Huffman v. Speedway SuperAmerica LLC et al

Filing 18

Opinion and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 13 Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing Claims. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (SGam)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
LAURI HUFFMAN,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 13-12453
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

v.
SPEEDWAY LLC,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING CLAIMS
Lauri Huffman worked for Speedway LLC from July 2011 through May 2013. In
November 2012, she became pregnant, and in March of 2013, her doctor recommended various
restrictions to keep her safe. Concluding that Huffman could not perform her job responsibilities
given her doctor’s restrictions, Speedway attempted to place her on leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA). But Huffman was unwilling to do so. After she failed to return the
requisite paperwork over a six-week period, Speedway terminated Huffman’s employment based
on job abandonment.

She then filed a complaint alleging violations of the FMLA and

Michigan’s Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act.
Huffman’s FMLA claim is not ripe, and it will be dismissed. Because all that remains is
a state law claim for pregnancy discrimination, the claim will be dismissed without prejudice to
Huffman’s ability to refile in state court.

I
A
In July 2011, Huffman was hired to act as a customer service representative in
Speedway’s Vassar, Michigan store. Four months later, in November, Huffman was promoted to
shift leader (still with Speedway’s Vassar, Michigan location).
Huffman had several duties and responsibilities as shift leader. A Speedway shift leader
“[s]erves as the leader and oversees the retail operations during a designated shift” for any given
Speedway location. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 9, at 1, ECF No. 13. Shift leaders “ensure that the store
operates efficiently and in compliance with applicable Federal, State and local laws and
Company policies.”

Id.

Other responsibilities include training and coaching employees,

ensuring necessary paperwork is completed, handling escalated customer concerns and
emergencies, auditing inventory, maintaining a clean and organized store, and ensuring safe
work practices. Id.
Jennifer Francis, store manager at the Vassar, Michigan Speedway during a portion of the
time that Huffman worked there, clarified some of Huffman’s duties as shift leader. See Francis
Dep. 8, 17, attached as Def.’s Mot. Ex. 3. As a part of ensuring satisfactory customer service,
Huffman was responsible for making sure that the tasks outlined in Speedway’s Exceptional
Customer Experience (ECE) worksheet were completed each shift. Id. at 10, 26. Those include,
among others, food presentation tasks, inside presentation tasks (including restroom care), and
outside presentation tasks. See Def.’s Mot. Ex. 10.
In November 2012, Huffman became pregnant, and notified Speedway “shortly
thereafter.” Pl.’s Resp. 6, ECF No. 16. On March 6, 2013, Huffman presented Ms. Francis with
a note from her physician indicating that Huffman required simple limitations: a maximum of 8-

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hour shifts with 15-minute breaks every 4 hours. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 21, at 3. Ms. Francis
forwarded Huffman’s restrictions to Richard Farran, Speedway’s Human Resource Manager. Id.
at 2. Because Huffman’s restrictions did not impact her ability to perform the functions of a shift
leader, Mr. Farran approved them. Huffman Dep. 97–98, attached as Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1.
Huffman visited her OB/GYN, Dr. Walter Yee, on April 3, 2013. Dr. Yee provided
Huffman with discharge instructions that indicated she should “not perform activities” that could
cause her to “fall or drop something on [her]self.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 22. Moreover, Dr. Yee
recommended that Huffman take April 4, 2013, off of work because she was suffering from “hip
pain secondary to pregnancy.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 23. Huffman delivered the information to Ms.
Francis, who in turn forwarded it along to Mr. Farran.
After reviewing Dr. Yee’s instructions and note, Mr. Farran decided that he needed
additional information as to what Huffman could and could not do before he determined whether
Speedway could accommodate her restrictions. So Mr. Farran asked Ms. Francis to find out
what tasks Huffman was not comfortable performing. See Huffman Dep. 97; Francis Dep. 28–
29. Ms. Francis conferred with Huffman, and Huffman wrote a list of nine tasks that she did not
feel comfortable performing due to her pregnancy:
- Taking out heavy bags of trash
- Leaning into the bottle return bin (too deep to reach items)
- Lifting and changing BIBs
- Climbing the tall ladder
- Lifting propane tanks
- Lifting full tea urns
- Continuous up and down (bending, squatting) somedays, not all

