintiffs shall file the Amended Complaint forthwith.

/s/ Timothy S. Hillman
TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN
DISTRICT JUDGE

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