Ricci v. Delta Air Lines

Filing 29

District Judge Margaret R. Guzman: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER on 26 Plaintiff's Motion for the Application of Massachusetts Law. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion for the application of Massachusetts law [ECF No. 26] is DENIED. The Court concludes that Connecticuts two-year statute of limitations applies to both Plaintiffs negligence and breach of contract claims and, therefore, both claims are time-barred. Accordingly, the case shall be DISMISSED. (SF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

MICHAEL RICCI,
Plaintiff,
v.
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

Case No. 4:24-CV-40006-MRG

Defendant.

GUZMAN, D.J.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR THE APPLICATION OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW [ECF No. 26]
I.

INTRODUCTION
This is a personal injury case. Plaintiff-passenger Michael Ricci alleges that Defendant-airline

Delta Air Lines, Inc. committed negligence and breach of contract when a beverage cart allegedly broke
free in-flight and severely injured Plaintiff’s knee during the first leg of an employer-funded flight from
Connecticut to Tennessee.
This matter is presently before the Court on Plaintiff’s somewhat unusual motion [ECF No. 26]
asking this Court to make a choice-of-law determination at an early stage of the case for this key reason:
if Massachusetts’ three-year statute of limitations for negligence actions 1 applies to Plaintiff’s claim(s),
the case was timely brought and may proceed. If, however, Connecticut’s two-year statute of limitations

1

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A provides that, “Except as otherwise provided, actions of tort, actions of
contract to recover for personal injuries, and actions of replevin, shall be commenced only within three
years next after the cause of action accrues.”
1

for negligence actions 2 applies to Plaintiff’s claim(s) 3, Plaintiff’s case is time-barred.
After ordering limited discovery on choice-of-law [ECF No. 23] and after a hearing [ECF No. 28]
on Plaintiff’s motion, this Court concludes that Connecticut’s two-year statute of limitations applies to
both Plaintiff’s negligence and breach of contract claims and, therefore, both claims are TIME-BARRED.
Accordingly, the case shall be DISMISSED.
II.

BACKGROUND
a. The Facts 4
i. Plaintiff and His Employer
Plaintiff is a Connecticut resident. [ECF No. 26-1 at 1]. In June 2019, he began working as a Vice

President of Project Management at a renewable energy firm, non-party Catalyze Holdings, LLC. [Id. at
2]. Catalyze’s corporate headquarters is in Texas, and the company maintained a regional office in
Massachusetts at the time of the alleged incident. [Id at 3]. Post-pandemic, Plaintiff worked remotely for
Catalyze from his home in Connecticut but was technically assigned to Catalyze’s Massachusetts location.
[Id.] 5 Plaintiff purchased multiple health insurance policies through Catalyze. [Id.]
ii. Plaintiff’s Employer-Funded Trip to Tennessee
In July 2021, Plaintiff told his supervisor that he needed to renew his renewable energy
certification and informed him that there was a qualifying continuing education class being held the next
2

In relevant part, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 provides that, “No action to recover damages for injury to
the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or
by malpractice . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained
or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered . . .”
3

Delta argues that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim actually sounds in negligence such that the
appropriate jurisdiction’s statute of limitations for negligence actions should apply to it as well as to the
negligence claim. As explained infra, the Court agrees.
4

The Court only recites the facts that are necessary to resolve the choice-of-law issue. The facts included
are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

5

In Plaintiff’s words, “[a]t the time of the incident underlying this claim, I worked remotely from home
but still out of the Marlborough, MA location.” [ECF No. 26-1 at 3].
Defendant has pointed out, and Plaintiff has not disputed, that Catalyze “closed its regional office in
Massachusetts at some point after Plaintiff’s travel and before suit was filed.” [ECF No. 27 at 5].
2

