Richardson v. Smith
Filing
10
ORDER denying 8 Application for Appointment of Counsel and 7 Petition for Release on Recognizance filed by Donald Richardson. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (SGam)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
DONALD RICHARDSON,
Petitioner,
v.
Case Number 11-13632
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
WILLIE SMITH,
Respondent.
________________________________________/
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTIONS FOR RELEASE
ON RECOGNIZANCE AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Petitioner Donald Richardson is a state prisoner presently confined at Boyer Road
Correctional Facility in Carson City, Michigan. He has filed a pro se application for the writ of
habeas corpus. Petitioner was convicted in Wayne County Circuit Court of assault with intent to
do great bodily harm less than murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of, or
attempt to commit, a felony. He is serving a sentence of three to ten years for the assault conviction
and two years for the felony firearm conviction.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. People v. Richardson,
No. 291617 (Mich. Ct. App. July 27, 2010). The Michigan Supreme Court likewise affirmed.
People v. Richardson, 803 N.W.2d 302 (Mich. 2011). Petitioner now seeks habeas relief in this
Court, alleging that the trial court was biased and failed to deliver a proper self defense instruction
to the jury. Currently pending before the Court are Petitioner’s motion for release from custody on
his own recognizance or surety (ECF No. 7) and Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel
(ECF No. 7) . For the following reasons, both motions will be denied.
I.
Petitioner alleges in his motion for release on recognizance that district courts have inherent
power to admit habeas petitioners on bail pending decisions in their cases. “One of the inherent
powers of the judiciary with regard to proceedings before it,” Petitioner correctly observes, “ has
been the admission of a prisoner to bail where, in the exercise of his discretion, the judge deems it
advisable.” Jago v. U.S. Dist. Court, N. Dist. of Ohio, 570 F.2d 618, 622 (6th Cir. 1978). This
power, however, is exercised only in very unusual cases. “Since a habeas petitioner is appealing a
presumptively valid state conviction, both principles of comity and common sense dictate that it will
indeed be the very unusual case where a habeas petitioner is admitted to bail prior to a decision on
the merits in the habeas case.” Lee v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993). As the Supreme
Court instructs, a habeas petitioner
is incarcerated because he has been tried, convicted, and sentenced by a court of law.
He now attacks his conviction in a collateral proceeding. It is obvious that a greater
showing of special reasons for admission to bail pending review should be required
in this kind of case than would be required in a case where applicant had sought to
attack by writ of habeas corpus an incarceration not resulting from a judicial
determination of guilt. In this kind of case it is therefore necessary to inquire
whether, in addition to there being substantial questions presented by the appeal,
there is some circumstance making this application exceptional and deserving of
special treatment in the interests of justice.
Aronson v. May, 85 S. Ct. 3, 5 (1964)(citations omitted). “[A]s a practical matter, . . . motions for
bail will be denied in most of the habeas proceedings,” as there will be few occasions when a
petitioner will meet the Aronson standard. Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990).
In this case, Petitioner has not alleged any circumstance making his application for release
the exceptional case deserving of special treatment. His motion for release on recognizance or
surety will be denied.
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II.
Petitioner alleges in his motion for counsel that he is not trained in the law and that he is
unable to retain competent legal counsel. Petitioner has no constitutional right to appointment of
counsel on collateral review of his convictions. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987);
Post v. Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419, 425 (6th Cir. 2005); Cobas v. Burgess, 306 F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir.
2002) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991)). The interests of justice do not require
appointment of counsel at this time. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).
III.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for release on recognizance or surety
(ECF No. 7) is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 8) is
DENIED.
s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge
Dated: November 30, 2011
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney of record herein by electronic means and upon
Donald Richardson, #719076, at Boyer Road Correctional Facility,
10274 Boyer Road, Carson City, MI 48811 by first class U.S. mail on
November 30, 2011.
s/Tracy A. Jacobs
TRACY A. JACOBS
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