Tincher v. Lafler

Filing 10

OPINION and ORDER denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denying a Certificate of Appealability. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (DWor)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

RANDY TINCHER,
Petitioner,
v.

Case Number 08-14078
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

BLAINE C. LAFLER,
Respondent.
________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Petitioner Randy Tincher, presently confined at Carson City Correctional Facility in Carson
City, Michigan, has filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus through counsel. Petitioner was
convicted in Wayne County Circuit Court of armed robbery and assault with intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of fourteen
to thirty years in prison for the armed robbery and six and a half to fifteen years for the assault.
Petitioner alleges that he is incarcerated in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Respondent Blaine C. Lafler responds that
Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted or without merit. For the reasons explained below,
the petition will be denied.
I.
Petitioner was charged with armed robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. The
charges arose from allegations that Petitioner and his co-defendant, Christopher Mullins, assaulted
Eric Cunningham at a trailer park in Canton Township, Michigan on March 5, 2002, and stole some
of Cunningham’s personal property. As explained by the Michigan Court of Appeals, Cunningham

met Tincher at a gathering hosted by Natisha Baker. Cunningham sold Tincher some
cocaine for $20. Tincher and Mullins later came to Cunningham’s trailer and asked
for more cocaine. Cunningham claimed that Tincher and Mullins then beat him, and
Tincher stabbed him with a steak knife. Afterward, defendants bound Cunningham’s
hands with an appliance cord, and stole clothes, jewelry, knives, a Play Station, and
$400 in cash.
People v. Tincher, No. 246891, 2004 WL 1460687 (Mich. Ct. App. June 29, 2004) (unpublished).
On November 5, 2002, a Wayne County Circuit Court jury found Petitioner guilty of armed
robbery, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529, and assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than
murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84, as a lesser-included offense of assault with intent to commit
murder. Petitioner was sentenced to fourteen to thirty years in prison for the armed robbery and to
a concurrent term of six and one-half to twenty years for the assault.
A.
In an appeal of right, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor
to read Natisha Baker’s testimony from the preliminary examination into the record and by denying
defense counsel’s request to endorse and call Jimmy Baugh as a defense witness. These issues
constitute habeas claims three and four. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected both claims and
affirmed Petitioner’s convictions in an unpublished per curiam opinion. See Tincher, 2004 WL
1460687. On January 31, 2005, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because it was
not persuaded to review the issues. See People v. Tincher, 692 N.W.2d 386 (Mich. 2004).
On or about January 16, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in which
he claimed that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to present a defense, make objections,
move for a continuance, and call witnesses. Petitioner also alleged that the prosecutor committed
misconduct, that trial counsel should have objected to the scoring of the sentencing guidelines, and
that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the claims about trial counsel on direct review.
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These issues constitute habeas claims one, two, and five. The trial court adjudicated Petitioner’s
claims on the merits and denied Petitioner’s motion because Petitioner had failed to establish actual
prejudice and entitlement to relief under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D)(3). Petitioner raised the
same issues on appeal from the trial court’s decision. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave
to appeal for failure to establish entitlement to relief under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D), see
People v. Tincher, No. 277654 (Mich. Ct. App. July 17, 2007), and on May 29, 2008, the Michigan
Supreme Court denied leave to appeal for the same reason. See People v. Tincher, 748 N.W.2d 880
(Mich. 2008). Reconsideration was denied on September 9, 2008. See People v. Tincher, 755
N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 2008).
B.
Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition through counsel on September 23, 2008. His
claims are: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a defense, make objections, move
for a continuance, and call witnesses, and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this
issue in the direct appeal; (2) the prosecutor repeatedly mischaracterized the evidence in his closing
argument; (3) the trial court erred by granting the prosecutor’s request to read Natisha Baker’s
testimony from the preliminary examination; (4) the trial court erred by denying defense counsel’s
request to endorse and call Jimmy Baugh as a defense witness; and (5) trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the scoring of the Michigan sentencing guidelines, and appellate counsel was
ineffective for not raising this issue on appeal. Respondent argues in an answer to the habeas
petition that Petitioner’s first, second and fifth claims are procedurally defaulted because Petitioner
raised those claims for the first time in his motion for relief from judgment and the State’s appellate