month in Tennessee. [Id.] Plaintiff’s supervisor agreed that it was in Catalyze’s best interest for Plaintiff
to attend the Tennessee class. [Id.] Catalyze paid for Plaintiff’s airline tickets and expenses associated
with the trip. [Id.] The round-trip Delta flights called for Plaintiff to travel from Connecticut to Tennessee
on August 9, 2021, with a layover in Georgia. The return flight called for Plaintiff to travel from
Tennessee to Connecticut on August 13, 2021, with a layover in Michigan. [Id.]
iii. Plaintiff’s Injury and Eventual Treatment / Surgery
As planned, Plaintiff boarded his Delta flight from Connecticut to Georgia on August 9, 2021. [Id
at 4]. Plaintiff fell asleep in an aisle seat. [Id.] About thirty to forty minutes after takeoff, a beverage cart
came free, rolled down the center aisle, and struck his right knee. [Id.] Plaintiff’s knee began to swell
immediately, and the Delta flight crew provided him with an ice pack. [Id.]
Once the plane landed in Georgia, Plaintiff boarded his connecting flight to Tennessee. [Id.] Once
in Tennessee, Plaintiff sought treatment for his knee from an urgent care facility. [Id.] He was then
diagnosed with bursitis. [Id.] Upon his eventual return to Connecticut, Plaintiff initially sought treatment
from his physician and then an orthopedic specialist at the University of Massachusetts Memorial Hospital
in Massachusetts. [Id.] Plaintiff then transferred medical providers and began receiving treatment and
physical therapy in Connecticut. [ECF No. 27 at 2 (citations omitted)]. Subsequently, Plaintiff underwent
a right knee excision prepatellar bursectomy, also in Connecticut. [Id. (citation omitted)].
b. Procedural History
Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1-1], which Delta removed to this Court from the Massachusetts
Superior Court on diversity grounds, asserts two causes of action: negligence (Count I) and breach of
contract (Count II). [ECF No. 1-1 at 5-6]. Delta filed its Answer [ECF No. 15] and the Court set the
matter down for a scheduling conference. During that initial conference, the Court determined that the
choice-of-law issue was possibly dispositive and that the parties should therefore engage in limited
discovery and resolve the matter with motion practice. [ECF No. 23]. At the next court appearance, the
Court set a briefing deadline and a hearing date. [ECF No. 24].
In turn, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for the application of Massachusetts law. [ECF No. 26].
In his motion, Plaintiff argued that his negligence claim (Count I) arises under Massachusetts law, such
3

that the Commonwealth’s applicable three-year statute of limitations for tort claims should apply. Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 260, §2A; [ECF No. 26 at 3]. Delta argued that properly understood, Ricci’s negligence
claim arises under Connecticut law, such that the applicable two-year state of limitations should apply.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584; [see ECF No. 27 at 1]. As stated supra, Count I was timely brought if the
Massachusetts statute of limitations applies but is time-barred if the Connecticut statute of limitations
applies. 6
With respect to Count II, Plaintiff’s position appears to be that Delta waived any argument that the
breach of contract claim arose under some law other than Massachusetts law by not advancing that
argument in its Answer. [See ECF No. 15 at 5–6]. 7 However, in its sole responsive pleading to Plaintiff’s
motion for the application of Massachusetts law, Delta directly briefed this issue and argued that this claim
arises under Connecticut law since the claim actually sounds in negligence. [ECF No. 27 at 8]. The Court
easily concludes that Delta did not waive its choice-of-law argument relative to Count II. Delta’s
argument was timely and appropriately raised in their response to Plaintiff’s motion, and, in turn, Plaintiff
was given the opportunity to respond to it during oral argument. [ECF No. 28]. 8 There was no waiver
of Delta’s argument regarding Count II.
6

This is because the alleged incident occurred on August 9, 2021 [ECF No. 1-1 at 4] and Plaintiff filed
this suit in Worcester Superior Court on December 1, 2023. [ECF No. 26 at 5].
7

In his motion, Plaintiff did not brief the issue of which jurisdiction’s law applies to its breach of contract
claim, but instead argues that:
Delta does not assert the same affirmative defense to Plaintiff’s contract claim. Instead,
Delta contends only that Plaintiff’s contract claim is “barred by the applicable contract of
carriage.” Plaintiff’s [breach of] contract claim therefore is not addressed herein, nor was
it the subject of this Court’s prior hearings concerning choice of law.
[ECF No. 26 at 3 n.1] (internal citation omitted).
8

