Richards v. Smith et al
Filing
9
OPINION and ORDER Dismissing Plaintiff's 1 Civil Rights Complaint and Concluding that an Appeal Cannot be Taken in Good Faith. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (BSoc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
KYLE RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case Number: 11-cv-10929
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
ERIC SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
AND CONCLUDING THAT AN APPEAL CANNOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
Plaintiff Kyle B. Richards (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the Macomb County Jail
in Mount Clemens, Michigan, filed this pro se civil rights complaint on March 9, 2011, challenging
his arrest for a bank robbery on January 7, 2011, in Macomb County. Plaintiff submitted a six-page,
hand-written complaint in which he claims that he has “denied such allegations and plead[ed] not
guilty.” (Compl. at 2.) He names the following as defendants: (1) Macomb County Prosecuting
Attorney Eric Smith (“Prosecutor Smith”), (2) Criminal Defense Attorney Steve Kaplan (“Attorney
Kaplan”), and (3) Macomb County Judge Edward Servitto (“Judge Servitto”) (collectively,
“Defendants”).
According to Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendants have conspired against him. He alleges that
Attorney Kaplan, along with Prosecutor Smith, harassed him and used “excessive threats” to get him
to plead guilty. (Compl. at 4.) He also claims that Judge Servitto told him that if he did not plead
guilty, then he would receive “the harshest punishment.” (Compl. at 6.) It is unclear to the Court
the specific relief that Plaintiff is requesting.
For the reasons provided hereafter, the Court will dismiss the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
Court also concludes that an appeal cannot be taken in good faith.
I
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)
(“PLRA”), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service
on a defendant if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Similarly, the Court is required to
dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees which it
finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
relief from a defendant who is immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous
if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31
(1992).
To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant is a person
who acted under color of state or federal law, and (2) the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff
of a federal right, privilege, or immunity. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978);
Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996). A pro se civil rights complaint is to be
construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d
359, 361 (6th Cir. 1988). Despite the liberal pleading standard accorded pro se plaintiffs the Court
finds that, in this case, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal.
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II
A
Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal for several reasons. First, the portion of
Plaintiff’s complaint challenging his state-court criminal proceedings must be dismissed. A claim
may be brought under § 1983 by a state prisoner to challenge a condition of his imprisonment, see
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973), but not the validity of his confinement. See Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). This holds true regardless of the relief sought by
Plaintiff. Id. at 487-89.
Heck and other Supreme Court cases, when taken together
indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)–no
matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the
prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)–if
success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement
or its duration.”
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). If Plaintiff were to prevail on the claims contained
in his complaint, the validity of his continued confinement would be called into question. Such
claims are barred by Heck and must be dismissed.
B
Second, the Court finds that Defendant Judge Edward Servitto is entitled to absolute
immunity in this case to the extent Plaintiff is requesting monetary damages. Judges and judicial
employees are entitled to absolute judicial immunity on claims for damages. See Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (finding that a judge performing judicial functions is absolutely immune
from suit seeking monetary damages even if acting erroneously, corruptly or in excess of
jurisdiction); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 221 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9);
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see also Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti, 458 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446-47 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (noting that
judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has described the immunity from
suit enjoyed by judges as follows:
“[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions
for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are
alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” This immunity applies to
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover for alleged deprivation of civil
rights. The Supreme Court explained: “If judges were personally liable for erroneous
decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious,
would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to
provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it
would manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication. . . . Most
judicial mistakes or wrongs are open to correction through ordinary mechanisms of
review, which are largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably associated with
exposing judges to personal liability.”
Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s challenge to the proceedings involve the performance of judicial duties by Judge
Servitto. Accordingly, Judge Servitto is absolutely immune from suit for such conduct and the claim
against him must be dismissed.
C
Third, Plaintiff’s action against Prosecutor Smith also must be dismissed because prosecutors
are immune from suit for actions taken during the prosecution of a plaintiff.
“Absolute prosecutorial immunity, like absolute judicial immunity, is a common law
principle that shields a prosecutor from § 1983 liability.” Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 946 (6th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). A prosecutor has absolute
immunity for all acts “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” such
as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31. The
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Sixth Circuit has held:
Those acts that occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the
state, e.g., acts taken to prepare for the initiation of judicial proceedings or to prepare
for trial, are protected by absolute immunity. By contrast, a prosecutor who
“performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police
officer” such as “searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him
probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested” is entitled only at most to
qualified immunity.
Cooper, 203 F.3d at 947 (internal citations omitted). As with judicial immunity, the motives of the
prosecutor are irrelevant for purposes of immunity. Eldridge v. Gibson, 332 F.3d 1019, 1021 (6th
Cir. 2003).
In the instant case, Prosecutor Smith’s decision to prosecute Plaintiff, his advocacy in court,
his communication with witnesses, and his decisions regarding the disposition of the case are all in
the course of his role as advocate for which he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Therefore, the claims against Prosecutor Smith must be dismissed.
D
Finally, Plaintiff’s suit against Attorney Kaplan also must be dismissed because it fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Attorneys performing a
lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a criminal defendant do not “act under color of state law”
and are therefore not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
317-18 (1981). Even though the defective performance of a criminal defense attorney may cause
the legal process to deprive an accused criminal defendant of his liberty in an unconstitutional
manner, the lawyer who may be responsible for the unconstitutional action does not act under the
color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 329 n.6
(1983); see also Dunning v. Yuetter, 12 F. App’x 282, 284 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that criminal
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defense attorneys did not act under color of state law for purpose of § 1983). The Court will
therefore dismiss the claims against Attorney Kaplan.
III
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may granted
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s pro se civil rights complaint.
Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE except to the extent that his claims
fall under the rubric of Heck, which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE until his criminal
convictions have been invalidated. When a prisoner’s civil-rights claims are barred by the Heck v.
Humphrey doctrine, the appropriate course for a federal district court is to dismiss the claims for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), rather than to
dismiss the complaint with prejudice as being frivolous, because the former course of action is not
an adjudication on the merits and would allow the prisoner to reassert his claims if his convictions
or sentences are later invalidated. See Murphy v. Martin, 343 F. Supp. 2d 603, 609 (E.D. Mich.
2004).
Additionally, the Court concludes that an appeal from this order would be frivolous and
cannot be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997).
s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge
Dated: May 16, 2011
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney of record herein by electronic means and upon Kyle
Richards, #340573, at Macomb County Jail, P.O. Box 2308. Mt.
Clemens, Mi 48043 by first class U.S. mail on May 16, 2011.
s/Tracy A. Jacobs
TRACY A. JACOBS
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