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courts rejected the claims on the basis of Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D).1
Although the State’s appellate courts did deny leave to appeal in brief orders citing Michigan
Court Rule 6.508(D), “[b]rief orders citing Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D) are not explained orders
invoking a procedural bar.” Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 2010). “Rule 6.508(D)
has both a procedural and a substantive component,” and “citations to a defendant’s failure to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief can refer to a defendant’s failure to meet that burden
on the merits.” Id. at 291. The Court therefore must look to the last reasoned opinion to determine
the basis for the state courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s claim. Id. When that opinion appears to rest

1

Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D) reads in relevant part:

(D) Entitlement to Relief. The defendant has the burden of establishing
entitlement to the relief requested. The court may not grant relief to the defendant
if the motion
(1) seeks relief from a judgment of conviction and sentence that still is subject to
challenge on appeal pursuant to subchapter 7.200 or subchapter 7.300;
(2) alleges grounds for relief which were decided against the defendant in a prior
appeal or proceeding under this subchapter, unless the defendant establishes that a
retroactive change in the law has undermined the prior decision;
(3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have
been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under
this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates
(a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior motion,
and
(b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief
....
The court may waive the “good cause” requirement of subrule (D)(3)(a) if it
concludes that there is a significant possibility that the defendant is innocent of
the crime.
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primarily on federal law, courts must presume that no procedural default has been invoked by a
subsequent unexplained order that leaves the judgment in place. Id. at 291-92.
The trial court issued a ten-page, reasoned opinion on habeas claims one, two, and five and
relied on Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in its discussion of Petitioner’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims. Because the trial court’s opinion rests primarily on federal law, this
Court presumes that the State’s appellate courts left the trial court’s reasoned opinion in place and
did not invoke a procedural default. Habeas claims one, two, and five therefore are not procedurally
defaulted. Even if they were procedurally defaulted, procedural default is not a jurisdictional
limitation, Pudelski v. Wilson, 576 F.3d 595, 606 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 130 S.
Ct. 3274 (2010), and it is more efficient to address the merits of Petitioner’s claims than to determine
whether they are procedurally defaulted. The Court will proceed to address Petitioner’s claims on
their merits, using the following standard of review.
II.
Habeas petitioners are entitled to the writ of habeas corpus only if the state court’s
adjudication of their claims on the merits
(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceedings.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the

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state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An “unreasonable
application” occurs when “a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme
Court] to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court
decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application
must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. And “where factual findings are challenged, the habeas
petitioner has the burden of rebutting, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption that the
state court’s factual findings are correct.” Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 914 (6th Cir. 2010)).
“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long
as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington
v. Richter, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). To obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a
federal court, “a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented
in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87.
III.
A.
Petitioner asserts that the trial prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly
mischaracterizing the testimony of Natisha Baker and Kevin McCallister during his closing
argument.

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1.
Prosecutors may not use improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction,
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), but “[c]laims of prosecutorial misconduct are
reviewed deferentially on habeas review.” Millender v. Adams, 376 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 512 (6th Cir. 2003)). To prevail on his claim, Petitioner
must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s conduct violated a specific constitutional right or was so
fundamentally unfair as to deprive him of due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,
642-45 (1974). “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209, 219 (1982).
Courts in this Circuit employ a two-prong test for determining whether prosecutorial
misconduct rendered a trial fundamentally unfair. Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 515 (6th Cir.
2006) (citing United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, a court must ask
whether the prosecutor’s conduct or remarks were improper. Id. at 516. Second, if the conduct or
remarks were improper, a reviewing court must consider whether the improper acts were so flagrant
as to warrant reversal. Id. Four factors are used when making this determination: “(1) whether the
evidence against the defendant was strong[;] (2) whether the conduct of the prosecution tended to
mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (3) whether the conduct or remarks were isolated or
extensive; and (4) whether the remarks were made deliberately or accidentally.” Id.
Prosecutors may not misrepresent the facts or assert facts that were never admitted in
evidence. Washington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689, 700 (6th Cir. 2000). They may, however, “argue
the record . . . and forcefully assert reasonable inferences from the evidence.” Bates v. Bell, 402

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F.3d 635, 646 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court cannot reverse a conviction unless the prosecutor’s
remarks were “so flagrant as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Gillard v. Mitchell,
445 F.3d 883, 897 (6th Cir. 2006).
2.
Petitioner contends that the prosecutor improperly stated that prosecution witness Natisha
Baker overheard Petitioner planning to rob Eric Cunningham. According to Petitioner, Ms. Baker
merely testified that Petitioner planned to beat the victim, not beat and rob him.
Ms. Baker’s testimony reads as follows:
Q

[by the prosecutor] Did you hear a conversation between [Petitioner] and [codefendant] Chris [Mullins]?