In any event, there is no bright line rule requiring the Court to find that choice-of-law arguments waived
at this stage of the proceedings. See e.g., Shimizu Corp. v. Dow Roofing Sys., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 139260, at *28-29 (D. Mass. Sep. 27, 2013) (explaining that “while a court may find waiver for
failure to timely raise choice-of-law issues or when opposing parties agree to the source of the substantive
law, courts are not required to find such waiver” (emphasis in original)).
4

c. An Early-Stage Choice-of-Law Determination is Appropriate
The Court recognizes at the outset that early-stage choice-of-law determinations are not common
events in civil sessions of federal court. See e.g., Chinn v. GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89977, at *4 (D.
Mass. Dec. 7, 2007) (ruling at the motion to dismiss stage that, “[w]ithout a stipulation of the parties, the
court is unable to make a choice-of-law determination at this early stage of procedural skirmishing”); First
Union Nat’l Bank v. Banque Paribas, 135 F. Supp. 2d 443, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (reasoning at the motion
to dismiss stage that, “it is premature to make a definitive choice of law ruling both because it is not yet
clear that there is a conflict between New York and English law and because the litigation is at a
preliminary stage”). However, the Court’s research reveals that there is no rule against making such a
determination in these early days of the case. Moreover, the Court has determined that an early-stage
choice-of-law determination is particularly appropriate in this case for three reasons.
First, the choice-of-law issue is dispositive, at least with respect to the negligence claim (Count I),
meaning that it is highly efficient to resolve the issue now. Compare Lynx Sys. Developers, Inc. v. Zebra
Enter. Sols. Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37777, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 2016) (“[h]ow and in what
fashion each state’s laws apply is not determinative at this early stage of whether this case moves forward.
If necessary, choice of law analysis will be conducted at a later time.” (emphasis added)). Second, the
parties have conducted choice-of-law-related discovery and have fully briefed the issue. Compare Chinn,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89977 at *4 (“[w]ithout a more robust record, the court is not in a position to
determine whether New Jersey or Massachusetts has a more significant relationship to the case than does
Connecticut.” (emphasis added)). Third, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion; meaning that the
parties have been fully heard. For all three of these reasons, the Court finds that this is the unusual case
where an early-stage choice-of-law determination is warranted and appropriate. See e.g., Hickinbottom
v. Atrium Med. Corp., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146157 *10-11 (D. N.H. Aug. 29, 2019) (deciding at the
motion to dismiss stage that plaintiff “has not shown that the choice-of-law determination is premature,
and the court [therefore] employs the analysis.”).
d. Was There a Forum Selection Clause?
Although neither party briefed this issue, the Court inquired at the motion hearing as to whether
5

any applicable contract of carriage might have contained a forum selection or other related provision that
might bear on the choice-of-law issue. 9 Neither party was certain as to the answer to the Court’s question
and neither party submitted any supplemental pleadings on the issue. Accordingly, the Court presumes
for purposes of this opinion that the parties did not have a contractual agreement mandating which
jurisdiction’s statute of limitations should apply to Plaintiff’s claims.
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
a. Choice-of-Law Legal Framework
When this Court sits in diversity, it must apply the choice of law rules from its forum state: the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Holbrook v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 487 F. Supp. 3d 100, 105 (D. Mass. 2020)
(citation omitted). The precise conflicts-of-law issue before the Court today is one involving conflicting
statutes of limitations. Massachusetts courts apply the so-called “functional approach” when dealing with
this specific choice-of-law issue. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gourdeau Constr. Co., 419 Mass. 658,
660-63, 647 N.E.2d 42 (1995). In New England Telephone, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the
“functional approach” rule as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (hereafter,
“Restatement”), § 142 (2nd 1988), which provides, in part, that:
(2) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations permitting the claim unless:
(a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial interest of the forum; and
(b) the claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state having a
more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence.
419 Mass. at 659 n.1 (citing to § 142(2)).
9

The Court recognizes that even if Delta’s contract of carriage did contain a forum selection clause, it
might only have provided which jurisdiction’s substantive law controls and might not have provided for
which jurisdiction’s statute of limitations should apply. See e.g., Davidovich v. Shimha LLC, 2023
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9455, *7-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 2023) (unpublished) (explaining that “forum
selection clauses only deal with substantive law, not procedural law and the forum state generally
determines whether such law is procedural or substantive”) (citation omitted).

