Baker v. Lear Corp. et al

Filing 40

ORDER Granting Defendants' 31 32 Motions for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (Sian, M)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
JAMES BAKER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-cv-11313

v.

Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

LEAR CORP., et al,
Defendant.
_______________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff James Baker brought suit against Defendants Lear Corporation, United Auto
Workers (UAW) International, and UAW Local 1819 on April 8, 2015. The complaint alleges
one count: a violation of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. See
Compl., ECF No. 1. Baker contends that he was discharged from his job at Lear after being
falsely accused of threatening to kill another employee. Id. Baker alleges that his discharge
violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and that the union breached its duty of fair
representation during his grievance proceedings. Id.
After the close of discovery, Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. See ECF
Nos. 31, 32. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment will be
granted.
I.
James Baker was hired by Lear as an hourly worker at its Roscommon plant on May 19,
2010. See Baker Dep. I at 7–8, ECF No. 32, Ex. 1. Lear’s Roscommon plant manufactures,
among other things, internal skeletons for automobile seats. Id. at 8. Hourly workers at

Roscommon are represented by United Auto Workers (UAW) Local 1819. Id. at 13. Baker
worked without incident until June of 2012, when Baker joined an apprentice program for
machine repair and maintenance. See Letter to Purvis at 1, ECF No. 37, Ex. 5. The apprentice
program involved working third-shift. Id. Soon after starting the program, Baker began having
problems with his third-shift coworkers. Id.
A.
In July 2012, Baker received an invitation from third-shift supervisor Bob Reycraft to
attend a meeting at Mr. Reycraft’s house for a business venture he was planning. Id. Baker
attended but declined the business opportunity. Id. After the meeting, Baker decided that it was
improper for a supervisor to ask a subordinate to participate in a private business venture. Id.
Over the next twenty months, Baker submitted six complaints to Lear Management. See
Kato Dep. at 91, ECF No. 31, Ex. 6. Besides asserting that the meeting at Mr. Reycraft’s house
was improper, these complaints contained allegations of harassment, equipment sabotage, and
retaliation by third shift coworkers. See ECF No. 31, Exs. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. Specifically,
Baker asserted that third shift employees had pointed lasers into his eyes while working, that
company equipment was being used for personal repairs, that he was being blamed for
equipment problems he did not create, and that he was unfairly reported for “birddogging.”1 See
Letter to Purvis 1. Around the same time, Baker’s sister was also having problems with thirdshift employees. Royce Dep. at 13–16, ECF No. 32, Ex. 8. Baker believed that the mistreatment
suffered by him and his sister was retribution from Mr. Reycraft for refusing to join his business
venture. Id. at 13.
In the face of this alleged mistreatment, Baker asked for a meeting on November 25,
2013 with Rebecca Purvis, the plant manager; Joel Kato, the human resources manager; and
1

“Birddogging” means paying unnecessary attention to someone. Kato Dep. 99, ECF No. 32, Ex 5.

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Deborah White, who was Baker’s union representation at the meeting. Baker Dep. II at 17–18,
ECF No. 32, Ex. 2. At the meeting, Baker outlined his concerns about the potential retaliation
and sabotage and resigned from the apprentice program. Id. at 19.
On December 28, 2013, Baker sent Ms. Purvis a letter detailing his complaints about the
workplace and requesting a response from Lear. See Letter to Purvis 1. On January 31, 2014, Ms.
Purvis responded in writing. Letter to Baker, ECF No. 31, Ex. 12. Ms. Purvis explained, in part,
that the company had found no evidence of harassment or retaliation. Id.
B.
In January 2014, Baker returned to first shift. Baker Dep. I at 38–39. On January 29,
2014, Baker reported another incident of sabotage. Baker Email, ECF No. 31, Ex. 12. This time,
Baker also spoke to Debbie Royce about his concerns. Baker Dep. I at 49–50. At the time,
Debbie Royce was a union steward, an elected position responsible for representing union
members during disputes with the company. Baker Dep. II at 78–83.
On Saturday March 1, 2014, Baker approached Ms. Royce in the cafeteria with an
envelope he wanted Ms. Royce to give to Bill Martin, the president of the union, outlining his
concerns with ongoing workplace conditions. Baker Dep. I at 49. At that moment, Ms. Royce
was talking with Deborah White about scheduling a meeting to discuss employee complaints
about Rebecca Baker, Plaintiff’s sister. Royce Dep at 14–15.
According to Ms. Royce, after Baker handed her the package, he began loudly objecting
to the complaints lodged against his sister. Id. at 15–16. Ms. Royce then walked over to the
cooler, and Baker followed while continuing to discuss his sister. Id. at 16. Ms. Royce told Baker
that she was unable to discuss his sister’s case with him. Id. According to Ms. Royce, Baker then
followed her out of the lunchroom and towards her position on the line. Id. Baker was allegedly

