Mangual v. Worcester et al

Filing 89

District Judge Timothy S. Hillman: ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION entered granting in part and denying in part 71 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Castles, Martin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
__________________________________________
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v.
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CITY OF WORCESTER, MATTHEW EARLY, )
MICHAEL HANLON, and KELLEN SMITH, )
Defendants.
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HECTOR L. MANGUAL,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 15-40017-TSH

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
January 23, 2018
HILLMAN, D.J.

Background
Hector L. Mangual (“Mangual” or “Plaintiff”) has filed a federal civil rights claim
against the City of Worcester (“City”), and Detective Sgt. Matthew Early (“Det. Sgt. Early”),
Detective Michael Hanlon (“Det. Hanlon”) and Detective Kellen Smith (“Det. Smith”) of the
Worcester Police Department (the City, Det. Sgt. Early, and Dets. Hanlon and Smith
collectively referred to as “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violation of his
Constitutional due process rights, his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
and his right to be free from use of excessive force against him. Mangual has also filed
Massachusetts state law claims against the Defendants for violation of the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”), Mass.Gen.L. ch. 12, §§11-H-I, violation of the Massachusetts

Privacy Act, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 214, §1B, conspiracy, assault and battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, Mangual alleges that he was subjected to an
unlawful strip and body cavity search and excessive force was used against him in an
interrogation/holding room located at the Worcester Police Department, including officer(s)
kicking him, slamming his face and refusing to loosen his handcuffs when he complained they
were too tight.
This Order and Memorandum of Decision addresses Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgmnet (Docket No. 71). For the reasons set forth below, that motion is allowed,
in part and denied, in part.
Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is appropriate where, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 236 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)). “‘A “genuine” issue is one that could be resolved in favor of either party, and a
“material fact” is one that has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case.” Sensing v.
Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC, 575 F.3d 145, 152 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting CaleroCerezo v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004)).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and makes all reasonable inferences in favor
thereof. Sensing, 575 F.3d at 153. The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact within the record. Id., at 152. “‘Once the moving
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party has pointed to the absence of adequate evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case,
the nonmoving party must come forward with facts that show a genuine issue for trial.’” Id.
(citation to quoted case omitted). “‘[T]he nonmoving party “may not rest upon mere
allegations or denials of the [movant’s] pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to each issue upon which [s/he] would bear the
ultimate burden of proof at trial.” Id. (citation to quoted case omitted). The nonmoving party
cannot rely on “conclusory allegations” or “improbable inferences”. Id. (citation to quoted
case omitted). “‘The test is whether, as to each essential element, there is “sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” ’ ” Id.
(citation to quoted case omitted).
Facts
On October 24, 2011, Worcester Police Department (“WPD”) Vice Squad Detective
Dana Randall (“Det. Randall”) was told by a confidential, reliable informant (“CI”)
that Mangual was in possession of a large, black handgun, had boasted of committing a
number of armed robberies in the Main South area of Worcester, and was headed to the Main
South area pf the City with the intent to commit additional armed robberies and sell drugs.
The CI provided Det. Randall with a detailed description of Mangual, including the clothes he
was wearing and a distinct physical mark located on Mangual’s neck. The CI also told Det.
Randall that Mangual had a large amount of heroin on his person for sale, which was located
in his buttock’s area. As a result of Det. Randall receiving this information, he and five other
detectives from the WPD Vice Squad, including Det. Sgt. Early and Dets. Smith and Hanlon,