6

In conducting this analysis, this Court must recognize that the two above-listed criteria are
“necessarily related and should be evaluated ‘with some sensitivity’ to one another.” Nierman v. Hyatt
Corp., 441 Mass. 693, 696 (2004) (citations omitted). Relatedly, the focus is to be “on the timeliness of
the action, rather than the underlying claim.” Holbrook, 487 F. Supp. 3d at 105. Indeed, the SJC has also
reasoned that a Massachusetts court may apply the statute of limitations of another state if that state has
“the dominant interest in having its own limitations statute enforced.” See Nierman, 441 Mass. at 69698.
The New England Telephone Court called attention to several Comments to § 142 that are
particularly relevant here. 419 Mass. at 661. First, the court explained that when conducting the “more
significant relationship” analysis, the focus “should be on which State has the more significant relationship
to the occurrence and to the parties with respect to the issue of limitations,” citing to Comment “g” of the
Restatement, which provides in part that, “the forum should not entertain a claim when doing so would
not advance any local interest and would frustrate the policy of a state with a closer connection with the
case and whose statute of limitations would bar the claim.” Id. (citing § 142 comment g) (emphasis
added). The SJC also called attention to the “emerging trend” -- articulated in Comment “e” -- to bar a
claim if it is barred by “the state which, with respect to the issue of limitations is the state of most
significant relationship to the occurrence and to the parties under the principles stated in § 6 [of the
Restatement]” Id. (citing § 142 comment e) (emphasis in original). The § 6 factors 10 help to inform the

10

These include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in
the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
7

Court’s analysis of which jurisdiction has the more significant relationship to the parties and the
occurrence. Id. at 664, n. 6 (explaining that, “[i]t may be, as a practical matter, that the principles of §
6 have no important role to play in § 142(2) until a court Comes to consider which State has the more (or
most) significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence.”).
IV.

APPLICATION -- TIMELINESS OF THE COMPLAINT
a. The Negligence Claim (Count I)
i. More Significant Relationship Test
The Court begins by considering whether Plaintiff’s claim would be “barred under the statute of
limitations of a state having a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence.” § 142(2);
Nierman, 441 Mass. at 697 (beginning its choice-of-law, conflicting statute-of-limitations analysis with
the “more significant relationship” prong). After careful review, the Court concludes that the more
significant relationship test points strongly towards the use of the Connecticut limitations statute.
Rather than affirmatively arguing which jurisdiction has the “more significant relationship” to the
parties and the occurrence, Plaintiff argued in negative terms that “Connecticut does not have a more
significant relationship with the parties or the occurrence.” [See ECF No. 26 at 7–9]. Specifically,
Plaintiff averred that “Connecticut’s only relationship with the parties is that the Plaintiff resides in
Connecticut and flew out of Connecticut” and, with respect to the occurrence, argued that “we are
uncertain where the incident took place” [Id. at 8–9 (emphasis added)].

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Restatement, § 6(2).