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shouting that Mr. Reycraft was responsible for the complaints lodged against his sister. Id. at 17.
Baker then allegedly told Ms. Royce that if anything happened to his sister, he would kill Mr.
Reycraft. Id. Ms. Royce told him that she did not want to hear anything more. Id. Baker then
allegedly repeated his threat twice and indicated that something might happen to Ms. Royce as
well. Id.
According to Baker, he gave Ms. Royce a packet of documents at around 6:35 a.m. Baker
Dep. I at 54. He denies saying anything to Ms. Royce about the complaints lodged against his
sister. Id. Baker also denies threatening to harm Mr. Reycraft. Id. at 55. He further denies
talking to Ms. Royce on the floor about anything that day. Id. at 55–56.
There were no witnesses who heard the alleged threat. See Kato Dep. at 8. However,
there are several witnesses who attest that Baker belligerently confronted Ms. Royce on the
morning in question. See Aff. of Karmen Cornell, ECF No. 31, Ex. 14; Aff. Peggy Silk, ECF No.
31, Ex. 15; Aff. Sid Fuller, ECF No. 31, Ex. 16.
Ms. Royce reported to Mr. Kato, the human resources manager for the plant, that Baker
had threatened to kill Mr. Reycraft. Kato Dep. at 6. On Wednesday March 5, 2014, Mr. Kato met
with Baker to discuss the allegation. Deb Royce and Deborah White were also present at the
meeting. Baker Dep I at 58. Baker denied making the threat and asked who his union
representation was. Id. at 59. Mr. Kato did not indicate whether Baker had union representation
and suspended Baker pending investigation of the allegation. Kato Dep. at 8. Baker was
suspended until May 6, 2014, during which time he completed approximately six counseling
sessions with Lear’s employee assistance program provider. Baker Dep. I at 65; Kato Dep. at 9–
10.

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Mr. Kato investigated the alleged threat by asking Ms. Royce to submit a written
statement. Kato Dep. at 8. He also asked Ms. Royce if there were any witnesses. Id. at 27.
Because there were not, Mr. Kato did not interview anyone besides Baker, Ms. Royce, and Ms.
White. Id. at 16, 27. Mr. Kato testifies that he made the decision to discharge Baker by March 7,
2014, but decided to wait until Baker completed the counseling before informing him. Id. at 27.
Although the counseling provider ultimately determined that Baker did not have any violent
propensities, Mr. Kato believed that Ms. Royce’s report was credible. Id. at 28–29.
On May 6, 2014, Baker met with Joel Kato and Adam Jelenic, another human resources
employee at Lear. Baker Dep. I at 68. Kevin Molner was also present and acting as Baker’s
union representation. Id. at 68. At the meeting, Mr. Kato informed Baker that he had violated
two plant rules and would be discharged. See Disciplinary Rep. ECF No. 32, Ex. 13.
Specifically, Mr. Kato found that Baker violated Rule A6, which prohibits threatening plant
employees, and Rule B2, which prohibits distracting others or causing confusion by unnecessary
shouting. Id.
C.
Under the CBA for the Roscommon plant, union members who believe the company has
violated the CBA can file a grievance. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, ECF No. 32, Ex. 4,
at 5–6. Grievances proceed in five steps. In the first step, the employee verbally presents their
grievance to their supervisor. Id. If the grievance is not resolved, the issue is reduced to writing
and submitted to the department manager. Id. Under step two, the department manager will
review the claim and answer the grievance. Id. If not settled at step two, the grievance can be
appealed to the Shop Committee. Id. Under step three, that committee will consider the claim at
its next meeting. Id. If still unresolved, a representative from UAW International may initiate