A

[by Ms. Baker] Yes. Bits and pieces. What I heard was Randy said, you know, let’s
go over there, and then I heard Chris say, you know, they mumbled something and
then Chris said, let’s not go over there, dude, let’s not go over there. I don’t feel
right about this. Let’s not go over there.

Q

Did they say what they were going over there to do?

A

All that was said on the part was that Randy was just going to beat
him up.

Q

Okay. Was he going to take anything from him?

A

All that was said on the part was that Randy was just going to beat
him up.

Q

Okay. Was he going to take anything from him?

A

God, that was so long ago. He just said it wasn’t right that, you
know, he wanted his, you know, what he deserved, you know.

Q

What was he talking about?

A

The coke.

Q

Okay. And you indicated that he was going to go over there and beat
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him up for that?
A

Yes.

(Tr. Oct. 31, 2002, at 119-20.)
In his closing argument, the prosecutor correctly stated that Ms. Baker had said the
defendants intended to go in Cunningham’s trailer and beat him up. (Tr. Nov. 4, 2002, at 23.) The
prosecutor then stated that Ms. Baker had said that Petitioner’s plan was to beat up Eric Cunningham
and take the stuff:
Take what I deserve, money and cocaine, she tells you he’s talking about. At
first Mr. Mullins is, I don’t feel good about this. I don’t feel good about this. Why
is that? He planned on robbing him, planned on beating him up and robbing him.
Once he gets to that trailer they’re all in agreement.
(Id. at 26.) Stating that the defendants planned to beat and rob Cunningham was a reasonable
inference from Ms. Baker’s testimony that Petitioner “wanted his [cocaine]” and “what he
deserved.”

Even if the prosecutor’s remarks amounted to a mischaracterization of Ms. Baker’s

testimony, the defendants’ actual conduct, as described by Eric Cunningham, indicated that they
intended to do more than just beat Cunningham. Cunningham testified that Petitioner went into his
room and started “trashing stuff” and that Mullins told Cunningham to give him his Play Station and
necklace. Both defendants asked where Cunningham’s dope and money were, and, in addition to
the Play Station and necklace, they took his clothing, a sword, a knife, and money. (Tr. Oct. 29,
2002, at 177-84.) Thus, the prosecutor’s comments regarding the defendants’ intent could not have
misled the jurors.
The evidence against Petitioner was strong, and the prosecutor’s comments were not “so
egregious as to render the trial fundamentally unfair,” Angel v. Overberg, 682 F.2d 605, 608 (6th
Cir. 1982), particularly under the “‘stringent standards applicable on habeas review.’” Durr v.
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Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 441 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 539 (6th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1652 (2008). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief
on the basis of the prosecutor’s remarks about Natisha Baker’s testimony.
3.
Petitioner claims that the prosecutor also mischaracterized the testimony of Eric
Cunningham’s neighbor, Kevin McCallister. According to Petitioner, McCallister testified that he
saw two men near Cunningham’s trailer on the night of the crime and the men had their hands at
their sides, whereas, the prosecutor claimed that McCallister had said the two men were holding
something.
McCallister did testify on cross-examination by the co-defendant’s attorney that the two men
had their hands at their sides. (Tr. Oct. 30, 2002, at 112.) He previously testified on direct
examination that the men could have been carrying something and that he did not remember telling
the police whether the men were carrying anything. (Id. at 110.)
McCallister did not testify that he told the police the men were carrying something. The
prosecutor therefore mischaracterized McCallister’s testimony during closing arguments when he
said that McCallister had told the police he saw the men carrying something, but he could not
determine what it was. (Tr. Nov. 4, 2002, at 69-70.)
Defense counsel, however, objected to the prosecutor’s remark, and the trial court stated that
the jury would have to determine what was said. (Id. at 69.) The trial court also instructed the jury
that the lawyers’ statement and arguments were not evidence, but were meant to help the jurors
understand the evidence and each side’s legal theories. (Id. at 87.) A trial court can generally
correct improprieties in a prosecutor’s closing argument “by instructing the jury that closing

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arguments are not evidence.” United States v. Crosgrove, 637 F.3d 646, 664 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing
United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 406 (6th Cir. 2001)). Thus, the prosecutor’s improper
remark does not warrant reversal of Petitioner’s convictions.
B.
Petitioner alleges next that the trial court erred by granting the prosecutor’s request to read
Natisha Baker’s testimony from the preliminary examination into the record.