8

In support of his argument that Connecticut does not have the more significant relationship with
the parties and the occurrence in this case, Plaintiff’s principally cited to Nierman, cited supra. 441 Mass.
693; [ECF No. 26 at 8–9]. The Court agrees that Nierman is highly instructive but concludes that its
teachings actually cut strongly in favor of a finding that Connecticut has the more significant relationship
to the parties and the occurrence in this case.
The plaintiffs in Nierman were a married couple from Massachusetts. 441 Mass. at 693-94. Mrs.
Nierman was injured at a hotel in Texas when a hotel employee accelerated a transport cart in which she
was seated. 441 Mass. at 693-94. The corporation that owned the hotel was incorporated in Delaware
and had its principal place of business in Illinois. Id. All the events constituting the alleged negligence
occurred in Texas. Id. Plaintiffs had made the hotel reservations through a Massachusetts travel agent.
Id. Plaintiffs’ claim would have been barred under the Texas two-year statute of limitations for negligence
actions, but timely under Massachusetts’ three-year statute. Id.
Rejecting the argument that the Massachusetts statute should apply, the SJC found that Texas had
the “dominant interest” in having its statute of limitations applied, id. at 698, and explained in part that,
Massachusetts has a general interest in having its residents compensated for personal
injuries suffered in another State. It cannot be said, however, that its interest in the
timeliness of such an action is more compelling than that of Texas. The Texas Legislature
has prescribed a two-year period within which the [plaintiff] could have commenced this
action. This time frame reflects its judgment as to the proper balance between the need of
its citizens to redress injuries and their right to be protected from protracted exposure to
liability.
Id. at 697–98.
Here, Connecticut has the “dominant interest” in having its statute of limitations applied. See id.
Four undisputed facts, when viewed through the prism of Nierman and other instructive pieces of case
law, point strongly towards this conclusion.

9

•

Undisputed Fact #1

Plaintiff is -- and was at the time of the alleged incident (i.e., August of 2021) -- a Connecticut
resident and citizen. In its considered judgment, the Connecticut legislature has decided that a two-year
statute of limitations for negligence claims strikes the proper balance between its citizens’ rights to seek
remedies for their injuries and defendants’ right to be protected from unreasonably prolonged exposure to
liability. Id. at 697–98; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584. Indeed, the Connecticut Appellate Court has
explained,
There are two principal reasons generally given for the enactment of a statute of repose:
(1) it reflects a policy of law, as declared by the legislature, that after a given length of time
a [defendant] should be sheltered from liability and furthers the public policy of allowing
people, after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a degree of certainty,
free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability . . . and (2) to
avoid the difficulty in proof and record keeping which suits involving older [claims]
impose.
Beebe v. Town of E. Haddam, 48 Conn. App. 60, 67 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although a Plaintiff’s state of residency is not a dispositive factor in this analysis, see e.g., Gordon
v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 229, 234 (D. Mass. 2017), it is a fact that
the Court may and does consider relevant here. Plaintiff did not need to cross state lines to follow this
lawsuit. Indeed, Plaintiff has not suggested that the substantive law of negligence is materially different
in Massachusetts such that there was a strategic reason for Plaintiff to file suit in the Commonwealth but
for the timeliness issue. Thus, the undisputed fact that Plaintiff is a resident and citizen of Connecticut
supports a finding that Connecticut has the more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrences
in this case.
•

Undisputed Fact #2

At the time of the alleged incident, Plaintiff worked remotely for Catalyze from his home in
Connecticut. A central theme of Plaintiff’s argument in favor of the application of Massachusetts law is

10

that the Delta flight on which he was allegedly injured was part of an employer-funded trip and that his
employer maintained a field office to which he was assigned in Massachusetts. [ECF No. 26 at 2].
However, Plaintiff overlooks the significance of the fact that since the pandemic, he has been a remote
Catalyze employee based in Connecticut. [ECF No. 26-1 at 3]. The Court gives very little weight to the
allegation that he was assigned to a Massachusetts field office, [see id. at 3], and is instead much more
interested in where he actually did his work for Catalyze, which was in Connecticut. Cf. Wallens v.
Milliman Fin. Risk Mgmt. LLC, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (rejecting at the motion to
dismiss stage a defendant-supervisor’s argument that a California federal district court did not have
personal jurisdiction over her where she had allegedly harassed a California-based remote employee
during virtual meetings).
Whether the Delta flight tickets were purchased from the Catalyze Massachusetts field office is
irrelevant to the analysis under Nierman. See 441 Mass. 693, 697 (“The fact that [plaintiffs’] travel
reservations were booked through Massachusetts travel agents carries no weight in our analysis,
because that contact has no apparent bearing on any issue in the case, let alone the limitations issue”)
(emphasis added)). Moreover, as noted supra, Catalyze closed its Massachusetts field office before
Plaintiff filed suit, [ECF No. 27 at 5], so whatever tenuous connection Plaintiff had with Massachusetts
via Catalyze is insignificant to the present legal analysis. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s status as a remote
worker for Catalyze supports a finding that Connecticut has the more significant relationship to the
parties and the occurrence in this case.
•

