Smith v. Bank of America/Fleet

Filing 18

ORDER denying 16 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (SGam)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
RODNEY SMITH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 13-13327
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

v.
BANK OF AMERICA/FLEET,
Defendant.
/
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
In July 2013, Rodney Smith filed a pro se complaint in Michigan state court, alleging that
Bank of America/Fleet (BAF) committed “trespass of rights . . . while acting as a
creditor/lender” and while “acting as a complainant in district court.” Pl.’s Compl. 6, attached
as Def.’s Notice Removal Ex. A. Specifically, Smith believes that BAF “filed an action . . .
against [him] . . . and caused procurement of a void order dated 7-26-06 . . . .” Id. It appears that
in 2006 BAF filed a lawsuit against Smith to collect approximately $6,000, and Smith did not
answer or appear. Subsequently, the state court entered default judgment against him.
BAF removed Smith’s complaint on August 2, 2013, and on August 9, 2013, it filed a
motion to dismiss. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 3. The motion was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder, and on October 17, 2013, Judge Binder issued a report
recommending that the motion to dismiss be granted and the case be dismissed.
Judge Binder concluded that Smith’s complaint—which is entitled “Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment to Declare a Void Judgment a Matter of Public Record”—requests relief
that this Court is unable to grant. Judge Binder concluded that Smith seeks “a declaration that
the state court judgment against him is void . . . .” Report & Rec. 5, ECF No. 9. Under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, this Court “lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.”
Id.
When no objections were filed by either party, Judge Binder’s report and
recommendations were adopted on November 5, 2013. Judgment was entered against Smith the
same day. On November 20, 2013, Smith filed a motion for reconsideration. He indicates that
he sent objections, via United States mail, on November 1, 2013—only two days after he was
served with Judge Binder’s report. Attached to Smith’s motion is a receipt substantiating his
assertion. See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. A, ECF No. 16.
But even if Smith’s objections were timely and are considered, it does not change the
ultimate result of his case. In his objections, Smith admits that his complaint requests “review of
a state court judgment,” Pl.’s Objection 1, ECF No. 15, a judgment that he claims is “void” and
“based upon nothing at all,” id. at 2. Although he seeks review of a state court judgment, Smith
argues in his objections that an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to save his
claims: “There are exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when the state court judgment
was procured through fraud, deception, accident, or mistake. If a state court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the prior action, its orders would be void ab initio and subject to attack,
notwithstanding Rooker-Feldman.” Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, it appears that Smith believes
the state court acted in “excess of [its] jurisdiction,” id., and thus the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not foreclose his claims.
Smith is incorrect. The 2006 state court action against him involved a complaint filed by
BAF in a debt-collection action, and the court entered a default judgment when Smith did not
answer or appear. As established in Asset Acceptance Corp. v. Robinson, 625 N.W.2d 804
(Mich. Ct. App. 2001), Michigan state courts have jurisdiction over debt-collection actions. Id.

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at 808 (indicating suit was proper where involving a defendant “subject to the FDCPA as a debt
collector”). Moreover, Michigan courts have long recognized the entry of judgment by default
as an appropriate method for disposing of cases where one party fails to participate. See Lyell v.
Sanbourn, 2 Mich. 109, 115 (1851) (sustaining entry of judgment by default due to “the plaintiffs
in error”). Accordingly, the state court did not act in “excess of jurisdiction” as Smith contends.
And, as Judge Binder pointed out in his report and recommendation, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine precludes subject-matter jurisdiction over Smith’s claim. The doctrine “originates from
two Supreme Court decisions, which were rendered 60 years apart.” Coles v. Granville, 448
F.3d 853, 857 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). In Coles, the Sixth Circuit explained the
two Supreme Court decisions that led to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
In both cases the plaintiffs challenged the validity of state court decision by filing
suit in federal district court. In Rooker, the plaintiff asked the district court to
render the state court judgment against him “null and void.” In Feldman, the
plaintiffs filed suit against the actual state court that had rejected the plaintiffs’
applications to practice law. In both cases the Supreme Court dismissed the suits
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1257, only the Supreme Court, and not the lower federal courts, enjoys appellate
jurisdiction over state court decisions.
Coles, 448 F.3d at 857. The Supreme Court has clarified that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies only to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
That is the precise situation presented here. Smith is a state-court loser, complaining of
harms caused by a state-court judgment, rendered long before he filed his complaint in this case.
As Smith notes in his objections, he wants this Court to review that state court judgment and to
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declare it “null and void,” just as was the request in Rooker almost one-hundred years ago.
Nothing in the record indicates that the state court did not have jurisdiction over Smith
personally or over the subject matter of the 2006 lawsuit between Smith and BAF, and in this
circuit, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “precludes federal court jurisdiction where that claim is a
specific grievance that the law was invalidly—even unconstitutionally—applied in the plaintiff’s
particular case.” Gabhart v. Cocke Cnty., Tenn., 155 F. App’x 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Tropf v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002)). Smith’s claims are
without merit.
So regardless of Smith’s objections, Judge Binder’s report and recommendations were
correct and were appropriately adopted. Smith’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, and this Court lacks the subject-matter jurisdiction necessary to consider them.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Smith’s motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 16, is
DENIED.
Dated: December 13, 2013

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge
PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing
order was served upon each attorney or party of record
herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail, and
upon Rodney Smith, P.O. Box 36, Black River, MI 48721
by first class U.S. mail, on December 13, 2013.
s/Tracy A. Jacobs
TRACY A. JACOBS

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