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step four by appealing to Lear’s director of labor relations. Id. If the grievance is still unresolved
after step four, UAW International can appeal to arbitration. Id.
The UAW rarely resolves a grievance through arbitration. In the past five years, the
UAW International representative assigned to Roscommon has appealed only one case to
arbitration, and that case involved a different plant. See Ebenhoeh Dep. at 57, ECF No. 32, Ex. 3.
The UAW has not appealed a grievance that originated in the Roscommon plant to arbitration
since at least 2004. Kato V. S. at 5, ECF No. 32, Ex. 14. During that time, UAW has filed
numerous grievances at the Roscommon plant where Lear did not settle the grievance or reinstate
the employee. Id. In each situation, UAW chose not to appeal to arbitration. Id. Because the
UAW funds the costs of arbitration, the UAW, not the aggrieved employee, makes the decision
about whether to appeal to arbitration. Id. at 42–43. If the UAW representative believes that the
grievance should be appealed to arbitration, the representative must then persuade a UAW
executive committee to approve funding for the arbitration. Id.
Instead of appealing to arbitration, UAW sometimes attempts to resolve grievances
through mediation. Ebenhoeh Dep. at 41–42. UAW prefers mediation to arbitration because it is
more economical. Camarata V. S. at 2–3, ECF No. 32, Ex. 15. Mediation is an optional step in
the grievance process, but decisions by mediators are generally binding. Id. Although the
Roscommon CBA did not contain a binding mediation provision at the time Baker filed his
grievance, CBAs for other plants did and the current CBA for Roscommon includes a mediation
provision. Id. See also CBA Excerpts, ECF No. 32, Ex. 15A. Since 2004, grievance mediation
has occurred only once at the Roscommon plant, and that one’s grievance was Baker’s. Kato
Dep. at 58.
D.

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Immediately after his discharge, Baker and his union representative, Mr. Molner, decided
to file a grievance pursuant to the procedures set forth in the CBA. Before filing the grievance,
Mr. Molner met with Baker, discussed the claims, heard Baker’s account, and then prepared the
grievance and showed it to Baker for approval. Baker Dep. II at 142. Mr. Molner represented
Baker through the first three grievance stages, which Lear denied. Id. at 76.
At stage four, Matt Ebenhoeh, a UAW International employee responsible for defending
union members in stage four and five grievances, took over representation of Baker. Id.
Immediately upon beginning his representation of Baker, Mr. Ebenhoeh requested all of Local
1819’s investigative notes on the grievance. Ebenhoeh Dep. at 27–28. After reviewing those
documents, Mr. Ebenhoeh arranged a meeting with Baker. Baker Dep. II at 78. At that meeting,
Mr. Ebenhoeh heard Baker’s account of the dispute and discussed the grievance documents with
Baker. Ebenhoeh Dep. at 32–33. Mr. Ebenhoeh was unable to find any corroborating witnesses
for either Baker’s or Royce’s account. Id. at 29.
Mr. Ebenheoh then advocated for Baker at the stage four hearing before the bargaining
committee. Id. at 36. After the hearing, the committee offered to reinstate Baker with back pay
and move him to second shift if Baker apologized. Id. at 41. Baker refused the offer. Id.
At this point, Mr. Ebenhoeh had only two options for continuing the grievance: mediation
or arbitration. Mr. Ebenhoeh asked Baker if he was willing to use mediation to try and resolve
the grievance. Id. Baker agreed. Id. The mediator chosen was Larry Sedrowski, who Mr.
Ebenhoeh believed to be union-friendly and trustworthy. Id. at 42. Prior to mediation, Lear asked
if Baker would be willing to accept the mediator’s decision as binding. Id. at 44. The parties
agree that Baker wanted to reserve his right to sue Ms. Royce, but they disagree over whether he
agreed to make the mediation binding as to his claims against the company. Id. at 66. According

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to Baker, he was not aware the company agreed to be bound by the mediator’s decision and he
did not agree to be bound himself. Baker Dep. II at 87.
According to Mr. Ebenhoeh, Baker was asked on three separate occasions before the
mediator rendered his decision if he would accept it as binding. Ebenhoeh Dep. at 44. In each
instance, Baker agreed. Id. Joel Kato, Peter Kamarata, Vern Manning, and Adam Jelenic were
present at the mediation on Lear’s behalf and likewise assert that Baker agreed to be bound by
the decision. Kato V. S. at 2; Camarata V. S. at 3; Manning V. S. at 2, ECF No. 32, Ex. 24;
Jelenic V. S. at 2, ECF No. 32, Ex. 25.
Baker brought two affidavits to the mediation which he wanted Mr. Ebenhoeh to use in
his defense. Ebenhoeh Dep. at 52. Baker had not provided these affidavits previously. Baker
Dep. II at 138–39. The first affidavit, written by Frank Horvath, asserted that Ms. Royce had
falsely accused him of making threats in the workplace. Aff. Frank Horvath, ECF No. 32, Ex. 22.
Mr. Horvath filed a grievance against Lear, arguing that Ms. Royce’s allegations were false. Id.
After an investigation, Lear rejected the accusations. Id. The second affidavit was written by
Patrick Eisenhardt, a cousin of Ms. Royce’s, and asserted that Ms. Royce was an untrustworthy
person. Aff. Patrick Eisenhardt, ECF No. 32, Ex. 23. Mr. Eisenhardt’s affidavit also included a
text message sent to him by Ms. Royce asking if Mr. Eisenhardt could write a statement
indicating he heard Baker make the threat. Id. Mr. Eisenhardt believed the text message
represented a thinly veiled attempt by Ms. Royce to get him to lie for her. Id. Besides those two
affidavits, Baker provided the union no other evidence supporting his claim. Baker Dep. II at
137.
Mr. Ebenhoeh chose not to present the two affidavits during the meeting. Ebenhoeh Dep.
at 52. Mr. Ebenhoeh decided that Mr. Horvath’s affidavit had nothing to do with Baker’s case

