Ward v. Samuel

Filing 8

OPINION and ORDER Summarily Dismissing Complaint and Concluding that an Appeal Cannot be Taken in Good Faith. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (SGam)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

DONALD WARD, #46018-039,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 1:12-CV-14287
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

v.
CHARLES SAMUELS, JR.,
Defendant.
_______________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND
CONCLUDING THAT AN APPEAL CANNOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
Plaintiff Donald Ward, a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Milan,
Michigan (FCI-Milan), has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee for
this Bivens action. A Bivens action is considered the federal counterpart to an action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see also Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys
P.C., 76 F.3d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1996). In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he is not being given
proper medical care nor provided a safe environment at the prison in violation of his federal
constitutional and statutory rights. He names the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, Charles
Samuels, Jr., as Defendant in this action. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Having reviewed the
complaint, the Court dismisses it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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I
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA), the Court is required to sua sponte
dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it determines that the action
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). The Court is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against
government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in
law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989).
A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520–21 (1972). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint
set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as
well as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to
“give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). While this notice pleading
standard does not require “detailed” factual allegations, it does require more than the bare assertion
of legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

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U.S. at 557).
To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant is a person
who acted under color of state or federal law, and (2) the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff
of a federal right, privilege, or immunity. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155–57 (1978);
Harris v. Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009).
II
Plaintiff identifies only Bureau of Prisons Director Charles Samuels Jr. as a defendant in this
action.

Plaintiff, however, has failed to allege facts demonstrating Defendant’s personal

involvement in the alleged delay or denial of medical care or the conditions at FCI-Milan. It is wellsettled that a plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of a defendant to state a civil rights
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens. See Monell v. Department of Social Svs., 436 U.S. 658,
691–92 (1978) (Section 1983 liability cannot be based upon a theory of respondeat superior or
vicarious liability); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009) (same); see also Taylor v.
Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 69 F.3d 716, 727–28 (6th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff must allege facts
showing that the defendant participated, condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in alleged
misconduct to establish liability). Plaintiff has not done so. Any assertion that the defendant failed
to supervise an employee, should be vicariously liable for another employee’s conduct, erred in
denying complaints, and/or did not sufficiently respond to the situation is insufficient to state a civil
rights claim. See, e.g., Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Martin v.
Harvey, 14 F. App’x 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff has also not alleged facts showing that
any injury he suffered is the result of any policy or regulation, or that any improper conduct arose
from the deliberate failure to adequately investigate, train, or supervise employees. See Ellis v.
Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) (setting forth three-part test for such

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claims). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a federal civil rights claim. See
Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
588 (1998). Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to the named
defendant, and his complaint must therefore be dismissed.
III
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a civil rights claim
upon which relief may be granted against the Defendant. Finally, the Court concludes that an appeal
from this order would be frivolous and cannot be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3);
see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED with
prejudice as to the named Defendant. This dismissal is without prejudice as to any medical or health
care claims that the plaintiff may have against a proper defendant.
Dated: March 11, 2013

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail, and upon Donald Ward #46018-039 at Federal
Correctional Complex Terre Haute, IN 47802 by first class U.S. mail
on March 11, 2013.
s/Tracy A. Jacobs
TRACY A. JACOBS

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