Guest-Marcotte v. Life Insurance Company Of North America et al
Filing
28
ORDER Overuling 22 Objection, Adopting 20 Report and Recommendation, and Granting 11 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (Sandusky, K)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
KIMBERLY J. GUEST-MARCOTTE,
Plaintiff,
v
Case No. 15-cv-10738
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
METALDYNE SALARY CONTINUATION PLAN, and
METALDYNE POWERTRAIN COMPONENTS, INC.,
Defendants.
__________________________________________/
ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTION, ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION, AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Kimberly Guest-Marcotte was employed with Metaldyne Powertrain
Components for about eight years. After she was diagnosed with Ehlers-Danlos syndrome,
Guest-Marcotte applied for short-term disability benefits with her employer’s ERISA Plan
administrator, Defendant Life Insurance Company of North America.
Despite providing
documentation from physicians that she “could not perform the material duties of her regular
occupation,” the Plan administrator denied her request for short-term disability benefits because
Guest-Marcotte had not shown that “she is unable to perform all the substantial and material
duties of his or her regular occupation . . . .” The day after the Plan administrator denied her
appeal for short-term benefits, Metaldyne terminated her employment due to the “unknown
nature of your ability to perform your job functions in the future,” as evidenced by the
documentation from physicians. In other words, the physician documents were not sufficient to
show that Guest-Marcotte was disabled for purposes of short-term disability benefits, but were
sufficient for Metaldyne to terminate her employment because she was not capable of
performing her job functions.
On February 27, 2015, Plaintiff Kimberly Guest-Marcotte filed suit against her former
employer, Metaldyne Powertrain Co., and her former employer’s ERISA Plan administrator, Life
Insurance Co. of North America (“LICNA/CIGNA”). Guest-Marcotte claims that Defendant
Metaldyne discriminated against her because she had a disability, even though she was able to
perform her job duties. Guest-Marcotte also claims that Defendant LICNA/CIGNA improperly
denied her request for long-term disability benefits because she was disabled from working.
On April 24, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Guest-Marcotte’s Persons with
Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”) claim, asserting that, given her repeated and
unequivocal statements that she was completely disabled for the purpose of receiving long-term
benefits, she is estopped from now claiming that she could perform the duties of her job.
Because Guest-Marcotte has provided no explanation for the apparent inconsistency between her
PWDCRA and ERISA claims, her PWDCRA claim will be dismissed.
I.
Guest-Marcotte worked as a Senior Risk Analyst for Metaldyne from July 2005 until
November 22, 2013. She alleges that she became unable to continue her normal workload in
June 2013 due to her Ehlers-Danlos syndrome.1 Guest-Marcotte applied for short-term benefits
under Metaldyne’s Salary Continuation Plan, which provides short-term benefits to an employee
who:
because of Injury or Sickness . . . is unable to perform all the substantial and
material duties of his or her regular occupation, or solely due to Injury or
1
According to the Ehlers-Danlos National Foundation website, “[i]ndividuals with Ehlers-Danlos syndromes (EDS)
have a genetic defect in their connective tissue, the tissue that provides support to many body parts such as the skin,
muscles and ligaments. The fragile skin and unstable joints found in patients with EDS are the result of faulty or
reduced amounts of collagen.” www.ednf.org/what-eds.
-2-
Sickness, is unable to earn more than 80% of his or her Indexed Covered
Earnings.
Compl. Ex. 3.
In support of her application for short-term benefits, Guest-Marcotte relied on the
testimony Doctors Kadaj and Tinkle. In a Healthcare Provider Questionnaire, Dr. Kadaj wrote
that Guest-Marcotte’s condition was expected to last a “lifetime,” Ex. 2 at 1, that she was not
able to perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable
accommodations, that there were no accommodations that would enable her to perform her job
duties, and that “[i]t is unlikely she will recover fully/sufficiently.” Id. at 2-3.