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and that to the extent it demonstrated a tendency by Ms. Royce to lie, it confused the issues. Id.
at 52–55. Mr. Ebenhoeh decided against using Mr. Eisenhardt’s affidavit because he interpreted
the message as Ms. Royce simply asking Mr. Eisenhardt if he had heard the threat. Id. at 52.
After both sides presented their cases, the mediator denied Baker’s grievance. Id. at 47.
After the mediation, Mr. Ebenhoeh sent Baker a letter indicating that the mediator’s resolution
was binding and that Baker would not be reinstated. Ebenheoh Letter, ECF No. 32, Ex. 27. On
March 15, 2015, Baker sent Mr. Ebenheoh a letter asking when arbitration would begin and
asserting that Mr. Ebenhoeh should have used the affidavits in his defense of Baker. Baker
Letter, ECF No. 32, Ex. 28. Baker initiated this suit on April 8, 2015. ECF No. 1.
II.
Defendants now move for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment should
be granted if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has
the initial burden of identifying where to look in the record for evidence “which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must set out specific facts
showing “a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)
(citation omitted). The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-movant and determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law.” Id. at 251-52.
III.

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Defendants Lear and UAW move for summary judgment on Baker’s hybrid § 301 claim
under the Labor Management Relations Act. To recover through a hybrid § 301 action, the
employee must demonstrate both that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement
and that the union breached the duty of fair representation. Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide,
Inc., 15 F.3d 573, 583 (6th Cir. 1994). Because the two claims are “‘inextricably
interdependent,’” the employee cannot recover against either party unless the employee makes
both showings. Id. at 583–84 (quoting DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164
(1983)).
A.
Before bringing suit under § 301, an employee must attempt to exhaust internal union
remedies. Clayton v. Int’l Union, 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981). Defendant UAW argues that Baker
failed to exhaust all grievance procedures before bringing suit and that the suit should
consequently be dismissed.
Here, Baker exhausted all remedies. He asserted his grievance through the first four
stages provided by the CBA. Although Baker agreed to attempt mediation, he did so at the
request of his union representative. The parties dispute whether the mediation was binding, but
there is no dispute that the decision whether to bring the grievance to arbitration was solely in the
hands of the UAW. Ebenhoeh Dep. at 42–43. See also Vaca, 386 U.S. at 194–95. Thus, Baker
was unable to control whether the grievance would proceed to arbitration, and the fact that the
grievance ended in mediation rather than arbitration does not mean Baker failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. On the contrary, Baker made clear that he wanted to arbitrate his
grievance and filed this suit only after Mr. Ebenhoeh made clear that would not happen. See

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Baker Letter, ECF No. 32, Ex. 28. Baker made a reasonable attempt to exhaust his internal union
remedies.
B.
The first question under § 301 is whether Baker’s discharge violated the CBA. Art. III of
the CBA gives Lear the power to discharge an employee for “proper cause.” Collective
Bargaining Agreement at 3. Although “proper cause” is not defined, the CBA also includes a list
of Lear’s “Rules and Penalties.” Id. at 56. That list specifies that employees who violate the rules
in List “A” will be subject to immediate discharge. Id. Rule A6 prohibits “[t]hreatening,
intimidating, coercing, or interfering with employees or supervision at any time.” Id. at 57.
Company rules can provide a basis for determining whether a “proper cause” requirement
is met. The facts here are similar to those in Highway & Local Motor Freight Empl. Local Union
No. 667 v. Wells Lamont, 69 F. App'x 300 (6th Cir. 2003). There, the parties were disputing the
meaning of a “just cause” requirement for termination. Id. at 305. The Sixth Circuit explained
that an undefined “just cause” requirement would “‘draw its essence’” from the terms of the
CBA.” Id. The Court defined “just cause” as cause “‘based on reasonable grounds” and for
which there is “a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith.’” Id. (quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICT. 863 (1990). Thus, under a “just cause” standard, “[the employer] has the authority to
terminate any employee, as long as it follows its own guidelines and the termination is not
arbitrary and capricious.” Id. Wells Lamont’s list of “Work Rules” was “a list of reasons for
termination for ‘just cause.’” Id. See also Blesedell v. Chillicothe Tel. Co., No. 2:13-CV-451,
2015 WL 1968870, at *13 (S.D. Ohio May 1, 2015), aff'd, 811 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 2016)
(reasoning that violation of the employer’s written “Rules of Conduct” constituted “just cause”
for discharge).

