Stornello v. Sampson et al

Filing 13

OPINION and ORDER Dismissing 1 Complaint and Denying Right to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs on Appeal. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (SGam)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
ANGELO STORNELLO,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 1:13-CV-13085
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

v.
BARBARA SAMPSON, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
AND DENYING RIGHT TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF FEES AND
COSTS ON APPEAL
Angelo Stornello is a state prisoner incarcerated at the Parnall Correctional Facility in
Jackson, Michigan. On July 18, 2013, he filed a complaint alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Stornello names three members of the Michigan Parole Board as defendants, seeking monetary and
injunctive relief.
Stornello’s allegations arise from the Michigan Parole Board’s decision requiring him to
complete residential sex offender programming (RSOP) at the Cooper Street Correctional Facility,
rather than at a community-based treatment program, and the Parole Board’s subsequent denial of
release on parole. In June 2011, the parole board recommended that Stornello be placed at a
community-based treatment program. He was then accepted into a community-based program, but,
sometime later, his community-based program placement was canceled. He was then informed he
would instead remain incarcerated and participate in a residential prison program. Ultimately,
Stornello removed himself from the residential treatment program because of his concerns about
confidentiality. Stornello v. Department of Corrections, No. 309636, 2013 WL 951174, at *3 (Mich.
Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2013).

I
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint set forth “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the
relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
While this notice pleading standard does not require “detailed” factual allegations, Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions or “an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Stornello has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee for this
action due to his indigence. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the court is required
to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it determines
that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Similarly, the court is required to dismiss a complaint seeking
redress against government entities, officers, and employees that it finds to be frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an

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arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 155–57 (1978). A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972).
II
A
First, Stornello argues that the Defendants violated his rights under the Due Process Clause
by requiring him to complete an RSOP program before he could be released on parole. Stornello
also asserts that the Defendants violated his Due Process rights by issuing an 18-month continuance,
so that he was not eligible for parole until that time had passed, without first granting him an
interview.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. As the Supreme Court
has explained, the Fourteenth Amendment protects “the individual against arbitrary action of
government.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). The Supreme Court has definitively
held that under the United States Constitution, a lawfully convicted person has no right to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska
Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); see also Kentucky Dep’t. of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Simply stated, there is no federal constitutional right to
parole. See Gavin v. Wells, 914 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372,

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377-378 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F. App’x 456, 458–59 (6th Cir. 2006)).
While there is no federal constitutional right to parole, the Supreme Court has held that a convicted
person may have a liberty interest created by a state’s laws, which is subject to constitutional
protection. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983)).
A state does not have a constitutional duty to establish a parole system, however, and the
presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally-protected liberty interest
in parole release. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, 11; see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.
369, 373 (1987). Rather, a protected liberty interest exists only if state law entitles a prisoner to
release on parole.
Recognizing the “broad powers” of Michigan authorities to deny parole, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that Michigan law does not create a
liberty interest in parole. See Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164–65 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc);
see also Ward v. Stegall, 93 F. App’x 805, 806 (6th Cir. 2004) (following Sweeton). The Michigan
Supreme Court has also recognized that there is no liberty interest in parole in Michigan. See Glover
v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603–04 (Mich. 1999). Consequently, the denial of parole
does not implicate a federal right. See Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404–05 (Michigan state
prisoners have no protected liberty interest in release on parole).
“Prisoners have no constitutional right to rehabilitation, education, or jobs.” Argue v.
Hofmayer, 80 F. App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348
(1981)); see also Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976). “[P]articipation in a rehabilitative
program is a privilege that the Due Process Clause does not guarantee.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81
F.3d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996). Because prisoners have no constitutional right to participate in a

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rehabilitation program, Stornello cannot show that the Board’s decision deprived him of due process
of law.
B
Stornello also argues that the cancellation of his treatment in a community-based treatment
program and the denial of release on parole constitute cruel and unusual punishment because these
decisions caused him tremendous disappointment, emotional distress, and depression.
The denial of parole does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment where a prisoner is
not being held beyond the statutory maximum for the crimes of conviction. Kordenbrock v. Brown,
469 F. App’x 434, 435 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2012); see also Carnes v. Engler, 76 F. App’x 79, 81 (6th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the denial of parole does not implicate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment); Slakman v. Buckner, 434 F. App’x 872, 875 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he [parole board’s] decision to deny [prisoner] parole constitutes merely a disappointment,
rather than a punishment of cruel and unusual proportions.”).
Stornello’s disappointment and depression about his continued confinement do not establish
an Eighth Amendment violation.
III
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
It is further ORDERED that if Stornello elects to appeal this decision, he may not proceed
without prepayment of the fees and costs on appeal because an appeal would be frivolous and could

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not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962).

Dated: January 17, 2014

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail, and upon Angelo Stornello #264946, Parnall
Correctional Facility, 1780 E. Parnall, Jackson, MI 49201 by first class
U.S. mail, on January 17, 2014.
s/Tracy A. Jacobs
TRACY A. JACOBS

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