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went to the Main South area to look for Mangual. The detectives were all in plain clothes
wearing badges and/or clothing with the word “Police” displayed.
At approximately 3:45 p.m., Mangual was walking to go catch a bus home around the
area of Sycamore Street and Main Street, in the vicinity of a used car lot. He was walking
towards City Hall. Out of nowhere, he was rushed by a number of men who grabbed him and
handcuffed his hands behind his back. Based on the information they had that Mangual was
armed, Dets. Smith and Randall conducted a pat frisk. One of the items recovered was what
appeared to be a large frame semi-automatic handgun with “Smith and Wesson” printed on
the handle; the hammer of the pistol was in the “cocked back” position. It was later
determined that this “gun” was a replica and not a working firearm. Mangual’s pockets were
emptied and Det. Smith put all of his property into his baseball cap, including the “gun,” a
steak knife, $110.00, his wallet, and keys. Another police officer in a black vest patted
Mangual’s body all over and stated that Mangual was either “clear” or “clean.” Mangual was
Mirandized and asked if he had any additional drugs or weapons on his person. Det.Sgt. Early
advised him that he believed he had heroin on him and would allow him to retrieve the drugs
so there would not be the necessity to conduct a search. Mangual denied having any drugs
on his person.
Mangual was unclear as to why he had been stopped and did not cooperate with the
officers’ attempts to conduct a more thorough search of his person. The officers put him
inside a red SUV. Det. Sgt. Early and Mangual sat in the back seat and Dets. Hanlon and
Smith sat in the front. Mangual asked why he was not being taken in the transportation wagon
which had arrived at the scene. Det. Sgt. Early responded, “oh no, you’re getting strip
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searched.” When they arrived in at the Worcester Police Station garage, Mangual claims that
Det. Sgt. Early ordered his detectives to assure the cameras were off. Mangual was held
outside the vehicle for a few moments and then another officer came out and said, “they’re
good.” Mangual was then brought inside and put into a cell. Per WPD Policy and Procedure
720, strip searches are not conducted on camera; however, the video monitor is turned on and
the supervisor relays the actions being taken so that the audio portion of the camera system
records the search while the arrestee remains outside of the visible frame of the video camera.
Initially, Det. Sgt. Early stepped inside the cell with Mangual. Once Dets. Smith and Det.
Hanlon joined them, Det. Sgt. Early stepped out. He then stood in the cell doorway and
observed the subsequent events.
Det. Smith grabbed Mangual and flipped him over in the air and slammed him on his
face. Mangual was caught off guard, but he managed to break the fall with minimum impact
to his face. Det. Smith then put him down and jumped on his back, putting his full weight on
him. Mangual could not breathe— he tried to relax and felt his wrist being pressed, which
was painful. Mangual heard Det. Sgt. Early command him to comply and stop resisting.
Dets. Hanlon and Smith grabbed him and stood him up, slamming him flat against the wall.
Mangual fell, and collapsed to the floor. Mangual was kicked and stepped on. Det. Hanlon
then took his sneakers off while Det. Smith pinned him face down. Next, Mangual felt his
pants being yanked off his body; he felt the cold floor on his leg areas. Mangual could hear
Det. Sgt. Early saying, “Hector, spread your cheeks.” He then felt his underwear pulled off
him. While this was happening, Det. Smith was on top of him twisting his wrist. Mangual

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remembers asking Det. Sgt. Early to look at his wrist—he was in pain and thought was cut
around his wrist area.
Mangual asked to see a doctor. Det. Sgt. Early said that nobody was hurting him.
Mangual heard someone ask, “Who’s doing it?” Det. Smith was still on top of him when
Mangual feel fingers spreading his butt cheeks open. Mangual clenched his buttocks and
heard “relax, Hector, just relax”. Mangual, who felt violated, yelled “please don’t do this,
please don’t do this to me.” Det. Hanlon continued to press his buttocks wide apart. Mangual
was in pain in his buttocks area and at the same time, Det. Smith kept pressure on his back
and was twisting wrist. Mangual screamed in pain. He kept hearing Det. Sgt. Early say,
“Hector spread your cheeks, bend over, spread your cheeks”. Mangual then felt fingers
entering his anus cavity; he again yelled out in pain. Mangual felt cold, then a burning
sensation as he felt fingers inside his body. He heard Det. Sgt. Early saying, “game’s up.”
Mangual yelled and asked the officers stop violating him. Det. Smith was hitting him on his
back side.
A plastic bag was removed from Mangual’s rectum. Subsequently, it was determined
to contain five separately packaged gram bags of heroin. The plastic bag was placed into an
evidence bag and labelled “body cavity” by Officer Fred McGill, the evidence officer.
Mangual was then left alone on the floor. He pleaded to have his pants and other clothing
returned, but was denied. Dets. Smith and Hanlon both dressed him-- they would not uncuff
him and allow him to dress myself. Mangual was put him in another cell room for several
hours before he was taken out, uncuffed and booked. Mangual was never released on bail. He
was charged in Worcester Superior Court with: Carrying a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of
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Mass.Gen. L. ch. 269, §10(b); Possession With Intent to Distribute (Class A) Second or
Subsequent Offense, in violation of Mass.Gen. L. ch. 94C, § 32(b); Resisting Arrest; and
Disturbing the Peace, in violation of Mass. Gen. L. c. 272, § 53. As to the first three offenses,
Mangual was charged as a habitual offender. Mangual pled guilty to the following offenses:
carrying a dangerous weapon, possession of a Class A substance (heroin) with intent to
distribute, resisting arrest and disturbing the peace. The second/subsequent drug offense and
habitual offender charges were dismissed. During the pendency of the criminal case, Mangual
filed a motion to suppress all physical evidence, including the heroin, on the basis that the
WPD detectives conducted an unlawful search in violation of his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. It is unclear whether that motion was ever ruled on.
Discussion
The Defendants asserts that they are entitled to summary judgment on Mangual’s
Section 1983, MCRA, and state tort law claims for unlawful search at the Worcester Police
Department headquarters because these claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), and the doctrine of judicial estoppel. They further argue that
Mangual has failed to allege any congnizable claims arising from the search of his person and
his arrest at the initial scene and that he cannot establish the essential elements of a Section
1983 claim for supervisory/Monell liability against the City. In his opposition and at the
hearing, Mangual clarified that his claims arise out of the search conducted at the Worcester
Police Department headquarters-- he is not asserting any separate claims relating to his arrest
arrest and/or police conduct at the intitial scene, rather he inlcuded those facts and