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The Sixth Circuit has “adopted an ‘honest belief’ rule with regard to an employer’s
proffered reason” for an adverse employment action. Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing,
Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806–07
(6th Cir.1998)). Although this rule originated in the employment discrimination context, courts
have also applied the rule in § 301 actions when determining whether a corporation violated the
CBA by discharging an employee. See Blesedell, 2015 WL 1968870 at *14; Deats v. IUE-CWA,
No. 3:11-CV-00576-TBR, 2013 WL 1729367, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 22, 2013). Under the
honest belief rule, an employer “has an honest belief in its reason for discharging an employee
where the employer reasonably relied ‘on the particularized facts that were before it at the time
the decision was made,’” and in that case the employer’s proffered reasoning for discharging will
be accepted. Majewski, 274 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Smith, 155 F.3d at 807). The employer need
not make a perfect investigation of the apparent reason for discharge. Rather, “the key inquiry is
whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an
adverse employment action.” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998).
In short, Lear’s discharge of Baker violated the CBA’s “proper cause” requirement if it
did not comply with Lear’s own guidelines or was arbitrary and capricious. And if Lear’s
investigation and decisional process was reasonably conducted and resulted in an honest belief
that Baker violated company rules, Lear’s decision to terminate Baker was based on sufficient
evidence to be non-arbitrary.
Here, Baker has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his
termination violated the CBA. Baker admits that making a death threat would be a legitimate
basis for discharge under the CBA. Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 30. However, Baker argues that
Lear terminated him without having sufficient evidence that Baker actually made the threat. Id.

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Baker first argues that Lear has no precedent at the Roscommon plant for discharging an
employee when the sole evidence comes from the employee’s accuser. Id. Several Lear
employees asserted that they had never seen someone discharged solely on the basis of “he
said/she said” evidence. See Molner Dep. at 28, ECF No. 37, Ex. 19; Fistler Dep. at 49, ECF No.
37, Ex. 21; Jaynes Dep at 20–21, ECF No. 37, Ex. 25. But the lack of precedent for discharging
an employee on the sole basis of the accuser’s testimony does not by itself establish a material
issue of fact as to whether Lear breached the CBA. The CBA contains no provision requiring
additional evidence besides the accuser’s testimony before discharge; only proper cause is
required. See Collective Bargaining Agreement at 3. The question is whether Lear’s departure
from past practice was arbitrary and capricious. Even construing the facts in a light most
favorable to Baker, there is no genuine issue of material fact on that question.
Upon receiving Royce’s complaint, Mr. Kato conducted an investigation. He asked Ms.
Royce for a written statement and met with Baker. Kato Dep. at 7–8. Mr. Kato asked whether
there were any witnesses but found that there were none. Id. at 27. So he did not speak with any
witnesses. Id. Mr. Kato’s decision, then, came down to whether he believed Baker’s or Ms.
Royce’s story. Mr. Kato testified that he found Ms. Royce to be more credible given his long
work history with her. Id. at 13–14. Mr. Kato also testified that there was no other reason that he
chose to believe Ms. Royce instead of Baker. Id. at 15. Once convinced that a threat had been
made, Mr. Kato made the decision to discharge Baker because of the threat’s seriousness. Id. at
31–32.
Mr. Kato’s investigation was reasonable under the circumstances. Mr. Kato talked with
everyone involved in the dispute. There were no witnesses to the specific details of Baker’s
conversation with Ms. Royce, so Mr. Kato’s failure to interview witnesses was reasonable. And

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even though Lear’s practice was to not discharge employees in “he said/she said” situations, Mr.
Kato’s decision to respond decisively to a threat to kill a coworker was reasonable. Considering
the unfortunate frequency of workplace violence, a company is certainly justified in discharging
an employee it believes to pose a credible threat of violence. Because the alleged threat here was
serious, Mr. Kato’s departure from past practice was not arbitrary or capricious. Baker has failed
to advance any evidence that Lear did not discharge other employees in the past who made
similar allegations of violence. Frank Horvath’s affidavit indicated that he had been accused by
Ms. Royce of making threatening comments yet kept his job, but there is no indication that Ms.
Royce accused Mr. Horvath of threatening to kill anyone. See Aff. Frank Horvath. In fact, Mr.
Kato indicated he had never before dealt with a “threat of grievous harm to somebody.” Kato
Dep. at 20. Thus, Mr. Kato’s departure from past practice was reasonable given the seriousness
of the threat.
Even if Mr. Kato’s decision to discharge Baker was based on an insufficient factual basis,
Baker has still failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Kato
honestly believed Baker had made the threat. As the Sixth Circuit stated in the employment
discrimination context, “the plaintiff must allege more than a dispute over the facts upon which
his discharge was based. He must put forth evidence which demonstrates that the employer did
not ‘honestly believe’ in the proffered non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment
action.” Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Smith, 155 F.3d
at 806–07). See also Deats v. IUE-CWA, No. 3:11-CV-00576-TBR, 2013 WL 1729367, at *4
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 22, 2013) (“[A] genuine factual dispute over the facts relied upon by GE simply
does not equate to a genuine factual dispute whether GE reasonably relied on those facts.”).