The factual

background for this claim was explained by the Michigan Court of Appeals as follows:
The prosecutor endorsed Baker as a witness for defendants’ trial. On the
second day of trial, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Baker, who was in the
twenty-fourth week of a high-risk pregnancy, had just been taken to the hospital.
The prosecutor asked the court to declare Baker unavailable, and allow him to admit
Baker’s preliminary examination testimony pursuant to MRE 804(b)(1), redacted to
exclude hearsay statements. The court responded that it would not declare Baker
unavailable until the prosecutor provided medical documentation that she was unable
to testify in court. On the third day of trial, the prosecutor supplied a letter from
Baker’s treating physician, Dr. Bryant, who was not one of the physicians who
attended to her in the emergency room. Dr. Bryant indicated that he had ordered bed
rest, and that it would pose a “terrible risk” to Baker’s unborn child if she testified.
Baker was instructed to rest on her side as much as possible and go to Dr. Bryant’s
office for a follow-up examination. The prosecutor acknowledged that Dr. Bryant
had not examined Baker during her emergency. Over Tincher’s objections, the trial
court ruled that Baker was not available as a witness, and allowed the prosecutor to
introduce her preliminary examination testimony.
Tincher, 2004 WL 1460687, at *1.
Petitioner claims that the prosecutor failed to show due diligence in seeking to present Baker
and failed to meet the standard for use of prior recorded testimony under state law, including Mich.
Comp. Laws § 768.26, Michigan Rules of Evidence 804(a)(5) and 804(b)(1), and People v. Dye, 427
N.W.2d 501 (Mich. 1988). Petitioner further alleges that the use of Ms. Baker’s prior testimony
deprived him of his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded on review of Petitioner’s claim that the
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trial court did not err in finding that the prosecutor made a satisfactory showing that Baker was
unable to testify due to her condition and that Petitioner’s right of confrontation was not violated.
1.
The alleged violations of state law are not a basis for habeas relief because federal habeas
courts are “limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S.
37, 41 (1984) (“A federal court may not issue the writ [of habeas corpus] on the basis of a perceived
error of state law.”); Hall v. Vasbinder, 563 F.3d 222, 239 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that, “[t]o the
extent that any testimony and comments violated Michigan’s rules of evidence, such errors are not
cognizable on federal habeas review”). The only question is whether Petitioner’s right of
confrontation was violated.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987).
The Clause “guarantees the right of a criminal defendant ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.’ The right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine witnesses.” Id. (citing Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 406-07 (1965)). Ordinarily, testimonial hearsay evidence may not be
introduced against a defendant in a criminal trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the person. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 68 (2004). “Testimonial evidence” includes prior testimony at a preliminary examination. Id.

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2.
Natisha Baker was unavailable at Petitioner’s trial due to problems associated with her
pregnancy. Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to show that Ms. Baker’s condition would
not improve or stabilize. Ms. Baker’s doctor, however, implied in his letter to the trial court that Ms.
Baker would remain unavailable to testify. He ordered bed rest, and he stated that testifying would
pose a “terrible risk” to Baker’s unborn child. In the words of the Michigan Court of Appeals,
“[t]here was no reasonable basis for inferring, as Tincher suggests, that Baker’s problems would
have resolved within a few days.” Tincher, 2004 WL 1460687, at *2. The trial court therefore
appropriately credited the doctor’s written opinion that Ms. Baker’s pregnancy rendered her unable
to testify. Cf. United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that it was
appropriate for the trial court to credit a physician’s written opinion that a witness who was
twenty-eight weeks pregnant would be unable to undergo the stress of testimony). “There is nothing
wrong with [a trial court’s] relying on a physician’s statement when assessing availability,” for a
pregnancy can pose “special risks for a mother and her unborn child that may be exacerbated by the
stress of trial.” Id.
Respondent has demonstrated that Ms. Baker was unavailable to testify, and, because
Petitioner’s former attorney had an opportunity to cross-examine Baker at the preliminary
examination, the Confrontation Clause was not violated. Notably, Petitioner does not contend that
his motive for cross examining Baker at the preliminary hearing was different from his motive at
trial. The state court’s finding that Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were not
violated did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme
Court precedent.