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- lifting full crates of pop to get to the next crate in the cooler
- standing for long periods of time
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 24. Ms. Francis then memorialized the list in an email to Mr. Farran, which she
sent on April 9, 2013. Id.
After reviewing Huffman’s list, Mr. Farran still required additional information to decide
if her restrictions could be accommodated. So he instructed Ms. Francis to ask Huffman to
return to Dr. Yee so that Dr. Yee could fill out a Fitness for Duty form and indicate on a blank
ECE worksheet which tasks Huffman could not perform. Huffman complied, and on April 10,
2013, Dr. Yee filled out both forms. See Def.’s Mot. Exs. 10, 25. Huffman then delivered the
two forms to Ms. Francis, and Ms. Francis forwarded them to Mr. Farran. Huffman Dep. 118.
On the Fitness for Duty form, Dr. Yee indicated that, through her delivery, Huffman
could perform “Light medium work: Lifting 20[lbs] max & frequently lifting up to #10[lbs].”
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 25. He also noted that Huffman could occasionally bend, squat, kneel, reach,
stand, and walk, but that she could not climb at all. Id. Finally, Dr. Yee indicated that Huffman
should stay off the “large ladder,” have a stool to sit on, and avoid lifting things that could fall or
drop on her abdomen. Id.
On the ECE worksheet he completed, Dr. Yee indicated that the following tasks “may be
avoided for the duration of [Huffman’s] pregnancy”:
- Speedy Tea Available/Fresh
- Wash/Rinse/Sanitize Speedy Tea Urn
- Clean Tops/Under Machines/Inside Cabinets
- Stock/Clean Cooler and Cooler Doors
- Check/Empty Inside Trash

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- Stock Outside
- Check/Empty Outside Trash
- Clean Baseboards
- Clean Walls Where Needed/Clean Windows
- Wash Restroom Doors/Frames/Walls
- Clean Cooler Floor, Door Frames & Under Product
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 10. As Speedway points out in its motion, according to the ECE worksheet,
each of the first seven tasks must be completed each and every shift. Id; see also Def.’s Mot.
13–14. The final four tasks must be completed once each week. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 10.
Mr. Farran examined Huffman’s restrictions, as indicated by Dr. Yee, and concluded that
Speedway “could not accommodate the restrictions that she presented.”

Farran Dep. 30,

attached as Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2.
B
Speedway maintains a leave of absence policy (the Policy) that applied to Huffman in
2012 and 2013. See Policy 1, attached as Def.’s Mot. Ex. 19. The Policy governs both personal
leave, id. at 7–9, and leave under the FMLA, id. at 1–7.
Up to twelve workweeks of unpaid FMLA leave is available for Speedway employees
“with 12 or more months of service, who have worked 1,250 or more hours in the preceding 12
months, and who work at a worksite with 50+ employees within a 75-mile radius . . . .” Policy 1.
An employee who satisfies the preceding criteria is entitled to FMLA leave if she suffers from a
documented “serious health condition” that makes her unable to perform the functions of her job.
Id. Such a “serious health condition” can result from a pregnancy. A note on page one of the
Policy establishes that “FMLA leave may begin prior to the birth of your child if you are unable

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to work due to medical reasons.” Id. Indeed, under the Policy, a “serious health condition” is
defined as “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves . . . [a]ny
period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal care.” Id. at 2.
C
After concluding that Huffman could not satisfy her work responsibilities due to her
physician’s restrictions, Mr. Farran informed Ms. Francis that Speedway would offer Huffman a
leave of absence. Ms. Francis then called Huffman on April 11, 2013, and informed her that she
“could not return to work until [she] was off the restrictions that the doctor gave [her].”
Huffman Dep. 119. Huffman did not agree that her restrictions should keep her from working.
Id. Nevertheless, Ms. Francis forwarded a request for leave of absence paperwork form to
Speedway’s leave processor, Jennifer Garrett.
Ms. Garrett sent the leave of absence paperwork directly to the Vassar, Michigan store
(via email) on April 16, 2013. See Def.’s Mot. Ex. 27. The paperwork indicated that Huffman
was eligible for FMLA leave, id. at 2, but in order for Speedway to determine whether she
qualified for FMLA leave, she needed to return the enclosed certification form by May 4, 2013.
Although Huffman received the paperwork and understood that it was due by May 4, 2013, she
decided that she “wasn’t going to fill them out” because she felt that she did not need to take
leave. Huffman Dep. 122–23.
On April 16, 2013, Huffman emailed Mr. Farran to inform him that she did “not wish to
be on leave” or be “forced” to take leave. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 28. She indicated that she would not
fill out the FMLA paperwork because she was “willing and able to work.” Id. In response, Mr.
Farran called Huffman and explained “that the paperwork had to be turned in for [her] to be
approved for the FMLA” leave that was necessitated, in his opinion, by her doctor’s restrictions.