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Thus, the mere fact that Baker denies making the threat is insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact.
Although Baker argues that Lear’s true motive in discharging him was to keep Baker
from reporting the ongoing equipment sabotage to OSHA, Baker has failed to identify any
evidence that Mr. Kato made his decision to discharge on this basis instead of out of an honest
belief that Baker threatened Mr. Reycraft. Baker has failed to produce any evidence that Mr.
Kato knew Baker was threatening to report the sabotage to OSHA, much less any evidence that
Mr. Kato discharged Baker to prevent that report.
In short, even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Baker, Mr. Kato’s
investigation and decision to discharge Baker was reasonable and non-arbitrary. Mr. Kato
believed after his investigation that Baker had threatened to kill a coworker. Because this
violated company rules and because of the seriousness of the threat, Mr. Kato decided to
discharge Baker. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lear violated the CBA.
C.
Because Baker has failed to advance evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Lear violated the CBA, summary judgment will be granted in favor of
Defendants. Even if Baker was able to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the question
of whether Lear violated the CBA, his § 301 claim would still fail because there is no genuine
issue of material fact on the question of whether UAW breached its duty of fair representation.
i.
A union breaches its duty of fair representation only when its conduct towards its
members is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
Each of those three bases provides a separate route for a plaintiff to prove breach. Blesedell v.

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Chillicothe Tel. Co., 811 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 2016). Judicial review of a union’s performance
must be “highly deferential.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991).
Union representatives are not held to the same standard as lawyers. Garrison v. Cassens Transp.
Co., 334 F.3d 528, 539 (6th Cir. 2003). See also Poole v. Budd Co., 706 F.2d 181, 185 (6th
Cir.1983) (“Union representatives are not to be strictly held to the standards of attorneys.”)
(citation omitted).
Because the aggrieved employee has no individual right to have his grievance arbitrated
under the CBA, “a breach of the duty of fair representation is not established merely by proof
that the underlying grievance was meritorious.” Vaca, 386 U.S. at 194–95. In fact, a breach of
the duty of fair representation is not established even if the union chooses to settle the dispute
short of arbitration over the employee’s objections, providing the union’s decision was not
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Id. at 192. Furthermore, even if the union breached its
duty of representation, the plaintiff must still show that the breach substantially impacted the
outcome of the proceeding. Black, 15 F.3d at 585.
Baker admits that UAW’s representation was not discriminatory. Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Summ.
J. at 18. Accordingly, the only question is whether Baker has put forth evidence creating a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether UAW’s representation was arbitrary or in bad faith.
a.
UAW’s actions in representing Baker were not arbitrary. “[A] union’s actions are
arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union’s actions, the
union’s behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational.” Air Line
Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (citation omitted). Mere negligence on the
union’s part does not constitute arbitrariness. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S.

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362, 376 (1990). Likewise, “ordinary mistakes, errors, or flaws in judgment also will not
suffice.” Garrison v. Cassens Transp. Co., 334 F.3d 528, 538 (6th Cir. 2003). In short, a union’s
actions are arbitrary only if they were “wholly irrational.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int'l v. O'Neill,
499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991). A “tactical decision,” even if it proves to be a “devastating”
miscalculation of strategy, is not a breach of the duty of fair representation. Garrison, 334 F.3d
at 541.
First, Baker argues that the union violated his Weingarten rights by failing to provide
representation at the March 3, 2014 meeting where he was suspended pending investigation into
the alleged threat. Union employees have a right to refuse to submit to an interview which they
reasonably fear may result in discipline without union representation. N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256 (1975). To the extent Baker is asserting a stand-alone Weingarten claim,
this Court may not consider it because the NRLB has exclusive jurisdiction over activities
subject to § 7 of the NLRA. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245
(1959). Baker asserted this Weingarten claim before the NRLB, which rejected the argument.
See Dec. 30, 2014 Letter from NRLB, ECF No. 32, Ex. 20. This Court cannot review that
decision. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(f) (providing that final NRLB decisions can be appealed only to
federal courts of appeal). To the extent Baker argues that the potential Weingarten violation
constituted arbitrary behavior by the union, his argument still fails because he has not put forth
evidence demonstrating that the lack of representation had any impact on the meeting.
Baker also argues that the union’s conduct was arbitrary because his union
representatives, Mr. Molner and Mr. Ebenhoeh, failed to investigate his grievance. Specifically,
Baker points to their failure to prepare written documents detailing their investigatory findings,
as required by UAW procedure. But Mr. Molner and Mr. Ebenhoeh’s failure to prepare written

