Burnham v. Evangelitis et al

Filing 39

District Judge Timothy S. Hillman: ORDER AND MEMORANDUM entered granting 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (Castles, Martin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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)
)
ARTHUR BURNHAM
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CIVIL ACTION
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Petitioner,
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NO. 4:17-40160-TSH
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v.
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)
SHERIFF LEWIS EVANGELIDIS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL MAURA HEALY )
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)
Respondents.
______________________________________ )

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Docket No. 9).
September 21, 2018
HILLMAN, D.J.

Petitioner, Arthur Burnham filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus pursuant to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docket No. 1).
The petition is verbose, disorganized, rambling, and at times incoherent. Petitioner challenges
his confinement at Worcester County Sheriff’s Office for a number of reasons including
objections about his right to counsel, motion practice in his state criminal proceedings, his own
civil litigation, and the venue of his trial. Respondent, Sheriff Lewis Evangelidis, moves to
dismiss on the grounds that Petitioner fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For
the reasons stated below, Respondent’s motion (Docket No. 9) is granted.
Standard of Review
A defendant may move to dismiss, based solely on the complaint, for the plaintiff's “failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). Although detailed factual allegations are not
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, the standard “requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. “The
relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is
asking the court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint.” Ocasio-Hernandez v. FortunoBurset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Langadinos v.
American Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 68 (1st Cir. 2000). It is a “context-specific task” to determine
“whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief,” one that “requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)
(internal citations omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). On the other hand, a court
may not disregard properly pled factual allegations, “even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Because Plaintiff appears pro se, we construe his pleadings more favorably than we would
those drafted by an attorney. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless,
Plaintiff's pro se status does not excuse him from complying with procedural and substantive law.
See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997).
Analysis

“Since the beginning of this country’s history Congress has, subject to few exceptions,
manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference from federal
courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Thus, “a federal court must abstain if (1)
there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding involving the federal plaintiff that (2) implicates
important state interests and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to
assert his claims.” Colonial Life & Accidental Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.
2009). Here, there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding in the Worcester Superior Court.
Additionally, the proceeding implicates important state interests as Petitioner has been charged
with numerous felonies including Secreting/Throwing/Launching/Placing Explosives in violation
of Mass. Gen. Laws c. 268, § 102A. Finally, Petitioner has adequate opportunity to raise his
federal claims in the state proceeding.
In addition, federal courts may only enjoin state criminal actions “under extraordinary
circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.” Younger, 401
U.S. at 45. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate this precondition for habeas relief. Petitioner
sites a variety of grievances regarding his state proceeding such as the disagreements with
appointed counsel, losing pretrial motions, and the venue of his trial. The Court in Younger,
however, noted that “the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single
criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered irreparable in the special legal sense
of that term.” 401 U.S. at 46. Instead, “the threat to the plaintiff’s federal protected rights must
be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.” Id.
Petitioner fails to demonstrate irreparable loss or that he is “threatened with any injury other than
that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.” Id. at 47.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has failed to plausibly demonstrate that he is
entitled to habeas relief. Therefore, Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 9) is granted.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Timothy S. Hillman
TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN
DISTRICT JUDGE