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C.
Petitioner alleges that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to (a) call witnesses and
present a defense to the armed robbery charge, (b) object to the prosecutor’s mischaracterization of
Natisha Baker’s and Kevin McCallister’s testimony, and (c) move for a continuance when Ms.
Baker had problems with her pregnancy and could not appear in court. Petitioner contends that trial
counsel’s omissions prejudiced him and that his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to
present a claim about trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal.
1.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must
demonstrate “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish deficient performance, a
defendant must show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential.” Id. at 689.
To demonstrate that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense, a defendant must show
“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694. “This does not require a showing that counsel’s actions
‘more likely than not altered the outcome,’ ” but “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be
substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 792 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
“The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two
apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Id. at 788 (internal and end citations omitted).

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2.
Petitioner alleges that his trial attorney failed to present a defense to the armed robbery
charge and neglected to produce his friends as witnesses. According to Petitioner, his friends would
have testified that the items supposedly stolen from Eric Cunningham actually belonged to
Petitioner. This information, Petitioner contends, would have disproved the robbery charge and
discredited Cunningham’s testimony.
Although defense counsel did not put any witnesses on the stand, he did present a defense
to the charges. He maintained that Eric Cunningham had not been a credible witness and that
Cunningham was involved in drugs and was beaten by his suppliers because he cheated them out
of money. Defense counsel also argued to the jury that the shoes, coat, and necklace allegedly taken
from Eric Cunningham belonged to Petitioner. (Tr. Nov. 4, 2002, at 53-57.)
Petitioner has submitted affidavits from friends whom he claims defense counsel should have
called at trial, but not all of the friends mention the coat, shoes, and necklace that supposedly
belonged to Petitioner. And the affidavits that do mention these items do not refer to the other items
that were taken from Eric Cunningham, namely, a knife, sword, Play Station, and money. As the
trial court recognized, even if trial counsel had called the affiants as witnesses, they probably would
not have been able to account for these additional items. The Court therefore finds that defense
counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Petitioner’s friends as witnesses.
3.
Petitioner alleges next that his trial attorney should have objected to the prosecutor’s
mischaracterization of Natisha Baker’s and Kevin McCallister’s testimony. Counsel did object to
the prosecutor’s comments about McCallister’s testimony (Tr. Nov. 4, 2002, at 69), and the

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prosecutor’s remark about Natisha Baker’s testimony was a reasonable inference from the evidence.
Even if the remark about Ms. Baker’s testimony was improper, it did not amount to flagrant
misconduct. See supra section III.A.2.
Petitioner’s underlying claims about the prosecutor’s closing arguments lack merit.
Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the remarks. Hoffner v.
Bradshaw, 622 F.3d 487, 509 (6th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-9276 (U.S. Feb. 24,
2011).
4.
Petitioner claims that trial counsel should have moved for a continuance when Ms. Baker
had problems with her pregnancy and could not appear in court. Counsel was not required to move
for a continuance because defense counsel made an adequate objection to the use of Ms. Baker’s
prior testimony and it is unlikely that the trial court would have adjourned the trial.
Defense counsel asked the trial court on the second day of trial to hold the proceedings in
abeyance until the prosecution could obtain further information about Ms. Baker’s condition. (Tr.
Oct. 30, 2002, at 166-67.) The trial court conditionally granted the prosecution’s request to use Ms.
Baker’s testimony from the preliminary examination, but asked for a future update on Ms. Baker’s
condition. (Id. at 170-72.) Defense counsel responded to this ruling by arguing that it would be
legally incorrect to permit Ms. Baker not to testify absent medical documentation, and that, if Baker
did not testify, her prior testimony should not be read into the record. Defense counsel also asked
for permission to make an offer of proof that Ms. Baker had testified the way she did at the
preliminary examination because Eric Cunningham had threatened to harm her and her daughter if

