Maye v. Klee et al

Filing 167

ORDER Granting 165 MOTION to Stay. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (KWin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
DERRICK MAYE,
Plaintiff,
v

Case No. 14-cv-10864
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

PAUL KLEE, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STAY
On March 19, 2018, the Court entered an order adopting Magistrate Judge Davis’s report
and recommendation over Defendants’ objections. ECF No. 157. The order granted Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment in part and denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. On April 17, 2018, Defendants Serafin and Taylor filed a notice of
appeal of the Court’s order. ECF No. 162. On April 26, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to stay
further proceedings in this case pending review by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. ECF No.
165. On May 10, Plaintiff filed a response opposing the motion to stay. ECF No. 166.
“A district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an
issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
Here, the Court adopted Judge Davis’s finding that Defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity because Plaintiff’s right to attend the Eid was clearly established in law based on
Judge Avern Cohn’s order in the Dowdy case and the corresponding policy directive issued by
MDOC. Order at 3-4, 7-11, ECF No. 157. Whether a legal right has been clearly established is a
question of law. Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 2015). Thus, the Court’s denial

of qualified immunity on that basis was an immediately appealable decision. See Forsyth, 472
U.S. at 530.
The parties dispute whether the proceedings in this matter should be stayed pending the
appeal. Defendants argue that “once an appeal is filed based on qualified immunity that all
proceedings should cease until the issue is resolved.” Mot. at 2 (citing English v. Dyke, 23 F. 3d
1086, 1089 (6th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff argues that the 4-factor test applicable to motions to stay
counsels against granting Defendants’ motion. Resp. at 4 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 247 F.3d
631, 632 (6th Cir. 2001)).
In determining whether to issue a stay of proceedings pending appeal, the Court must
consider: “(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the
appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the
prospect that others will be harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in
granting the stay.”Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150,
153 (6th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). “All four factors are not prerequisites but are
interconnected considerations that must be balanced together.” Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 244 (6th Cir. 2006).
Here, Defendant makes no attempt to explain why they are likely to succeed on the
merits. Plaintiff also notes that, “[a]s the Sixth Circuit recognized in Yates, ‘delaying trial in
order to allow a defendant to appeal a denial of qualified immunity prolongs the process, often to
the disadvantage of the plaintiff . . . [d]efendants may seek to stall because they gain from delay
at plaintiffs’ expense, an incentive yielding unjustified appeals.’” Resp. at 8 (quoting Yates v.
City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1991)). However, it is also true that as to the second
and fourth factors, “the justification for allowing immediate appeals from the denial of qualified

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immunity is that forcing state actors to litigate destroys rights created by the immunity.” Rondigo
LLC v. Twp. of Richmond, Michigan, 2009 WL 10681186, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2009)
(citing Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)). Furthermore, as to the third factor,
Plaintiff has not identified any undue harm that he will suffer other than a delay in obtaining
relief, which is the same harm inherent in all cases in which a stay is granted. Ultimately, “the
power to stay proceedings ordinarily lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Bays v.
Montmorency, Cty. of, 2017 WL 510696, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2017) (citing F.T.C. v.
E.M.A. Nationwide Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 626–28 (6th Cir. 2014)). On balance, the factors here
counsel in favor of granting the stay.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion to stay, ECF No. 165, is GRANTED and
proceedings in this matter are STAYED.
It is further ORDERED that the clerk of court is DIRECTED to administratively close
this case. Upon conclusion of the appeal, either party may move to lift the stay and reopen the
case.

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge
Dated: May 14, 2018

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on May 14, 2018.
s/Kelly Winslow
KELLY WINSLOW, Case Manager

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