Williams v. Barnhart

Filing 24

ORDER denying 20 Motion to Compel; denying 21 Motion for Evidentiary Hearing. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (SGam)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

CHESTER WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
Case Number 09-12667
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

v.
RAYMOND BOOKER,
Respondent.
________________________________________/

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTIONS
FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND DISCOVERY
Petitioner Chester Williams has filed a pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The habeas petition challenges Petitioner’s Wayne County convictions for
second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of, or attempt to commit,
a felony. Petitioner was sentenced to two years in prison for the felony firearm conviction, and a
consecutive term of twenty-five to forty years for the murder conviction. He alleges in his habeas
petition that: (1) he was deprived of a fair trial by the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the
lesser-included offense of manslaughter; (2) the trial court improperly suppressed evidence of the
victim’s prior acts of violence; (3) trial and appellate counsel were ineffective; (4) the trial court
improperly submitted the charge of first-degree murder to the jury, and the evidence was insufficient
to sustain his conviction for second-degree murder; and (5) the police failed to preserve critical
impeachment evidence. Currently pending before the Court are Petitioner’s motions for an
evidentiary hearing and for limited discovery.

I
The third habeas claim alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when
the trial court re-instructed the jury in Petitioner’s and his attorney’s absence. Petitioner further
alleges that his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. He seeks
an evidentiary hearing on the issue of his attorneys’ ineffectiveness.
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
govern this case, and
AEDPA restricts the availability of federal evidentiary hearings. See Davis v. Lafler,
658 F.3d 525, 539 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Martin, J., concurring in part). For a
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding, sections
2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) of AEDPA apply, and the district court is limited to the record
that was before the state court at the time. See [Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, __,
131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011)]; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Keeling v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 673 F.3d 452, 464 (6th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed,
No. 11-10290 (U.S. May 10, 2012). If the state court did not adjudicate Petitioner’s claims on the
merits, the question is whether he failed to develop the factual basis for his claim in state court. See
id. (explaining 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)).1

1

Section 2254(e)(2) reads:

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless
the applicant shows that-(A) the claim relies on-(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of due
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It appears that no state court adjudicated the merits of Petitioner’s claim about trial and
appellate counsel, and Petitioner claims that he is not at fault for failing to develop the factual basis
for his claim in state court. “In cases where an applicant for federal habeas relief is not barred from
obtaining an evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the decision to grant such a hearing rests
in the discretion of the district court.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 468 (2007).
In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider
whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual
allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief . . . .
[I]f the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes
habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Id. at 474.
Although no state court adjudicated Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim on the merits, the trial
court’s successor adjudicated the related allegation that there was an improper ex parte
communication between the trial court and the jury. The successor judge stated in an order denying
Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment that the trial court merely provided the jury with written
copies of jury instructions previously agreed to. When a court merely reiterates instructions
previously given and approved by counsel, a defendant is not deprived of his right to be present or
his right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. Phillips v. Bradshaw, 607 F.3d 199, 224
(6th Cir. 2010); Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 218 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court therefore finds it
unnecessary to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether Petitioner’s attorneys were ineffective for

diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error,
no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of
the underlying offense.
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failing to object at trial or on appeal to the trial court’s re-instruction.
II
The fifth habeas claim alleges that the police failed to preserve critical impeachment
evidence. The evidence in question is the deceased victim’s tee-shirt. In his motion for discovery,
Petitioner seeks the Wayne County Medical Examiner’s photograph of the shirt. He contends that
the it would show that the shooting was close-range and that he acted in self defense.
Habeas petitioners are not entitled to discovery as a matter of course. Bracy v. Gramley, 520
U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Although a judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct
discovery, “the scope and extent of such discovery is a matter confided to the discretion of the
District Court.” Id. at 909. It is an abuse of discretion not to permit discovery when specific factual
allegations, if fully developed, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Id. at 908-09.
Petitioner alleges that the prosecution failed to preserve potentially useful evidence, but to
prevail on this claim, Petitioner must demonstrate that the police acted in bad faith. Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). He “must show: (1) that the government acted in bad faith in
failing to preserve the evidence; (2) that the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before
its destruction; and (3) that the nature of the evidence was such that the defendant would be unable
to obtain comparable evidence by other means.” Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir.
2002) (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, and United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 218 (6th Cir.
1996)).
Petitioner alleges that a photograph of the tee-shirt has exculpatory value and that he has
been unable to obtain the evidence by other means. But a photograph of the missing shirt would not
help Petitioner establish that the police acted in bad faith by destroying the evidence. Therefore,

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Petitioner would not be entitled to habeas relief on the basis of his fifth claim even if he acquired
the photograph and was able to show that the shooting was close range.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing, ECF No.
21, is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for limited discovery, ECF No. 20, is
DENIED.
Dated: October 10, 2012

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney of record herein by electronic means and upon
Chester Williams #134688, Ryan Correctional Facility, 17600 Ryan
Road, Detroit, MI 48212 by first class U.S. mail on October 10, 2012.
s/Tracy A. Jacobs
TRACY A. JACOBS

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