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circumstances in his recitation of the factsr to give context to the later interactions at the
police station.1
Mangual’s Federal and State Civil Rights Claims and His State Law Claims Based on the
Alleged Unlawful Search
In order to establish a claim under Section 1983, Mangual must establish that a person
acting under the color of law denied him a right secured by the constitution or by federal
law.There is no question that the individual Defendants were acting under the color of law at
the time of the alleged illegal search and therefore, the issue before the Court is whether any
Defendant violated his constitutional rights. Mangaul alleges that the indivdual Defenadants
violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by conducting an illegal
body cavity searh of his person at the Worcester Police Departyment and by using excessive
force in connection with effectuating the search.
As for Mangual’s MCRA claims, he must prove that his exercise or enjoyment of
rights secured by the constitution or laws of either the United States or Massachusetts has
been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion.
See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12, § 11I. The MCRA is the state “counterpart” to Section 1983 and, in
general, is coextensive therewith. The primary difference is that to succeed on an MCRA
claim, a plaintiff must also show that the violation of rights occurred “by threats, intimidation
or coercion.” Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49, 52 (1989). “A
‘threat’ means the ‘intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of

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Mangual provided a very detailed and lengthy description of what he alleges occurred at the scene on
Main and Sycamore Streets where the officers initially confronted him. Since Mangual is not pursing any claims
relating to his arrest or any police conduct at the initial scene, I have opted to provide only a cursory summary of
those events.

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injury or harm.’ ” Goddard v. Kelley, 629 F.Supp.2d 115, 128 (D.Mass.2009)(citation to
quoted case omitted). “Intimidation” means putting a person in fear for the purpose of
compelling or deterring his or her conduct. Id. “Coercion” means application of physical or
moral force to another to constrain him to do against his will something he would not
otherwise do. Id. The direct violation of a constitutional right does not establish a MCRA
violation because “it is not an attempt to force someone to do something the person is not
lawfully required to do.” Columbus v. Biggio, 76 F.Supp.2d 43, 54 (D.Mass.1999).
Mangual’s Unlawful Search and Seizure Claims
Mangual claims that Det. Sgt. Early and Dets. Hanlon and Smith violated his Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure when
they conducted a search of his body cavity at the Worcester Police Department. The
Defendants assert that Mangual’s claims are barred by Heck, which provides that where a
plaintiff asserts a violation of Section 1983 “based upon alleged unlawful actions that would
‘necessarily imply’ that a prior conviction was invalid, the plaintiff must prove that the
conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid by an appropriate state tribunal or
called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a federal court.” The question
thus becomes whether a finding that the individual Defendants search of Mangual’s person
was unlawful would “necessarily imply” that his conviction for drug possession was invalid.
Little discussion is warranted with respect to this claim. Mangual pled guilty to possession of
heroin (a Class A substance) with intent to distribute; the heroin was discovered during the
strip search conducted at the Worcester Police Station. A finding that the search was unlawful
would invalidate Mangual’s conviction and therefore, is barred by Heck. Accordingly, the
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Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mangual’s Section 1983 unlawful search
claim.2
To the extent that Mangual has alleged state law claims alleging that the body cavity
search of his person was unlawful, I agree with those judge’s in this District that have held
that the reasoning of Heck “appl[ies] with equal weight to state-law claims. The favorabletermination requirement was intended to prevent collateral attacks on convictions ‘through the
vehicle of a civil suit, and was based on the ‘hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.’”. Cabot
v. Lewis, 241 F.Supp.3d 239, 257 (D.Mass. 2017); see also Aldrich v. City of Cambridge, Civ.
Act. No. 12-12273-RGS, 2012 WL 6622495 at *8 & n. 10 (D.Mass. Dec. 18, 2012).
Therefore, to the extent that prevailing on his state law claim would undermine the validity of
his conviction, I find that Mangual’s state law claims are barred. See Cabot, 241 F.2d at 239.
Accordingly, I find that Mangual’s MCRA unlawful search claim, his claim for violation of
the Massachusetts Privacy Act, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 214, §1B, and his conspiracy and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims (to the extent these latter two claims are based on the
alleged unlawful search) are also barred. Given that I find that Mangual’s unlawful search

2 As pointed out by Mangual, even if a search or seizure is unconstitutional, evidence discovered as a
result of that search may be used to support a conviction in state court if it is admissible based upon the
independent source, inevitable discovery or harmless error doctrine. In such cases, a civil rights claim asserting
that the search was unlawful would not necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction. See Heck, 512 U.S.at
487, 114 S.Ct. 2364 n.7. However, Mangual fails explain how doctrines such as inevitable discovery, harmless
error or the like would cure the Fourth Amendment violation alleged in this case. Accordingly, I find that this
claim is barred by Heck. See Fairbanks v. O’Hagan, 255 F.Supp.3d 239, 245 (D.Mass. 2017)(plaintiff claims
that unlawful search claim are not barred by Heck, but fails to address how alternative discovery doctrines would
cure alleged Fourth Amendment violation).