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she did not testify in his favor. (Id. at 176-80.)2 The trial court asked for medical documentation
regarding Ms. Baker’s condition and agreed to wait another day before making a ruling on the issue.
(Id. at 182-83, 230-33.)
On the following day, defense counsel objected to an additional continuance, stating that the
matter had been prolonged long enough. Defense counsel argued that the prosecution should not
be permitted to use the preliminary examination transcription if the prosecution could not produce
documentation regarding Ms. Baker’s condition. (Tr. Oct. 31, 2002, at 6-7, 95-96.) The prosecution
ultimately produced medical documentation, and the trial court concluded that Ms. Baker was not
available to testify.
It is clear from the record that defense counsel made a tactical decision to oppose the use of
Ms. Baker’s prior testimony rather than seek an additional continuance. Furthermore, the trial court
gave no indication that it was inclined to adjourn the trial indefinitely, and the use of Ms. Baker’s
prior testimony did not violate Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Defense counsel
was not ineffective for failing to request an indefinite adjournment.
5.
Petitioner asserts that his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the above
issues about trial counsel on direct review. Petitioner was not entitled to compel his appointed
attorney to raise all nonfrivolous claims on appeal if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment,
elected not to raise the claims. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). And because his “claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel lacks merit, his appellate counsel’s failure to raise that claim
on direct appeal cannot be deemed constitutionally deficient performance.” Willis v. Smith, 351 F.3d

2

The defendants were Ms. Baker’s cousins.
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741, 746 (6th Cir. 2003).
D.
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to endorse and call Jimmy
Baugh as a defense witness. Petitioner claims that the trial court’s ruling violated his constitutional
rights to compulsory process and to present witnesses in his own defense.
The Michigan Court of Appeals explained the factual background for this claim as follows:
Defendants did not present any witnesses. On the third day of trial,
defendants’ attorneys informed the trial court that they had discovered a new
witness, and moved to add him to their witness lists. The witness, Jimmy Baugh,
was an inmate in the Wayne County lockup and a defendant in an unrelated case.
Defendants had met Baugh in the “bull pen” while being transported from the jail to
their respective courtrooms. They learned that Baugh had a conversation with
Cunningham, who was also in the jail, awaiting trial for a charge of reckless
discharge of a firearm. Defendants contended that Cunningham told Baugh things
that contradicted Cunningham’s trial testimony.
The trial court allowed defendants to make an offer of proof as to Baugh’s
testimony. Baugh testified that he had complained to Cunningham that his
accomplices were testifying against him, and Cunningham replied that the same
thing was happening to him. Cunningham then told Baugh that he had been selling
drugs with some other men when their supplier demanded they return the drugs or
pay for them. Cunningham did not have enough money, so he was beaten. The other
men were later caught with drugs, and they were now trying to implicate
Cunningham. Cunningham did not say anything about being robbed. Cunningham
showed Baugh a scar on his hand. Baugh believed that Cunningham was a defendant
in a drug case, and he did not know until the morning he talked to defendants that
Cunningham was the complainant in an assault case.
The trial court found Baugh’s testimony irrelevant because it described an
incident in which Cunningham was assaulted over a drug deal involving two other
persons, and not the instant case. It denied defendants’ request to add him to their
witness list.
Tincher, 2004 WL 1460687, at *1-2.
The Michigan Court of Appeals determined that Baugh’s proposed testimony was irrelevant
to the defendants’ theory that someone other than the defendants injured the victim. The Court of
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Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying late endorsement of
Baugh.
1.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused in a criminal
prosecution with “the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”
U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right “is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Johnson v. Bell, 525 F.3d 466, 480 n.13 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
18-19 (1967)).
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance,
if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the
defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may
decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the
prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the
right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental
element of due process of law.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19.
“Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own
defense. Indeed, this right is an essential attribute of the adversary system itself.” Taylor v. Illinois,
484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, “[a] defendant’s right to present relevant
evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions. A defendant’s interest in
presenting such evidence may thus bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal
trial process.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (footnote, citations, and
quotations marks omitted).
While the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under
rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that
they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges
to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such
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as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. . . . [T]he
Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is repetitive . . . , only
marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion
of the issues.
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326-27 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
2.
Petitioner alleges that Baugh’s testimony was crucial to the defense theory that Eric
Cunningham was assaulted after a drug deal went sour. Petitioner maintains that the primary error
in the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was the court’s conclusion that Baugh’s testimony concerned
an incident unrelated to the case being tried. However, as the Michigan Court of Appeals
recognized,
[t]he primary feature of Baugh’s testimony was Cunningham’s complaint that his
accomplices in a drug delivery offense were trying to implicate Cunningham. There
was no indication that Tincher or Mullins ever sold drugs with Cunningham, or that
they tried to implicate Cunningham in any criminal activity. Although defendants
argued that Baugh’s testimony would reveal that Cunningham was falsely accusing
Tincher and Mullins, Baugh never said anything about Cunningham making false
accusations. On the contrary, Baugh did not even know that Cunningham was the
complainant in an assault case.
Tincher, 2004 WL 1460687, at *4.
The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling that the
defendants could not present Baugh as a witness. This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals,
because Baugh’s testimony could have confused the jurors and misled them.
Petitioner’s right to present a defense was not violated by the trial court’s decision to exclude
only marginally relevant evidence that posed an undue risk of prejudice or confusion of the issues.
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326-27. Similarly, Petitioner’s right to compulsory process was not violated,