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Huffman Dep. 127–28. Mr. Farran also explicitly told Huffman that if she did not complete the
leave paperwork, she was “at risk of being terminated for job abandonment.” Id. at 128.
Huffman remained adamant, and did not comply.
On May 7, 2013, three days after Huffman’s paperwork was due, Ms. Garrett sent
Huffman an FMLA denial notice with the following letter:
On 4/16/13, a leave packet was sent to you for completion in connection with
your Request for a Leave of Absence. As stated in the packet, your leave
paperwork was due back to the Leave Department by 5/4/13. As of today, your
paperwork has not been received. As such, FMLA leave for this period is denied.
You may still be eligible for a personal leave of absence, but you must return your
completed leave packet by 5/17/13. If Speedway does not receive your
completed leave packet by this date, your employment may be terminated.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 7 (emphasis in original).

Huffman received the letter on May 14, 2013.

Huffman Dep. 129. By that time, she had already retained an attorney. Id. at 130. Huffman did
not have any conversations with anyone from Speedway after that point. Id. at 132. When she
failed to return the leave of absence paperwork by May 17, 2013, as directed, Speedway
terminated Huffman’s employment for job abandonment on May 29, 2013.
D
Less than one month later, on June 4, 2013, Huffman filed a complaint against
Speedway alleging two claims: (1) violation of the FMLA when Speedway “ordered [Huffman]
to file a claim for FMLA when she did not need or want to[,]” and (2) violation of Michigan’s
Elliott Larsen Civil Right’s Act based on pregnancy discrimination. Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 34, 41, ECF
No. 1. Subsequently, Huffman filed a first amended complaint asserting the same two claims but
clarifying the proper defendant, Speedway LLC. On February 28, 2014, Speedway filed a
motion for summary judgment.

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II
Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The focus must
be “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). All justifiable inferences from the evidence must be drawn
in the non-moving party’s favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986). “Entry of summary judgment is appropriate ‘against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’ ” Walton v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.3d
481, 485 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
III
Huffman presents a federal claim under the FMLA and a state law claim under Elliot
Larsen. But her federal claim is not yet ripe and it will be dismissed. Because her state law
claim is more appropriately adjudicated in state court, Huffman’s Elliot Larsen claim will be
dismissed without prejudice.
A
Huffman adequately summarizes her FMLA claim as follows: “[she] was discriminated
against for opposing the unlawful practice and use of FMLA by [Speedway] when it tried to
force her to take FMLA [leave] . . . .” Pl.’s Resp. 14. Thus, Huffman’s claim is what the Sixth
Circuit has recognized as an “involuntary-leave claim” under the FMLA, where an employer
forces an employee to take FMLA leave against the employee’s wishes. See Wysong v. Dow
Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2007).

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In Wysong, the court explained what an

involuntary-leave claim entails: “An involuntary-leave claim is really a type of interference
claim. An employee may have a claim under [29 U.S.C.] § 2615(a)(1) when an employer forces
an employee to take FMLA leave when the employee does not have a ‘serious health condition’
that precludes her from working.” Id.
But the court in Wysong went on to make a crucial clarification—“However, the
employee’s claim ripens only when and if the employee seeks FMLA leave at a later date, and
such leave is not available because the employee was wrongfully forced to use FMLA leave in
the past.” Id. So although the court “recognize[d] that an employer who forces an employee to
take leave may create a claim under the FMLA,” to maintain such a claim, a plaintiff must
“allege also that she later requested FMLA leave, but that [the employer] refused, based on the
fact that she had already used up her available FMLA leave.” Id. at 449, 450.
Nowhere in Huffman’s amended complaint does she allege that she requested FMLA
leave from Speedway after it attempted to put her on involuntary leave. See Pl.’s Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 9. Instead, it is undisputed that Speedway attempted to place Huffman on leave, she
refused to return the requisite paperwork, her employment was terminated, and she has not
spoken with a Speedway representative since.

It is also undisputed that Huffman never

requested FMLA leave but was unable to obtain it because she had been previously forced to use
it. Accordingly, Huffman has not satisfied her burden of alleging a claim under the FMLA based
on involuntary leave. This claim will be dismissed.
B
Huffman’s only other claim is a state law claim for pregnancy discrimination. But
“[w]hen all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will
point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state court if the action was

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removed.” Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Because exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Huffman’s remaining claim would not foster
judicial economy and would result in “needlessly resolving issues of state law[,]” id. at 953,
Huffman’s pregnancy-discrimination claim under Elliot Larsen will be dismissed without
prejudice to her ability to refile in an appropriate state court forum.
IV
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Speedway’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No.
13, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
It is further ORDERED that Huffman’s FMLA claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that Huffman’s Elliot Larsen claim is DISMISSED without
prejudice. This is a final order and closes the case.
Dated: May 1, 2014

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing
order was served upon each attorney or party of record
herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on May
1, 2014.
s/Tracy A. Jacobs
TRACY A. JACOBS

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