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documentation of their findings is, at worst, ordinary negligence. The grievance centered on a
single conversation with no witnesses; failing to prepare full written documentation of the
investigation for this dispute falls far short of being “wholly irrational.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n,
499 U.S. at 78.
Likewise, Baker argues that Mr. Ebenhoeh’s failure to interview any witnesses, also in
violation of UAW policy, was arbitrary. But there were no witnesses of the threat to interview.
Mr. Ebenhoeh’s failure to interview nonexistent witnesses was not arbitrary.
Baker also argues that Mr. Ebenhoeh acted arbitrarily by convincing him to consent to
mediation. Baker has failed to present any evidence that Mr. Ebenhoeh’s belief that mediation
would be advantageous for Baker was irrational. Mr. Ebenhoeh had used mediation before and
believed that the “union-friendly” mediator would be sympathetic to Baker’s case. Id. at 42.
Finally, Baker argues that Mr. Ebenhoeh breached his duty of fair representation by
failing to offer the Horvath and Eisenhardt affidavits at the mediation hearing. But Mr.
Ebenheoh’s testimony clearly indicates that he read the affidavits, considered their value, and
determined that they would not strengthen Baker’s case. See Ebenhoeh Dep. at 52–53. Even if
this was a “devastating miscalculation of strategy,” which Baker has not shown, this was still
simply a tactical decision on Mr. Ebenhoeh’s part and cannot constitute a breach of the duty of
fair representation. See Garrison, 334 F.3d at 541.
Thus, Baker has failed to put forth evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the union’s conduct was arbitrary.
b.
Baker also argues that the union acted in bad faith. A union acts in bad faith when “‘it
acts with an improper intent, purpose, or motive ... encompass[ing] fraud, dishonesty, and other

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intentionally misleading conduct.’” Merritt v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
613 F.3d 609, 619 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Spellacy v. Airline Pilots Ass’n–Int’l, 156 F.3d 120,
126 (2d Cir.1998)).
Baker first argues that union represented him in bad faith during the grievance process
because there was substantial evidence that Ms. Royce lied about the alleged threat and because
Ms. Royce had “personal animus towards Baker.” Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 22–26. Both
these arguments improperly focus on the facts of the underlying grievance, not whether UAW’s
representation was in bad faith. As the Supreme Court held in Vaca v. Stipes, “breach of the duty
of fair representation is not established merely by proof that the underlying grievance was
meritorious.” 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967).
Baker next argues that Mr. Ebenhoeh’s suggestion that mediation be attempted was made
in bad faith because it was a deviation from the CBA. But Baker has failed to assert that Mr.
Ebenhoeh’s recommendation was made with an improper purpose or animus. Mr. Ebenhoeh
asserted that he recommended mediation because it was cheaper than arbitration and because he
believed it would be helpful to Baker, especially because the mediator chosen was “unionfriendly.” Ebenhoeh’s Dep. at 42. These are proper reasons for recommending mediation, and
Baker has failed to put forward any evidence showing that Mr. Ebenhoeh had other, bad faith,
reasons for seeking mediation.
Likewise, Baker has failed to put forward any evidence that Mr. Ebenhoeh’s
investigation was made in bad faith or that Mr. Ebenhoeh’s refusal to present the Horvath and
Eisenhardt affidavits at the mediation was done in bad faith. Baker argues that the investigation
was perfunctory, but the entire dispute centered on a single conversation with no witnesses.
Given the straightforward allegations, Mr. Ebenhoeh’s quick investigation does not, by itself,