LICNA/CIGNA denied her short-term benefits claim in August 2013, apparently because
she had not met the definition of “disabled”.2 In her appeal, Guest-Marcotte’s attorney described
the impairments: “[s]he could not sit, stand, or drive for any length of time. Her cognitive
abilities were impaired, and she was in significant pain. She was constantly fatigued, and could
not perform repetitive tasks such as typing or using a computer mouse,” and that she “could not
perform the material duties of her regular occupation . . . .” Ex. 2 at 9. Guest-Marcotte’s appeal
was denied in November 2013.
On November 22, 2013, Metaldyne terminated Guest-Marcotte’s employment based on
Dr. Kadaj’s letter “which indicated that you remained unable to perform the essential function of
your position with or without a reasonable accommodation,” and that she was “unlikely to
recover fully/sufficiently to perform the functions of your position”. Doc. 1, Ex. 8. Thus, as
Guest-Marcotte accurately notes, her request for short-term benefits was denied because she was
not disabled, yet Metaldyne terminated her employment because she was disabled.
2
The denial letter did not explain why Guest-Marcotte’s application was denied, but instead simply recited the
Disability Policy.
-3-
On February 27, 2015, Guest-Marcotte filed suit against Defendants. Guest-Marcotte
attached affidavits from both Dr. Kadaj and Dr. Tinkle, each of whom testified that he believed
that Guest-Marcotte was disabled. See Tinkle Affidavit at ¶ 15 (“It was my professional opinion
that Ms. Guest-Marcotte was disabled indefinitely from employment . . . .”); Kadaj Affidavit at ¶
11 (“At the time Ms. Guest-Marcotte applied for Short Term Disability, it was my professional
opinion that Ms. Guest-Marcotte was disabled from employment . . . .”).
On April 24, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Guest-Marcotte’s PWDCRA
claim, asserting that she was estopped from claiming that she could perform her job duties (as
required to state a PWDCRA claim) because she had repeatedly alleged that she was disabled
from performing her job duties when she applied for short-term benefits. On June 22, 2015,
United States Magistrate Judge Patricia Morris issued a report recommending that Defendants’
motion be granted: “I suggest that Defendants have pointed to sufficiently undermining
statements and admissions by Plaintiff to preclude Plaintiff from proving her prima facie case
under the PWDCRA.” Rep. & Rec. 8. Guest-Marcotte filed a timely objection to the report on
July 2, 2015.
II.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a party may object to and seek review of
a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If objections are
made, “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Objections must be stated with
specificity. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985) (citation omitted). “Only those specific
objections to the magistrate’s report made to the district court will be preserved for appellate
-4-
review.” Carson v. Hudson, 421 F. App’x 560, 563 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Souter v. Jones, 395
F.3d 577, 585-86 (6th Cir. 2005)).
III.
Guest-Marcotte filed one objection to the Magistrate’s report: she claims that she has
adequately pleaded a PWDCRA claim. She contends that it is Defendants who should be
estopped from asserting inconsistent defenses (i.e., that Guest-Marcotte was not disabled for the
purpose of short-term benefits, but was so disabled that her employment had to be terminated).
To prevail on an employment discrimination claim under the PWDCRA, a “plaintiff must
show (1) that he is [disabled] as defined in the act, (2) that the [disability] is unrelated to his
ability to perform his job duties, and (3) that he has been discriminated against in one of the
ways delineated in the statute.” Chmielewski v. Xermac, Inc., 580 N.W.2d 817, 821 (1998). In
other words, Guest-Marcotte cannot prevail on her PWDCRA claim if her Ehlers-Danlos
syndrome rendered her unable to perform the duties of Senior Risk Analyst.
Defendants claim that Guest-Marcotte is essentially estopped from claiming that her
disability is unrelated to her ability to perform her job duties. They explain that Guest-Marcotte
repeatedly applied for short-term disability benefits, claiming that that she was unable to perform
the essential function of her job, Ex. 2 at 2, that there were no accommodations that would
enable her to perform her job responsibilities, id., and that “it is unlikely she will recover
fully/sufficiently,” id. at 3. Therefore, according to Defendants, Guest-Marcotte cannot now
claim that she is completely disabled in order to obtain short-term disability benefits while
simultaneously claiming that she is disabled but able to perform her job duties for purposes of
her PWDCRA claim.
