Dorchen / Martin Associates, Inc. v. The Brook of Cheyboygan, Inc. et al

Filing 31

ORDER denying 25 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder. (JBro)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
DORCHEN/MARTIN ASSOC., INC.,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO: 11-10561

vs.

DISTRICT JUDGE THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
MAGISTRATE JUDGE CHARLES E. BINDER

THE BROOK OF CHEBOYGAN,
and PRACTICAL ENGINEERS, INC.,
Defendants.
/

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
(Doc. 25)
This order is entered under the authority given to this Magistrate Judge in an
Order of Reference issued by District Judge Ludington pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A).

I.

Introduction
This is a copyright case involving the architectural design of assisted living facilities. Pending

is Defendants’ motion for a protective order. The parties do not dispute that some form of protective
order is appropriate, but Defendants assert that any such order should provide that certain documents
should not only be designated “confidential” but “confidential–attorney’s eyes only.” After review of

the pleadings, I conclude that, pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(1), the motion is ready for
decision without oral argument.
II.

Analysis and Conclusions
The standards governing the decision of this motion are well stated by Magistrate Judge

Majzoub in Consolidated Rail Corp. v Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co., No. 09-CV-10179, 2010

WL 2331039, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 10, 2010)(citations omitted):
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that for good cause shown, a party may
seek an order that limits the scope and dissemination of discoverable information. The
Court has broad discretion to fashion an appropriate protective order.
A party seeking a protective order must describe the alleged harm “with a particular and specific
demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Nemir v.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 381 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2004). In the business context, such a showing
requires “specific demonstrations of fact, supported where possible by affidavits and concrete
examples...” Deford v. Schmid Prod. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 653 (D. Md.1987), accord Tinman v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 176 F. Supp. 2d 743, 745-46 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The requested
protective order, “confidential–attorney’s eyes only,” is “the most restrictive possible protective order,
confining dissemination of discovery materials to plaintiff’s attorneys and expert witnesses only” and
its overuse makes it “difficult, and perhaps impossible for an attorney to counsel a client to
compromise or even abandon a case on the basis of information kept secret from the client.” Arvco
Container Corp. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 1:08-cv-548, 2009 WL 311125 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 9,
2009)(denying motion for attorney eyes’ only protective order where defendant failed to establish
pricing structure was proprietary and where record showed only that defendant did not trust plaintiff
and would be uncomfortable if plaintiff’s business executives had access to the material).
In the instant case, Defendants “submit [that] good cause exists” but they make no specific
allegations, let alone demonstrations of fact, indicating why good cause exists to impose the most
restrictive order regarding the requested information. (Doc. 25 at 4.) After review of the motion, the
response and the accompanying briefs and exhibits, I am unable to find the requisite showing of “good
cause” necessary to justify the designation of documents covered by the proposed protective order to
be restricted as “confidential–attorney’s eyes only.” The motion will therefore be denied.

III.

Order
For the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Protective

Order (Doc. 25) is DENIED. The parties may enter a Protective Order consistent with that shown in
Exhibit A to the Motion (Doc. 25), excising all reference to the term “CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY’S EYES ONLY.”
Review of this order is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), FED. R. CIV. P. 72, and E.D. Mich.
LR 72.1(d).

s/

Dated: May 29, 2012

 Charles E Binder
`

CHARLES E. BINDER
United States Magistrate Judge

CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically filed this date, and electronically served on
Frederick Butters, Robert Brandenburg, Robert Seibert and Robert Tuttle.
Date: May 29, 2012

By
s/Jean L. Broucek
Case Manager to Magistrate Judge Binder