Undisputed Fact #3

Plaintiff sustained his alleged injury on a Delta flight that departed from a Connecticut
airport. Likely because it was a convenient option near his home (and home office), Plaintiff’s trip
commenced at Bradley International Airport in Hartford, Connecticut. [ECF No. 26-1 at 3]. Although

11

Delta is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Georgia, [ECF No. 1-1 at 3], it is
undisputed that just prior to Plaintiff’s alleged injury, Plaintiff, the Delta flight crew, the aircraft (and thus
the equipment on board) were all last on terra firma in Connecticut.
Plaintiff suggested that the jurisdiction over which the plane was flying at the time of the alleged
incident -- perhaps New York -- should have some bearing on the analysis. [ECF No. 26 at 8, n. 3 (“It
should be noted that the average Delta flight pattern from Connecticut to Georgia flies over New York
approximately 30 minutes into the flight. New York also has a three-year statute of limitations for personal
injury claims. N.Y. C.P.L.R Law § 214.”) The Court will not credit conjecture about where the aircraft
may have been while Plaintiff was asleep. Moreover, the Court finds that a separate section of the
Restatement, namely, § 145 (2nd 1988) (hereafter, “§ 145”), contains a Comment which, while not directly
applicable to the statute of limitations conflict issue, 11 provides some instructive guidance.
Specifically, Comment e to § 145(2) provides that:
When there is a relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and when the injury
was caused by an act done in the course of the relationship, the place where the relationship
is centered is another contact to be considered. So when the plaintiff is injured while
traveling on a train or while riding as a guest passenger in an automobile, the state where
his relationship to the railroad or to the driver of the automobile is centered may be the
state of the applicable law… A possible example is where the plaintiff in state X purchases
a train ticket from the defendant to travel from one city in X to another city in X, but is
injured while the train is passing for a short distance through state Y. Here X local law,
rather than the local law of Y, may be held to govern the rights and liabilities of the
parties.
§ 145, Comment e (emphasis added).
This train ride example is particularly instructive for two reasons. First, the Restatement
calls for the application of the law from the state where the train originated. Second and more

11

As a general matter, § 145 provides guidance on how to determine which jurisdiction’s substantive law
applies. See McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 227 N.J. 569, 589 (2017) (explaining that “this Court
[has] formally adopted the Second Restatement's most-significant-relationship test in sections 146, 145,
and 6 for deciding the choice of substantive law in tort cases involving more than one state” (emphasis in
original)).
12

fundamentally, the Restatement does not call for the application of the law from the state where
the injury occurs when the train was only passing through that state for a short distance. Thus,
there is no reasonable argument that the Court should apply New York (or some other state whose
airspace the Delta flight might have been flying through) when the injury occurred. Accordingly,
the fact that all the parties and equipment involved in the alleged incident had departed from a
Connecticut airport supports a finding that Connecticut has the more significant relationship to the
parties and the occurrence in this case.
•