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because the trial court did not arbitrarily deny Petitioner “the right to put on the stand a witness
. . . whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense.” Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. at 23.
E.
Petitioner’s fifth and final claim alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the scoring of a prior record variable of the Michigan sentencing guidelines. Petitioner also
contends that his appellate attorney was ineffective for not challenging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
on this issue.
The sentencing factor in question is prior record variable (PRV) 1, which measures prior
high-severity felony convictions. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 777.51. Petitioner apparently was
scored twenty-five points for receiving and concealing property under $300 in Kentucky. Petitioner
contends that his Kentucky conviction should have been scored as a misdemeanor because, at
approximately the time when the offense was committed, legislators changed the dollar amount that
distinguished misdemeanors from felonies and the threshold amount for a felony was raised from
$100 to $1,000.
Petitioner has not provided any details about the date of his Kentucky offense or the effective
date of the legislature change in the law that distinguishes misdemeanors from felonies. Thus, this
aspect of Petitioner’s claim fails.
Petitioner also alleges that the Kentucky crime was a low-severity felony for which he should
have been scored five points under PRV 2 (prior low-severity felony convictions) instead of twentyfive points for a high-severity felony under PRV 1. Petitioner asserts that, if PRV 1 had been
properly scored at zero and PRV 2 were scored at five points, the recommended sentencing range

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would be 108 to 225 months, not 126 to 210 months, as calculated by the probation department.
Trial counsel’s failure to object to the allegedly incorrect PRV 1 does not mean that
Petitioner necessarily suffered prejudice. Spencer v. Booker, 254 F. App’x 520, 525 (6th Cir. 2007).
To show prejudice, Petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney’s alleged
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “Where
ineffective assistance at sentencing is asserted, prejudice is established if the movant demonstrates
that his sentence was increased by the deficient performance of his attorney.” Spencer, 254 F.
App’x at 525 (citing Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 200 (2001)).
The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a minimum sentence of fourteen years for the armed
robbery. This sentence fell within the recommended sentencing guidelines range of 126 to 210
months or ten and a half to seventeen and a half years. The sentence also fell within the sentencing
guidelines range that Petitioner claims should have been used (108 to 225 months or nine to eighteen
years, nine months). Thus, even if the trial court had calculated Petitioner’s sentencing guidelines
at nine to eighteen years, nine months, the court could have imposed the same sentence. And
because there is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court would have imposed a lesser
sentence had PRV 1 been scored zero, there is no merit to Petitioner’s claim that he was prejudiced
by his trial and appellate attorneys’ purported ineffectiveness. Spencer, 254 F. App’x at 526.
IV.
The state courts’ adjudications of Petitioner’s claims did not result in decisions that were
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, or
an unreasonable determination of the facts.

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Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus [dkt. #1] is
DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED because reasonable
jurists would not debate the Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s claims nor conclude that the claims
deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000).
s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge
Dated: June 14, 2011

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on June 14, 2011.
s/Tracy A. Jacobs
TRACY A. JACOBS

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