-5-
Generally, the Michigan courts have concluded that the pursuit and receipt of disability
benefits does not automatically preclude or estop the recipient from pursuing a PWDCA claim.
Carpenter v. Snacktime Services, Inc., 2005 WL 763308, at *7-8 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 5. 2005)
(plaintiff not estopped from pursuing PWDCA merely because a worker’s compensation
magistrate judge had determined that he was disabled). This is because claims for Social
Security benefits and PWDCA claims have different definitions for the word “disabled”. See
Tranker v. Figgie International, Inc., 585 N.W.2d 337, 339-40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(declarations of disability in an SSDI do not necessarily bar a plaintiff from proving a claim of
disability discrimination because in the social security definition of “disabled” does not take into
account the possibility of accommodation); Kiely v. Hearland Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 359
F.3d 386, 389-90 (6th Cir. 2004) (same).
However, when a plaintiff has represented that she was totally incapable of working at
the time of the adverse employment decisions but does not explain how she could have been
otherwise “qualified” for the position in question, courts have generally held that she cannot
satisfy the elements of her PWDCA claim as a matter of law. Cleveland v. Policy Management
Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 804 (1999) (a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination “cannot
simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of” an earlier claim that he is disabled);
Neview v. D.O.C. Optics Corp., 382 F. App’x 451, 459 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that plaintiff
had failed to meet burden under ADA where “[i]n both her deposition and at her workers’
compensation hearing, Neview testified that at the time of her termination she was totally
incapable of working as a DOC store manager, or in any job whatsoever.”); Carpenter v.
Snacktime Services, Inc., 2005 WL 763308, at *7-8 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 5. 2005) (“plaintiff is
judicially estopped from pursuing her PWDCRA claim because of assertions she made during
-6-
her worker’s compensation hearing.
Specifically, plaintiff admitted that there was no
accommodation that defendant could provide to allow her to perform her job.”).
Here, Guest-Marcotte has made no attempt to reconcile or explain her inconsistent
positions regarding her ability (or a lack of) to perform her job duties. Instead, Guest-Marcotte
focuses on Defendants’ inconsistent reactions to her claims: “Defendants have repeatedly found
that [Guest-Marcotte’s] condition does not preclude Plaintiff from performing her job, thus not
believing Plaintiff’s disability claims. Nonetheless, despite repeated statements in the denial of
benefit claim letters from LICNA/CIGNA that Plaintiff could perform her job, her employer
fired her in violation of the statute because she could no longer perform her job.” Objs. 8. But,
as Magistrate Judge Morris correctly concluded, “[i]t is Plaintiff’s admissions that matter when
considering whether Plaintiff’s claim is legally sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, not
Defendants’ potentially inconsistent defenses.” Rep. & Rec. 9 (citing Malibu Media, LLC v.
Sanchez, 2014 WL172301, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2014)).
Guest-Marcotte filed suit alleging two claims that are—at least facially—inconsistent:
she claims that she was completely disabled for the purpose of obtaining short-term disability
benefits, but that her disability did not affect her ability to perform her job duties for the purpose
of her PWDCA claim. Although a plaintiff may allege these two claims, the plaintiff must
provide some explanation—any explanation—that would reconcile the incongruity.
Guest-
Marcotte has not done so here, and therefore she has not sufficiently pleaded a claim for
violation of the PWDCRA.
IV.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Guest-Marcotte’s Objection (ECF No. 22) is
OVERRULED.
-7-
It is further ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF
No. 20) is ADOPTED.
It is further ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is
GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that Guest-Marcotte’s PWDCRA claim is DISMISSED.
s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge
Dated: August 5, 2015
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on August 5, 2015.
s/Karri Sandusky
Karri Sandusky, Acting Case Manager
-8-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?