Undisputed Fact #4

Plaintiff received significant treatment, physical therapy, and surgery related to his alleged
injury in Connecticut. The fourth and final undisputed fact that supports a finding that Connecticut has
the more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence in this case is that Plaintiff received
such significant medical treatment for his alleged injury in his home state of Connecticut. See e.g., Straub
v. Bos. Sci. Corp. (In re Bos. Sci. Corp.), MDL No. 2326, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31770, at *7 (S.D. W.
Va. Mar. 16, 2015) (“Here, the implantation surgery that allegedly resulted in [plaintiff’s] injuries took
place in Arizona. [Plaintiff] is an Arizona resident, and she received medical care for her alleged injuries
in Arizona. No other state has a more significant relationship. Thus, I apply Arizona’s substantive law—
including Arizona’s statutes of limitations—to this case”) (emphasis added)). This factor is particularly
important here since it is conceivable that doctors and other medical staff that treated Plaintiff could be
called to testify, in addition to his medical records being at issue. It too weighs in favor of finding that
Connecticut has the more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence in this case.
For the reasons stated supra, the Court concludes that Connecticut has the most significant
relationship to the parties and the occurrence relative to the negligence claim. See Nierman, 441 Mass. at
698.

13

i.

Substantial Interest Test

The next question for the Court under § 142(2) is whether Plaintiff’s negligence claim “would
advance a substantial forum interest” of Massachusetts and “would not seriously impinge upon the
interests of other states.” Id. at 696. Hinging his argument on the tenuous hook between Massachusetts
and his employment with Massachusetts (discussed supra), Plaintiff argued that his claim would advance
a substantial forum interest of Massachusetts since (a) Plaintiff has “just expectations of compensation for
an injury that occurred while he was on a work-related trip – for both workers’ compensation and thirdparty purposes” and because (b) health insurers that provided the majority of Plaintiff’s care “enjoy certain
statutory protections for repayment of their care.” [ECF No. 26 at 5–6]. Both arguments are unavailing.
Defendant has pointed out and Plaintiff has not disputed that he did not file a workers’
compensation claim in Massachusetts (at least not before filing this suit). [ECF No. 27 at 4–5]. Moreover,
even if he had, that would not have been enough, standing on its own, to show that Massachusetts has a
substantial interest that overcomes Connecticut’s more significant interest in the claim.

See e.g.,

Mukarker v. City of Phila., 238 F. Supp. 3d 174, 178 (D. Mass. 2017) (observing that, in two unpublished
opinions, “the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that the financial implications of workers’ compensation
and other Massachusetts laws did not give the forum state a substantial interest to overcome a more
significant relationship to the claim”) (citations omitted)).

Just as the SJC stated in Nierman,

Massachusetts “has a general interest in having its residents 12 compensated for personal injuries suffered
in another State” but it “cannot be said, however, that its interest in the timeliness of such an action is
more compelling” than that of Connecticut.

See Nierman, 441 Mass. at 697 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Connecticut “has the dominant interest in having its own limitations
statute enforced” on the negligence claim. See id. at 698.

12

Since Plaintiff is not a Massachusetts resident, his general reliance on Nierman is even more tenuous.
14

In sum, after carefully applying the § 142(2) test, the Court finds that Connecticut’s two-year
statute of limitations for negligence claims, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584, applies to Count I and the claim is
therefore TIME-BARRED.
b. The Breach of Contact Claim (Count II)
i. Legal Standard – Substance Over Form
The threshold question on this claim is whether it actually sounds in negligence. See e.g., Lee v.
Ohio Educ. Ass'n, 951 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “[t]he label which a plaintiff applies
to [her] pleading does not determine the nature of the cause of action”) (emphasis added and citations
omitted); Brooks v. District of Columbia, 375 F. Supp. 3d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2019) (explaining that, “the
Court looks through the form of the complaint to the substance of the allegations to determine the true
nature of Plaintiffs’ claims”) (emphasis added and citation omitted). If it does, in fact, sound in
negligence, then the Court must apply the Connecticut two-year statute of limitations for negligence
actions to this claim for the same reasons stated supra. As noted, Defendant contends that Count II does
sound in negligence, [ECF No. 27 at 8], while Plaintiff took no position on that precise question,
suggesting instead that Delta had somehow waived argument on the issue. [ECF No. 26 at 3, n. 1].
ii. Application
After careful review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim does indeed sound in
negligence. [See ECF No. 1-1 at 6]. Although Count II is captioned as “Breach of Contract,” Plaintiff
neither cited nor attached any purported contract to the Complaint. [See ECF No. 1-1]. Although Plaintiff
was prompted by the Complaint’s Civil Cover Sheet to provide a “[d]etailed [d]escription” of any contract
claims, this section was left blank. [ECF No. 1-3 at 1]. The closest thing to a purported contract that
Plaintiff presented to the Court was a copy of some “Terms and Conditions” contained in the Delta flight
receipt that Plaintiff attached to his pleading in support of the instant motion. [ECF No. 26-1 at 21-22].

