Burnham v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS et al

Filing 6

District Judge Timothy S. Hillman: ORDER entered. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE onYounger abstention grounds. No filing fee shall be assessed.(Castles, Martin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

ARTHUR A. BURNHAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 18-40001-TSH

ORDER
January 19, 2018
HILLMAN, D.J.
For the reasons stated below, the Court dismisses this action based on Younger
abstention.
I.

Background
Before the Court is the complaint of pro se litigant Arthur Burnham. Burnham, a pretrial

detainee, brings this action under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. He alleges that state officials at the Worcester Superior Court, where his criminal case is
proceeding, are retaliating against him for having filed various civil actions and opposing acts
that violate the ADA. He claims that the defendants “did subject [him] to irrational disability
discrimination, pervasive unequal treatment including systematic deprivation of fundimental
rights under the first, fourth, sixth and fourteenth amendments by systematically excluding [him]
of his fundimental right to be present at all critical states of his trial [sic].” Compl. at 1-2.
Burnham further asserts that he has been denied of the right to have a meaningful opportunity to
be heard on substantive issues and that the prosecution and his “unloyal” defense counsel “were
deliberately interfering with compulsory process to conceal vital medical records” of various

conditions from which the plaintiff suffers. Id. at 2. He characterizes the conduct of the
defendants as being “analogous to a 16th century star chamber proceeding[,] an ‘arbitrary arm of
royal power’ in the days of the Tudor and Stuart kings.” Id.
Burnham does not seek damages. See id. at 161. He asked that the state criminal
prosecution be enjoined and that he be allowed to argue his defense “in front of a federal neutral
party.” Id.
II.

Discussion
As Burnham knows from this Court’s earlier opinions in some of his other cases, “federal

courts have long recognized ‘the fundamental policy against federal interference with state
criminal proceedings.’” In re Justices of Superior Ct. Dep’t of Mass. Trial Ct., 218 F.3d 11, 16
(1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)). Congress has long
expressed its policy that “the state courts be allowed to conduct state proceedings free from
interference by the federal courts.” Id. at 16. This policy against “federal interference with state
judicial proceedings is premised on ‘a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of
the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.’” Id. (quoting Younger, 401 U.S.
at 44). “Except in the most extraordinary cases, a federal court must presume that state courts,
consistent with the imperatives of the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. Const. art. VI, are fully
competent to adjudicate federal constitutional and statutory claims properly presented by the
parties.” Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 988 F.2d 252, 262 (1st Cir.1993) (footnote omitted).

2

Under the principles of Younger abstention, “a federal court must abstain from hearing a
case if doing so would ‘needlessly inject’ the federal court into ongoing state proceedings.”
Coggeshall v. Mass. Bd. of Registration of Psychologists, 604 F.3d 658, 664 (1st Cir. 2010)
(quoting Brooks v. N.H. Supreme Ct., 80 F.3d 633, 637 (1st Cir. 1996)). Younger abstention is
even appropriate where litigants “claim violations of important federal rights,” In re Justices of
Superior Ct., 218 F.3d at 17, as long as the federal claims can be “raised and resolved
somewhere in the state process” Maymó-Meléndez v. Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir.
2004) (emphasis added).
Here, Younger abstention is appropriate. Adjudicating this action would not only
interfere with the criminal prosecution in state court, it would completely end the prosecution
were the Court to grant the relief Burnham seeks. The Court recognizes that Burnham appears to
have spent enormous effort not only carefully drafting this lengthy complaint but also acquiring
an understanding of the law to do so. The Court also acknowledges Burnham’s position that
Younger abstention does not apply because he has allegedly been prevented from having a
meaningful opportunity to present his arguments in state court. He also represents that his
attempts to receive relief from a Single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court have also been
successful.
Notwithstanding, the application of Younger abstention does not turn on a litigant’s
success in obtaining relief in the state court proceeding, only his ability to do so. Although
Burnham has been unsuccessful thus far in obtaining relief in the state court in the manner that
he desires, there is no indication that he is foreclosed from pursuing a direct appeal or
postconviction relief in the event of a conviction. See, e.g., Haff v. Firman, 646 F.3d Appx. 604,
606 (10th Cir. 2016) (application of Younger abstention appropriate even though highest state

3

court had rejected pretrial detainee’s motion for interlocutory relief; state court had not
foreclosed a direct appeal or postconviction relief).
III.

Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE on

Younger abstention grounds. No filing fee shall be assessed.
So Ordered.
/s/ Timothy S. Hillman___
TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN
DISTRICT JUDGE

4