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create a question of whether he acted in bad faith. And, as already discussed, Mr. Ebenheoh’s
decision to not submit the affidavits was a reasoned, tactical decision. Tactical decisions cannot
constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation. Garrison, 334 F.3d at 541.
Baker further argues that Ms. Royce was present at the mediation hearing and presented
ex parte evidence to the mediator, but that Lear and Mr. Ebenhoeh concealed Ms. Royce’s
presence from him. Baker asserts that Ms. Royce admitted to being present at the mediation
hearing, Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 27, but the Court is unable to find that admission in the
record provided. Regardless, Baker has put forward no evidence that Mr. Ebenheoh knew of Ms.
Royce’s presence. Unless Mr. Ebenheoh consented to Ms. Royce’s presence and concealed that
fact from Baker, Mr. Ebenheoh did not act with bad faith. Further, Baker has failed to present
any evidence that Ms. Royce’s presence or testimony at the mediation had any impact on the
result.
Finally, Baker argues that he did not agree that the mediation would be binding. Although
this fact is disputed, the dispute is not material. UAW was under no obligation to engage in
mediation or arbitration. Ebenheoh Dep. at 42–43. Accordingly, even if the mediation was, as
Baker argues, nonbinding, UAW was still within its rights to decline to arbitrate the grievance.
And Baker has failed to put forward any evidence that UAW’s decision not to arbitrate was made
in bad faith. On the contrary, UAW was not required to mediate the case, but chose to do so.
Baker thus had an extra opportunity to prevail in his grievance. Likewise, because UAW only
rarely arbitrates grievance disputes, their decision to forego arbitration here is not, by itself,
evidence of bad faith. See Ebenhoeh Dep. at 57. Baker has not produced any additional evidence
that UAW’s decision to decline to arbitrate his grievance was motivated by bad faith.

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Baker has therefore failed to put forth evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on
the question of whether UAW represented Baker in bad faith during his grievance.
ii.
Even if the employee shows that the union breached its duty of fair representation, the
employee must also show that the union’s breach so seriously flawed the grievance procedure as
to make it “more than likely” that the outcome was affected. Dushaw v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 66
F.3d 129, 132 (6th Cir. 1995). See also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570
(1976). Baker has failed to identify facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact on this
question as well.
Baker argues primarily that his UAW representatives should have investigated the claims
made in the Horvath and Eisenhardt affidavits early in their representation of him. He asserts that
the information in the affidavits could have easily been discovered and, if known by the Lear
decision makers, would have “likely affected the outcome at every stage.” Pl.’s Resp. Mot.
Summ. J. at 29.
But Mr. Kato, the person in charge of deciding whether to discharge Baker, had also
handled the allegations that Ms. Royce made against Mr. Horvath. Kato Dep. at 44–48, ECF No.
38, Ex. A. Even if there is no evidence that Mr. Kato explicitly considered those previous
allegations during Baker’s grievance, Mr. Horvath’s affidavit did not contain information that
Mr. Kato was unaware of. As such, it is unlikely that the affidavit would have changed Mr.
Kato’s perspective on Baker’s grievance.
The Eisenhardt affidavit asserted that Ms. Royce asked Mr. Eisenhardt to fabricate
corroborating evidence of Baker’s alleged threat. This information would have been new to Mr.
Kato. However, Ms. Royce did not send the message to Mr. Eisenhardt until July 15, 2014. Aff.

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Patrick Eisenhardt. Because the first four stages of the grievance occurred before the message
was sent, see Camarata V. S. at 2, that message could not have affected the outcome of those
proceedings.
Although Mr. Ebenhoeh refused to submit the two affidavits at the mediation hearing,
there is no reason to think the affidavits would have “more than likely” changed the result. The
Horvath affidavit provides some evidence that Ms. Royce has lied before, but it offers no direct
proof that Ms. Royce lied about Baker’s alleged threat. And the message Mr. Eisenhardt received
from Ms. Royce could be interpreted, as Mr. Ebenheoh testified he interpreted it, as simply
asking if Mr. Eisenhardt had heard the threat. Ebenheoh Dep. at 52. Submission of the affidavits
might have improved Baker’s chances of winning the mediation, but neither affidavit was
sufficiently probative of Baker’s arguments as to make it “more than likely” that the ultimate
result at mediation would have changed.
Baker further argues that the result of his grievance was likely affected by UAW’s failure
to investigate whether Baker’s threat to report the equipment sabotage to OSHA was the
motivation behind his discharge. But Baker has not presented any evidence that Mr. Kato’s
decision to discharge him stemmed from his threat to make a report to OSHA. Baker’s
conclusory claim that a proper investigation would have produced evidence likely to affect the
outcome of the grievance is entirely without evidentiary support.
Thus, Baker has failed to produce any evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether UAW’s actions or omissions “more than likely” affected the outcome of his
grievance.
IV.

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Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, ECF
No. 31 and 32, are GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that Count 1 of Plaintiff Baker’s complaint, ECF No. 1, is
DISMISSED with prejudice.

Dated: August 26, 2016

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on August 26, 2016.
s/Michael A. Sian
MICHAEL A. SIAN, Case Manager

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