15

However, it is not for the Court to read these terms and conditions and determine if they plausibly support
a breach of contract claim. See Delgado Echevarria v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 856 F.3d 119, 139 (1st
Cir. 2017) (“Judges are not expected to be mindreaders. Consequently, a litigant has an obligation to spell
out its arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold its peace.")
Looking through the form of the Complaint to its substance, see Brooks, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 45,
provides further evidence that Count II is part and parcel of Plaintiff’s negligence claim. Notably, Plaintiff
alleges that when he purchased his Delta airline ticket, the “agreement between the parties” “implied that
the Plaintiff would arrive safely to his destination while on board the aircraft.” [ECF No. 1-1 at 6]
(emphasis added). The Plaintiff further alleges that Delta “through its own negligence, failed to transport
the Plaintiff to his destination free from injury.” [Id] (emphasis added).

By its own terms, then, this

claim, in substance, sounds in tort law, specifically negligence.
Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court has explicitly stated that simply naming a cause of action
a breach of contract does not magically produce a breach of contract claim. See Gazo v. City of Stamford,
255 Conn. 245, 262 (2001) (rejecting the argument that a breach of contract claim lay against a defendant
and explaining that “[p]ut another way, the liability of [the defendant in question] to the plaintiff, if any,
is based on principles of tort law, and the plaintiff may not convert that liability into one sounding in
contract merely by talismanically invoking contract language in his complaint”) (emphasis added)).
Here, Plaintiff did not direct the Court to any particular contract-at-issue. Just for example, to prove a
breach of contract under Massachusetts law, Plaintiff would have to show that “that there was a valid
contract, that the defendant breached its duties under the contractual agreement, and that the breach caused
the plaintiff damage.” See Gibson Found., Inc. v. Norris, 88 F.4th 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2023).
After careful scrutiny, the Court finds that Count II sounds in negligence. Therefore, the Court
applies Connecticut’s two-year statute of limitations to Count II for the same reasons stated supra. See

16

Pinette v. McLaughlin, 96 Conn. App. 769, 774 n.3 (2006) (observing first, “[o]f course, a contract to
undertake certain obligations may give rise to a duty that forms the basis for a claim of negligence. That
is to be distinguished, however, from a cause of action based on breach of contract” and then finding that
a claim alleged as breach of contract actually sounded in negligence and was thus subject to the statute of
limitations for negligence actions.) Accordingly, the Court applies Connecticut’s two-year statute of
limitations for negligence claims, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584, to Count II and the claim is therefore TIMEBARRED.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for the application of Massachusetts law [ECF No.
26] is DENIED. As noted supra, the Court applies the Connecticut two-year statute of limitations for
negligence actions to both Counts I and II and finds that this case is therefore fully time-barred. While
Defendant has not filed a motion to dismiss, “[s]ua sponte dismissal can be appropriate where the
complaint ‘contain[s] incurable defects that are evident from the face of the complaint.’” González-Ortíz
v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. (PRASA), No. 23-1509 (RAM), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197256, at *7
(D.P.R. Oct. 28, 2024) (quoting Martinez-Rivera v. Sanchez Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2007)). The
First Circuit has held that a district court acts “within its authority to dismiss sua sponte Plaintiff’s []
claims as time-barred” when “the statute of limitations defects were evident on the face of the Complaint,
and any amendment to the factual basis would not alter that determination.” González-Ortíz, No. 23-1509
(RAM), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197256, at *7-8. Such is the case here, and, accordingly, this case is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 10, 2025

/s/ Margaret R. Guzman
MARGARET R. GUZMAN
United States District Judge

17