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claims are barred by Heck, it is not necessary for me to address Defendants’ assertion that the
claim is barred by judicial estoppel.
Mangual’s Federal and State Civil Rights Claims and His State Law Claims Based on the
Alleged Use Of Excessive Force
A plaintiff’s excessive force claims are also barred by Heck where the judgement in
his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convction. However, Heck would bar
such a claim only where the plainitff’s “excessive force claim and the conviction [are] so
interrelated factually, so as to bar the §1983 claim.” Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173. 180 (1st
Cir. 2006). Applying the law in this case, Mangual’s claims are arguably barred to the extent
extent he alleges that during the strip search, the officer(s) used excessive force when they
spread his “butt cheeks,” or probed his rectum with their fingers in the process of removing
the plastic baggie containing the drugs. However, his allegations that he was subjected to
excessive force when during the course of the search the officers kicked him, punched him,
body/face slammed him, jumped on and kneed him, and twisted his wris are not “so
interrelated factulally” such that previaling on his Sectioin 1983 claim would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction. Therefore, Mangual’s Section 1983 excessive force
claim is not barred by Heck.3 Likewise, his state law MCRA claim, his claims for excessive
force and assault and battery would not be barred by Heck, nor would his conpiracy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims (to the extent that they related to the
Defendants alleged use of excessive force).

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At the Final Pretrial Conference, the Court will give the parties the opportunity to argue their
positions regarding the scope of Mangual’s excessive force claim given the parameters set forth by the Court in
this discussion.

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Defendants also argue that Mangual’s claims for alleged use of excessive force are
barred by judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel “is a doctrine which ‘generally prevents a party
from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory
argument to prevail in another phase.’ Unlike the doctrine of issue preclusion, judicial
estoppel does not require that the issue have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding.”
Thore, 466 F.3d at 181 (citation to quoted case and internal citation omitted). The First Circuit
has held that admissions of facts during a prior guitly plea colloquy by a criminal defendant
do not per se binding on that individual in a subsequent civil rights action. Id., at 182. This
case is a prime example of why applying such a per se rule could result in the perpetration of
a grave injustice. Defendants have provided the Court with a copy of Mangual’s plea
colloquy. It is clear that only a bare-boned version of the facts was read into the record to
support Mangual’s guilty plea. Indeed, it is not even apparent from the factual recitation that
there was a search conducted at police headquaters. Instead, the factual recitation infers that
the search was conducted at the time of the intitial stop on Main and Sycamore Streets.
However, Mangual is not pursuing any claims related to anyting which happened prior to the
events which took place at the Worcester Police Department. Under these circumstances, I do
not find that Mangual’s “current position is directily inconsistent with facts admitted at his
pleay colloquy.” Id., at 185. Accordingly, I do not find that Mangual’s claims are barred by
the judicial estoppel doctrine. See Id., at 183 (courts are reluctant to find that individual
should be bound by recitation of facts in plea agreement because, among other reasons, guilty
pleas do not necessarily establish absolute historic facts).

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Finally, Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted, essentially, because
other than Mangual’s self-serving statements, there is no evidence to support his claims. They
also allege that Mangual fails to set forth any facts which would establish that he suffered any
damages and therefore, has failed to establish an essential element of his claims. I disagree
and find that taking the facts in a light most favorable to Mangual, which I am obligated to do
at the summary judgment stage, there are genunie issues of material fact which preclude a
finding of summary judgment.4

Conclusion
It is hereby Ordered that:

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 71) is allowed, in part and
denied, in part, as provided in this Order and Memorandum of Decision.

/s/ Timothy S. Hillman
TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN
DISTRICT JUDGE

4 Defendants are correct that Mangual’s Section 1983 unlawful search claim against the City under
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 486 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. (1978). is barred by Heck. However,
his Section 1983 excessive force claims are not so barred. Because the parties have agreed to bifurcate such
claims, the Court does not find that on this record, it would be beneficial to undertake an analysis of whether
Mangual has asserted sufficient facts to establish supervisory and Monell liability against the City based on his
Section 1983 excessive forces claims.

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